Only SameSite=Lax protected the acknowledge and zone save/delete endpoints,
even though a Csrf helper and mintable token already existed. Add
GET /api/csrf (CsrfController::token) to mint/return a per-session token,
check it (auth -> rbac -> csrf -> mutate) in EventDetailController::acknowledge
and ZoneConfigController::save/delete, and wire app.js/zone-draw.js to fetch
the token on load and send it as X-Csrf-Token on every POST.
Every login attempt, including unknown users (via DUMMY_HASH), forces a full
Argon2id verify with no rate limit, letting a flood take down the login
endpoint / shared host via hashing-cost amplification. Add a pre-auth
per-IP limiter (RateLimiterRepository, default 20/min) as the first check
in AuthController::login, before any user lookup or password hashing.
An unauthenticated attacker could guess a real device_id and 429-lock that
camera by hammering /api/events before HMAC verification ran, dropping its
accident events. Add a cheap pre-auth per-IP limiter (Config::ingestIpRateLimitPerMin,
default 300/min) that fires before any device-secret lookup, and move the
existing per-device limiter to run only after HMAC + timestamp + nonce checks
succeed, so only authenticated requests consume a device's own quota.
