The PHP app runs on Cafe24 shared web hosting -- calling it 'cloud'
was misleading. Renames the directory, the edge client module, and
every doc/script/identifier that used the term.
- cloud/ -> server/ (incl. server/deploy/build_cafe24_package.sh paths)
- edge/cloudclient.py -> edge/serverclient.py, CloudClient -> ServerClient
- cloud/docs/cloud-deploy.md -> server/docs/server-deploy.md
- CLOUD_* env/config keys -> SERVER_*
- tests renamed to match
Tests: PHP 109 pass (4 skipped), pytest 167 pass. dist/ regenerated.
Two independent adversarial reviews (codex CLI + a 6-dimension verification
workflow) of the delivery-hardening branch surfaced ~40 findings; this closes
the confirmed correctness/security/deploy blockers plus a codex re-review pass.
edge:
- geometry: track_displacement per-second threshold recalibrated (0.02->0.25,
env-tunable via MOTION_THR, validated finite/positive); confidence-filter
keypoints with a bbox-center fallback so hallucinated points don't fake motion
- fall: low-confidence frames no longer cancel an active FALLING/FALLEN incident
(freeze + reset recovery timer so recovery needs a fresh confident streak);
baseline height only seeded from trusted frames
- queue: PostClient.send() returns a tri-state SendResult; only definite 4xx
count toward the poison drop cap, so a network outage (incl. 408/425/429/5xx)
never deletes queued safety events; legacy rows persist their minted uuid
- config: reject placeholder / http / short DEVICE_SECRET at startup
- zones: warn+skip legacy pixel-space polygons that would silently match nothing
cloud:
- zone endpoints wired into P3-2b site-scope (cross-site read/write/delete
closed) + role gate on list; catch narrowed so DB faults surface as 500
- snapshot purge keeps the DB row when unlink() fails (no untrackable PIPA orphan)
- ingest dedup path re-stores missing snapshots (+ short-write guard); UNIQUE
(event_id, content_hash) makes recovery idempotent under retry/race
- event list cursor carries full-precision occurred_at (no float rounding at the
page boundary); string keyset end-to-end
- SiteScope '' fails closed (only NULL is global); dashboard fetches full page cap
- runnable migration (site/event_uuid + backfill ordering + indexes); rate-limit
reap fails open
deploy:
- offline bundle hashes EVERY file (fatal on missing/failed/injected; models in
SBOM; arch in tarball name; REQUIRE_SIGNATURE option)
- installer verifies before any mutation, Hailo arch preflight before install,
atomic src swap, backend reconcile preserves a working operator choice
- systemd DeviceAllow=char-dma_heap (the /dev/dma_heap/ dir form was inert)
Verified: edge pytest 165 passed / 2 skipped; cloud phpunit 109 passed / 4
skipped; deploy scripts bash -n clean. Reviewed by codex twice (findings +
fixes) with the second-pass findings folded in.
P4-8: AuthController::login now verifies the CSRF token the login form
already emits (Csrf::check over session vs posted field), returning 403
before the user lookup. Closes a login-CSRF / session-fixation hole where
a forged cross-site POST could silently log a victim into an attacker's
account. Tests seed the session+body token; adds
testLoginRejectsMissingOrWrongCsrf.
P4-6: ZoneConfigController::save wraps the repository write in
try/catch(\RuntimeException) so an ownership/device mismatch is a 400
(invalid_zone) client error, not an uncaught 500. Adds
testSaveOwnershipMismatchIs400NotError with a throwing repo double.
phpunit: 88 passing (4 skipped: PDO-backed).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019Xmn8KZWqiQUguEMRtn6rW
Only SameSite=Lax protected the acknowledge and zone save/delete endpoints,
even though a Csrf helper and mintable token already existed. Add
GET /api/csrf (CsrfController::token) to mint/return a per-session token,
check it (auth -> rbac -> csrf -> mutate) in EventDetailController::acknowledge
and ZoneConfigController::save/delete, and wire app.js/zone-draw.js to fetch
the token on load and send it as X-Csrf-Token on every POST.
