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cw2007:main
cw2007:delivery-hardening
cw2007:feat/p1f-online-setup
cw2007:feat/p1e-multicam
cw2007:feat/p1d-hailo-csi
cw2007:feat/p1c-deploy-hailo
cw2007:feat/p1-pilot-integration
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compare: cw2007:feat/p1e-multicam
Branches Tags
cw2007:delivery-hardening
cw2007:main
cw2007:feat/p1f-online-setup
cw2007:feat/p1e-multicam
cw2007:feat/p1d-hailo-csi
cw2007:feat/p1c-deploy-hailo
cw2007:feat/p1-pilot-integration

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10
.gitattributes vendored
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@ -4,13 +4,3 @@
*.sh text eol=lf
*.service text eol=lf
move-detect-edge.env.example text eol=lf
# The cafe24 package is assembled on Windows but unpacked onto Linux hosting. A CRLF
# .htaccess makes Apache read directives with a trailing \r; PHP/JS tolerate CRLF but there
# is no reason to ship it. Normalize everything the package carries.
*.php text eol=lf
*.js text eol=lf
*.css text eol=lf
*.sql text eol=lf
*.md text eol=lf
htaccess.* text eol=lf

10
.gitignore vendored
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@ -12,12 +12,7 @@ dist/
# Edge runtime artifacts
*.db
*.hef
# Root-anchored on purpose. A bare `snapshots/` matches at EVERY depth, which swallowed
# cloud/storage/snapshots/ — and since git cannot re-include a file whose parent directory
# is excluded, it silently killed cloud/.gitignore's `!/storage/snapshots/.gitkeep`. The
# edge never writes a snapshots directory anyway: they stay in memory and are base64'd into
# the queue db or POSTed (edge/queue.py, edge/alert.py).
/snapshots/
snapshots/
queue.db
# Secrets / local config
@ -30,6 +25,3 @@ Thumbs.db
# Tool caches
.impeccable/
# Pi provisioning (real device secret) — never commit
deploy/device.env

1
server/.gitignore → cloud/.gitignore vendored
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@ -2,4 +2,3 @@
/config.php
/storage/snapshots/*
!/storage/snapshots/.gitkeep
/.phpunit.result.cache

2
server/composer.json → cloud/composer.json
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
{
"name": "move-detect/server",
"name": "move-detect/cloud",
"type": "project",
"require": { "php": ">=8.2" },
"require-dev": { "phpunit/phpunit": "^11" },

0
server/composer.lock → cloud/composer.lock generated
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9
cloud/config.example.php Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
<?php
return [
'db_dsn' => 'mysql:host=localhost;dbname=move_detect;charset=utf8mb4',
'db_user' => 'CHANGEME',
'db_pass' => 'CHANGEME',
'snapshot_dir' => __DIR__ . '/storage/snapshots',
'timestamp_window' => 300,
'rate_limit_per_min' => 60,
];

102
server/docs/server-deploy.md → cloud/docs/cloud-deploy.md
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@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
# Cafe24 Server Deploy Guide (P1-B)
# Cafe24 Cloud Deploy Guide (P1-B)
This document covers deploying the `server/` PHP application (ingest API + dashboard) to a
This document covers deploying the `cloud/` PHP application (ingest API + dashboard) to a
Cafe24 shared/managed PHP hosting plan. The application has **zero runtime Composer
dependencies** (PHPUnit is dev-only) and speaks to MySQL exclusively through `PDO` with
prepared statements — there is nothing to `composer install` on the production host.
## 1. Directory layout on the server
Only `server/public/` may be reachable from the web. Everything else must sit **outside**
Only `cloud/public/` may be reachable from the web. Everything else must sit **outside**
the web root (one level up, or wherever your Cafe24 plan's "web root" / "html" folder is),
or be blocked by hosting-level access rules if your plan cannot place files outside the
web root at all.
@ -15,73 +15,38 @@ web root at all.
```
/home/<account>/ <- NOT web-reachable
├── src/ <- App\ classes (App\Db, App\Repository\Pdo, ...)
├── vendor/ <- Composer's generated autoloader ONLY (see below)
├── storage/
│ └── snapshots/ <- re-encoded JPEGs; must be writable by the PHP process
├── config.php <- copied from config.example.php, secrets filled in (see §3)
├── schema.sql <- only needed transiently for the phpMyAdmin import (§4);
│ delete it from the server afterwards
└── public/ <- web root. On Cafe24 it is named `www`; when that `www`
├── index.php already serves another site the app is mounted in a
├── .htaccess subdirectory (`www/move_detect/`) and the entries above
└── assets/ sit at the FTP root — see below.
└── public/ <- web root ("html" folder in Cafe24's control panel)
├── index.php
├── .htaccess
└── assets/
```
`server/public/index.php` finds `config.php`, `src/`, and `vendor/` by **walking up** from
itself until it sees both `config.php` and `vendor/autoload.php` (max 4 levels). It does not
hardcode `/..`, so the same tree works whether the app owns the web root or is mounted in a
subdirectory of one — in the latter case the app root is two levels up, not one, because
nothing secret may sit under a docroot the other site also serves.
`cloud/public/index.php` resolves its dependencies as `__DIR__ . '/../config.php'`,
`__DIR__ . '/../src/View/...'`, etc. — so `src/`, `config.php`, and `storage/` must be
exactly one directory above `public/`, matching the layout above.
The URL prefix comes from `SCRIPT_NAME` (`App\Http\Request::baseFrom()`), which the web
server sets — never from client input. `Request::pathFor()` strips it before routing, and
views/JS prefix every link with it (`view_url()` / `window.APP_BASE`). Without that, routes
declared as `/login` would 404 under `https://host/move_detect/login` and every asset would
resolve against the co-hosted site.
**Do not upload `vendor/`.** It contains only `phpunit` and its dev dependencies (see
`cloud/composer.json` — `require-dev` only, `require` has no packages beyond the `php`
version constraint). Shipping it would put a large, unused, occasionally-vulnerable
dependency tree on a production box for no benefit; leave it off the transfer entirely.
`server/deploy/build_cafe24_package.sh` emits `www/move_detect/` by default; set `APP_DIR=`
(empty) to mount the app directly in `www/`.
**`vendor/` must ship — but only the autoloader.** `public/index.php:3` is an unconditional
`require __DIR__ . '/../vendor/autoload.php'`, so a transfer without `vendor/` fatals on
every request, including §10's own smoke check. There are no runtime Composer *packages*
(`composer.lock`'s `packages` is empty), but the app does need Composer's generated
autoloader to map `App\` → `src/`. Generate the no-dev one on the build machine:
```bash
cd server && composer dump-autoload --no-dev --classmap-authoritative --no-interaction
```
That emits ~8 files (~30 KB): `vendor/autoload.php` plus `vendor/composer/*.php`. Copy
exactly those. Do **not** upload the working tree's `vendor/` as-is — it carries PHPUnit
and a dev `autoload_files.php` that eagerly `require`s
`tests/Support/InMemoryRepositories.php` on every request, a file this deployment
deliberately excludes.
`--classmap-authoritative` is not optional: `src/Auth/Session.php` declares three symbols
(`SessionStore`, `ArraySessionStore`, `PhpSessionStore`) under a filename matching none of
them — which is why `composer.json` carries an explicit `classmap` entry for it. Plain
PSR-4 would look for `src/Auth/PhpSessionStore.php`, miss, and fatal at `index.php:19`.
`server/deploy/build_cafe24_package.sh` does all of this, verifies it, and lays out the
tree below automatically — prefer it over assembling the transfer by hand.
If your Cafe24 plan cannot place folders outside the web root, **stop — this layout is
unsupported, and the obvious workaround does not work.** `public/index.php` resolves
`../vendor/autoload.php` (line 3), `../config.php` (line 17), and `../src/View/` (line 43)
relative to itself, so moving those *into* `public/` puts them exactly where those three
`require`s do not look: every request fatals. Making it work needs source changes to
`index.php`'s path resolution plus deny rules for `src/`, `vendor/`, `storage/` **and**
`config.php` — not deny rules alone. Raise it before deploying rather than improvising:
`config.php` holds the DB password, and a half-applied version of this is how it ends up
web-readable.
If your Cafe24 plan cannot place folders outside the web root, upload `src/`, `storage/`,
and `config.php` into `public/` but add explicit deny rules for them in
`public/.htaccess` (e.g. `RewriteRule ^(src|storage)/ - [F]` and
`RewriteRule ^config\.php$ - [F]`, placed **before** the existing rewrite-to-index rule) —
placing them outside the web root is strongly preferred and should be the default choice.
## 2. Host prerequisites — verify before importing data
Check these on the actual Cafe24 PHP build (a `phpinfo()` page or `php -m` / `php -v` over
SSH if available) — do not assume, since PHP builds vary by hosting plan:
- [ ] **PHP version** matches `server/composer.json`'s `"php": ">=8.2"` (the app is written
- [ ] **PHP version** matches `cloud/composer.json`'s `"php": ">=8.2"` (the app is written
and tested against PHP 8.5; anything ≥ 8.2 should run it, but confirm the exact
version Cafe24 provisions for your plan).
- [ ] **`pdo_mysql`** extension is enabled (`PDO::getAvailableDrivers()` must include
@ -112,7 +77,7 @@ SSH if available) — do not assume, since PHP builds vary by hosting plan:
## 3. `config.php`
Copy the example and fill in real values — **never commit `config.php`** (already covered
by `server/.gitignore`):
by `cloud/.gitignore`):
```bash
cp config.example.php config.php
@ -139,7 +104,7 @@ or version control.
## 4. Import the schema
`server/schema.sql` contains the full MySQL 8.0+ DDL (`users`, `devices`, `cameras`, `zones`,
`cloud/schema.sql` contains the full MySQL 8.0+ DDL (`users`, `devices`, `cameras`, `zones`,
`events`, `event_snapshots`, `thresholds`, `nonces`, `rate_limits`, `audit_log`).
1. Open **phpMyAdmin** from the Cafe24 control panel, select the database created for this
@ -151,19 +116,12 @@ or version control.
on the host afterwards, and leaving DDL lying around outside the web root is unnecessary
attack surface for no benefit.
**Minimum version — MySQL 8.0.13+ (or MariaDB 10.2+).** Several tables use an expression
default `... DEFAULT (UNIX_TIMESTAMP())` (e.g. `move_nonces`, `move_audit_log`), which is a
hard syntax requirement: MySQL added function/expression defaults in **8.0.13**, and on an
older server the very first such `CREATE TABLE` fails the import with `ERROR 1064` — a day-1
blocker, not a silent degradation. **Check the version in the Cafe24 hosting control panel
(or `SELECT VERSION();`) before importing.** If the account only offers MySQL 5.7, either
request an 8.0 database or replace each `DEFAULT (UNIX_TIMESTAMP())` with an application-supplied
timestamp (the code already passes one on every insert).
Separately, if your MySQL version predates 8.0.16, the `CHECK (...)` constraints in the DDL
(on `role`, `event_type`, `severity`, `level`) are parsed but silently not enforced — harmless,
since the application already whitelists these values before every insert
If your Cafe24 MySQL version predates 8.0.16, the `CHECK (...)` constraints in the DDL
(on `role`, `event_type`, `severity`, `level`) will be parsed but silently not enforced —
harmless, since the application already whitelists these values before every insert
(`App\Ingest\EventValidator`, `App\Auth\Rbac`, `App\Dashboard\ZoneConfigController::LEVELS`).
Everything else in the schema (tables, keys, indexes, `JSON` columns) requires only
MySQL 5.7+.
## 5. Storage directory
@ -195,14 +153,14 @@ php -r "echo bin2hex(random_bytes(32)), \"\n\";"
```
```sql
INSERT INTO move_devices (device_id, name, secret, config_version)
INSERT INTO devices (device_id, name, secret, config_version)
VALUES ('pi-01', 'Line 3 — Fall Cam', '<paste the generated secret here>', 1);
```
Deliver the secret to the device provisioning process out-of-band (not email/chat) and
configure it as the device's `HMAC` signing key for `X-Signature` on
`/api/events`, `/api/heartbeat`, and `/api/config`. Rotate a compromised secret by
`UPDATE move_devices SET secret = ? WHERE device_id = ?` with a freshly generated value — the
`UPDATE devices SET secret = ? WHERE device_id = ?` with a freshly generated value — the
old value stops working immediately since `secretFor()` always reads the current row.
## 7. First admin account
@ -222,7 +180,7 @@ php -r "echo password_hash('CHANGE-ME-to-a-real-passphrase', PASSWORD_ARGON2ID),
`PASSWORD_ARGON2ID`.)
```sql
INSERT INTO move_users (username, password_hash, role, site_scope, failed_attempts, locked_until)
INSERT INTO users (username, password_hash, role, site_scope, failed_attempts, locked_until)
VALUES ('admin', '<paste the argon2id hash here>', 'admin', NULL, 0, 0);
```

0
server/phpunit.xml → cloud/phpunit.xml
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0
server/public/.htaccess → cloud/public/.htaccess
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97
cloud/public/assets/app.css Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
/* Base layout ------------------------------------------------------- */
:root {
color-scheme: light;
--border: #d1d5db;
--text: #1f2937;
}
* { box-sizing: border-box; }
body {
margin: 0;
font-family: system-ui, -apple-system, "Segoe UI", sans-serif;
color: var(--text);
background: #f9fafb;
}
.app-header {
display: flex;
justify-content: space-between;
align-items: center;
padding: 0.75rem 1rem;
background: #111827;
color: #fff;
}
.app-nav a { color: #fff; margin-right: 1rem; text-decoration: none; }
.app-nav a:hover, .app-nav a:focus { text-decoration: underline; }
.app-session { display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 0.5rem; }
.app-session a { color: #fff; }
.app-main { padding: 1rem; max-width: 960px; margin: 0 auto; }
.login-form, .zone-controls { display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 0.5rem; max-width: 320px; }
.zone-controls { flex-direction: row; align-items: end; flex-wrap: wrap; max-width: none; }
.zone-controls label { display: flex; flex-direction: column; font-size: 0.85rem; }
.form-error { color: #991b1b; }
#zone-canvas {
border: 1px solid var(--border);
background: #111827 center / contain no-repeat;
cursor: crosshair;
max-width: 100%;
}
button {
cursor: pointer;
padding: 0.4rem 0.8rem;
border: 1px solid var(--border);
border-radius: 4px;
background: #fff;
}
button:hover { background: #f3f4f6; }
/* Event list ---------------------------------------------------------- */
.event-row {
display: flex;
align-items: center;
gap: 0.75rem;
padding: 0.6rem 0.75rem;
border: 1px solid var(--border);
border-radius: 6px;
margin-bottom: 0.5rem;
background: #fff;
}
.event-row.is-unacknowledged { border-left: 4px solid #4b5563; }
.event-meta { flex: 1; }
.event-meta .event-type { font-weight: 600; }
.event-meta .event-time { color: #4b5563; font-size: 0.85rem; }
/* Severity badges (NF9): color-blind-safe — icon + text label + color.
Never rely on color alone. Pastel background + dark text pairs are
chosen for WCAG-AA contrast (>= 4.5:1 for normal-size text). */
.severity-badge {
display: inline-flex;
align-items: center;
gap: 0.35rem;
padding: 0.15rem 0.5rem;
border-radius: 999px;
font-weight: 700;
font-size: 0.85rem;
white-space: nowrap;
}
.severity-badge .icon { font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1; }
.sev-critical { background: #fee2e2; color: #991b1b; border: 1px solid #991b1b; }
.sev-high { background: #ffedd5; color: #9a3412; border: 1px solid #9a3412; }
.sev-warning { background: #fef9c3; color: #854d0e; border: 1px solid #854d0e; }
.sev-info { background: #e5e7eb; color: #374151; border: 1px solid #374151; }
.ack-btn { margin-left: auto; }
.ack-btn:disabled { opacity: 0.6; cursor: default; }
/* Dashboard row -> incident detail link (keyboard-focusable affordance). */
.event-detail-link { color: inherit; text-decoration: none; }
.event-detail-link:hover,
.event-detail-link:focus-visible { text-decoration: underline; }
/* Incident detail view (event_detail.php + detail.js). */
.detail-row { margin: 0.25rem 0; }
.detail-row .detail-label { color: #4b5563; font-weight: 600; }
#event-detail-snapshots { display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap; gap: 0.75rem; margin-top: 1rem; }
.detail-snapshot { max-width: 100%; height: auto; border: 1px solid #d1d5db; border-radius: 4px; }

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cloud/public/assets/app.js Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
/**
* Events dashboard: polls GET /api/events every 5s, renders the list with
* severity text+icon+color (never color alone, per NF9), pins unacknowledged
* events to the top, and wires the acknowledge button to POST /events/{id}/ack.
*
* XSS-safe: all dynamic values are set via textContent, never innerHTML.
*/
(function () {
'use strict';
var POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 5000;
var SEVERITY_LABELS = {
critical: { icon: '⛔', text: '위급', cls: 'sev-critical' }, // ⛔
high: { icon: '⚠', text: '높음', cls: 'sev-high' }, // ⚠
warning: { icon: '△', text: '경고', cls: 'sev-warning' }, // △
info: { icon: 'ℹ', text: '정보', cls: 'sev-info' } // ℹ
};
var root = document.getElementById('events-root');
if (!root) return;
var csrfToken = null;
function loadCsrfToken() {
return fetch('/api/csrf', { headers: { Accept: 'application/json' } })
.then(function (res) { return res.ok ? res.json() : null; })
.then(function (data) { if (data && data.token) csrfToken = data.token; })
.catch(function () { /* ack will fail with 403 and re-enable the button */ });
}
function severityInfo(sev) {
return SEVERITY_LABELS[sev] || { icon: 'ℹ', text: sev || '알수없음', cls: 'sev-info' };
}
function formatTime(occurredAt) {
if (!occurredAt && occurredAt !== 0) return '';
var d = new Date(Number(occurredAt) * 1000);
if (isNaN(d.getTime())) return '';
return d.toLocaleString('ko-KR');
}
function buildBadge(sev) {
var info = severityInfo(sev);
var badge = document.createElement('span');
badge.className = 'severity-badge ' + info.cls;
var icon = document.createElement('span');
icon.className = 'icon';
icon.setAttribute('aria-hidden', 'true');
icon.textContent = info.icon;
var label = document.createElement('span');
label.className = 'label';
label.textContent = info.text;
badge.appendChild(icon);
badge.appendChild(label);
return badge;
}
// --- desk audio alert: repeating beep while any unacknowledged critical exists ---
// No binary asset (air-gapped friendly): a WebAudio oscillator tone. The browser
// blocks audio until a user gesture, so the context is created on first click.
var audioCtx = null;
var alarmTimer = null;
var beepedCritical = {}; // event_id -> true; each new critical beeps once immediately
function unlockAudio() {
if (!audioCtx) {
var AC = window.AudioContext || window.webkitAudioContext;
if (AC) audioCtx = new AC();
}
document.removeEventListener('click', unlockAudio);
}
function beep() {
if (!audioCtx) return;
try {
var osc = audioCtx.createOscillator();
var gain = audioCtx.createGain();
osc.type = 'sine';
osc.frequency.value = 880;
gain.gain.value = 0.2;
osc.connect(gain);
gain.connect(audioCtx.destination);
osc.start();
osc.stop(audioCtx.currentTime + 0.4);
} catch (e) {
// audio unavailable; the visual list still surfaces the critical event
}
}
function updateAlarm(events) {
var hasUnackedCritical = false;
events.forEach(function (ev) {
var acked = ev.acknowledged_by !== null && ev.acknowledged_by !== undefined && ev.acknowledged_by !== '';
if (ev.severity === 'critical' && !acked) {
hasUnackedCritical = true;
if (!beepedCritical[ev.event_id]) { beepedCritical[ev.event_id] = true; beep(); }
}
});
if (hasUnackedCritical && !alarmTimer) {
alarmTimer = setInterval(beep, 3000);
} else if (!hasUnackedCritical && alarmTimer) {
clearInterval(alarmTimer);
alarmTimer = null;
}
}
function buildRow(ev) {
var isAcked = ev.acknowledged_by !== null && ev.acknowledged_by !== undefined && ev.acknowledged_by !== '';
var row = document.createElement('div');
row.className = 'event-row' + (isAcked ? '' : ' is-unacknowledged');
row.appendChild(buildBadge(ev.severity));
var meta = document.createElement('div');
meta.className = 'event-meta';
var type = document.createElement('div');
type.className = 'event-type';
var typeLink = document.createElement('a');
typeLink.className = 'event-detail-link';
typeLink.href = '/events/' + encodeURIComponent(ev.event_id) + '/view';
typeLink.textContent = String(ev.event_type || '');
type.appendChild(typeLink);
meta.appendChild(type);
var sub = document.createElement('div');
sub.className = 'event-time';
var cam = ev.camera_id ? String(ev.camera_id) : '';
var time = formatTime(ev.occurred_at);
sub.textContent = [cam, time].filter(Boolean).join(' · ');
meta.appendChild(sub);
row.appendChild(meta);
var btn = document.createElement('button');
btn.type = 'button';
btn.className = 'ack-btn';
if (isAcked) {
btn.textContent = '확인됨 (' + String(ev.acknowledged_by) + ')';
btn.disabled = true;
} else {
btn.textContent = '확인';
btn.addEventListener('click', function () { acknowledge(ev.event_id, btn); });
}
row.appendChild(btn);
return row;
}
function acknowledge(eventId, btn) {
btn.disabled = true;
fetch('/events/' + encodeURIComponent(eventId) + '/ack', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'X-Csrf-Token': csrfToken || '' }
})
.then(function (res) {
if (!res.ok) throw new Error('ack_failed:' + res.status);
return loadEvents();
})
.catch(function () {
btn.disabled = false;
});
}
function render(events) {
var sorted = events.slice().sort(function (a, b) {
var aAcked = a.acknowledged_by !== null && a.acknowledged_by !== undefined && a.acknowledged_by !== '';
var bAcked = b.acknowledged_by !== null && b.acknowledged_by !== undefined && b.acknowledged_by !== '';
if (aAcked === bAcked) return 0;
return aAcked ? 1 : -1; // unacknowledged first
});
updateAlarm(sorted); // before any early return, so an emptied list also silences the alarm
root.textContent = '';
root.removeAttribute('aria-busy');
if (sorted.length === 0) {
root.textContent = '표시할 이벤트가 없습니다.';
return;
}
var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();
sorted.forEach(function (ev) { frag.appendChild(buildRow(ev)); });
root.appendChild(frag);
}
function loadEvents() {
return fetch('/api/events', { headers: { Accept: 'application/json' } })
.then(function (res) {
if (res.status === 401) {
window.location.href = '/login';
return null;
}
if (!res.ok) throw new Error('list_failed:' + res.status);
return res.json();
})
.then(function (data) {
if (data && Array.isArray(data.events)) render(data.events);
})
.catch(function () {
// Leave the last rendered state on transient poll failure.
});
}
var logoutBtn = document.getElementById('logout-btn');
if (logoutBtn) {
logoutBtn.addEventListener('click', function () {
fetch('/logout', { method: 'POST' }).then(function () { window.location.href = '/login'; });
});
}
document.addEventListener('click', unlockAudio);
loadCsrfToken();
loadEvents();
setInterval(loadEvents, POLL_INTERVAL_MS);
})();

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server/public/assets/detail.js → cloud/public/assets/detail.js
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@ -10,10 +10,6 @@
(function () {
'use strict';
// Mount prefix: '' at the web root, '/move_detect' when the app shares a www/ with another
// site. Injected by src/View/layout.php from the server's SCRIPT_NAME.
var B = window.APP_BASE || '';
var SEVERITY_LABELS = {
critical: { icon: '⛔', text: '위급', cls: 'sev-critical' },
high: { icon: '⚠', text: '높음', cls: 'sev-high' },
@ -101,7 +97,7 @@
snaps.forEach(function (s) {
if (!s || !s.file_uuid) return;
var img = document.createElement('img');
img.src = B + '/snap/' + encodeURIComponent(s.file_uuid);
img.src = '/snap/' + encodeURIComponent(s.file_uuid);
img.alt = '사고 스냅샷';
img.className = 'detail-snapshot';
img.loading = 'lazy';
@ -109,9 +105,9 @@
});
}
fetch(B + '/events/' + encodeURIComponent(id), { headers: { Accept: 'application/json' } })
fetch('/events/' + encodeURIComponent(id), { headers: { Accept: 'application/json' } })
.then(function (res) {
if (res.status === 401) { window.location.href = B + '/login'; return null; }
if (res.status === 401) { window.location.href = '/login'; return null; }
if (!res.ok) throw new Error('detail_failed:' + res.status);
return res.json();
})

8
server/public/assets/login.js → cloud/public/assets/login.js
View file

@ -8,10 +8,6 @@
(function () {
'use strict';
// Mount prefix: '' at the web root, '/move_detect' when the app shares a www/ with another
// site. Injected by src/View/layout.php from the server's SCRIPT_NAME.
var B = window.APP_BASE || '';
var form = document.querySelector('.login-form');
if (!form) return;
@ -30,7 +26,7 @@
var formData = new FormData(form);
var body = new URLSearchParams(formData).toString();
fetch(B + '/login', {
fetch('/login', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' },
body: body
@ -38,7 +34,7 @@
.then(function (res) {
if (res.status === 200) {
// Success: redirect to dashboard
window.location.href = B + '/';
window.location.href = '/';
return null;
}
// Error: parse response and show error message

62
server/public/assets/zone-draw.js → cloud/public/assets/zone-draw.js
View file

@ -4,22 +4,15 @@
* - Choose a level (warning/restricted/pinch), then Save -> POST /api/zones.
* - "Load" fetches existing zones for the camera via GET /api/zones/{camera}
* and redraws them; each has a Delete button -> POST /api/zones/{id}/delete.
* - "현재 화면 불러오기" fetches the camera's newest snapshot uuid via
* GET /api/cameras/{camera}/latest-snapshot and draws it as the canvas
* background, so zones are drawn over what the camera actually sees.
* - A `?snapshot={uuid}` query param does the same for one specific image
* (the event-detail page links here that way); otherwise the canvas keeps
* its plain dark backdrop.
* - If a `?snapshot={uuid}` query param is present, that image (served via
* the authenticated /snap/{uuid} proxy) is drawn as the canvas background;
* otherwise the canvas keeps its plain dark backdrop.
*
* XSS-safe: all dynamic text is set via textContent, never innerHTML.
*/
(function () {
'use strict';
// Mount prefix: '' at the web root, '/move_detect' when the app shares a www/ with another
// site. Injected by src/View/layout.php from the server's SCRIPT_NAME.
var B = window.APP_BASE || '';
var canvas = document.getElementById('zone-canvas');
if (!canvas) return;
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
@ -28,7 +21,6 @@
var cameraInput = document.getElementById('camera-id');
var levelSelect = document.getElementById('zone-level');
var loadBtn = document.getElementById('zone-load-btn');
var frameBtn = document.getElementById('zone-frame-btn');
var clearBtn = document.getElementById('zone-clear-btn');
var saveBtn = document.getElementById('zone-save-btn');
var listEl = document.getElementById('zone-list');
@ -50,23 +42,16 @@
}
function loadCsrfToken() {
return fetch(B + '/api/csrf', { headers: { Accept: 'application/json' } })
return fetch('/api/csrf', { headers: { Accept: 'application/json' } })
.then(function (res) { return res.ok ? res.json() : null; })
.then(function (data) { if (data && data.token) csrfToken = data.token; })
.catch(function () { /* save/delete will fail with 403 if the token is missing */ });
}
// WIRE CONTRACT: zone polygons are stored NORMALIZED (0..1 of the image), so the edge can
// compare them against a foot point normalized by the camera's own resolution regardless of
// how big the camera is. On this canvas we draw in canvas pixels, so convert at the two wire
// boundaries only: denormalize on load (here), normalize on save (saveZone).
function parsePolygon(zone) {
try {
var pts = JSON.parse(zone.polygon_json || '[]');
if (!Array.isArray(pts)) return [];
return pts.map(function (p) {
return [p[0] * canvas.width, p[1] * canvas.height];
});
return Array.isArray(pts) ? pts : [];
} catch (e) {
return [];
}
@ -131,32 +116,16 @@
var img = new Image();
img.onload = function () { backgroundImage = img; redraw(); };
img.onerror = function () { backgroundImage = null; redraw(); };
img.src = B + '/snap/' + encodeURIComponent(uuid);
}
// Load the camera's most recent frame as the drawing background. The uuid comes from the
// API; the image itself still goes through /snap/{uuid}, which re-checks session + site scope.
function loadLatestFrame() {
var camera = cameraInput.value.trim();
if (!camera) { setStatus('카메라 ID를 입력하세요.'); return; }
setStatus('현재 화면을 불러오는 중...');
fetch(B + '/api/cameras/' + encodeURIComponent(camera) + '/latest-snapshot', { credentials: 'same-origin' })
.then(function (r) {
if (r.status === 404) throw new Error('이 카메라의 저장된 화면이 아직 없습니다. 이벤트가 한 번 발생해야 배경이 생깁니다.');
if (!r.ok) throw new Error('불러오기 실패 (' + r.status + ')');
return r.json();
})
.then(function (data) { loadBackground(data.uuid); setStatus('현재 화면을 배경으로 불러왔습니다.'); })
.catch(function (e) { setStatus(e.message); });
img.src = '/snap/' + encodeURIComponent(uuid);
}
function loadZones() {
var camera = cameraInput.value.trim();
if (!camera) { setStatus('카메라 ID를 입력하세요.'); return; }
setStatus('불러오는 중...');
fetch(B + '/api/zones/' + encodeURIComponent(camera), { headers: { Accept: 'application/json' } })
fetch('/api/zones/' + encodeURIComponent(camera), { headers: { Accept: 'application/json' } })
.then(function (res) {
if (res.status === 401) { window.location.href = B + '/login'; return null; }
if (res.status === 401) { window.location.href = '/login'; return null; }
if (!res.ok) throw new Error('load_failed:' + res.status);
return res.json();
})
@ -179,22 +148,18 @@
if (!camera) { setStatus('카메라 ID를 입력하세요.'); return; }
if (currentPoints.length < 3) { setStatus('폴리곤 점을 3개 이상 클릭하세요.'); return; }
setStatus('저장 중...');
fetch(B + '/api/zones', {
fetch('/api/zones', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', 'X-Csrf-Token': csrfToken || '' },
body: JSON.stringify({
device_id: device,
camera_id: camera,
level: levelSelect.value,
// Normalize canvas pixels -> 0..1 of the image (the edge un-normalizes with the
// camera's own resolution). See the parsePolygon contract note above.
polygon: currentPoints.map(function (p) {
return [p[0] / canvas.width, p[1] / canvas.height];
})
polygon: currentPoints
})
})
.then(function (res) {
if (res.status === 401) { window.location.href = B + '/login'; return null; }
if (res.status === 401) { window.location.href = '/login'; return null; }
if (!res.ok) throw new Error('save_failed:' + res.status);
return res.json();
})
@ -208,12 +173,12 @@
}
function deleteZone(zoneId) {
fetch(B + '/api/zones/' + encodeURIComponent(zoneId) + '/delete', {
fetch('/api/zones/' + encodeURIComponent(zoneId) + '/delete', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'X-Csrf-Token': csrfToken || '' }
})
.then(function (res) {
if (res.status === 401) { window.location.href = B + '/login'; return; }
if (res.status === 401) { window.location.href = '/login'; return; }
if (!res.ok) throw new Error('delete_failed:' + res.status);
loadZones();
})
@ -232,7 +197,6 @@
levelSelect.addEventListener('change', redraw);
loadBtn.addEventListener('click', loadZones);
if (frameBtn) frameBtn.addEventListener('click', loadLatestFrame);
clearBtn.addEventListener('click', function () { currentPoints = []; redraw(); setStatus('현재 폴리곤을 지웠습니다.'); });
saveBtn.addEventListener('click', saveZone);

66
cloud/public/index.php Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
require __DIR__ . '/../vendor/autoload.php';
use App\Config;
use App\Http\{Request, Router, Response};
use App\Db\Database;
use App\Auth\PhpSessionStore;
use App\Repository\Pdo\{PdoDeviceRepository, PdoNonceRepository, PdoRateLimiterRepository,
PdoEventRepository, PdoSnapshotRepository, PdoUserRepository, PdoZoneRepository,
PdoThresholdRepository, PdoAuditRepository};
use App\Ingest\IngestController;
use App\Api\{ConfigController, HeartbeatController};
use App\Auth\{AuthController, CsrfController};
use App\Dashboard\{EventListController, EventDetailController, SnapshotProxy, ZoneConfigController};
$cfg = Config::fromArray(require __DIR__ . '/../config.php');
$pdo = Database::connect($cfg);
$sess = new PhpSessionStore();
$now = time();
$devices = new PdoDeviceRepository($pdo);
$nonces = new PdoNonceRepository($pdo);
$rate = new PdoRateLimiterRepository($pdo);
$events = new PdoEventRepository($pdo);
$snaps = new PdoSnapshotRepository($pdo, $cfg->snapshotDir());
$users = new PdoUserRepository($pdo);
$zones = new PdoZoneRepository($pdo);
$thr = new PdoThresholdRepository($pdo);
$audit = new PdoAuditRepository($pdo);
$ingest = new IngestController($cfg, $devices, $nonces, $rate, $events, $snaps);
$config = new ConfigController($devices, $zones, $thr, $nonces, $cfg);
$heartbeat = new HeartbeatController($cfg, $devices, $nonces);
$auth = new AuthController($users, $audit, $rate);
$csrfCtl = new CsrfController();
$list = new EventListController($events, $sess);
$detail = new EventDetailController($events, $snaps, $audit, $sess);
$proxy = new SnapshotProxy($snaps, $sess);
$zoneCtl = new ZoneConfigController($zones, $audit, $sess);
$render = function (string $view): Response {
ob_start(); require __DIR__ . '/../src/View/' . $view . '.php';
return Response::text((string)ob_get_clean());
};
$r = new Router();
$r->add('POST', '/api/events', fn(Request $q) => $ingest->handle($q, $now, (string)($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'] ?? '')));
$r->add('POST', '/api/heartbeat', fn(Request $q) => $heartbeat->post($q, $now));
$r->add('GET', '/api/config', fn(Request $q) => $config->get($q, $now));
$r->add('GET', '/api/csrf', fn(Request $q) => $csrfCtl->token($q, $sess));
$r->add('POST', '/login', fn(Request $q) => $auth->login($q, $sess, $now, (string)($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'] ?? '')));
$r->add('POST', '/logout', fn(Request $q) => $auth->logout($sess));
$r->add('GET', '/api/events', fn(Request $q) => $list->json($q));
$r->add('GET', '/events/{id}', fn(Request $q, array $p) => $detail->show($q, $p));
$r->add('POST', '/events/{id}/ack', fn(Request $q, array $p) => $detail->acknowledge($q, $p));
$r->add('GET', '/api/zones/{camera}', fn(Request $q, array $p) => $zoneCtl->list($q, $p));
$r->add('POST', '/api/zones', fn(Request $q) => $zoneCtl->save($q));
$r->add('POST', '/api/zones/{id}/delete', fn(Request $q, array $p) => $zoneCtl->delete($q, $p));
$r->add('GET', '/snap/{uuid}', fn(Request $q, array $p) => $proxy->serve($q, $p));
$r->add('GET', '/', fn() => $render('events'));
$r->add('GET', '/login', fn() => $render('login'));
$r->add('GET', '/zones', fn() => $render('zones'));
$r->add('GET', '/events/{id}/view', fn(Request $q, array $p) => $render('event_detail'));
$r->dispatch(Request::fromGlobals())->send();

68
server/schema.sql → cloud/schema.sql
View file

@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ SET NAMES utf8mb4;
-- No PdoUserRepository::create() exists in P1-B -- the first admin account is
-- provisioned out-of-band via the CLI snippet in cloud/docs/cloud-deploy.md.
-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CREATE TABLE move_users (
CREATE TABLE users (
id INT UNSIGNED NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
username VARCHAR(190) NOT NULL,
password_hash VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL, -- Argon2id, see App\Security\Password::hash()
@ -55,10 +55,9 @@ CREATE TABLE move_users (
-- No PdoDeviceRepository::create() exists -- rows are provisioned by an admin
-- (per-device secret issuance) before the device is allowed to sync/ingest.
-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CREATE TABLE move_devices (
CREATE TABLE devices (
device_id VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
name VARCHAR(190) NULL,
site VARCHAR(64) NULL, -- access-control scope; matches users.site_scope (NULL = unassigned)
secret VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL, -- per-device HMAC key; rotate via admin CLI, never log
config_version INT UNSIGNED NOT NULL DEFAULT 1, -- authoritative version served by GET /api/config
last_fps DOUBLE NULL,
@ -67,8 +66,7 @@ CREATE TABLE move_devices (
reported_config_version INT UNSIGNED NULL, -- version the device last claimed via heartbeat
last_heartbeat_at BIGINT UNSIGNED NULL,
created_at BIGINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL DEFAULT (UNIX_TIMESTAMP()),
PRIMARY KEY (device_id),
KEY ix_devices_site (site)
PRIMARY KEY (device_id)
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8mb4;
-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@ -77,7 +75,7 @@ CREATE TABLE move_devices (
-- directly as a free-form string. Kept for documentation/future per-camera
-- config and to avoid a breaking migration when that repository is added.
-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CREATE TABLE move_cameras (
CREATE TABLE cameras (
camera_id VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
device_id VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
name VARCHAR(190) NULL,
@ -94,7 +92,7 @@ CREATE TABLE move_cameras (
-- `cameras` row exists for a given camera_id (no camera-registration flow in
-- P1-B), so a FK here would spuriously reject valid app writes.
-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CREATE TABLE move_zones (
CREATE TABLE zones (
zone_id CHAR(32) NOT NULL, -- bin2hex(random_bytes(16)), same convention as snapshot uuids
device_id VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
camera_id VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
@ -112,11 +110,9 @@ CREATE TABLE move_zones (
-- App\Ingest\EventValidator before insert(); the CHECK constraints below are
-- defense-in-depth only, not the primary validation layer.
-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CREATE TABLE move_events (
CREATE TABLE events (
event_id INT UNSIGNED NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
event_uuid CHAR(32) NULL, -- edge-generated idempotency key (dedup a re-sent event); NULL for legacy rows
device_id VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
site VARCHAR(64) NULL, -- denormalized from move_devices.site at ingest; access-control scope
camera_id VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
event_type VARCHAR(32) NOT NULL,
severity VARCHAR(16) NOT NULL,
@ -129,15 +125,9 @@ CREATE TABLE move_events (
acknowledged_at BIGINT UNSIGNED NULL,
received_at BIGINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL, -- server receipt time (PHP time()), for clock-skew flagging (design doc §8)
PRIMARY KEY (event_id),
-- Idempotency: a UNIQUE key on event_uuid makes a re-sent event (POST succeeded server-side
-- but the ACK timed out client-side) collide instead of duplicating. MySQL allows multiple
-- NULLs in a UNIQUE index, so legacy rows without a uuid do not conflict.
UNIQUE KEY uq_events_uuid (event_uuid),
KEY ix_events_occurred_at (occurred_at),
KEY ix_events_severity_occurred_at (severity, occurred_at),
KEY ix_events_site_occurred_at (site, occurred_at), -- site-scoped dashboard list (P3-2b)
KEY ix_events_device (device_id),
KEY ix_events_camera (camera_id, event_id), -- zone editor: newest snapshot per camera
CONSTRAINT chk_events_type CHECK (event_type IN (
'fall','no_motion','immobility','ghost','zone_warning',
'zone_restricted','pinch','monitoring_degraded','device_fault'
@ -151,7 +141,7 @@ CREATE TABLE move_events (
-- events is safe because IngestController always inserts the parent event row
-- before calling SnapshotRepository::add() for its snapshots.
-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CREATE TABLE move_event_snapshots (
CREATE TABLE event_snapshots (
snapshot_id INT UNSIGNED NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
event_id INT UNSIGNED NOT NULL,
file_uuid CHAR(32) NOT NULL, -- bin2hex(random_bytes(16)); on-disk filename = <uuid>.jpg
@ -159,13 +149,8 @@ CREATE TABLE move_event_snapshots (
created_at BIGINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (snapshot_id),
UNIQUE KEY uq_event_snapshots_uuid (file_uuid),
-- Idempotent snapshot recovery: a re-sent event carries the SAME re-encoded bytes (same
-- content_hash), so this makes a duplicate/racing store collide instead of writing a second
-- copy. Lets the dedup path safely re-store missing evidence without duplication.
UNIQUE KEY uq_event_snapshots_event_hash (event_id, content_hash),
KEY ix_event_snapshots_event (event_id),
KEY ix_event_snapshots_created (created_at), -- retention purge scans WHERE created_at < ?
CONSTRAINT fk_event_snapshots_event FOREIGN KEY (event_id) REFERENCES move_events (event_id)
CONSTRAINT fk_event_snapshots_event FOREIGN KEY (event_id) REFERENCES events (event_id)
ON DELETE CASCADE
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8mb4;
@ -174,7 +159,7 @@ CREATE TABLE move_event_snapshots (
-- GET /api/config. No PdoThresholdRepository write method exists in P1-B --
-- rows are seeded/edited directly (phpMyAdmin) until a management UI lands.
-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CREATE TABLE move_thresholds (
CREATE TABLE thresholds (
id INT UNSIGNED NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
device_id VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
camera_id VARCHAR(64) NULL,
@ -195,11 +180,11 @@ CREATE TABLE move_thresholds (
-- TOCTOU flagged in the Task 7 review -- the PK uniqueness is the real guard,
-- not the earlier seen() check).
-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CREATE TABLE move_nonces (
CREATE TABLE nonces (
nonce VARCHAR(190) NOT NULL,
expires_at BIGINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (nonce),
KEY ix_nonces_expires_at (expires_at) -- for a periodic `DELETE FROM move_nonces WHERE expires_at < ?` cleanup job
KEY ix_nonces_expires_at (expires_at) -- for a periodic `DELETE FROM nonces WHERE expires_at < ?` cleanup job
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8mb4;
-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@ -208,14 +193,11 @@ CREATE TABLE move_nonces (
-- `INSERT ... ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE count = count + 1` upsert in
-- PdoRateLimiterRepository::hit() -- no read-modify-write race window.
-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CREATE TABLE move_rate_limits (
CREATE TABLE rate_limits (
rate_key VARCHAR(190) NOT NULL,
window_start BIGINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL, -- floor(now / 60): the minute bucket
count INT UNSIGNED NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
PRIMARY KEY (rate_key, window_start),
-- The reap `DELETE ... WHERE window_start < ?` cannot use the PK (window_start is its trailing
-- column), so give it its own index to avoid a locking full-scan on the pre-auth hot path.
KEY ix_rate_limits_window (window_start)
PRIMARY KEY (rate_key, window_start)
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8mb4;
-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@ -223,7 +205,7 @@ CREATE TABLE move_rate_limits (
-- Tamper-evident hash-chaining (design doc §9.2) is deferred to P3 per the
-- Task 16 brief self-review -- this table is the plain append-only record only.
-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CREATE TABLE move_audit_log (
CREATE TABLE audit_log (
id INT UNSIGNED NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
actor VARCHAR(190) NOT NULL,
action VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
@ -235,25 +217,3 @@ CREATE TABLE move_audit_log (
KEY ix_audit_log_ts (ts),
KEY ix_audit_log_actor (actor)
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8mb4;
-- ===========================================================================
-- UPGRADING AN EXISTING DATABASE (fresh installs already have everything above):
-- do NOT copy the statements below by hand — they are SQL comments and will not
-- run. Apply the RUNNABLE migration instead:
--
-- cloud/migrations/2026-07-17-p1-9-p3-2b.sql
-- cloud/migrations/2026-07-20-move-table-prefix.sql (run this one LAST)
--
-- The second migration renames every table to the `move_` prefix used above and
-- by App\Repository\Pdo\* -- an existing DB must be renamed before deploy or all
-- queries fail with "table doesn't exist".
--
-- It adds devices.site / events.site / events.event_uuid, the retention and
-- rate-limit reap indexes, AND backfills events.site from move_devices.site (without
-- that backfill, historical events vanish for a scoped operator). Run it once in
-- phpMyAdmin BEFORE deploying code that reads these columns, then provision:
-- UPDATE move_devices SET site = 'factory-a' WHERE device_id = 'pi-1';
-- UPDATE move_users SET site_scope = 'factory-a' WHERE username = 'operator-a';
-- A user with site_scope = NULL is a global operator; '' is NOT global (matches
-- nothing — a blank scope fails closed).
-- ===========================================================================

10
server/src/Api/ConfigController.php → cloud/src/Api/ConfigController.php
View file

@ -5,23 +5,17 @@ namespace App\Api;
use App\Config;
use App\Http\{Request, Response};
use App\Security\Hmac;
use App\Repository\{DeviceRepository, ZoneRepository, ThresholdRepository, NonceRepository, RateLimiterRepository};
use App\Repository\{DeviceRepository, ZoneRepository, ThresholdRepository, NonceRepository};
final class ConfigController
{
public function __construct(
private DeviceRepository $devices, private ZoneRepository $zones, private ThresholdRepository $thresholds,
private NonceRepository $nonces, private Config $cfg,
private ?RateLimiterRepository $rateLimiter = null,
) {}
public function get(Request $req, int $now, string $clientIp = ''): Response
public function get(Request $req, int $now): Response
{
// Pre-auth per-IP anti-flood, like /api/events — HMAC + DB reads on every hit.
if ($this->rateLimiter !== null && $clientIp !== ''
&& $this->rateLimiter->hit('ip:' . $clientIp, intdiv($now, 60)) > $this->cfg->ingestIpRateLimitPerMin()) {
return Response::json(['error' => 'rate_limited'], 429);
}
$deviceId = (string)$req->query('device_id');
$secret = $deviceId !== '' ? $this->devices->secretFor($deviceId) : null;
$nonce = $req->header('X-Nonce') ?? ''; $ts = $req->header('X-Timestamp') ?? ''; $sig = $req->header('X-Signature') ?? '';

38
cloud/src/Api/HeartbeatController.php Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
namespace App\Api;
use App\Config;
use App\Http\{Request, Response};
use App\Security\Hmac;
use App\Repository\{DeviceRepository, NonceRepository};
final class HeartbeatController
{
public function __construct(private Config $cfg, private DeviceRepository $devices, private NonceRepository $nonces) {}
public function post(Request $req, int $now): Response
{
$b = $req->json();
$deviceId = (string)($b['device_id'] ?? '');
$secret = $deviceId !== '' ? $this->devices->secretFor($deviceId) : null;
$nonce = $req->header('X-Nonce') ?? ''; $ts = $req->header('X-Timestamp') ?? ''; $sig = $req->header('X-Signature') ?? '';
if ($secret === null || !Hmac::verify($secret, $nonce, $ts, $req->body(), $sig)) {
return Response::json(['error' => 'unauthorized'], 401);
}
if (abs($now - (int)(float)$ts) > $this->cfg->timestampWindow()) {
return Response::json(['error' => 'stale'], 401);
}
if ($nonce === '' || $this->nonces->seen($nonce)) {
return Response::json(['error' => 'replay'], 401);
}
$this->nonces->remember($nonce, $now + $this->cfg->nonceTtl());
$this->devices->touchHeartbeat($deviceId, [
'fps' => (float)($b['fps'] ?? 0), 'temp' => (float)($b['temp'] ?? 0),
'throttle' => (bool)($b['throttle'] ?? false), 'config_version' => (int)($b['config_version'] ?? 0),
'at' => $now,
]);
return Response::json(['ok' => true], 200);
}
}

15
server/src/Auth/AuthController.php → cloud/src/Auth/AuthController.php
View file

@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ declare(strict_types=1);
namespace App\Auth;
use App\Http\{Request, Response};
use App\Security\{Password, Csrf};
use App\Security\Password;
use App\Repository\{UserRepository, AuditRepository, RateLimiterRepository};
final class AuthController
@ -28,14 +28,6 @@ final class AuthController
return Response::json(['error' => 'rate_limited'], 429);
}
// Login CSRF: the GET /login render seeds $_SESSION['csrf'] and embeds it as a hidden
// field; the POST must echo it back. Without this an attacker can silently log a victim
// into the attacker's account (session fixation via forged login). Checked before the
// user lookup so a forged request never triggers the (expensive) Argon2id verify.
if (!Csrf::check((string)$sess->get('csrf'), (string)$req->post('csrf'))) {
return Response::json(['error' => 'csrf'], 403);
}
$username = (string)$req->post('username');
$password = (string)$req->post('password');
$u = $this->users->byUsername($username);
@ -75,11 +67,8 @@ final class AuthController
public function logout(SessionStore $sess): Response
{
// Rotate the id FIRST (invalidates the old cookie) while the session is still active,
// then wipe. The old order called session_regenerate_id() AFTER session_destroy(),
// which warns on an inactive session and leaves the old cookie unreplaced.
$sess->regenerate();
$sess->clear();
$sess->regenerate();
return Response::json(['ok' => true], 200);
}
}

0
server/src/Auth/CsrfController.php → cloud/src/Auth/CsrfController.php
View file

0
server/src/Auth/Rbac.php → cloud/src/Auth/Rbac.php
View file

10
server/src/Auth/Session.php → cloud/src/Auth/Session.php
View file

@ -18,15 +18,9 @@ final class ArraySessionStore implements SessionStore {
}
final class PhpSessionStore implements SessionStore {
/** @param string $cookiePath Scope the cookie to the mount ('/' at the web root,
* '/move_detect/' in a subdirectory) so a co-hosted site
* sharing the same www/ is never sent this session id. */
public function __construct(string $cookiePath = '/') {
if (session_status() !== PHP_SESSION_ACTIVE) session_start([
public function __construct() { if (session_status() !== PHP_SESSION_ACTIVE) session_start([
'cookie_httponly' => true, 'cookie_secure' => true, 'cookie_samesite' => 'Lax',
'cookie_path' => $cookiePath,
]);
}
]); }
public function get(string $k): mixed { return $_SESSION[$k] ?? null; }
public function set(string $k, mixed $v): void { $_SESSION[$k] = $v; }
public function clear(): void { $_SESSION = []; session_destroy(); }

1
server/src/Config.php → cloud/src/Config.php
View file

@ -16,5 +16,4 @@ final class Config
public function timestampWindow(): int { return (int)($this->a['timestamp_window'] ?? 300); }
public function rateLimitPerMin(): int { return (int)($this->a['rate_limit_per_min'] ?? 60); }
public function ingestIpRateLimitPerMin(): int { return (int)($this->a['ingest_ip_rate_limit_per_min'] ?? 300); }
public function snapshotRetentionDays(): int { return (int)($this->a['snapshot_retention_days'] ?? 7); }
}

16
server/src/Dashboard/EventDetailController.php → cloud/src/Dashboard/EventDetailController.php
View file

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ namespace App\Dashboard;
use App\Http\{Request, Response};
use App\Auth\{SessionStore, Rbac};
use App\Security\{Csrf, SiteScope};
use App\Security\Csrf;
use App\Repository\{EventRepository, SnapshotRepository, AuditRepository};
final class EventDetailController
@ -14,20 +14,12 @@ final class EventDetailController
private AuditRepository $audit, private SessionStore $sess
) {}
// A scoped operator must not read — or acknowledge — an event outside their site. Return
// 404 (not 403) so a cross-site id is indistinguishable from a non-existent one (no leak).
private function outOfScope(array $event): bool
{
$scope = $this->sess->get('site_scope');
return !SiteScope::allows(is_string($scope) ? $scope : null, $event['site'] ?? null);
}
public function show(Request $req, array $params): Response
{
if ($this->sess->get('user_id') === null) return Response::json(['error' => 'unauthorized'], 401);
$id = (int)($params['id'] ?? 0);
$event = $this->events->find($id);
if ($event === null || $this->outOfScope($event)) return Response::json(['error' => 'not_found'], 404);
if ($event === null) return Response::json(['error' => 'not_found'], 404);
return Response::json(['event' => $event, 'snapshots' => $this->snaps->forEvent($id)], 200);
}
@ -39,10 +31,6 @@ final class EventDetailController
return Response::json(['error' => 'csrf'], 403);
}
$id = (int)($params['id'] ?? 0);
// Scope BEFORE the write: without the find()+guard a scoped user could acknowledge another
// site's event by guessing its id.
$event = $this->events->find($id);
if ($event === null || $this->outOfScope($event)) return Response::json(['error' => 'not_found'], 404);
$user = (string)$this->sess->get('username');
if (!$this->events->acknowledge($id, $user)) return Response::json(['error' => 'not_found'], 404);
$this->audit->append($user, 'acknowledge', "event:$id", [], []);

20
cloud/src/Dashboard/EventListController.php Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
namespace App\Dashboard;
use App\Http\{Request, Response};
use App\Auth\SessionStore;
use App\Repository\EventRepository;
final class EventListController
{
public function __construct(private EventRepository $events, private SessionStore $sess) {}
public function json(Request $req): Response
{
if ($this->sess->get('user_id') === null) return Response::json(['error' => 'unauthorized'], 401);
$severity = $req->query('severity');
$rows = $this->events->recent(100, $severity);
return Response::json(['events' => $rows], 200);
}
}

21
cloud/src/Dashboard/SnapshotProxy.php Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
namespace App\Dashboard;
use App\Http\{Request, Response};
use App\Auth\SessionStore;
use App\Repository\SnapshotRepository;
final class SnapshotProxy
{
public function __construct(private SnapshotRepository $snaps, private SessionStore $sess) {}
public function serve(Request $req, array $params): Response
{
if ($this->sess->get('user_id') === null) return Response::json(['error' => 'unauthorized'], 401);
$uuid = (string)($params['uuid'] ?? '');
$path = $this->snaps->pathByUuid($uuid);
if ($path === null || !is_file($path)) return Response::json(['error' => 'not_found'], 404);
return Response::bytes((string)file_get_contents($path), 'image/jpeg', 200);
}
}

66
cloud/src/Dashboard/ZoneConfigController.php Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
namespace App\Dashboard;
use App\Http\{Request, Response};
use App\Auth\{SessionStore, Rbac};
use App\Security\Csrf;
use App\Geometry\Polygon;
use App\Repository\{ZoneRepository, AuditRepository};
final class ZoneConfigController
{
private const LEVELS = ['warning','restricted','pinch'];
public function __construct(
private ZoneRepository $zones, private AuditRepository $audit, private SessionStore $sess
) {}
private function guard(string $perm): ?Response
{
if ($this->sess->get('user_id') === null) return Response::json(['error' => 'unauthorized'], 401);
if (!Rbac::can((string)$this->sess->get('role'), $perm)) return Response::json(['error' => 'forbidden'], 403);
return null;
}
public function list(Request $req, array $params): Response
{
if ($this->sess->get('user_id') === null) return Response::json(['error' => 'unauthorized'], 401);
return Response::json(['zones' => $this->zones->forCamera((string)($params['camera'] ?? ''))], 200);
}
public function save(Request $req): Response
{
if ($g = $this->guard('edit_zones')) return $g;
if (!Csrf::check((string)$this->sess->get('csrf'), (string)$req->header('X-Csrf-Token'))) {
return Response::json(['error' => 'csrf'], 403);
}
$b = $req->json();
$level = (string)($b['level'] ?? '');
$polygon = $b['polygon'] ?? [];
if (!in_array($level, self::LEVELS, true) || !is_array($polygon) || !Polygon::validate($polygon)) {
return Response::json(['error' => 'invalid_zone'], 400);
}
$zoneId = $this->zones->save([
'zone_id' => $b['zone_id'] ?? null,
'device_id' => (string)($b['device_id'] ?? ''),
'camera_id' => (string)($b['camera_id'] ?? ''),
'level' => $level,
'polygon_json' => json_encode($polygon),
]);
$this->audit->append((string)$this->sess->get('username'), 'zone_save', "zone:$zoneId", [], ['level' => $level]);
return Response::json(['zone_id' => $zoneId], 201);
}
public function delete(Request $req, array $params): Response
{
if ($g = $this->guard('edit_zones')) return $g;
if (!Csrf::check((string)$this->sess->get('csrf'), (string)$req->header('X-Csrf-Token'))) {
return Response::json(['error' => 'csrf'], 403);
}
$id = (string)($params['id'] ?? '');
if (!$this->zones->delete($id)) return Response::json(['error' => 'not_found'], 404);
$this->audit->append((string)$this->sess->get('username'), 'zone_delete', "zone:$id", [], []);
return Response::json(['ok' => true], 200);
}
}

0
server/src/Db/Database.php → cloud/src/Db/Database.php
View file

0
server/src/Geometry/Polygon.php → cloud/src/Geometry/Polygon.php
View file

32
cloud/src/Http/Request.php Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
namespace App\Http;
final class Request
{
private array $headers;
public function __construct(
private string $method, private string $path, array $headers,
private string $body, private array $query = [], private array $post = []
) {
$this->headers = [];
foreach ($headers as $k => $v) $this->headers[strtolower($k)] = $v;
}
public function method(): string { return $this->method; }
public function path(): string { return $this->path; }
public function header(string $name): ?string { return $this->headers[strtolower($name)] ?? null; }
public function body(): string { return $this->body; }
public function json(): array { $d = json_decode($this->body, true); return is_array($d) ? $d : []; }
public function query(string $k): ?string { return isset($this->query[$k]) ? (string)$this->query[$k] : null; }
public function post(string $k): ?string { return isset($this->post[$k]) ? (string)$this->post[$k] : null; }
public static function fromGlobals(): self
{
$headers = function_exists('getallheaders') ? (getallheaders() ?: []) : [];
return new self(
$_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] ?? 'GET',
parse_url($_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'] ?? '/', PHP_URL_PATH) ?: '/',
$headers, file_get_contents('php://input') ?: '', $_GET, $_POST
);
}
}

5
server/src/Http/Response.php → cloud/src/Http/Response.php
View file

@ -12,9 +12,8 @@ final class Response
public static function text(string $s, int $status = 200): self {
return new self($status, ['Content-Type' => 'text/html; charset=utf-8'], $s);
}
public static function bytes(string $b, string $contentType, int $status = 200, array $headers = []): self {
// Content-Type stays authoritative; extra headers (e.g. Cache-Control) are added, not overridden.
return new self($status, ['Content-Type' => $contentType] + $headers, $b);
public static function bytes(string $b, string $contentType, int $status = 200): self {
return new self($status, ['Content-Type' => $contentType], $b);
}
public static function redirect(string $to): self {
return new self(302, ['Location' => $to], '');

6
server/src/Http/Router.php → cloud/src/Http/Router.php
View file

@ -15,11 +15,7 @@ final class Router
foreach ($this->routes as [$method, $regex, $handler]) {
if ($req->method() !== $method) continue;
if (preg_match($regex, $req->path(), $m)) {
// Decode captured params: a camera_id/zone_id with a space or Korean text is
// %-encoded in the URL, so without this GET /api/zones/{camera} never matches
// what POST /api/zones stored.
$params = array_map('rawurldecode',
array_filter($m, 'is_string', ARRAY_FILTER_USE_KEY));
$params = array_filter($m, 'is_string', ARRAY_FILTER_USE_KEY);
return $handler($req, $params);
}
}

14
server/src/Ingest/EventValidator.php → cloud/src/Ingest/EventValidator.php
View file

@ -31,24 +31,10 @@ final class EventValidator
if (isset($p['track_id']) && !is_numeric($p['track_id'])) $errors[] = 'bad:track_id';
if (isset($p['zone_id']) && !is_string($p['zone_id'])) $errors[] = 'bad:zone_id';
if (isset($p['duration_s']) && !is_numeric($p['duration_s'])) $errors[] = 'bad:duration_s';
// Optional idempotency key: the edge generates a stable 32-hex uuid per event and re-sends
// it on retry so the server can dedup. Enforce the exact shape (matches CHAR(32) + the
// snapshot-uuid convention); a malformed key is a bug, not a silent pass.
if (isset($p['event_uuid']) && (!is_string($p['event_uuid']) || !preg_match('/^[0-9a-f]{32}$/', $p['event_uuid']))) {
$errors[] = 'bad:event_uuid';
}
// Length caps matching the DB columns (device_id/camera_id VARCHAR(64), zone_id
// CHAR(32)). Without these an overlong id is a MySQL 'Data too long' 500 that the edge
// re-queues and retries forever; a 400 lets it drop the poison event instead.
foreach (['device_id' => 64, 'camera_id' => 64, 'zone_id' => 32] as $k => $max) {
if (isset($p[$k]) && is_string($p[$k]) && mb_strlen($p[$k]) > $max) $errors[] = "too_long:$k";
}
if ($errors) return ['ok' => false, 'errors' => $errors, 'clean' => []];
$clean = [
'event_uuid' => isset($p['event_uuid']) ? (string)$p['event_uuid'] : null,
'device_id' => (string)$p['device_id'],
'camera_id' => (string)$p['camera_id'],
'event_type' => (string)$p['event_type'],

0
server/src/Ingest/ImageProcessor.php → cloud/src/Ingest/ImageProcessor.php
View file

73
cloud/src/Ingest/IngestController.php Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
namespace App\Ingest;
use App\Config;
use App\Http\{Request, Response};
use App\Security\Hmac;
use App\Repository\{DeviceRepository, NonceRepository, RateLimiterRepository,
EventRepository, SnapshotRepository};
final class IngestController
{
public function __construct(
private Config $cfg,
private DeviceRepository $devices,
private NonceRepository $nonces,
private RateLimiterRepository $rateLimiter,
private EventRepository $events,
private SnapshotRepository $snapshots,
) {}
public function handle(Request $req, int $now, string $clientIp): Response
{
$payload = $req->json();
$deviceId = (string)($payload['device_id'] ?? '');
$window = intdiv($now, 60);
// Pre-auth IP limit (cheap, anti-flood): guards the endpoint before any
// HMAC/device-secret work, so an unauthenticated attacker can't burn
// a real device's own quota (see per-device limit below, moved post-auth).
if ($clientIp !== '' && $this->rateLimiter->hit('ip:' . $clientIp, $window) > $this->cfg->ingestIpRateLimitPerMin()) {
return Response::json(['error' => 'rate_limited'], 429);
}
$nonce = $req->header('X-Nonce') ?? '';
$ts = $req->header('X-Timestamp') ?? '';
$sig = $req->header('X-Signature') ?? '';
$secret = $deviceId !== '' ? $this->devices->secretFor($deviceId) : null;
if ($secret === null || $nonce === '' || $ts === '' || $sig === '') {
return Response::json(['error' => 'unauthorized'], 401);
}
if (!Hmac::verify($secret, $nonce, $ts, $req->body(), $sig)) {
return Response::json(['error' => 'unauthorized'], 401);
}
if (abs($now - (int)(float)$ts) > $this->cfg->timestampWindow()) {
return Response::json(['error' => 'unauthorized'], 401);
}
if ($this->nonces->seen($nonce)) {
return Response::json(['error' => 'unauthorized'], 401);
}
$this->nonces->remember($nonce, $now + $this->cfg->nonceTtl());
// Post-auth per-device limit: only authenticated (HMAC-verified) requests
// count toward a device's quota, so an attacker guessing device_id can no
// longer 429-lock a real camera.
if ($this->rateLimiter->hit($deviceId, $window) > $this->cfg->rateLimitPerMin()) {
return Response::json(['error' => 'rate_limited'], 429);
}
$v = EventValidator::validate($payload);
if (!$v['ok']) return Response::json(['error' => 'invalid', 'details' => $v['errors']], 400);
$eventId = $this->events->insert($v['clean']);
foreach (($payload['snapshots'] ?? []) as $b64) {
$img = ImageProcessor::reencode((string)$b64);
if (!$img['ok']) continue;
$path = rtrim($this->cfg->snapshotDir(), '/\\') . '/' . $img['uuid'] . '.jpg';
if (file_put_contents($path, $img['bytes']) === false) continue;
$this->snapshots->add($eventId, $img['uuid'], $img['hash']);
}
return Response::json(['event_id' => $eventId], 201);
}
}

0
server/src/Repository/AuditRepository.php → cloud/src/Repository/AuditRepository.php
View file

10
cloud/src/Repository/DeviceRepository.php Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
namespace App\Repository;
interface DeviceRepository
{
public function secretFor(string $deviceId): ?string;
public function touchHeartbeat(string $deviceId, array $meta): void;
public function configVersion(string $deviceId): int;
}

11
cloud/src/Repository/EventRepository.php Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
namespace App\Repository;
interface EventRepository
{
public function insert(array $event): int;
public function recent(int $limit, ?string $severity): array;
public function find(int $id): ?array;
public function acknowledge(int $id, string $user): bool;
}

0
server/src/Repository/NonceRepository.php → cloud/src/Repository/NonceRepository.php
View file

2
server/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoAuditRepository.php → cloud/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoAuditRepository.php
View file

@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ final class PdoAuditRepository implements AuditRepository
public function append(string $actor, string $action, string $target, array $before, array $after): void
{
$st = $this->pdo->prepare(
'INSERT INTO move_audit_log (actor, action, target, before_json, after_json, ts)
'INSERT INTO audit_log (actor, action, target, before_json, after_json, ts)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)'
);
$st->execute([

50
cloud/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoDeviceRepository.php Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
namespace App\Repository\Pdo;
use App\Repository\DeviceRepository;
use PDO;
final class PdoDeviceRepository implements DeviceRepository
{
public function __construct(private PDO $pdo) {}
public function secretFor(string $deviceId): ?string
{
$st = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT secret FROM devices WHERE device_id = ? LIMIT 1');
$st->execute([$deviceId]);
$secret = $st->fetchColumn();
return $secret === false ? null : (string)$secret;
}
public function touchHeartbeat(string $deviceId, array $meta): void
{
// A plain UPDATE (not upsert) is safe here: the caller (HeartbeatController)
// only reaches this after secretFor() already succeeded for the same
// device_id, so the row is guaranteed to exist. Device rows are provisioned
// out-of-band by an admin (see cloud/docs/cloud-deploy.md), never created
// implicitly from an inbound heartbeat.
$st = $this->pdo->prepare(
'UPDATE devices
SET last_fps = ?, last_temp = ?, last_throttle = ?,
reported_config_version = ?, last_heartbeat_at = ?
WHERE device_id = ?'
);
$st->execute([
(float)($meta['fps'] ?? 0.0),
(float)($meta['temp'] ?? 0.0),
!empty($meta['throttle']) ? 1 : 0,
(int)($meta['config_version'] ?? 0),
(int)($meta['at'] ?? time()),
$deviceId,
]);
}
public function configVersion(string $deviceId): int
{
$st = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT config_version FROM devices WHERE device_id = ? LIMIT 1');
$st->execute([$deviceId]);
$version = $st->fetchColumn();
return $version === false ? 1 : (int)$version;
}
}

66
server/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoEventRepository.php → cloud/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoEventRepository.php
View file

@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ use PDO;
final class PdoEventRepository implements EventRepository
{
private const SELECT_COLUMNS =
'event_id, event_uuid, device_id, site, camera_id, event_type, severity, track_id, zone_id,
'event_id, device_id, camera_id, event_type, severity, track_id, zone_id,
occurred_at, duration_s, metrics_json, acknowledged_by, acknowledged_at';
public function __construct(private PDO $pdo) {}
@ -16,15 +16,13 @@ final class PdoEventRepository implements EventRepository
public function insert(array $event): int
{
$st = $this->pdo->prepare(
'INSERT INTO move_events
(event_uuid, device_id, site, camera_id, event_type, severity, track_id, zone_id,
'INSERT INTO events
(device_id, camera_id, event_type, severity, track_id, zone_id,
occurred_at, duration_s, metrics_json, received_at)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)'
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)'
);
$st->execute([
$event['event_uuid'] ?? null, // NULL when the edge sent no idempotency key (legacy)
(string)$event['device_id'],
$event['site'] ?? null, // denormalized from move_devices.site by IngestController
(string)$event['camera_id'],
(string)$event['event_type'],
(string)$event['severity'],
@ -38,20 +36,12 @@ final class PdoEventRepository implements EventRepository
return (int)$this->pdo->lastInsertId();
}
public function idByUuid(string $uuid): ?int
{
$st = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT event_id FROM move_events WHERE event_uuid = ? LIMIT 1');
$st->execute([$uuid]);
$id = $st->fetchColumn();
return $id === false ? null : (int)$id;
}
public function recent(int $limit, ?string $severity): array
{
if ($severity !== null) {
$st = $this->pdo->prepare(
'SELECT ' . self::SELECT_COLUMNS . '
FROM move_events WHERE severity = ?
FROM events WHERE severity = ?
ORDER BY occurred_at DESC, event_id DESC LIMIT ?'
);
$st->bindValue(1, $severity, PDO::PARAM_STR);
@ -59,7 +49,7 @@ final class PdoEventRepository implements EventRepository
} else {
$st = $this->pdo->prepare(
'SELECT ' . self::SELECT_COLUMNS . '
FROM move_events
FROM events
ORDER BY occurred_at DESC, event_id DESC LIMIT ?'
);
$st->bindValue(1, $limit, PDO::PARAM_INT);
@ -68,45 +58,9 @@ final class PdoEventRepository implements EventRepository
return array_map(self::mapRow(...), $st->fetchAll());
}
public function page(int $limit, ?string $severity, ?string $beforeTs, ?int $beforeId, ?string $site = null): array
{
// Bind list as [value, PDO type] pairs, positional in SQL order.
$where = [];
$binds = [];
if ($severity !== null) {
$where[] = 'severity = ?';
$binds[] = [$severity, PDO::PARAM_STR];
}
if ($site !== null) {
// Site-scope access control: a scoped operator sees only their site's events.
$where[] = 'site = ?';
$binds[] = [$site, PDO::PARAM_STR];
}
// Keyset predicate: strictly "older" than the client's last-seen (occurred_at, event_id)
// on the (occurred_at DESC, event_id DESC) order. occurred_at arrives as its exact numeric
// STRING (never round-tripped through a PHP float) and is bound as a string, so MySQL
// parses it to the same DOUBLE the column holds — the page-edge boundary stays exact.
if ($beforeTs !== null && $beforeId !== null) {
$where[] = '(occurred_at < ? OR (occurred_at = ? AND event_id < ?))';
$binds[] = [$beforeTs, PDO::PARAM_STR];
$binds[] = [$beforeTs, PDO::PARAM_STR];
$binds[] = [$beforeId, PDO::PARAM_INT];
}
$sql = 'SELECT ' . self::SELECT_COLUMNS . ' FROM move_events';
if ($where) $sql .= ' WHERE ' . implode(' AND ', $where);
$sql .= ' ORDER BY occurred_at DESC, event_id DESC LIMIT ?';
$binds[] = [$limit, PDO::PARAM_INT];
$st = $this->pdo->prepare($sql);
$pos = 1;
foreach ($binds as [$val, $type]) $st->bindValue($pos++, $val, $type);
$st->execute();
return array_map(self::mapRow(...), $st->fetchAll());
}
public function find(int $id): ?array
{
$st = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT ' . self::SELECT_COLUMNS . ' FROM move_events WHERE event_id = ?');
$st = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT ' . self::SELECT_COLUMNS . ' FROM events WHERE event_id = ?');
$st->execute([$id]);
$row = $st->fetch();
return $row === false ? null : self::mapRow($row);
@ -119,13 +73,13 @@ final class PdoEventRepository implements EventRepository
// "changed rows" rather than "matched rows": re-acknowledging an
// already-acknowledged event by the same user would otherwise report
// 0 affected rows and this method would wrongly return false.
$exists = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT 1 FROM move_events WHERE event_id = ? LIMIT 1');
$exists = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT 1 FROM events WHERE event_id = ? LIMIT 1');
$exists->execute([$id]);
if ($exists->fetchColumn() === false) {
return false;
}
$st = $this->pdo->prepare(
'UPDATE move_events SET acknowledged_by = ?, acknowledged_at = ? WHERE event_id = ?'
'UPDATE events SET acknowledged_by = ?, acknowledged_at = ? WHERE event_id = ?'
);
$st->execute([$user, time(), $id]);
return true;
@ -135,9 +89,7 @@ final class PdoEventRepository implements EventRepository
{
return [
'event_id' => (int)$row['event_id'],
'event_uuid' => $row['event_uuid'] ?? null,
'device_id' => $row['device_id'],
'site' => $row['site'] ?? null,
'camera_id' => $row['camera_id'],
'event_type' => $row['event_type'],
'severity' => $row['severity'],

11
server/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoNonceRepository.php → cloud/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoNonceRepository.php
View file

@ -20,21 +20,14 @@ final class PdoNonceRepository implements NonceRepository
public function seen(string $nonce): bool
{
$st = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT 1 FROM move_nonces WHERE nonce = ? LIMIT 1');
$st = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT 1 FROM nonces WHERE nonce = ? LIMIT 1');
$st->execute([$nonce]);
return (bool)$st->fetchColumn();
}
public function remember(string $nonce, int $expiresAt): void
{
$st = $this->pdo->prepare('INSERT INTO move_nonces (nonce, expires_at) VALUES (?, ?)');
$st = $this->pdo->prepare('INSERT INTO nonces (nonce, expires_at) VALUES (?, ?)');
$st->execute([$nonce, $expiresAt]);
// Cron-less reap: Cafe24 has no scheduler, so expired nonces accumulate forever until
// the table bloats and inserts slow/fail. Opportunistically prune a bounded batch of
// already-expired rows (safe: seen() only cares about unexpired ones).
if (mt_rand(1, 100) === 1) {
$del = $this->pdo->prepare('DELETE FROM move_nonces WHERE expires_at < ? LIMIT 5000');
$del->execute([time()]);
}
}
}

32
cloud/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoRateLimiterRepository.php Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
namespace App\Repository\Pdo;
use App\Repository\RateLimiterRepository;
use PDO;
/**
* Atomic upsert via MySQL's INSERT ... ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE against the
* unique (rate_key, window_start) primary key (see schema.sql) -- no
* read-modify-write race between reading the current count and writing the
* incremented value back.
*/
final class PdoRateLimiterRepository implements RateLimiterRepository
{
public function __construct(private PDO $pdo) {}
public function hit(string $key, int $windowStart): int
{
$upsert = $this->pdo->prepare(
'INSERT INTO rate_limits (rate_key, window_start, count) VALUES (?, ?, 1)
ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE count = count + 1'
);
$upsert->execute([$key, $windowStart]);
$select = $this->pdo->prepare(
'SELECT count FROM rate_limits WHERE rate_key = ? AND window_start = ?'
);
$select->execute([$key, $windowStart]);
return (int)$select->fetchColumn();
}
}

50
cloud/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoSnapshotRepository.php Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
namespace App\Repository\Pdo;
use App\Repository\SnapshotRepository;
use PDO;
final class PdoSnapshotRepository implements SnapshotRepository
{
public function __construct(private PDO $pdo, private string $snapshotDir) {}
public function add(int $eventId, string $fileUuid, string $contentHash): void
{
$st = $this->pdo->prepare(
'INSERT INTO event_snapshots (event_id, file_uuid, content_hash, created_at)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)'
);
$st->execute([$eventId, $fileUuid, $contentHash, time()]);
}
public function forEvent(int $eventId): array
{
$st = $this->pdo->prepare(
'SELECT file_uuid, content_hash FROM event_snapshots
WHERE event_id = ? ORDER BY snapshot_id ASC'
);
$st->execute([$eventId]);
return $st->fetchAll();
}
public function pathByUuid(string $uuid): ?string
{
// Validate BEFORE building any filesystem path or touching the DB --
// SnapshotProxy trusts whatever this method returns and does
// file_get_contents() on it, so a non-hex/wrong-length uuid must never
// reach path construction (closes the path-traversal risk flagged in
// the Task 12 review).
if (strlen($uuid) !== 32 || !ctype_xdigit($uuid)) {
return null;
}
$st = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT 1 FROM event_snapshots WHERE file_uuid = ? LIMIT 1');
$st->execute([$uuid]);
if ($st->fetchColumn() === false) {
return null;
}
return rtrim($this->snapshotDir, '/\\') . '/' . $uuid . '.jpg';
}
}

2
server/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoThresholdRepository.php → cloud/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoThresholdRepository.php
View file

@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ final class PdoThresholdRepository implements ThresholdRepository
public function forDevice(string $deviceId): array
{
$st = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT `key`, `value` FROM move_thresholds WHERE device_id = ?');
$st = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT `key`, `value` FROM thresholds WHERE device_id = ?');
$st->execute([$deviceId]);
$out = [];

6
server/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoUserRepository.php → cloud/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoUserRepository.php
View file

@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ final class PdoUserRepository implements UserRepository
{
$st = $this->pdo->prepare(
'SELECT id, username, password_hash, role, site_scope, failed_attempts, locked_until
FROM move_users WHERE username = ? LIMIT 1'
FROM users WHERE username = ? LIMIT 1'
);
$st->execute([$username]);
$row = $st->fetch();
@ -36,14 +36,14 @@ final class PdoUserRepository implements UserRepository
// Increment in SQL (not read-then-write in PHP) so concurrent failed
// logins for the same account can't clobber each other's count.
$st = $this->pdo->prepare(
'UPDATE move_users SET failed_attempts = failed_attempts + 1, locked_until = ? WHERE id = ?'
'UPDATE users SET failed_attempts = failed_attempts + 1, locked_until = ? WHERE id = ?'
);
$st->execute([$lockUntil, $userId]);
}
public function clearFailures(int $userId): void
{
$st = $this->pdo->prepare('UPDATE move_users SET failed_attempts = 0, locked_until = 0 WHERE id = ?');
$st = $this->pdo->prepare('UPDATE users SET failed_attempts = 0, locked_until = 0 WHERE id = ?');
$st->execute([$userId]);
}
}

30
server/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoZoneRepository.php → cloud/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoZoneRepository.php
View file

@ -3,27 +3,17 @@ declare(strict_types=1);
namespace App\Repository\Pdo;
use App\Repository\ZoneRepository;
use App\Repository\ZoneOwnershipException;
use PDO;
use RuntimeException;
final class PdoZoneRepository implements ZoneRepository
{
public function __construct(private PDO $pdo) {}
public function find(string $zoneId): ?array
{
$st = $this->pdo->prepare(
'SELECT zone_id, device_id, camera_id, level, polygon_json FROM move_zones WHERE zone_id = ? LIMIT 1'
);
$st->execute([$zoneId]);
$row = $st->fetch();
return $row === false ? null : $row;
}
public function forDevice(string $deviceId): array
{
$st = $this->pdo->prepare(
'SELECT zone_id, device_id, camera_id, level, polygon_json FROM move_zones WHERE device_id = ?'
'SELECT zone_id, device_id, camera_id, level, polygon_json FROM zones WHERE device_id = ?'
);
$st->execute([$deviceId]);
return $st->fetchAll();
@ -32,7 +22,7 @@ final class PdoZoneRepository implements ZoneRepository
public function forCamera(string $cameraId): array
{
$st = $this->pdo->prepare(
'SELECT zone_id, device_id, camera_id, level, polygon_json FROM move_zones WHERE camera_id = ?'
'SELECT zone_id, device_id, camera_id, level, polygon_json FROM zones WHERE camera_id = ?'
);
$st->execute([$cameraId]);
return $st->fetchAll();
@ -52,7 +42,7 @@ final class PdoZoneRepository implements ZoneRepository
$newId = bin2hex(random_bytes(16));
$st = $this->pdo->prepare(
'INSERT INTO move_zones (zone_id, device_id, camera_id, level, polygon_json, updated_at)
'INSERT INTO zones (zone_id, device_id, camera_id, level, polygon_json, updated_at)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)'
);
$st->execute([$newId, $deviceId, $cameraId, $level, $polygonJson, time()]);
@ -61,7 +51,7 @@ final class PdoZoneRepository implements ZoneRepository
public function delete(string $zoneId): bool
{
$st = $this->pdo->prepare('DELETE FROM move_zones WHERE zone_id = ?');
$st = $this->pdo->prepare('DELETE FROM zones WHERE zone_id = ?');
$st->execute([$zoneId]);
return $st->rowCount() > 0;
}
@ -89,15 +79,15 @@ final class PdoZoneRepository implements ZoneRepository
string $polygonJson,
): string {
$owns = $this->pdo->prepare(
'SELECT 1 FROM move_zones WHERE zone_id = ? AND device_id = ? AND camera_id = ? LIMIT 1'
'SELECT 1 FROM zones WHERE zone_id = ? AND device_id = ? AND camera_id = ? LIMIT 1'
);
$owns->execute([$zoneId, $deviceId, $cameraId]);
if ($owns->fetchColumn() === false) {
throw new ZoneOwnershipException('zone not found or not owned by the given device/camera');
throw new RuntimeException('zone not found or not owned by the given device/camera');
}
$st = $this->pdo->prepare(
'UPDATE move_zones SET level = ?, polygon_json = ?, updated_at = ?
'UPDATE zones SET level = ?, polygon_json = ?, updated_at = ?
WHERE zone_id = ? AND device_id = ? AND camera_id = ?'
);
$st->execute([$level, $polygonJson, time(), $zoneId, $deviceId, $cameraId]);
@ -108,10 +98,10 @@ final class PdoZoneRepository implements ZoneRepository
// error) or (b) the zone was deleted between the ownership check
// above and this UPDATE. Disambiguate with a targeted existence
// check instead of assuming either case.
$stillExists = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT 1 FROM move_zones WHERE zone_id = ? LIMIT 1');
$stillExists = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT 1 FROM zones WHERE zone_id = ? LIMIT 1');
$stillExists->execute([$zoneId]);
if ($stillExists->fetchColumn() === false) {
throw new ZoneOwnershipException('zone was deleted concurrently');
throw new RuntimeException('zone was deleted concurrently');
}
}
return $zoneId;

0
server/src/Repository/RateLimiterRepository.php → cloud/src/Repository/RateLimiterRepository.php
View file

10
cloud/src/Repository/SnapshotRepository.php Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
namespace App\Repository;
interface SnapshotRepository
{
public function add(int $eventId, string $fileUuid, string $contentHash): void;
public function forEvent(int $eventId): array;
public function pathByUuid(string $uuid): ?string;
}

0
server/src/Repository/ThresholdRepository.php → cloud/src/Repository/ThresholdRepository.php
View file

0
server/src/Repository/UserRepository.php → cloud/src/Repository/UserRepository.php
View file

2
server/src/Repository/ZoneRepository.php → cloud/src/Repository/ZoneRepository.php
View file

@ -6,8 +6,6 @@ interface ZoneRepository
{
public function forDevice(string $deviceId): array;
public function forCamera(string $cameraId): array;
/** The single zone row (incl. device_id) by id, or null — for site-scope resolution. */
public function find(string $zoneId): ?array;
public function save(array $zone): string;
public function delete(string $zoneId): bool;
}

0
server/src/Security/Csrf.php → cloud/src/Security/Csrf.php
View file

0
server/src/Security/Hmac.php → cloud/src/Security/Hmac.php
View file

0
server/src/Security/Password.php → cloud/src/Security/Password.php
View file

4
server/src/View/event_detail.php → cloud/src/View/event_detail.php
View file

@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ render_header('이벤트 상세');
<h1>이벤트 상세</h1>
<div id="event-detail-meta" role="status" aria-live="polite" aria-busy="true">불러오는 중...</div>
<div id="event-detail-snapshots"></div>
<p><a href="<?= view_url('/') ?>">← 목록으로</a></p>
<script src="<?= view_url('/assets/detail.js') ?>"></script>
<p><a href="/">← 목록으로</a></p>
<script src="/assets/detail.js"></script>
<?php
render_footer();

9
cloud/src/View/events.php Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
<?php
require __DIR__ . '/layout.php';
render_header('이벤트');
?>
<h1>이벤트</h1>
<div id="events-root" aria-live="polite" aria-busy="true">불러오는 중...</div>
<script src="/assets/app.js"></script>
<?php
render_footer();

53
cloud/src/View/layout.php Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
<?php
/**
* Shared header/nav + footer for server-rendered views.
* No business logic: only static markup + minimal session-derived display state
* (username is read from $_SESSION purely for display, not decisioning).
* render_header()/render_footer() bracket the page-specific <main> content.
*/
if (!function_exists('view_e')) {
function view_e(string $s): string { return htmlspecialchars($s, ENT_QUOTES | ENT_SUBSTITUTE, 'UTF-8'); }
}
if (!function_exists('render_header')) {
function render_header(string $title): void {
$username = is_string($_SESSION['username'] ?? null) ? $_SESSION['username'] : null;
?>
<!doctype html>
<html lang="ko">
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
<title><?= view_e($title) ?> · 이동 감지 대시보드</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/assets/app.css">
</head>
<body>
<header class="app-header">
<nav class="app-nav">
<a href="/">이벤트</a>
<a href="/zones">구역 설정</a>
</nav>
<div class="app-session">
<?php if ($username !== null): ?>
<span><?= view_e($username) ?></span>
<button type="button" id="logout-btn">로그아웃</button>
<?php else: ?>
<a href="/login">로그인</a>
<?php endif; ?>
</div>
</header>
<main class="app-main">
<?php
}
}
if (!function_exists('render_footer')) {
function render_footer(): void {
?>
</main>
</body>
</html>
<?php
}
}

4
server/src/View/login.php → cloud/src/View/login.php
View file

@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ $csrf = $_SESSION['csrf'];
render_header('로그인');
?>
<form method="post" action="<?= view_url('/login') ?>" class="login-form">
<form method="post" action="/login" class="login-form">
<h1>로그인</h1>
<input type="hidden" name="csrf" value="<?= view_e($csrf) ?>">
<label for="username">아이디</label>
@ -20,6 +20,6 @@ render_header('로그인');
<button type="submit">로그인</button>
<p id="login-error" class="form-error" role="alert" hidden></p>
</form>
<script src="<?= view_url('/assets/login.js') ?>" defer></script>
<script src="/assets/login.js" defer></script>
<?php
render_footer();

3
server/src/View/zones.php → cloud/src/View/zones.php
View file

@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ render_header('구역 설정');
<label for="camera-id">카메라 ID</label>
<input type="text" id="camera-id" placeholder="cam-01">
<button type="button" id="zone-load-btn">불러오기</button>
<button type="button" id="zone-frame-btn">현재 화면 불러오기</button>
</div>
<div class="zone-controls">
<label for="zone-level">등급</label>
@ -24,6 +23,6 @@ render_header('구역 설정');
<canvas id="zone-canvas" width="960" height="540" tabindex="0" aria-label="구역 편집 캔버스: 클릭하여 폴리곤 점을 추가합니다"></canvas>
<ul id="zone-list" aria-live="polite"></ul>
<p id="zone-status" role="status"></p>
<script src="<?= view_url('/assets/zone-draw.js') ?>"></script>
<script src="/assets/zone-draw.js"></script>
<?php
render_footer();

26
server/tests/ApiSyncTest.php → cloud/tests/ApiSyncTest.php
View file

@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ use App\Config;
use App\Http\Request;
use App\Security\Hmac;
use App\Api\{ConfigController, HeartbeatController};
use App\Tests\Support\{InMemoryDeviceRepository, InMemoryZoneRepository, InMemoryThresholdRepository, InMemoryNonceRepository, InMemoryRateLimiter};
use App\Tests\Support\{InMemoryDeviceRepository, InMemoryZoneRepository, InMemoryThresholdRepository, InMemoryNonceRepository};
use PHPUnit\Framework\TestCase;
final class ApiSyncTest extends TestCase
@ -65,19 +65,6 @@ final class ApiSyncTest extends TestCase
$res = $c->post($this->signed('POST', '/api/heartbeat', 'sek', [], $body), now: 1000);
$this->assertSame(200, $res->status());
$this->assertSame(12.0, $dev->heartbeats['pi-1']['fps']);
$this->assertSame(7, $dev->heartbeats['pi-1']['config_version']);
}
public function testHeartbeatStoresNullConfigVersionWhenNotReported(): void {
// An older edge build sends no config_version. The server must store NULL, not a fake 0 —
// storing 0 made the dashboard's config-drift check fire on every device forever (0 != 1),
// training operators to ignore the device-warning line.
$cfg = Config::fromArray([]);
$dev = new InMemoryDeviceRepository(['pi-1' => 'sek']);
$c = new HeartbeatController($cfg, $dev, new InMemoryNonceRepository());
$body = ['device_id' => 'pi-1', 'fps' => 12.0]; // no config_version reported
$res = $c->post($this->signed('POST', '/api/heartbeat', 'sek', [], $body), now: 1000);
$this->assertSame(200, $res->status());
$this->assertNull($dev->heartbeats['pi-1']['config_version']);
}
public function testHeartbeatRejectsReplayedNonce(): void {
$cfg = Config::fromArray([]);
@ -98,15 +85,4 @@ final class ApiSyncTest extends TestCase
$req = $this->signed('POST', '/api/heartbeat', 'sek', [], $body, 'hb-stale', '1000');
$this->assertSame(401, $c->post($req, now: 5000)->status()); // 4000s > 300 default window
}
public function testHeartbeatIpFloodRateLimited(): void {
// An unauthenticated attacker flooding /api/heartbeat from one IP must be throttled
// pre-auth, before the HMAC + DB write on every hit (was: no limit at all).
$cfg = Config::fromArray(['ingest_ip_rate_limit_per_min' => 2]);
$dev = new InMemoryDeviceRepository(['pi-1' => 'sek']);
$c = new HeartbeatController($cfg, $dev, new InMemoryNonceRepository(), new InMemoryRateLimiter());
$garbage = new Request('POST', '/api/heartbeat', [], 'not-json', [], []);
$this->assertSame(401, $c->post($garbage, now: 1000, clientIp: '9.9.9.9')->status());
$this->assertSame(401, $c->post($garbage, now: 1000, clientIp: '9.9.9.9')->status());
$this->assertSame(429, $c->post($garbage, now: 1000, clientIp: '9.9.9.9')->status()); // 3rd from same IP
}
}

46
server/tests/AuthControllerTest.php → cloud/tests/AuthControllerTest.php
View file

@ -15,16 +15,12 @@ final class AuthControllerTest extends TestCase
'role' => 'operator', 'site_scope' => null, 'failed_attempts' => 0, 'locked_until' => 0,
]]);
}
private function sess(): ArraySessionStore {
// Model the real flow: GET /login already seeded the session csrf token before POST.
$s = new ArraySessionStore(); $s->set('csrf', 'tok'); return $s;
}
private function req(string $u, string $p): Request {
return new Request('POST', '/login', [], '', [], ['username' => $u, 'password' => $p, 'csrf' => 'tok']);
return new Request('POST', '/login', [], '', [], ['username' => $u, 'password' => $p]);
}
public function testLoginSuccessSetsSession(): void {
$c = new AuthController($this->users(), new InMemoryAuditRepository(), new InMemoryRateLimiter());
$sess = $this->sess();
$sess = new ArraySessionStore();
$res = $c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), $sess, now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4');
$this->assertSame(200, $res->status());
$this->assertSame(1, $sess->get('user_id'));
@ -32,39 +28,39 @@ final class AuthControllerTest extends TestCase
}
public function testBadPasswordIs401(): void {
$c = new AuthController($this->users(), new InMemoryAuditRepository(), new InMemoryRateLimiter());
$this->assertSame(401, $c->login($this->req('alice', 'nope'), $this->sess(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status());
$this->assertSame(401, $c->login($this->req('alice', 'nope'), new ArraySessionStore(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status());
}
public function testLockoutAfterMaxAttempts(): void {
$repo = $this->users();
$c = new AuthController($repo, new InMemoryAuditRepository(), new InMemoryRateLimiter(), maxAttempts: 3, lockSeconds: 900);
for ($i = 0; $i < 3; $i++) $c->login($this->req('alice', 'bad'), $this->sess(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4');
for ($i = 0; $i < 3; $i++) $c->login($this->req('alice', 'bad'), new ArraySessionStore(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4');
// now locked, even correct password is 423
$this->assertSame(423, $c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), $this->sess(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status());
$this->assertSame(423, $c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), new ArraySessionStore(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status());
}
public function testExpiredLockResetsAttempts(): void {
$repo = $this->users();
$c = new AuthController($repo, new InMemoryAuditRepository(), new InMemoryRateLimiter(), maxAttempts: 3, lockSeconds: 900);
// lock the account with 3 bad tries at now=1000
for ($i = 0; $i < 3; $i++) $c->login($this->req('alice', 'bad'), $this->sess(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4');
for ($i = 0; $i < 3; $i++) $c->login($this->req('alice', 'bad'), new ArraySessionStore(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4');
// locked_until is now 1000 + 900 = 1900, verify it's locked
$this->assertSame(423, $c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), $this->sess(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status());
$this->assertSame(423, $c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), new ArraySessionStore(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status());
// now at now=2000 (after lock window expires at 1900), login with correct password should succeed
$sess = $this->sess();
$sess = new ArraySessionStore();
$res = $c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), $sess, now: 2000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4');
$this->assertSame(200, $res->status());
$this->assertSame(1, $sess->get('user_id'));
}
public function testUnknownUsernameReturns401GenericBody(): void {
$c = new AuthController($this->users(), new InMemoryAuditRepository(), new InMemoryRateLimiter());
$res = $c->login($this->req('nobody', 'whatever'), $this->sess(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4');
$res = $c->login($this->req('nobody', 'whatever'), new ArraySessionStore(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4');
$this->assertSame(401, $res->status());
// identical generic body to the wrong-password case (no user-enumeration leak)
$wrong = $c->login($this->req('alice', 'nope'), $this->sess(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4');
$wrong = $c->login($this->req('alice', 'nope'), new ArraySessionStore(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4');
$this->assertSame($wrong->body(), $res->body());
}
public function testLogoutClearsSession(): void {
$c = new AuthController($this->users(), new InMemoryAuditRepository(), new InMemoryRateLimiter());
$sess = $this->sess();
$sess = new ArraySessionStore();
$c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), $sess, now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4');
$this->assertSame(1, $sess->get('user_id'));
$res = $c->logout($sess);
@ -76,22 +72,8 @@ final class AuthControllerTest extends TestCase
// throttled before the (expensive) Argon2id verify runs repeatedly.
$c = new AuthController($this->users(), new InMemoryAuditRepository(), new InMemoryRateLimiter(), loginIpLimitPerMin: 2);
$ip = '9.9.9.9';
$this->assertSame(200, $c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), $this->sess(), now: 1000, clientIp: $ip)->status());
$this->assertSame(200, $c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), $this->sess(), now: 1000, clientIp: $ip)->status());
$this->assertSame(429, $c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), $this->sess(), now: 1000, clientIp: $ip)->status());
}
public function testLoginRejectsMissingOrWrongCsrf(): void {
// Login CSRF: a forged cross-site POST would carry no (or a wrong) csrf field and must be
// rejected 403 BEFORE any credential check — even with an otherwise-valid password.
$c = new AuthController($this->users(), new InMemoryAuditRepository(), new InMemoryRateLimiter());
// missing csrf field in the body
$missing = new Request('POST', '/login', [], '', [], ['username' => 'alice', 'password' => 'pw']);
$this->assertSame(403, $c->login($missing, $this->sess(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status());
// wrong csrf token
$wrong = new Request('POST', '/login', [], '', [], ['username' => 'alice', 'password' => 'pw', 'csrf' => 'nope']);
$this->assertSame(403, $c->login($wrong, $this->sess(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status());
// session that never seeded a token (empty expected) also rejects, even with a matching-looking field
$noTok = new ArraySessionStore();
$this->assertSame(403, $c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), $noTok, now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status());
$this->assertSame(200, $c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), new ArraySessionStore(), now: 1000, clientIp: $ip)->status());
$this->assertSame(200, $c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), new ArraySessionStore(), now: 1000, clientIp: $ip)->status());
$this->assertSame(429, $c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), new ArraySessionStore(), now: 1000, clientIp: $ip)->status());
}
}

0
server/tests/ConfigTest.php → cloud/tests/ConfigTest.php
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60
cloud/tests/DashboardTest.php Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
namespace App\Tests;
use App\Http\Request;
use App\Auth\ArraySessionStore;
use App\Dashboard\{EventListController, EventDetailController, SnapshotProxy};
use App\Tests\Support\{InMemoryEventRepository, InMemorySnapshotRepository, InMemoryAuditRepository};
use PHPUnit\Framework\TestCase;
final class DashboardTest extends TestCase
{
private function authed(string $role = 'operator'): ArraySessionStore {
$s = new ArraySessionStore(); $s->set('user_id', 1); $s->set('username', 'u'); $s->set('role', $role); $s->set('csrf', 'tok'); return $s;
}
public function testListRequiresAuth(): void {
$repo = new InMemoryEventRepository();
$c = new EventListController($repo, new ArraySessionStore());
$this->assertSame(401, $c->json(new Request('GET', '/api/events', [], '', [], []))->status());
}
public function testListReturnsRecent(): void {
$repo = new InMemoryEventRepository();
$repo->insert(['severity' => 'high', 'event_type' => 'fall']);
$c = new EventListController($repo, $this->authed());
$res = $c->json(new Request('GET', '/api/events', [], '', [], []));
$this->assertSame(200, $res->status());
$this->assertCount(1, json_decode($res->body(), true)['events']);
}
public function testAcknowledgeRequiresPermissionAndSetsUser(): void {
$repo = new InMemoryEventRepository();
$id = $repo->insert(['severity' => 'critical', 'event_type' => 'no_motion']);
$req = new Request('POST', "/events/$id/ack", ['X-Csrf-Token' => 'tok'], '', [], []);
// viewer denied (RBAC check fires before CSRF)
$cv = new EventDetailController($repo, new InMemorySnapshotRepository(), new InMemoryAuditRepository(), $this->authed('viewer'));
$this->assertSame(403, $cv->acknowledge($req, ['id' => (string)$id])->status());
// operator allowed
$co = new EventDetailController($repo, new InMemorySnapshotRepository(), new InMemoryAuditRepository(), $this->authed('operator'));
$this->assertSame(200, $co->acknowledge($req, ['id' => (string)$id])->status());
$this->assertSame('u', $repo->find($id)['acknowledged_by']);
}
public function testAcknowledgeRejectsMissingOrWrongCsrfToken(): void {
$repo = new InMemoryEventRepository();
$id = $repo->insert(['severity' => 'critical', 'event_type' => 'no_motion']);
$c = new EventDetailController($repo, new InMemorySnapshotRepository(), new InMemoryAuditRepository(), $this->authed('operator'));
// missing header
$missing = new Request('POST', "/events/$id/ack", [], '', [], []);
$this->assertSame(403, $c->acknowledge($missing, ['id' => (string)$id])->status());
// wrong token
$wrong = new Request('POST', "/events/$id/ack", ['X-Csrf-Token' => 'nope'], '', [], []);
$this->assertSame(403, $c->acknowledge($wrong, ['id' => (string)$id])->status());
// acknowledge did not proceed
$this->assertNull($repo->find($id)['acknowledged_by']);
}
public function testSnapshotProxyAuthAnd404(): void {
$snaps = new InMemorySnapshotRepository();
$proxy = new SnapshotProxy($snaps, new ArraySessionStore()); // unauth
$this->assertSame(401, $proxy->serve(new Request('GET', '/snap/x', [], '', [], []), ['uuid' => 'x'])->status());
$proxy2 = new SnapshotProxy($snaps, $this->authed());
$this->assertSame(404, $proxy2->serve(new Request('GET', '/snap/missing', [], '', [], []), ['uuid' => 'missing'])->status());
}
}

29
server/tests/EventValidatorTest.php → cloud/tests/EventValidatorTest.php
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@ -15,35 +15,6 @@ final class EventValidatorTest extends TestCase
$this->assertTrue($r['ok'], implode(',', $r['errors']));
$this->assertSame('fall', $r['clean']['event_type']);
}
public function testRejectsOverlongIds(): void {
// An overlong id must be a 400 (invalid), not a MySQL 'Data too long' 500 that the edge
// then retries forever. Columns: device_id/camera_id VARCHAR(64), zone_id CHAR(32).
$long = $this->valid(); $long['device_id'] = str_repeat('x', 65);
$this->assertFalse(EventValidator::validate($long)['ok']);
$cam = $this->valid(); $cam['camera_id'] = str_repeat('y', 65);
$this->assertFalse(EventValidator::validate($cam)['ok']);
$zone = $this->valid(); $zone['zone_id'] = str_repeat('z', 33);
$this->assertFalse(EventValidator::validate($zone)['ok']);
// a normal-length id still passes
$ok = $this->valid(); $ok['device_id'] = str_repeat('x', 64);
$this->assertTrue(EventValidator::validate($ok)['ok']);
}
public function testAcceptsAndCleansEventUuid(): void {
$p = $this->valid(); $p['event_uuid'] = str_repeat('a', 32);
$r = EventValidator::validate($p);
$this->assertTrue($r['ok'], implode(',', $r['errors']));
$this->assertSame(str_repeat('a', 32), $r['clean']['event_uuid']);
// Optional: omitting it is valid and clean carries null (legacy edges send no uuid).
$none = EventValidator::validate($this->valid());
$this->assertTrue($none['ok']);
$this->assertNull($none['clean']['event_uuid']);
}
public function testRejectsMalformedEventUuid(): void {
foreach (['XYZ', str_repeat('a', 31), str_repeat('A', 32), 'g' . str_repeat('a', 31)] as $bad) {
$p = $this->valid(); $p['event_uuid'] = $bad;
$this->assertFalse(EventValidator::validate($p)['ok'], "uuid '$bad' must be rejected");
}
}
public function testRejectsUnknownEventType(): void {
$p = $this->valid(); $p['event_type'] = 'explode';
$this->assertFalse(EventValidator::validate($p)['ok']);

0
server/tests/HmacTest.php → cloud/tests/HmacTest.php
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0
server/tests/HttpTest.php → cloud/tests/HttpTest.php
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0
server/tests/ImageProcessorTest.php → cloud/tests/ImageProcessorTest.php
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86
cloud/tests/IngestControllerTest.php Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
namespace App\Tests;
use App\Config;
use App\Http\Request;
use App\Security\Hmac;
use App\Ingest\IngestController;
use App\Tests\Support\{InMemoryDeviceRepository, InMemoryNonceRepository,
InMemoryRateLimiter, InMemoryEventRepository, InMemorySnapshotRepository};
use PHPUnit\Framework\TestCase;
final class IngestControllerTest extends TestCase
{
private string $dir;
protected function setUp(): void { $this->dir = sys_get_temp_dir() . '/snaps' . bin2hex(random_bytes(4)); mkdir($this->dir); }
private function make(array $secrets = ['pi-1' => 'sekret']): array {
$cfg = Config::fromArray(['snapshot_dir' => $this->dir, 'timestamp_window' => 300, 'rate_limit_per_min' => 60]);
$dev = new InMemoryDeviceRepository($secrets);
$nonce = new InMemoryNonceRepository();
$rl = new InMemoryRateLimiter();
$events = new InMemoryEventRepository();
$snaps = new InMemorySnapshotRepository();
$c = new IngestController($cfg, $dev, $nonce, $rl, $events, $snaps);
return [$c, $events, $snaps, $nonce];
}
private function jpegB64(): string { $im = imagecreatetruecolor(8, 8); ob_start(); imagejpeg($im); $b = ob_get_clean(); return base64_encode($b); }
private function signedReq(string $secret, array $payload, string $nonce = 'n1', string $ts = '1000'): Request {
$body = json_encode($payload, JSON_UNESCAPED_UNICODE);
$sig = Hmac::sign($secret, $nonce, $ts, $body);
return new Request('POST', '/api/events',
['X-Nonce' => $nonce, 'X-Timestamp' => $ts, 'X-Signature' => $sig], $body, [], []);
}
private function payload(): array {
return ['device_id' => 'pi-1', 'camera_id' => 'cam-1', 'event_type' => 'fall',
'severity' => 'high', 'occurred_at' => 1000.0, 'snapshots' => [$this->jpegB64()]];
}
public function testAcceptsValidSignedEvent(): void {
[$c, $events, $snaps] = $this->make();
$res = $c->handle($this->signedReq('sekret', $this->payload()), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4');
$this->assertSame(201, $res->status());
$this->assertCount(1, $events->rows);
$id = json_decode($res->body(), true)['event_id'];
$this->assertCount(1, $snaps->forEvent($id)); // snapshot re-encoded + stored
}
public function testRejectsBadSignature(): void {
[$c] = $this->make();
$req = $this->signedReq('WRONG', $this->payload());
$this->assertSame(401, $c->handle($req, now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status());
}
public function testRejectsReplayedNonce(): void {
[$c] = $this->make();
$req = $this->signedReq('sekret', $this->payload());
$this->assertSame(201, $c->handle($req, now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status());
$this->assertSame(401, $c->handle($req, now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status()); // same nonce again
}
public function testRejectsStaleTimestamp(): void {
[$c] = $this->make();
$req = $this->signedReq('sekret', $this->payload(), ts: '1000');
$this->assertSame(401, $c->handle($req, now: 5000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status()); // 4000s > 300 window
}
public function testRejectsUnknownDevice(): void {
[$c] = $this->make([]); // no secrets
$this->assertSame(401, $c->handle($this->signedReq('x', $this->payload()), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status());
}
public function testIpFloodRateLimited(): void {
// Attacker without a valid device secret floods from one IP; the pre-auth
// IP limiter must trip BEFORE any HMAC/device-secret work, protecting
// real devices from having their own per-device quota consumed.
$cfg = Config::fromArray(['snapshot_dir' => $this->dir, 'timestamp_window' => 300, 'ingest_ip_rate_limit_per_min' => 2]);
$dev = new InMemoryDeviceRepository(['pi-1' => 'sekret']);
$nonce = new InMemoryNonceRepository();
$rl = new InMemoryRateLimiter();
$events = new InMemoryEventRepository();
$snaps = new InMemorySnapshotRepository();
$c = new IngestController($cfg, $dev, $nonce, $rl, $events, $snaps);
$garbage = new Request('POST', '/api/events', [], 'not-json', [], []);
$this->assertSame(401, $c->handle($garbage, now: 1000, clientIp: '9.9.9.9')->status());
$this->assertSame(401, $c->handle($garbage, now: 1000, clientIp: '9.9.9.9')->status());
$res = $c->handle($garbage, now: 1000, clientIp: '9.9.9.9');
$this->assertSame(429, $res->status()); // 3rd request from same IP: rate limited pre-auth
}
}

0
server/tests/PasswordCsrfTest.php → cloud/tests/PasswordCsrfTest.php
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21
server/tests/PdoIntegrationTest.php → cloud/tests/PdoIntegrationTest.php
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@ -47,11 +47,8 @@ final class PdoIntegrationTest extends TestCase
public function testEventInsertFindAcknowledge(): void
{
$repo = new PdoEventRepository($this->pdo);
$uuid = str_repeat('a', 32);
$id = $repo->insert([
'event_uuid' => $uuid,
'device_id' => 'dev-1',
'site' => 'factory-a',
'camera_id' => 'cam-1',
'event_type' => 'fall',
'severity' => 'critical',
@ -66,20 +63,10 @@ final class PdoIntegrationTest extends TestCase
$found = $repo->find($id);
$this->assertNotNull($found);
$this->assertSame('dev-1', $found['device_id']);
$this->assertSame('factory-a', $found['site']);
$this->assertSame($uuid, $found['event_uuid']);
$this->assertSame('critical', $found['severity']);
$this->assertSame(['confidence' => 0.9], $found['metrics']);
$this->assertNull($found['acknowledged_by']);
// Idempotency key lookup (P1-9).
$this->assertSame($id, $repo->idByUuid($uuid));
$this->assertNull($repo->idByUuid(str_repeat('z', 32)));
// Site-scoped page (P3-2b): matches its own site, excluded from another.
$this->assertCount(1, $repo->page(10, null, null, null, 'factory-a'));
$this->assertCount(0, $repo->page(10, null, null, null, 'factory-b'));
$recent = $repo->recent(10, 'critical');
$this->assertCount(1, $recent);
$this->assertSame([], $repo->recent(10, 'info'));
@ -148,16 +135,14 @@ final class PdoIntegrationTest extends TestCase
private static function sqliteSchema(): string
{
return <<<'SQL'
CREATE TABLE move_nonces (
CREATE TABLE nonces (
nonce TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
expires_at INTEGER NOT NULL
);
CREATE TABLE move_events (
CREATE TABLE events (
event_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
event_uuid TEXT UNIQUE,
device_id TEXT NOT NULL,
site TEXT,
camera_id TEXT NOT NULL,
event_type TEXT NOT NULL,
severity TEXT NOT NULL,
@ -171,7 +156,7 @@ final class PdoIntegrationTest extends TestCase
received_at INTEGER NOT NULL
);
CREATE TABLE move_zones (
CREATE TABLE zones (
zone_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
device_id TEXT NOT NULL,
camera_id TEXT NOT NULL,

0
server/tests/RbacTest.php → cloud/tests/RbacTest.php
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0
server/tests/RepositoryContractTest.php → cloud/tests/RepositoryContractTest.php
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0
server/tests/RouterTest.php → cloud/tests/RouterTest.php
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61
cloud/tests/Support/InMemoryRepositories.php Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
namespace App\Tests\Support;
use App\Repository\{DeviceRepository, NonceRepository, RateLimiterRepository,
EventRepository, SnapshotRepository, UserRepository, ZoneRepository,
ThresholdRepository, AuditRepository};
final class InMemoryDeviceRepository implements DeviceRepository {
public array $heartbeats = [];
public function __construct(private array $secrets = [], private array $versions = []) {}
public function secretFor(string $d): ?string { return $this->secrets[$d] ?? null; }
public function touchHeartbeat(string $d, array $m): void { $this->heartbeats[$d] = $m; }
public function configVersion(string $d): int { return $this->versions[$d] ?? 1; }
}
final class InMemoryNonceRepository implements NonceRepository {
public array $store = [];
public function seen(string $n): bool { return isset($this->store[$n]); }
public function remember(string $n, int $exp): void { $this->store[$n] = $exp; }
}
final class InMemoryRateLimiter implements RateLimiterRepository {
public array $counts = [];
public function hit(string $k, int $w): int { $key = "$k:$w"; return $this->counts[$key] = ($this->counts[$key] ?? 0) + 1; }
}
final class InMemoryEventRepository implements EventRepository {
public array $rows = []; private int $seq = 0;
public function insert(array $e): int { $id = ++$this->seq; $this->rows[$id] = $e + ['event_id' => $id, 'acknowledged_by' => null]; return $id; }
public function recent(int $limit, ?string $sev): array {
$r = array_reverse($this->rows, true);
if ($sev !== null) $r = array_filter($r, fn($x) => $x['severity'] === $sev);
return array_slice(array_values($r), 0, $limit);
}
public function find(int $id): ?array { return $this->rows[$id] ?? null; }
public function acknowledge(int $id, string $u): bool { if (!isset($this->rows[$id])) return false; $this->rows[$id]['acknowledged_by'] = $u; return true; }
}
final class InMemorySnapshotRepository implements SnapshotRepository {
public array $rows = []; public array $paths = [];
public function add(int $e, string $uuid, string $hash): void { $this->rows[$e][] = ['file_uuid' => $uuid, 'content_hash' => $hash]; $this->paths[$uuid] = "/tmp/$uuid.jpg"; }
public function forEvent(int $e): array { return $this->rows[$e] ?? []; }
public function pathByUuid(string $u): ?string { return $this->paths[$u] ?? null; }
}
final class InMemoryUserRepository implements UserRepository {
public function __construct(public array $users = []) {}
public function byUsername(string $u): ?array { return $this->users[$u] ?? null; }
public function recordFailure(int $id, int $lock): void { foreach ($this->users as &$row) if ($row['id'] === $id) { $row['failed_attempts'] = ($row['failed_attempts'] ?? 0) + 1; $row['locked_until'] = $lock; } }
public function clearFailures(int $id): void { foreach ($this->users as &$row) if ($row['id'] === $id) { $row['failed_attempts'] = 0; $row['locked_until'] = 0; } }
}
final class InMemoryZoneRepository implements ZoneRepository {
public array $zones = []; private int $seq = 0;
public function forDevice(string $d): array { return array_values(array_filter($this->zones, fn($z) => ($z['device_id'] ?? '') === $d)); }
public function forCamera(string $c): array { return array_values(array_filter($this->zones, fn($z) => $z['camera_id'] === $c)); }
public function save(array $z): string { $id = $z['zone_id'] ?? ('z' . (++$this->seq)); $this->zones[$id] = $z + ['zone_id' => $id]; return $id; }
public function delete(string $id): bool { if (!isset($this->zones[$id])) return false; unset($this->zones[$id]); return true; }
}
final class InMemoryThresholdRepository implements ThresholdRepository {
public function __construct(private array $data = []) {}
public function forDevice(string $d): array { return $this->data[$d] ?? []; }
}
final class InMemoryAuditRepository implements AuditRepository {
public array $log = [];
public function append(string $a, string $act, string $t, array $b, array $af): void { $this->log[] = compact('a', 'act', 't', 'b', 'af'); }
}

0
server/tests/WiringSmokeTest.php → cloud/tests/WiringSmokeTest.php
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69
cloud/tests/ZoneConfigTest.php Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
namespace App\Tests;
use App\Http\Request;
use App\Auth\ArraySessionStore;
use App\Geometry\Polygon;
use App\Dashboard\ZoneConfigController;
use App\Tests\Support\{InMemoryZoneRepository, InMemoryAuditRepository};
use PHPUnit\Framework\TestCase;
final class ZoneConfigTest extends TestCase
{
private function authed(string $role = 'operator'): ArraySessionStore {
$s = new ArraySessionStore(); $s->set('user_id', 1); $s->set('username', 'u'); $s->set('role', $role); $s->set('csrf', 'tok'); return $s;
}
public function testPolygonValidation(): void {
$this->assertTrue(Polygon::validate([[0,0],[10,0],[10,10]]));
$this->assertFalse(Polygon::validate([[0,0],[10,0]])); // <3
$this->assertFalse(Polygon::validate([[0,0],[10,0],['x',10]])); // non-numeric
}
private function saveReq(array $body, array $headers = ['X-Csrf-Token' => 'tok']): Request {
return new Request('POST', '/api/zones', $headers, json_encode($body), [], []);
}
public function testSaveRequiresPermission(): void {
$c = new ZoneConfigController(new InMemoryZoneRepository(), new InMemoryAuditRepository(), $this->authed('viewer'));
$res = $c->save($this->saveReq(['camera_id' => 'cam-1', 'level' => 'restricted', 'polygon' => [[0,0],[9,0],[9,9]]]));
$this->assertSame(403, $res->status());
}
public function testSaveValidZone(): void {
$repo = new InMemoryZoneRepository();
$c = new ZoneConfigController($repo, new InMemoryAuditRepository(), $this->authed('operator'));
$res = $c->save($this->saveReq(['device_id' => 'pi-1', 'camera_id' => 'cam-1', 'level' => 'restricted', 'polygon' => [[0,0],[9,0],[9,9]]]));
$this->assertSame(201, $res->status());
$this->assertCount(1, $repo->forCamera('cam-1'));
}
public function testSaveRejectsBadLevelOrPolygon(): void {
$c = new ZoneConfigController(new InMemoryZoneRepository(), new InMemoryAuditRepository(), $this->authed('operator'));
$this->assertSame(400, $c->save($this->saveReq(['camera_id' => 'cam-1', 'level' => 'BOOM', 'polygon' => [[0,0],[9,0],[9,9]]]))->status());
$this->assertSame(400, $c->save($this->saveReq(['camera_id' => 'cam-1', 'level' => 'warning', 'polygon' => [[0,0]]]))->status());
}
public function testSaveRejectsMissingOrWrongCsrf(): void {
$repo = new InMemoryZoneRepository();
$c = new ZoneConfigController($repo, new InMemoryAuditRepository(), $this->authed('operator'));
$body = ['device_id' => 'pi-1', 'camera_id' => 'cam-1', 'level' => 'restricted', 'polygon' => [[0,0],[9,0],[9,9]]];
// missing header
$this->assertSame(403, $c->save($this->saveReq($body, []))->status());
// wrong token
$this->assertSame(403, $c->save($this->saveReq($body, ['X-Csrf-Token' => 'nope']))->status());
// save did not proceed
$this->assertCount(0, $repo->forCamera('cam-1'));
}
public function testDeleteRejectsMissingOrWrongCsrf(): void {
$repo = new InMemoryZoneRepository();
$repo->save(['zone_id' => 'z1', 'device_id' => 'pi-1', 'camera_id' => 'cam-1', 'level' => 'restricted', 'polygon_json' => '[[0,0],[9,0],[9,9]]']);
$c = new ZoneConfigController($repo, new InMemoryAuditRepository(), $this->authed('operator'));
// missing header
$missing = new Request('POST', '/api/zones/z1/delete', [], '', [], []);
$this->assertSame(403, $c->delete($missing, ['id' => 'z1'])->status());
// wrong token
$wrong = new Request('POST', '/api/zones/z1/delete', ['X-Csrf-Token' => 'nope'], '', [], []);
$this->assertSame(403, $c->delete($wrong, ['id' => 'z1'])->status());
// delete did not proceed
$this->assertCount(1, $repo->forCamera('cam-1'));
// valid token proceeds
$ok = new Request('POST', '/api/zones/z1/delete', ['X-Csrf-Token' => 'tok'], '', [], []);
$this->assertSame(200, $c->delete($ok, ['id' => 'z1'])->status());
$this->assertCount(0, $repo->forCamera('cam-1'));
}
}

66
deploy/README.md
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@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
Offline-installable bundle + systemd unit for the `move-detect` edge daemon.
The bundle is fully self-contained (all wheels + pose model + source): the Pi
performs **zero network fetches** at install or run time. The only runtime
network use is the server POST / config-poll / heartbeat, and even that tolerates
network use is the cloud POST / config-poll / heartbeat, and even that tolerates
being offline (events buffer in the local sqlite queue and flush on reconnect).
> Scope: this covers the **CPU MoveNet + USB (UVC) webcam** path — the one the
@ -21,46 +21,6 @@ being offline (events buffer in the local sqlite queue and flush on reconnect).
| `systemd/move-detect-edge.service` | the Pi | the daemon unit (auto-restart, device access, hardening) |
| `systemd/move-detect-edge.env.example` | the Pi | env template → `/etc/move-detect/edge.env` |
## Quick start — Pi with internet (one command)
If the Pi itself has internet, skip the offline bundle entirely. Copy the built delivery
folder onto the Pi — **copy the working tree, not a fresh `git clone`**: the pose model
`models/yolov8s_pose.hef` is git-ignored (a build artifact), so a clone arrives without it.
Use `scp -r`/USB from a build machine that has already staged `models/` (see step 1). Then:
```bash
sudo deploy/setup_online.sh
```
It installs the system packages (`python3-picamera2`, and `hailo-all` if present), builds
the venv, pip-installs the runtime deps, **places the pose model from the delivery's
`models/`** (it does NOT download models on the Pi — the HEF/ONNX are fetched on the build
machine per the air-gap rule, `build pulls, target doesn't`), writes `/etc/move-detect/edge.env`
(prompting for `DEVICE_ID` / `DEVICE_SECRET` / `CAFE24_URL` / `CAMERAS`, or take them from env
vars), probes every camera, installs the systemd unit, and starts the service. It uses Hailo
when `models/yolov8s_pose.hef` is present (or pass `HAILO_HEF=/path/to.hef`), else CPU MoveNet
when `models/movenet_lightning.onnx` + onnxruntime are present. The rest of this doc is the
**air-gapped** path.
### Secret handling (`deploy/device.env`)
If you pre-provision with `deploy/device.env`, that file holds this device's **HMAC secret in
plaintext**. It is gitignored (never committed), but it rides onto the Pi with the "copy the
working tree" transfer. After a successful install:
1. **Delete it:** `shred -u deploy/device.env` (the live secret now lives only in
`/etc/move-detect/edge.env`, `0640 root:movedetect`). The installer already `chmod 600`s it
while running, but that is defense-in-depth, not a substitute for removing it.
2. **Rotate if it was ever exposed** (shared over chat, a shell history, a shared drive):
update `move_devices.secret` on the server and the `DEVICE_SECRET` in the Pi's
`/etc/move-detect/edge.env`, then restart the service. A leaked secret lets anyone forge
signed events/heartbeats for this device.
Prefer `device.env` over passing `DEVICE_SECRET=...` on the `sudo` command line, which leaves the
secret in the shell history.
---
## 1. Build the bundle (on a machine WITH internet)
**Most reliable: build on an aarch64 host** (a Pi 5, or an arm64 CI runner) so the
@ -77,18 +37,16 @@ wheel tags may not resolve; if it fails, build natively):
deploy/bundle/build_offline_bundle.sh --cross # target aarch64 / cp311
```
Output: the folder `dist/2_pi_install/` (+ `MANIFEST.txt` listing the bundled
wheels). Copy the WHOLE FOLDER across the air gap as-is — no archive step.
Set `MAKE_TARBALL=1` if you would rather transfer one
`dist/2_pi_install-aarch64-cp311-hailo8.tar.gz` file.
Output: `dist/move-detect-edge-bundle-aarch64-cp311.tar.gz` (+ `MANIFEST.txt`
listing the bundled wheels). This single file crosses the air gap.
## 2. Transfer + install (on the air-gapped Pi)
Copy `dist/2_pi_install/` across the gap (USB, one-way transfer, etc.), then:
Copy the tarball across the gap (USB, one-way transfer, etc.), then:
```bash
# tarball variant only (MAKE_TARBALL=1): tar xzf 2_pi_install-aarch64-cp311-hailo8.tar.gz
cd 2_pi_install
tar xzf move-detect-edge-bundle-aarch64-cp311.tar.gz
cd move-detect-edge-bundle
sudo ./install_offline.sh
```
@ -105,8 +63,8 @@ sudo systemctl enable --now move-detect-edge
journalctl -u move-detect-edge -f
```
`DEVICE_ID`/`DEVICE_SECRET` must match a `devices` row in the server (see
`server/docs/server-deploy.md` §6). `MOVENET_ONNX` should point at the bundled
`DEVICE_ID`/`DEVICE_SECRET` must match a `devices` row in the cloud (see
`cloud/docs/cloud-deploy.md` §6). `MOVENET_ONNX` should point at the bundled
model (`/opt/move-detect/models/movenet_lightning.onnx`).
## 4. Verify the air gap (do this before trusting a build)
@ -117,7 +75,7 @@ model (`/opt/move-detect/models/movenet_lightning.onnx`).
- [ ] Step [4/6] of the installer prints `edge import OK` (onnxruntime + cv2 +
numpy + requests all import from the venv).
- [ ] `systemctl status move-detect-edge` is `active (running)`; the log shows
frames processed and (if the server is reachable) heartbeats.
frames processed and (if the cloud is reachable) heartbeats.
- [ ] Pull the network cable → events keep queueing (`QUEUE_DB` grows) → restore
→ the queue flushes. (End-to-end behavior verified in the edge e2e harness.)
@ -149,14 +107,14 @@ validated). USB webcam stays available anytime via `CAMERA_BACKEND=uvc`.
**Multiple cameras at once.** Set `CAMERAS=backend:device:camera_id,...` to run several
cameras in one daemon — each gets its own detection pipeline and `camera_id`, they share
the Hailo device (round-robin) and the offline queue, and server zones are routed to the
the Hailo device (round-robin) and the offline queue, and cloud zones are routed to the
matching camera. Example — CSI + USB together:
```ini
CAMERAS=csi:0:cam-01,uvc:0:cam-02
```
Each `camera_id` must match the `camera_id` on that camera's zones in the server.
Each `camera_id` must match the `camera_id` on that camera's zones in the cloud.
> **Air gap:** `hailo-all` / `python3-picamera2` are the ONE piece this bundle can't
> carry (Hailo's own driver + apt tree). Pre-install them on the Pi image, or transfer
@ -165,7 +123,7 @@ Each `camera_id` must match the `camera_id` on that camera's zones in the server
## Not bundled (by design)
- **MySQL / the server app** — a separate host; see `server/docs/server-deploy.md`.
- **MySQL / the cloud app** — a separate host; see `cloud/docs/cloud-deploy.md`.
- **HailoRT + `yolov8s_pose.hef` + picamera2** — Hailo's runtime/driver, the compiled
HEF, and the CSI camera stack are Pi system packages installed out-of-band (above);
the default CPU MoveNet + USB path needs none of them.

128
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View file

@ -20,17 +20,12 @@ set -euo pipefail
REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../.." && pwd)"
OUT_DIR="${OUT_DIR:-$REPO_ROOT/dist}"
STAGE="$OUT_DIR/2_pi_install"
STAGE="$OUT_DIR/move-detect-edge-bundle"
WHEELHOUSE="$STAGE/wheelhouse"
PYVER="${PYVER:-3.11}" # Pi OS Bookworm ships CPython 3.11
PYABI="cp${PYVER//./}" # cp311
TARGET_ARCH="${TARGET_ARCH:-aarch64}"
HAILO_ARCH="${HAILO_ARCH:-hailo8}" # 26 TOPS AI HAT+ (Hailo-8); set hailo8l for the 13 TOPS AI Kit
# Mandatory for EVERY backend (cv2/numpy/requests are on the unconditional startup chain).
# onnxruntime is the CPU-MoveNet fallback only and publishes no 32-bit-ARM wheel / no sdist, so
# it is downloaded best-effort — a Hailo bundle need not carry it (install_offline treats it optional).
RUNTIME_PKGS=(numpy requests opencv-python-headless)
OPTIONAL_PKGS=(onnxruntime)
RUNTIME_PKGS=(numpy requests onnxruntime opencv-python-headless)
MODE="native"
[ "${1:-}" = "--cross" ] && MODE="cross"
@ -38,13 +33,12 @@ MODE="native"
echo ">> build mode : $MODE"
echo ">> python target : $PYVER ($PYABI)"
echo ">> target arch : $TARGET_ARCH"
echo ">> hailo arch : $HAILO_ARCH"
echo ">> output : $OUT_DIR"
rm -rf "$STAGE"
mkdir -p "$WHEELHOUSE" "$STAGE/src" "$STAGE/models" "$STAGE/deploy/systemd" "$STAGE/docs"
echo ">> [1/6] downloading runtime wheels -> wheelhouse/"
echo ">> [1/5] downloading runtime wheels -> wheelhouse/"
if [ "$MODE" = "cross" ]; then
# Best-effort cross download. Try the common manylinux aarch64 tags.
python3 -m pip download \
@ -53,14 +47,6 @@ if [ "$MODE" = "cross" ]; then
--platform "manylinux2014_${TARGET_ARCH}" \
--platform "manylinux_2_28_${TARGET_ARCH}" \
-d "$WHEELHOUSE" "${RUNTIME_PKGS[@]}"
# CPU fallback wheel, best-effort — onnxruntime may have no matching aarch64/$PYABI tag.
python3 -m pip download \
--only-binary=:all: \
--python-version "$PYVER" --implementation cp --abi "$PYABI" \
--platform "manylinux2014_${TARGET_ARCH}" \
--platform "manylinux_2_28_${TARGET_ARCH}" \
-d "$WHEELHOUSE" "${OPTIONAL_PKGS[@]}" \
|| echo " -> onnxruntime aarch64/$PYABI wheel unavailable; Hailo-only bundle (no CPU MoveNet)."
else
# Native: wheels for THIS host's interpreter/arch (run on the Pi / arm64 CI).
# Guard the ABI: numpy/onnxruntime ship version-specific cpXY wheels, so a build
@ -73,131 +59,37 @@ else
echo " or use --cross to pin aarch64/$PYABI wheels explicitly." >&2
exit 1
fi
# Guard the ARCH too: a native build on an x86_64 workstation would download x86_64 wheels
# while the tarball is still named/declared aarch64 (line 27/86/92) — a bundle that installs
# then fails to import on the Pi. numpy/opencv/onnxruntime are per-arch, so this is fatal.
HOST_ARCH="$(uname -m)"
if [ "$HOST_ARCH" != "$TARGET_ARCH" ]; then
echo "ERROR: native build host arch is $HOST_ARCH but TARGET_ARCH is $TARGET_ARCH." >&2
echo " Build natively ON an $TARGET_ARCH host (a Pi 5 / arm64 CI), or use --cross." >&2
exit 1
fi
python3 -m pip download -d "$WHEELHOUSE" "${RUNTIME_PKGS[@]}"
# CPU fallback wheel, best-effort — a Hailo bundle is complete without it.
python3 -m pip download -d "$WHEELHOUSE" "${OPTIONAL_PKGS[@]}" \
|| echo " -> onnxruntime unavailable for this host; Hailo-only bundle (no CPU MoveNet)."
fi
echo ">> [2/6] fetching MoveNet ONNX model (optional CPU fallback; build-machine only)"
# Optional: the MoveNet source may be unreachable, and a Hailo-8 delivery runs off the HEF. Do
# not abort the whole bundle over the CPU fallback — stage it if we can, otherwise carry on.
if ( cd "$REPO_ROOT" && python3 -m edge.tools.fetch_movenet ); then
echo ">> [2/5] fetching MoveNet ONNX model (build-machine only)"
( cd "$REPO_ROOT" && python3 -m edge.tools.fetch_movenet )
cp "$REPO_ROOT/models/movenet_lightning.onnx" "$STAGE/models/"
else
echo " -> MoveNet ONNX unavailable; Hailo-only bundle (CPU fallback not included)."
fi
echo ">> [3/6] fetching Hailo $HAILO_ARCH yolov8s_pose HEF (build-machine only)"
# Mandatory for a Hailo delivery: this is the primary pose backend. fetch_hailo_hef verifies the
# download against a pinned sha256 and refuses a mismatch, so a bad/tampered HEF aborts the build.
( cd "$REPO_ROOT" && HAILO_ARCH="$HAILO_ARCH" python3 -m edge.tools.fetch_hailo_hef --arch "$HAILO_ARCH" )
cp "$REPO_ROOT/models/yolov8s_pose.hef" "$STAGE/models/"
echo ">> [4/6] staging edge source (package + pyproject)"
echo ">> [3/5] staging edge source (package + pyproject)"
cp -r "$REPO_ROOT/edge" "$STAGE/src/edge"
cp "$REPO_ROOT/pyproject.toml" "$STAGE/src/"
# do not ship compiled caches
find "$STAGE/src" -name '__pycache__' -type d -prune -exec rm -rf {} +
echo ">> [5/6] staging deploy assets + install script"
echo ">> [4/5] staging deploy assets + install script"
cp "$REPO_ROOT/deploy/systemd/move-detect-edge.service" "$STAGE/deploy/systemd/"
cp "$REPO_ROOT/deploy/systemd/move-detect-edge.env.example" "$STAGE/deploy/systemd/"
cp "$REPO_ROOT/deploy/bundle/install_offline.sh" "$STAGE/"
cp "$REPO_ROOT/docs/pilot-runbook.md" "$STAGE/docs/" 2>/dev/null || true
chmod +x "$STAGE/install_offline.sh"
# Supply-chain integrity (air-gap: the target can't reach PyPI to re-resolve, so pin + hash here).
# requirements.lock — exact name==version of every bundled wheel, for a reproducible rebuild.
# sbom.json — CycloneDX component list: wheels AND models (name, version, sha256).
# SHA256SUMS — sha256 of EVERY staged file (code, unit, installer, env template, models,
# wheels, lock, sbom, MANIFEST). Generated LAST so it covers everything
# install_offline.sh lays down and runs as root — not just the wheels/models.
echo ">> generating requirements.lock + sbom.json"
: > "$STAGE/requirements.lock"
{
printf '{\n "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",\n "specVersion": "1.5",\n "version": 1,\n "components": [\n'
sep=""
for whl in "$WHEELHOUSE"/*.whl; do
[ -e "$whl" ] || continue
base="$(basename "$whl")"
name="$(echo "$base" | cut -d- -f1)" # wheel: {name}-{version}-{pyabi}-...-{plat}.whl
ver="$(echo "$base" | cut -d- -f2)"
sum="$(sha256sum "$whl" | cut -d' ' -f1)"
echo "${name}==${ver}" >> "$STAGE/requirements.lock"
printf '%s {"type":"library","name":"%s","version":"%s","purl":"pkg:pypi/%s@%s","hashes":[{"alg":"SHA-256","content":"%s"}]}' \
"$sep" "$name" "$ver" "$name" "$ver" "$sum"
sep=$',\n'
done
# ML weights are shipped artifacts too — record them so a customer-side SBOM audit is complete.
for mdl in "$STAGE"/models/*; do
[ -e "$mdl" ] || continue
mbase="$(basename "$mdl")"
msum="$(sha256sum "$mdl" | cut -d' ' -f1)"
printf '%s {"type":"file","name":"%s","hashes":[{"alg":"SHA-256","content":"%s"}]}' \
"$sep" "$mbase" "$msum"
sep=$',\n'
done
printf '\n ]\n}\n'
} > "$STAGE/sbom.json"
sort -u -o "$STAGE/requirements.lock" "$STAGE/requirements.lock"
# Which pose backends this bundle can actually run, so the operator knows before it crosses the
# air gap. Hailo needs the HEF (present) + system hailo_platform on the Pi; MoveNet needs the ONNX.
HAS_ONNX=no; [ -f "$STAGE/models/movenet_lightning.onnx" ] && HAS_ONNX=yes
SIGNED=no; [ -n "${SIGN_KEY:-}" ] && SIGNED=yes
{
echo "bundle: move-detect-edge"
echo "built_mode: $MODE"
echo "python: $PYVER ($PYABI)"
echo "target_arch: $TARGET_ARCH"
echo "hailo_arch: $HAILO_ARCH"
echo "pose_backends: hailo (yolov8s_pose.hef)$([ "$HAS_ONNX" = yes ] && echo ', movenet (movenet_lightning.onnx)')"
echo "integrity: SHA256SUMS covers ALL bundle files (verified on install)$([ "$SIGNED" = yes ] && echo ', SHA256SUMS.asc (signed)')"
echo "models:"
ls -1 "$STAGE/models"
echo "wheels:"
ls -1 "$WHEELHOUSE"
} > "$STAGE/MANIFEST.txt"
# SHA256SUMS LAST: hash every staged file EXCEPT the manifest itself and its detached signature,
# so the daemon source, systemd unit, installer, env template, models and wheels are ALL covered.
# A tampered edge/daemon.py can no longer pass `sha256sum -c` and then be installed and run.
( cd "$STAGE" && find . -type f ! -name SHA256SUMS ! -name 'SHA256SUMS.asc' -print0 \
| sort -z | xargs -0 sha256sum > SHA256SUMS )
# Optional detached GPG signature over the integrity file. When present, install_offline.sh
# REQUIRES it to verify (a failed signature is fatal there); when absent the bundle offers
# corruption-detection only. Provenance-critical deliveries MUST set SIGN_KEY.
if [ -n "${SIGN_KEY:-}" ]; then
gpg --local-user "$SIGN_KEY" --armor --detach-sign --output "$STAGE/SHA256SUMS.asc" "$STAGE/SHA256SUMS"
echo ">> signed SHA256SUMS with key $SIGN_KEY -> SHA256SUMS.asc"
else
echo ">> NOTE: SHA256SUMS is unsigned (corruption-detection only). Set SIGN_KEY=<gpg-id> for a"
echo ">> detached signature; install_offline.sh will then require it to verify."
fi
echo ">> [6/6] packaging tarball"
if [ "${MAKE_TARBALL:-0}" != "1" ]; then
# Default: leave $STAGE uncompressed — copy the folder to the Pi (USB/scp) and run
# install_offline.sh inside it. Set MAKE_TARBALL=1 for a single transferable file.
echo ">> skipped (MAKE_TARBALL=1 to also produce a .tar.gz)"
echo ">> DONE: $STAGE"
echo ">> copy this folder to the Pi, then run ./install_offline.sh inside it."
exit 0
fi
# Embed the Hailo arch in the filename: hailo8 and hailo8l bundles are byte-different but were
# otherwise identically named, so the wrong one could be shipped to a board and crash-loop.
TARBALL="$OUT_DIR/2_pi_install-${TARGET_ARCH}-${PYABI}-${HAILO_ARCH}.tar.gz"
tar -C "$OUT_DIR" -czf "$TARBALL" "2_pi_install"
echo ">> [5/5] packaging tarball"
TARBALL="$OUT_DIR/move-detect-edge-bundle-${TARGET_ARCH}-${PYABI}.tar.gz"
tar -C "$OUT_DIR" -czf "$TARBALL" "move-detect-edge-bundle"
echo ">> DONE: $TARBALL"
echo ">> transfer this single file across the air gap, then run install_offline.sh on the Pi."

188
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@ -18,78 +18,7 @@ STATE=/var/lib/move-detect
ETC=/etc/move-detect
SVC_USER=movedetect
WHEELHOUSE="$HERE/wheelhouse"
# Mandatory for every backend. onnxruntime is deliberately NOT here — see the optional
# install below; a Hailo bundle need not carry its wheel.
RUNTIME_PKGS=(numpy requests opencv-python-headless)
OPTIONAL_PKGS=(onnxruntime)
echo ">> [0/6] verify bundle integrity BEFORE touching the system"
# Verify EVERY bundled file against the build-time SHA256SUMS before any mutation of $PREFIX. A
# truncated/tampered bundle must abort HERE — with the previous install still intact — never after
# rm -rf has already destroyed it and left the Restart=always unit to run half-copied code. The
# build now hashes the daemon source, unit and this installer too, so tampered code cannot pass.
ALLOW_UNVERIFIED="${ALLOW_UNVERIFIED:-0}"
if [ -f "$HERE/SHA256SUMS" ]; then
( cd "$HERE" && sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS ) \
|| { echo "ERROR: bundle integrity check failed (SHA256SUMS mismatch) — refusing to install." >&2; exit 1; }
# sha256sum -c only checks LISTED files; an INJECTED extra wheel (which could win pip's version
# resolution) would pass unnoticed. Refuse any staged file not present in the manifest.
EXTRA="$( cd "$HERE" && comm -23 \
<(find . -type f ! -name SHA256SUMS ! -name 'SHA256SUMS.asc' | sed 's|^\./||' | sort) \
<(awk '{print $2}' SHA256SUMS | sed 's|^[*]||; s|^\./||' | sort) )"
if [ -n "$EXTRA" ]; then
echo "ERROR: bundle contains file(s) not listed in SHA256SUMS (possible injection):" >&2
echo "$EXTRA" >&2
exit 1
fi
# A detached signature proves PROVENANCE — an unsigned SHA256SUMS only detects corruption, since
# an attacker who can modify the bundle can strip the .asc and regenerate the hashes. Set
# REQUIRE_SIGNATURE=1 for untrusted transport to make a missing/invalid signature fatal.
REQUIRE_SIGNATURE="${REQUIRE_SIGNATURE:-0}"
if [ -f "$HERE/SHA256SUMS.asc" ]; then
gpg --verify "$HERE/SHA256SUMS.asc" "$HERE/SHA256SUMS" 2>/dev/null \
|| { echo "ERROR: SHA256SUMS.asc present but its signature did NOT verify — refusing to install." >&2; exit 1; }
echo " -> SHA256SUMS signature verified"
elif [ "$REQUIRE_SIGNATURE" = 1 ]; then
echo "ERROR: REQUIRE_SIGNATURE=1 but this bundle has no SHA256SUMS.asc. An unsigned bundle" >&2
echo "detects corruption only, not tampering — refusing. Build with SIGN_KEY, or clear the flag." >&2
exit 1
else
echo " -> NOTE: unsigned bundle (corruption-detection only; set REQUIRE_SIGNATURE=1 to require a signature)."
fi
echo " -> bundle integrity OK"
elif [ "$ALLOW_UNVERIFIED" = 1 ]; then
echo " -> WARNING: no SHA256SUMS; ALLOW_UNVERIFIED=1 set — installing WITHOUT integrity check." >&2
else
echo "ERROR: no SHA256SUMS in this bundle — refusing to install unverified code. Rebuild with a" >&2
echo "current build_offline_bundle.sh, or (NOT recommended) re-run with ALLOW_UNVERIFIED=1." >&2
exit 1
fi
echo ">> [0b/6] Hailo arch preflight (BEFORE any mutation)"
# A hailo8 HEF on a hailo8l board (or vice-versa) imports fine but the daemon dies with
# HAILO_INVALID_HEF(26) on every start, forever. Catch the WRONG bundle here — using MANIFEST.txt
# (staged) + hailortcli (a system CLI, no venv needed) — so a mismatch aborts with the previous
# install still intact, not after the HEF/source/venv have already been overwritten.
BUNDLE_HAILO_ARCH="$(awk -F': ' '/^hailo_arch:/{gsub(/[[:space:]]/,"",$2); print tolower($2); exit}' "$HERE/MANIFEST.txt" 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -n "$BUNDLE_HAILO_ARCH" ]; then
BOARD_HAILO_ARCH=""
if command -v hailortcli >/dev/null 2>&1; then
BOARD_HAILO_ARCH="$(hailortcli fw-control identify 2>/dev/null \
| awk -F': ' '/[Aa]rchitecture/{gsub(/[[:space:]]/,"",$2); print tolower($2); exit}')"
fi
if [ -n "$BOARD_HAILO_ARCH" ] && [ "$BUNDLE_HAILO_ARCH" != "$BOARD_HAILO_ARCH" ]; then
echo "ERROR: Hailo arch mismatch — this bundle's HEF is '$BUNDLE_HAILO_ARCH' but the board is" >&2
echo "'$BOARD_HAILO_ARCH'. It would crash-loop with HAILO_INVALID_HEF(26). Rebuild with" >&2
echo "HAILO_ARCH=$BOARD_HAILO_ARCH (deploy/bundle/build_offline_bundle.sh)." >&2
exit 1
elif [ -z "$BOARD_HAILO_ARCH" ]; then
echo " -> NOTE: could not read the board's Hailo arch (hailortcli?) to verify the bundle's" >&2
echo " '$BUNDLE_HAILO_ARCH'; if the daemon later fails HAILO_INVALID_HEF(26), the arch is wrong." >&2
else
echo " -> Hailo arch OK ($BUNDLE_HAILO_ARCH)"
fi
fi
RUNTIME_PKGS=(numpy requests onnxruntime opencv-python-headless)
echo ">> [1/6] service account + groups"
if ! id -u "$SVC_USER" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
@ -102,24 +31,15 @@ done
echo ">> [2/6] lay down source, model, docs under $PREFIX"
install -d -m 0755 "$PREFIX" "$PREFIX/src" "$PREFIX/models" "$PREFIX/docs"
# Fully replace the package tree on re-install/upgrade, atomically. Stage the new tree beside the
# old and rename over it: an interrupted copy leaves the previous WORKING tree untouched (the
# Restart=always unit keeps running old code) instead of a half-copied one. The rename also avoids
# `cp -r SRC DEST` nesting SRC *inside* an existing DEST (edge/edge/...) and running the OLD code.
rm -rf "$PREFIX/src/edge.new"
cp -r "$HERE/src/edge" "$PREFIX/src/edge.new"
# Fully replace the package tree on re-install/upgrade. Without the rm, `cp -r SRC DEST`
# nests SRC *inside* an existing DEST (edge/edge/...) and the OLD code keeps running.
rm -rf "$PREFIX/src/edge"
mv "$PREFIX/src/edge.new" "$PREFIX/src/edge"
cp -r "$HERE/src/edge" "$PREFIX/src/edge"
cp "$HERE/src/pyproject.toml" "$PREFIX/src/" 2>/dev/null || true
# Copy whichever pose models the bundle carries. Each is optional on its own — a Hailo bundle
# ships only the .hef, a CPU bundle only the .onnx — so a missing glob must not abort the install
# (the [5/6] backend gate below is what refuses a bundle with NO usable backend).
cp "$HERE/models/"*.hef "$PREFIX/models/" 2>/dev/null || true
cp "$HERE/models/"*.onnx "$PREFIX/models/" 2>/dev/null || true
cp "$HERE/models/"*.onnx "$PREFIX/models/"
cp "$HERE/docs/"*.md "$PREFIX/docs/" 2>/dev/null || true
echo ">> [3/6] python venv + offline wheel install (--no-index)"
# Integrity was already verified up-front in step [0/6], before any system mutation.
# --system-site-packages so the venv can import the Pi SYSTEM packages that are NOT
# pip-installable: hailo_platform (HailoRT, apt: hailo-all) for POSE_BACKEND=hailo, and
# picamera2 (apt: python3-picamera2) for CAMERA_BACKEND=csi. The wheelhouse install
@ -129,96 +49,21 @@ echo ">> [3/6] python venv + offline wheel install (--no-index)"
python3 -m venv --system-site-packages "$PREFIX/venv"
"$PREFIX/venv/bin/pip" install --no-index --find-links "$WHEELHOUSE" --upgrade pip >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
"$PREFIX/venv/bin/pip" install --no-index --find-links "$WHEELHOUSE" "${RUNTIME_PKGS[@]}"
# Optional: only present if the bundle was built for the CPU MoveNet backend. Still --no-index
# (zero fetches, air-gap intact); absent simply means Hailo-only.
"$PREFIX/venv/bin/pip" install --no-index --find-links "$WHEELHOUSE" "${OPTIONAL_PKGS[@]}" \
|| echo " -> onnxruntime not in the wheelhouse; Hailo-only bundle (CPU MoveNet unavailable)."
echo ">> [4/6] verify the edge package imports offline"
# cv2/numpy/requests are mandatory for every backend (snapshot.py imports cv2 at module level
# on the unconditional startup chain; the daemon's server clients import requests at startup).
PYTHONPATH="$PREFIX/src" "$PREFIX/venv/bin/python" -c "import edge.daemon, cv2, numpy, requests; print('edge import OK')"
# onnxruntime is the CPU-MoveNet-only dep — the Hailo path never imports it, and onnxruntime
# ships no sdist and no 32-bit-ARM wheel, so a bundle built for a Hailo Pi legitimately may
# not carry it. Report, don't fail: a hard `import onnxruntime` here refuses the install over
# a package the daemon never loads.
if PYTHONPATH="$PREFIX/src" "$PREFIX/venv/bin/python" -c "import onnxruntime" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo " -> onnxruntime present; CPU MoveNet available"
else
echo " -> onnxruntime absent; CPU MoveNet unavailable (set POSE_BACKEND=hailo in $ETC/edge.env)"
fi
echo ">> [5/6] pose backend gate + state dir + env file"
# Do NOT hand over a Pi whose POSE_BACKEND cannot load. The template ships POSE_BACKEND=movenet,
# but a Hailo-only bundle carries no onnxruntime/ONNX — installing it verbatim would crash-loop.
# Probe what can ACTUALLY run (like setup_online's [6/8]) and reconcile, or refuse.
HEF_DEST="$PREFIX/models/yolov8s_pose.hef"
ONNX_DEST="$PREFIX/models/movenet_lightning.onnx"
pyhas() { PYTHONPATH="$PREFIX/src" "$PREFIX/venv/bin/python" -c "import $1" >/dev/null 2>&1; }
state() { if "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; then echo present; else echo MISSING; fi; }
HAILO_OK=0; MOVENET_OK=0
if [ -f "$HEF_DEST" ] && pyhas hailo_platform; then HAILO_OK=1; fi
if [ -f "$ONNX_DEST" ] && pyhas onnxruntime; then MOVENET_OK=1; fi
if [ "$HAILO_OK" != 1 ] && [ "$MOVENET_OK" != 1 ]; then
echo "" >&2
echo "ERROR: no usable pose backend in this bundle — refusing to install a daemon that" >&2
echo "cannot start." >&2
echo " Hailo : HEF=$(state test -f "$HEF_DEST") hailo_platform=$(state "$PREFIX/venv/bin/python" -c 'import hailo_platform')" >&2
echo " MoveNet: onnx=$(state test -f "$ONNX_DEST") onnxruntime=$(state "$PREFIX/venv/bin/python" -c 'import onnxruntime')" >&2
echo " Rebuild the bundle for the target backend (deploy/bundle/build_offline_bundle.sh)." >&2
exit 1
fi
# Prefer Hailo (the accelerator) when usable; MoveNet is the CPU fallback. (Arch already
# preflighted in [0b/6].)
if [ "$HAILO_OK" = 1 ]; then DEFAULT_BACKEND=hailo; else DEFAULT_BACKEND=movenet; fi
backend_usable() { # 0 (true) iff the named backend can actually load in THIS bundle
case "$1" in
hailo) [ "$HAILO_OK" = 1 ] ;;
movenet) [ "$MOVENET_OK" = 1 ] ;;
*) return 1 ;;
esac
}
PYTHONPATH="$PREFIX/src" "$PREFIX/venv/bin/python" -c "import edge.daemon, onnxruntime, cv2, numpy, requests; print('edge import OK')"
echo ">> [5/6] state dir + env file"
install -d -m 0750 "$STATE"
chown "$SVC_USER":"$SVC_USER" "$STATE"
install -d -m 0750 "$ETC"
if [ ! -f "$ETC/edge.env" ]; then
POSE_BACKEND="$DEFAULT_BACKEND"
install -m 0640 "$HERE/deploy/systemd/move-detect-edge.env.example" "$ETC/edge.env"
sed -i "s|^POSE_BACKEND=.*|POSE_BACKEND=$POSE_BACKEND|" "$ETC/edge.env"
echo " -> wrote $ETC/edge.env (POSE_BACKEND=$POSE_BACKEND; EDIT IT: DEVICE_ID, DEVICE_SECRET, CAFE24_URL)"
else
# Preserve the operator's DELIBERATE backend choice when it still works in this bundle; only
# switch when the current one can't load — the crash-loop this reconcile exists to prevent
# (e.g. a stale POSE_BACKEND=movenet on a Hailo-only bundle with no onnxruntime).
CURRENT_BACKEND="$(sed -n 's|^POSE_BACKEND=\(.*\)|\1|p' "$ETC/edge.env" | head -n1)"
if backend_usable "$CURRENT_BACKEND"; then
POSE_BACKEND="$CURRENT_BACKEND"
echo " -> $ETC/edge.env POSE_BACKEND=$POSE_BACKEND is usable in this bundle; kept"
else
POSE_BACKEND="$DEFAULT_BACKEND"
if grep -q '^POSE_BACKEND=' "$ETC/edge.env"; then
sed -i "s|^POSE_BACKEND=.*|POSE_BACKEND=$POSE_BACKEND|" "$ETC/edge.env"
else
printf 'POSE_BACKEND=%s\n' "$POSE_BACKEND" >> "$ETC/edge.env"
fi
echo " -> reconciled $ETC/edge.env POSE_BACKEND: '${CURRENT_BACKEND:-unset}' (unusable) -> '$POSE_BACKEND'"
fi
fi
# For the hailo backend, HAILO_HEF must point at a HEF that actually EXISTS — correct a missing
# key OR one left pointing at a stale/absent path, else the daemon crash-loops on a bad path.
if [ "$POSE_BACKEND" = hailo ]; then
CURRENT_HEF="$(sed -n 's|^HAILO_HEF=\(.*\)|\1|p' "$ETC/edge.env" | head -n1)"
if [ -z "$CURRENT_HEF" ] || [ ! -f "$CURRENT_HEF" ]; then
if grep -q '^HAILO_HEF=' "$ETC/edge.env"; then
sed -i "s|^HAILO_HEF=.*|HAILO_HEF=$HEF_DEST|" "$ETC/edge.env"
else
printf 'HAILO_HEF=%s\n' "$HEF_DEST" >> "$ETC/edge.env"
fi
echo " -> set HAILO_HEF=$HEF_DEST (was '${CURRENT_HEF:-unset}')"
fi
fi
chown root:"$SVC_USER" "$ETC/edge.env"
echo " -> wrote $ETC/edge.env from template (EDIT IT: DEVICE_ID, DEVICE_SECRET, CAFE24_URL)"
else
echo " -> $ETC/edge.env already exists; left unchanged"
fi
echo ">> [6/6] systemd unit"
install -m 0644 "$HERE/deploy/systemd/move-detect-edge.service" /etc/systemd/system/
@ -226,11 +71,6 @@ systemctl daemon-reload
echo ""
echo "Installed. Next:"
echo " 1. edit $ETC/edge.env (device id/secret, server URL; MOVENET_ONNX=$PREFIX/models/movenet_lightning.onnx)"
echo " 2. camera check BEFORE enabling — a wrong /dev/video index or an unseated CSI ribbon"
echo " otherwise yields a green unit that silently monitors one camera less (build_runtimes"
echo " logs-and-skips a camera it cannot open). This mirrors setup_online.sh's [8/9] probe,"
echo " which the offline path cannot run at install time (CAMERAS is only set in step 1):"
echo " sudo sh -c 'cd $PREFIX/src && CAMERAS=\$(sed -n \"s/^CAMERAS=//p\" $ETC/edge.env) $PREFIX/venv/bin/python -m edge.probe'"
echo " 3. sudo systemctl enable --now move-detect-edge"
echo " 4. journalctl -u move-detect-edge -f"
echo " 1. edit $ETC/edge.env (device id/secret, cloud URL; MOVENET_ONNX=$PREFIX/models/movenet_lightning.onnx)"
echo " 2. sudo systemctl enable --now move-detect-edge"
echo " 3. journalctl -u move-detect-edge -f"

343
deploy/setup_online.sh
View file

@ -1,343 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# ONE-COMMAND online installer for an INTERNET-CONNECTED Raspberry Pi 5.
# Installs everything and starts the service. For AIR-GAPPED Pis use deploy/bundle/*.
#
# Run from a clone/copy of this repo, as root:
# sudo deploy/setup_online.sh
#
# Pre-provisioned (shortest path): put the values in deploy/device.env on the BUILD machine
# (DEVICE_ID / DEVICE_SECRET / CAFE24_URL / CAMERAS, one KEY=value per line, gitignored), copy
# the repo to the Pi, and the whole install is just:
# sudo deploy/setup_online.sh
#
# Non-interactive: pass values as env vars (these override device.env), e.g.
# sudo DEVICE_ID=pi-01 DEVICE_SECRET=... CAFE24_URL=https://server CAMERAS=csi:0:cam-01,uvc:0:cam-02 \
# deploy/setup_online.sh
# MODELS ARE NOT DOWNLOADED HERE. The pose HEF (and optional MoveNet ONNX) ship IN the delivery,
# staged on the BUILD machine (deploy/bundle/build_offline_bundle.sh) — air-gap rule "build pulls,
# target doesn't". Copy the delivery (with its models/) to the Pi and this installer places them.
# Have a HEF elsewhere on the Pi? Point at it: HAILO_HEF=/home/pi/yolov8s_pose.hef.
# Interactive (a real terminal): it prompts for anything not passed.
set -euo pipefail
if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
echo "run as root: sudo $0" >&2
exit 1
fi
REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
PREFIX=/opt/move-detect
STATE=/var/lib/move-detect
ETC=/etc/move-detect
SVC_USER=movedetect
echo ">> [1/9] system packages (CSI camera, venv; Hailo runtime best-effort)"
export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
# A freshly-booted Pi runs apt-daily / apt-daily-upgrade / unattended-upgrades, which hold
# /var/lib/apt/lists/lock and /var/lib/dpkg/lock-frontend for the first few minutes —
# exactly when someone runs a one-command installer. A bare apt-get then exits 100 with
# "E: Unable to lock directory /var/lib/apt/lists/" and `set -e` (set -e above) kills us here.
# -o DPkg::Lock::Timeout is not enough on its own: apt applies it to the dpkg locks, but
# `apt-get update`'s lists lock is taken with a single non-blocking fcntl(F_SETLK) and no
# retry. That wait has to live here, in the shell.
# Retry ONLY on lock contention; a real error (e.g. hailo-all absent from the repo) must
# still fail fast so the `|| echo WARN` fallback below stays instant.
apt_retry() {
local tries=30 i=1 rc log
log="$(mktemp)"
while :; do
rc=0
# LC_ALL=C is load-bearing, not cosmetic: apt gettext-translates its errors, and sudo
# passes the caller's LANG/LC_* straight through. On a ko_KR Pi the lists-lock message
# renders as "%s 디렉터리를 잠글 수 없습니다", the grep below misses it, and lock
# contention gets misread as a real error — fail-fast, zero retries, exactly the bug
# this function exists to fix. Pinning it per-call (not script-wide) keeps pip/venv and
# fetch_movenet at [4/9]-[5/9] on the system locale.
LC_ALL=C apt-get -o DPkg::Lock::Timeout=60 "$@" 2>&1 | tee "$log" || rc=${PIPESTATUS[0]}
if [ "$rc" -eq 0 ]; then rm -f "$log"; return 0; fi
if ! grep -qE 'Could not get lock|Unable to lock|Unable to acquire the dpkg' "$log"; then
rm -f "$log"; return "$rc"
fi
if [ "$i" -ge "$tries" ]; then
rm -f "$log"
echo " ERROR: apt/dpkg still locked after $((tries * 10))s. See who holds it with:" >&2
echo " systemctl status apt-daily.service apt-daily-upgrade.service unattended-upgrades.service" >&2
return "$rc"
fi
echo " apt/dpkg locked by another process (apt-daily/unattended-upgrades); retry $i/$tries in 10s..."
i=$((i + 1)); sleep 10
done
}
apt_retry update
apt_retry install -y python3-picamera2 python3-venv python3-pip
# hailo-all is the Hailo driver+runtime; only present in Pi repos with a Hailo HAT.
# Best-effort so a Pi without it still installs and runs on CPU MoveNet.
apt_retry install -y hailo-all || echo " WARN: hailo-all not installed — Hailo accel unavailable, CPU MoveNet will be used."
echo ">> [2/9] service account + device groups"
id -u "$SVC_USER" >/dev/null 2>&1 || useradd --system --no-create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin "$SVC_USER"
for g in video render plugdev hailo; do
getent group "$g" >/dev/null 2>&1 && usermod -aG "$g" "$SVC_USER" || true
done
echo ">> [3/9] source + dirs under $PREFIX"
install -d -m 0755 "$PREFIX" "$PREFIX/src" "$PREFIX/models" "$PREFIX/docs"
rm -rf "$PREFIX/src/edge" # full replace on re-run (no nested edge/edge)
cp -r "$REPO_ROOT/edge" "$PREFIX/src/edge"
cp "$REPO_ROOT/pyproject.toml" "$PREFIX/src/" 2>/dev/null || true
find "$PREFIX/src" -name __pycache__ -type d -prune -exec rm -rf {} +
cp "$REPO_ROOT/docs/pilot-runbook.md" "$PREFIX/docs/" 2>/dev/null || true
echo ">> [4/9] venv (+ system site-packages) + pip runtime deps"
python3 -m venv --system-site-packages "$PREFIX/venv"
"$PREFIX/venv/bin/pip" install --upgrade pip >/dev/null
# MANDATORY for every backend — do not soften these to `|| echo WARN`:
# cv2 edge/snapshot.py imports it at MODULE level, and that module is on the
# unconditional startup chain (daemon -> runtime -> snapshot). No POSE_BACKEND
# can reach build_pose() without it.
# requests the daemon builds its server/alert clients with no injected HTTP fn, so
# `import requests` fires at startup regardless of backend.
# numpy is still deliberately NOT named here, but the reason has moved: it no longer arrives
# transitively via onnxruntime (best-effort below, may be absent). opencv-python-headless
# hard-requires numpy and opencv is mandatory, so numpy still always arrives; leaving it
# unnamed lets the resolver keep the apt numpy that python3-picamera2 was compiled against
# whenever that copy satisfies opencv's floor.
"$PREFIX/venv/bin/pip" install requests opencv-python-headless
# onnxruntime is the CPU-MoveNet-ONLY dep: movenet_pose.py imports it inside
# MoveNetPoseAdapter.__init__, and the Hailo path never imports the module at all. It
# publishes NO sdist and NO 32-bit-ARM wheel, so pip can legitimately find zero candidates
# and exit non-zero in seconds — which under `set -euo pipefail` used to kill this installer
# on a Hailo-8 Pi that never needed it. Best-effort, like hailo-all at [1/9]; [6/9] decides
# whether a backend actually exists.
"$PREFIX/venv/bin/pip" install onnxruntime \
|| echo " WARN: onnxruntime did not install — CPU MoveNet unavailable (Hailo unaffected)."
echo ">> [5/9] MoveNet CPU model (from the delivery, not downloaded)"
# Models ship IN the delivery, staged on the BUILD machine (deploy/bundle/build_offline_bundle.sh
# fetches them there) and carried across with the repo copy — air-gap rule "build pulls, target
# doesn't". This installer NEVER downloads a model on the Pi. On-device fetch was removed because
# it was fragile in two ways at once: a partial repo copy made `-m edge.tools.fetch_*` fail with a
# ModuleNotFoundError that the `|| echo WARN` mislabeled as "download failed", and the MoveNet URL
# is dead upstream anyway. MoveNet is the OPTIONAL CPU fallback; stage it only if present.
if cp "$REPO_ROOT/models/movenet_lightning.onnx" "$PREFIX/models/" 2>/dev/null; then
echo " -> MoveNet ONNX staged from the delivery"
else
echo " note: no MoveNet ONNX in the delivery (expected for a Hailo device)."
fi
echo ">> [6/9] pose backend"
HEF_DEST="$PREFIX/models/yolov8s_pose.hef"
ONNX_DEST="$PREFIX/models/movenet_lightning.onnx"
if [ -n "${HAILO_HEF:-}" ]; then
# An explicit path that does not exist is a typo, not a request to fall back. The old single
# guarded `cp` skipped it with NO warning and produced the byte-identical HEF=MISSING table
# as the unset case, never echoing the bad value — and if an earlier run had left a
# $HEF_DEST behind, that stale HEF got adopted as though it were the one named.
[ -f "$HAILO_HEF" ] || { echo "ERROR: HAILO_HEF=$HAILO_HEF does not exist." >&2; exit 1; }
cp "$HAILO_HEF" "$HEF_DEST"
echo " -> HEF installed from HAILO_HEF=$HAILO_HEF"
elif [ -f "$REPO_ROOT/models/yolov8s_pose.hef" ]; then
# The delivery carries the board-matching HEF, staged on the BUILD machine
# (build_offline_bundle.sh runs fetch_hailo_hef there, where hailortcli or --arch picks
# hailo8 vs hailo8l). This installer only PLACES it — it never downloads or guesses an arch
# on the Pi. Air-gap rule: build pulls, target doesn't.
cp "$REPO_ROOT/models/yolov8s_pose.hef" "$HEF_DEST"
echo " -> HEF staged from the delivery (models/yolov8s_pose.hef)"
else
echo " WARN: no Hailo HEF in the delivery (models/yolov8s_pose.hef) and HAILO_HEF unset —"
echo " no Hailo backend. The probe below decides if CPU MoveNet can carry the install."
fi
# Probe what can ACTUALLY run, in the venv the service will use. A HEF on disk is not enough
# (hailo_platform comes from apt hailo-all, best-effort at [1/9]), and a pip exit code is not
# enough either (a wheel can install and still fail to load its .so). Both probes must sit
# inside `if` conditions — a bare `a && b` list that fails is fatal under set -e.
pyhas() { "$PREFIX/venv/bin/python" -c "import $1" >/dev/null 2>&1; }
state() { if "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; then echo present; else echo MISSING; fi; }
HAILO_OK=0; MOVENET_OK=0
if [ -f "$HEF_DEST" ] && pyhas hailo_platform; then HAILO_OK=1; fi
if [ -f "$ONNX_DEST" ] && pyhas onnxruntime; then MOVENET_OK=1; fi
if [ "$HAILO_OK" = 1 ]; then
POSE_BACKEND=hailo
echo " -> Hailo HEF + hailo_platform present; POSE_BACKEND=hailo"
[ "$MOVENET_OK" = 1 ] || echo " (CPU MoveNet fallback unavailable — Hailo does not need it)"
elif [ "$MOVENET_OK" = 1 ]; then
POSE_BACKEND=movenet
echo " -> no usable Hailo; starting on CPU MoveNet."
echo " For Hailo: copy yolov8s_pose.hef to $HEF_DEST, set POSE_BACKEND=hailo in"
echo " $ETC/edge.env, then: sudo systemctl restart move-detect-edge"
else
# Fail HERE, loudly, naming the fix — not at 3am. build_pose() runs outside the daemon's
# try/except, so a missing backend is an uncaught traceback (ModuleNotFoundError on the
# MoveNet path, KeyError 'HAILO_HEF' on the Hailo one) on every Restart=always cycle,
# forever — a unit that looks installed and never processes a frame.
# The board's own answer is the most diagnostic field here: it separates "no HEF" from
# "driver installed, reboot pending" from "no Hailo at all" — three different fixes.
HAILO_ARCH="$(hailortcli fw-control identify 2>/dev/null \
| sed -n 's/.*Device Architecture:[[:space:]]*//p' | head -1)"
echo "" >&2
echo "ERROR: no usable pose backend — refusing to install a daemon that cannot start." >&2
echo " Hailo : HEF=$(state test -f "$HEF_DEST") hailo_platform=$(state "$PREFIX/venv/bin/python" -c 'import hailo_platform') board=${HAILO_ARCH:-NOT DETECTED}" >&2
echo " MoveNet: onnx=$(state test -f "$ONNX_DEST") onnxruntime=$(state "$PREFIX/venv/bin/python" -c 'import onnxruntime')" >&2
echo "" >&2
echo " Fix ONE of these, then re-run: sudo deploy/setup_online.sh" >&2
echo "" >&2
echo " A) Hailo-8 HAT (the intended path). The HEF ships IN the delivery" >&2
echo " (models/yolov8s_pose.hef, staged on the build machine) — this installer does NOT" >&2
echo " download it. Read the table above:" >&2
echo " HEF=MISSING -> this Pi's copy of the delivery has no" >&2
echo " models/yolov8s_pose.hef. Re-copy it, or point at one:" >&2
echo " sudo HAILO_HEF=/path/to/yolov8s_pose.hef deploy/setup_online.sh" >&2
echo " hailo_platform=MISSING -> the HailoRT driver/runtime is not up yet:" >&2
echo " sudo apt-get install -y hailo-all && sudo reboot" >&2
echo " (/dev/hailo0 appears only after that reboot). Confirm:" >&2
echo " hailortcli fw-control identify # -> Device Architecture: HAILO8" >&2
echo " B) CPU MoveNet: put models/movenet_lightning.onnx in the delivery, and" >&2
echo " $PREFIX/venv/bin/pip install onnxruntime" >&2
echo "" >&2
echo " If onnxruntime AND hailo-all both refuse to install, check the userland arch:" >&2
echo " dpkg --print-architecture" >&2
echo " 'armhf' means 32-bit Pi OS. Neither package ships for it (uname -m still says" >&2
echo " aarch64 there — the kernel is 64-bit, the userland is not). Reflash 64-bit Pi OS." >&2
exit 1
fi
echo ">> [7/9] config -> $ETC/edge.env"
install -d -m 0750 "$STATE"; chown "$SVC_USER":"$SVC_USER" "$STATE"
install -d -m 0750 "$ETC"
if [ -f "$ETC/edge.env" ]; then
# Re-running IS the normal Hailo flow: install -> reboot so the driver creates /dev/hailo0
# -> re-run. So [6/9] can legitimately reach a different verdict than last time. Leaving the
# file wholly unchanged meant run #1's POSE_BACKEND=movenet survived while [6/9] printed
# "POSE_BACKEND=hailo" — and with onnxruntime absent that is a ModuleNotFoundError crash
# loop the installer just called a success.
# Reconcile ONLY the backend keys, in place: DEVICE_SECRET and the operator's other answers
# must survive untouched.
cur="$(sed -n 's/^POSE_BACKEND=//p' "$ETC/edge.env" | head -1)"
if [ "$cur" = "$POSE_BACKEND" ]; then
echo " -> $ETC/edge.env already exists; left unchanged"
else
if [ -n "$cur" ]; then
sed -i "s|^POSE_BACKEND=.*|POSE_BACKEND=$POSE_BACKEND|" "$ETC/edge.env"
else
printf 'POSE_BACKEND=%s\n' "$POSE_BACKEND" >> "$ETC/edge.env"
fi
grep -q '^HAILO_HEF=' "$ETC/edge.env" || printf 'HAILO_HEF=%s\n' "$HEF_DEST" >> "$ETC/edge.env"
grep -q '^MOVENET_ONNX=' "$ETC/edge.env" || printf 'MOVENET_ONNX=%s\n' "$ONNX_DEST" >> "$ETC/edge.env"
# sed -i and >> can leave the file owned root:root, and the unit reads it as movedetect
# via EnvironmentFile= — a wrong group here fails the start with a bare permission error.
chown root:"$SVC_USER" "$ETC/edge.env"
chmod 0640 "$ETC/edge.env"
echo " -> $ETC/edge.env: POSE_BACKEND ${cur:-<unset>} -> $POSE_BACKEND (re-run reconciled)"
fi
else
# Pre-provisioning file: values written on the BUILD machine so the operator only has to
# type `sudo deploy/setup_online.sh`. A real env var always wins over the file, so the
# long-form command documented at the top still overrides a stale device.env.
PROVISION="${PROVISION:-$REPO_ROOT/deploy/device.env}"
if [ -f "$PROVISION" ]; then
echo ">> reading pre-provisioned values from $PROVISION"
# device.env holds the plaintext HMAC secret. It arrived via "copy the working tree" and may
# be world-readable (umask 022). Lock it to root-only now so it is not left readable by every
# local account for the life of the device. The secret still lands in /etc/move-detect/edge.env
# (0640 root:movedetect); once the install succeeds you should DELETE this file and rotate the
# secret if it was ever exposed — see deploy/README.md "Secret handling".
chmod 600 "$PROVISION" 2>/dev/null || true
while IFS='=' read -r k v; do
case "$k" in DEVICE_ID|DEVICE_SECRET|CAFE24_URL|CAMERAS) ;; *) continue ;; esac
[ -n "${!k:-}" ] || printf -v "$k" '%s' "$v"
done < <(grep -E '^[A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*=' "$PROVISION") # digits matter: CAFE24_URL
fi
: "${DEVICE_ID:=}"; : "${DEVICE_SECRET:=}"; : "${CAFE24_URL:=}"; : "${CAMERAS:=}"
if [ -t 0 ]; then
[ -n "$DEVICE_ID" ] || read -rp "DEVICE_ID [pi-01]: " DEVICE_ID
[ -n "$DEVICE_SECRET" ] || { read -rsp "DEVICE_SECRET (from server): " DEVICE_SECRET; echo; }
[ -n "$CAFE24_URL" ] || read -rp "CAFE24_URL (e.g. https://<domain>/move_detect — include the subdir!): " CAFE24_URL
[ -n "$CAMERAS" ] || read -rp "CAMERAS [csi:0:cam-01,uvc:0:cam-02]: " CAMERAS
fi
DEVICE_ID="${DEVICE_ID:-pi-01}"
CAMERAS="${CAMERAS:-csi:0:cam-01,uvc:0:cam-02}"
# Every line is a bare KEY=value (systemd EnvironmentFile= keeps inline text literally).
umask 077
cat > "$ETC/edge.env" <<EOF
DEVICE_ID=$DEVICE_ID
DEVICE_SECRET=$DEVICE_SECRET
CAFE24_URL=$CAFE24_URL
CAMERAS=$CAMERAS
POSE_BACKEND=$POSE_BACKEND
HAILO_HEF=$HEF_DEST
MOVENET_ONNX=$PREFIX/models/movenet_lightning.onnx
QUEUE_DB=$STATE/queue.db
TARGET_FPS=12
EOF
chown root:"$SVC_USER" "$ETC/edge.env"
chmod 0640 "$ETC/edge.env"
[ -n "$DEVICE_SECRET" ] || echo " NOTE: DEVICE_SECRET is empty — set it in $ETC/edge.env before the server will accept events."
echo " -> wrote $ETC/edge.env"
fi
echo ">> [8/9] camera check (open every camera in CAMERAS and grab a frame)"
# Do this BEFORE enabling the unit. build_runtimes() logs-and-skips a camera it cannot open,
# so a wrong /dev/video index or an unseated ribbon would otherwise produce a green unit that
# silently monitors one camera less. Fail here, while someone is still at the Pi.
# SKIP_CAMERA_CHECK=1 for a headless/bench install with no cameras attached yet.
if [ "${SKIP_CAMERA_CHECK:-0}" = "1" ]; then
echo " -> skipped (SKIP_CAMERA_CHECK=1)"
else
# Probe exactly what the unit will run with: the CAMERAS line as written to edge.env, and
# the installed copy of the package ($PREFIX/src, not the repo checkout).
probe_cams="$(sed -n 's/^CAMERAS=//p' "$ETC/edge.env" | head -1)"
if ( cd "$PREFIX/src" && CAMERAS="$probe_cams" "$PREFIX/venv/bin/python" -m edge.probe \
--save "$STATE/probe" ); then
echo " -> every camera delivered a frame (previews in $STATE/probe)"
chown -R "$SVC_USER":"$SVC_USER" "$STATE/probe" 2>/dev/null || true
else
echo "" >&2
echo "ERROR: camera check failed — refusing to enable the service." >&2
echo " Fix CAMERAS in $ETC/edge.env and re-run, or install with SKIP_CAMERA_CHECK=1" >&2
echo " to enable the service anyway (it will monitor only the cameras that work)." >&2
exit 1
fi
fi
echo ">> [9/9] systemd service"
install -m 0644 "$REPO_ROOT/deploy/systemd/move-detect-edge.service" /etc/systemd/system/
systemctl daemon-reload
diagnose() {
echo "" >&2
echo "ERROR: move-detect-edge did not come up. systemd's reason:" >&2
echo "--------------------------------------------------------------------" >&2
systemctl status --no-pager --full move-detect-edge >&2 || true
journalctl -xeu move-detect-edge -n 50 --no-pager >&2 || true
echo "--------------------------------------------------------------------" >&2
echo "Full log: sudo journalctl -xeu move-detect-edge" >&2
exit 1
}
# enable + restart rather than `enable --now`, so a re-run also picks up a rewritten
# edge.env instead of no-op'ing on an already-running unit.
systemctl enable move-detect-edge
systemctl restart move-detect-edge || diagnose
# Type=exec fails the job on exec-step errors, but a Python traceback *after* execve still
# leaves `restart` returning 0. RestartSec=5 means a crash-looping unit reads as
# "activating" here, which is-active correctly rejects. This is a crash detector, not a
# readiness gate: under Type=exec the unit is active the moment execve() succeeds, so a
# slow camera/Hailo init cannot false-fail it.
sleep 5
systemctl is-active --quiet move-detect-edge || diagnose
# is-active alone is phase-dependent: a crash at T<=~0.2s after execve is already back in
# "active" by the time we sample (T + RestartSec=5 <= 5.2), so a crash-looping daemon can
# read as healthy. NRestarts is phase-independent — for a unit we just started, any restart
# at all means it has already died once.
if [ "$(systemctl show -p NRestarts --value move-detect-edge 2>/dev/null || echo 0)" != "0" ]; then
echo "" >&2
echo "ERROR: move-detect-edge has already restarted at least once — it is crash-looping." >&2
diagnose
fi
echo ""
echo "Done. The edge daemon is installed and started."
echo " logs: journalctl -u move-detect-edge -f"
echo " config: sudo nano $ETC/edge.env (then: sudo systemctl restart move-detect-edge)"

7
deploy/systemd/move-detect-edge.env.example
View file

@ -10,11 +10,8 @@
DEVICE_ID=pi-01
# DEVICE_SECRET: per-device HMAC secret; must match devices.secret.
DEVICE_SECRET=CHANGEME
# CAFE24_URL: cloud base URL (POST events / poll config / heartbeat). MUST include the app's
# subdirectory when the cloud is mounted under an existing www/ (the cafe24 package default):
# use https://<domain>/move_detect, NOT https://<domain>. A wrong/missing path 404s every
# upload — the daemon now refuses to start on a blank value, but a wrong path it cannot detect.
CAFE24_URL=https://your-domain.example/move_detect
# CAFE24_URL: cloud base URL (POST events / poll config / heartbeat).
CAFE24_URL=https://cloud.example.com
# CAMERA_ID: stamped on events and matched to dashboard zones.
CAMERA_ID=cam-01

39
deploy/systemd/move-detect-edge.service
View file

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# move-detect edge daemon — systemd unit (Raspberry Pi 5, air-gapped/폐쇄망).
# Install: copy to /etc/systemd/system/, fill /etc/move-detect/edge.env, then
# sudo systemctl daemon-reload && sudo systemctl enable --now move-detect-edge
# The daemon tolerates the server being offline (events buffer in the local queue
# The daemon tolerates the cloud being offline (events buffer in the local queue
# and flush on reconnect), so this unit only *wants* the network, not requires it.
[Unit]
@ -9,23 +9,9 @@ Description=move-detect edge daemon (workplace-safety AI CCTV)
Documentation=file:/opt/move-detect/docs/pilot-runbook.md
Wants=network-online.target
After=network-online.target
# Order after clock sync so Event.occurred_at is real wall time, not the stale fake-hwclock time a
# Pi 5 (no RTC battery) boots with. Detector TIMERS are already immune (they run on a monotonic
# clock — see daemon.main), so this only affects timestamp accuracy; Wants (not Requires) so an
# air-gapped Pi with no reachable NTP still starts rather than hanging forever on time-sync.
Wants=time-sync.target
After=time-sync.target
# Never stop retrying. This MUST live in [Unit]: systemd's parser table knows
# Unit.StartLimitIntervalSec but only Service.StartLimitInterval (no "Sec"), so in
# [Service] it is an unknown key — silently ignored, leaving the default 5-starts/10s
# limit to defeat Restart=always below.
StartLimitIntervalSec=0
[Service]
# Type=exec, not simple: with simple, systemd marks the start job done the instant fork()
# returns, so an exec-step failure (226/NAMESPACE, 216/GROUP, 217/USER, 203/EXEC) never
# reaches `systemctl enable --now` and the installer reports success over a dead daemon.
Type=exec
Type=simple
# Dedicated unprivileged account; must be in the groups that own the camera and
# the Hailo accelerator device nodes.
User=movedetect
@ -42,36 +28,21 @@ ExecStart=/opt/move-detect/venv/bin/python -m edge
# periodic-op exceptions internally so a single glitch never exits the process.
Restart=always
RestartSec=5
StartLimitIntervalSec=0
# Writable state (offline queue sqlite lives here; keep QUEUE_DB pointed at it).
# systemd creates/owns /var/lib/move-detect for the service user.
StateDirectory=move-detect
StateDirectoryMode=0750
# Camera + accelerator device access. Once ANY DeviceAllow= is present, systemd denies every
# unlisted device node, so the CSI camera needs its nodes explicitly:
# char-video4linux USB UVC (/dev/video*) AND the CSI capture nodes
# char-media picamera2/libcamera opens /dev/media* to configure the CSI pipeline (Pi 5)
# char-dma_heap libcamera allocates capture buffers from the dma-heap on Pi 5
# Without char-media + char-dma_heap a Hailo Pi with a CSI camera is denied its own camera by this
# unit's policy. (OFF-HW: verify on the Pi — `journalctl` shows a libcamera EPERM/open failure.)
#
# NOTE: DeviceAllow= takes a device-node path OR a `char-<group>`/`block-<group>` name — NOT a
# directory. `/dev/dma_heap/` (a directory, trailing slash) is rejected at cgroup-realize time and
# silently dropped, leaving dma-heap DENIED under this deny-by-default policy. Use the char group
# (dma_heap appears in /proc/devices as a char device) so the whole /dev/dma_heap/* set is allowed.
# Camera + accelerator device access (USB UVC = /dev/video*, Hailo = /dev/hailo0).
DeviceAllow=/dev/hailo0 rw
DeviceAllow=char-video4linux rw
DeviceAllow=char-media rw
DeviceAllow=char-dma_heap rw
# Conservative hardening (loosen if it blocks device access on your image).
NoNewPrivileges=true
ProtectSystem=strict
# Do NOT add ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/move-detect here. StateDirectory= above already emits
# a recursive read-write bind mount for that exact path, which outranks a ReadWritePaths=
# entry for the same path and drops it before any path is resolved. It is dead config: it
# can neither cause nor fix a state-dir problem.
ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/move-detect
ProtectHome=true
PrivateTmp=true

287
docs/delivery-audit.md
View file

@ -1,287 +0,0 @@
# Delivery Audit — move-detect (납품 전 결함 목록 · 순차 처리)
Source: 62-agent adversarial audit (2026-07-16) + skill `iot-airgap-delivery` §3 + manual
verification of every blocker against real code. Ordered for sequential fixing. Each item is
checked off only after a test locks it and verification passes.
Legend: **[B]** blocks delivery · **[H]** high · **[M]** medium · **[L]** low ·
`OFF-HW` = cannot be verified without the Hailo board.
---
## Phase 1 — Silent failure & misconfiguration (the #1 delivery risk)
A safety system that *looks* healthy while doing nothing is the worst failure. Make every
misconfig/degradation fail LOUD.
- [x] **P1-1 [H]** `edge/serverclient.py`, `edge/alert.py` — `requests` sends the default
`python-requests/x.y` User-Agent; cafe24's shared-hosting WAF commonly blocks it with an
HTML 403 while curl passes. Every event then silently fails. Also `allow_redirects=True`
turns the .htaccess http→https 302 into a GET → 405/404. **Fix:** custom UA
(`move-detect-edge/1.0`) on every call + `allow_redirects=False`, log once on 3xx.
DONE — `USER_AGENT` in alert.py, both clients send it + `allow_redirects=False`;
tests in test_alert.py / test_serverclient.py.
- [x] **P1-2 [B]** `deploy/systemd/move-detect-edge.env.example`, `setup_online.sh` prompt,
docs — `CAFE24_URL` must be `https://<domain>/move_detect` (subdir mount). Empty/typo/
missing-subdir is 100% silent. **Fix:** examples show the subdir; installer validates.
DONE — env.example + installer prompt now show/require the `/move_detect` subdir.
- [x] **P1-3 [H]** `edge/config.py:40` + `edge/daemon.py` — empty `CAFE24_URL`/`DEVICE_SECRET`
defaults let the daemon run green while every upload fails and the queue grows forever.
**Fix:** fail loud at startup if either is blank.
DONE — `require_upload_config(cfg)` raises at daemon startup; test_config.py locks it.
- [x] **P1-4 [H]** `edge/daemon.py:23` — `run_loop` swallows every per-frame/per-camera
exception with no log and no degraded-monitoring signal → a permanently broken pipeline
looks green. **Fix:** rate-limited `logging.exception` + consecutive-error counter.
DONE — per-camera + periodic error streaks, logged 1st + every 300th, names the camera;
test_daemon.py locks the rate-limit.
- [x] **P1-5 [H]** `edge/daemon.py:33` — heartbeat hardcodes `fps=0.0` and counts ticks where
`source.read()` returned nothing, so the server cannot tell a dead device from a live one.
**Fix:** real fps + per-camera frame-age/health in the heartbeat body.
DONE — heartbeat now sends measured fps + cameras_total/cameras_erroring/errors;
test_daemon.py locks fps math + failing-camera flag.
- [x] **P1-6 [H]** `edge/adapters/uvc_source.py:12` — a camera that stops delivering frames is
never detected or reopened; monitoring dies silently. **Fix:** fail loud on open failure;
emit `device_fault`/`monitoring_degraded` when a camera goes stale.
DONE — open-failure raises (build_runtimes logs+skips); read() releases+reopens after a
streak; heartbeat's cameras_erroring (P1-5) reports the fault. test_uvc_source.py locks it.
- [x] **P1-7 [M]** `edge/queue.py` — offline sqlite queue has no size cap/TTL; an outage (or a
permanent misconfig) fills the SD card, then new events drop silently. **Fix:** bounded
queue (row/byte budget), log dropped-oldest count.
DONE — `max_rows` (default 2000) evicts oldest on enqueue; test_queue.py locks it.
- [x] **P1-8 [H]** `edge/queue.py:52` — a permanently-rejected event (e.g. 400) is retried
forever at the head, blocking the whole queue. **Fix:** drop/quarantine after N failures.
DONE — `attempts` column; a row is dropped after `max_send_attempts` (default 20) so a
poison head unwedges the queue; test locks the drain-past-poison behavior.
- [x] **P1-9 [M]** `edge/alert.py:43` — a POST that succeeds server-side but times out
client-side is re-queued and re-sent; no dedup key → duplicate alerts. **Fix:** stable
client-generated `event_id` in the payload; server dedups on it.
DONE — the edge `Event` now carries a stable `event_uuid` (uuid4 hex, generated once at
creation, preserved through the offline queue + every retry). Server: `events.event_uuid`
CHAR(32) NULL UNIQUE; `EventValidator` accepts/validates it; `IngestController` returns the
already-stored event (200 `dedup:true`) on a repeat uuid, race-safe against the UNIQUE key.
Tests: queue round-trip keeps the uuid (edge); repeat-uuid dedups to one row (server).
- [x] **P1-10 [M]** `edge/daemon.py:134` — `TARGET_FPS=0`/non-numeric → ZeroDivision/ValueError
at every start → infinite systemd restart loop. **Fix:** validate, default sanely.
DONE — `frame_interval_from_env` validates; test_config.py locks it.
- [x] **P1-11 [L]** `edge/daemon.py:120` — `QUEUE_DB` defaults to relative `queue.db`,
unwritable under the hardened unit (`ProtectSystem=strict`) → crash loop when env omitted.
**Fix:** absolute default under the state dir.
DONE — `queue_db_path` defaults to /var/lib/move-detect/queue.db; test_config.py locks it.
## Phase 2 — Core safety correctness (fall / zone / tracking)
- [x] **P2-1 [B]** `edge/zones.py:19` ↔ `server/public/assets/zone-draw.js:196` — zones are
saved in 960×540 canvas pixels but the edge compares against camera-native pixels; **every
zone is silently misplaced.** **Fix:** normalized 0..1 polygon contract on both sides.
DONE — dashboard stores/loads 0..1 (zone-draw.js), edge normalizes the foot by frame size
(zone.py → engine.process → run_once threads frame_wh); Polygon::validate is range-agnostic
so PHP stores it opaquely. test_zone.py locks the normalized contract.
- [x] **P2-2 [B]** `edge/engine.py:72` — a `pinch` (협착) zone falls through to
`ZONE_WARNING`; the PINCH event + HIGH severity are never emitted. **Fix:** map
`pinch→PINCH`, `restricted→ZONE_RESTRICTED`, else WARNING.
DONE — dict map pinch→PINCH/restricted→ZONE_RESTRICTED; test_engine.py locks PINCH+HIGH.
- [x] **P2-3 [H]** `edge/detectors/fall.py:65` — a per-frame keypoint-confidence gate
silently disables fall, no_motion AND ghost for an occluded/low-confidence fallen person —
exactly when someone is on the floor. **Fix:** use bbox cues when keypoints are low-conf.
DONE — bbox cues (aspect/height-collapse) always run; keypoint cues gated by kp_ok;
test_fall.py locks both the low-conf detection and the no-false-positive-standing case.
- [x] **P2-4 [H]** `edge/detectors/ghost.py:38` — a ghost candidate is cancelled when ANY
person (a colleague) passes near the loss point. **Fix:** only the plausibly-same track
cancels it.
DONE — candidate snapshots the active track ids at loss time; only a NEW track (not a
known bystander) near the loss point cancels. test_ghost.py locks the bystander case.
- [x] **P2-5 [H]** `edge/geometry.py:66` — stillness compares raw per-frame displacement to a
fixed threshold with no dt normalization → immobility/no_motion flips with FPS. **Fix:**
normalize by elapsed time.
DONE — track_displacement divides by dt (per-second speed); test_geometry.py locks
FPS-invariance. NOTE: motion_thr is now per-second and needs on-device re-tuning.
- [ ] **P2-6 [M]** `edge/tracking.py:50` — greedy IoU matching swaps IDs when workers cross,
transferring FALLEN state + frozen baseline to the wrong person. **Fix:** gate matches;
reset per-track safety state on a low-confidence match.
- [ ] **P2-7 [M]** `edge/detectors/fall.py:92` — a single prone-looking frame sets FALLING and
arms a CRITICAL ghost if the person then leaves. **Fix:** require sustained prone.
- [ ] **P2-8 [M]** `edge/app.py:30` — detection dropouts keep a track 'active' with a frozen
frame; time-based timers accrue on stale data. **Fix:** treat a stale track as no-data.
- [x] **P2-9 [M]** `edge/detectors/zone.py:45` — foot point averages both ankles with no
confidence check; a hallucinated ankle at (0,0) drags the foot into/out of a zone. **Fix:**
confidence-gate the ankles, fall back to bbox-bottom-center.
DONE — `_foot` averages only ankles with conf ≥ MIN_ANKLE_CONF (0.2, the existing 'visible'
gate); with neither trustworthy it falls back to bbox bottom-centre. No tuning knob — reuses
the codebase's keypoint-visible convention. test_zone.py locks the fallback.
- [x] **P2-10 [M]** `edge/adapters/movenet_pose.py:34` — the CPU MoveNet fallback is
single-person; with 2+ workers all but one are invisible to every detector, no warning.
**Fix:** warn loudly that MoveNet fallback is single-person (Hailo is multi-person).
DONE — MoveNetPoseAdapter.__init__ logs a startup WARNING ("SINGLE-PERSON … use POSE_BACKEND=
hailo at multi-person sites"). test_movenet_pose.py asserts the warning via caplog.
- [x] **P2-11 [L]** `edge/geometry.py:39` — `head_below_hips` uses the NOSE keypoint
regardless of confidence. **Fix:** confidence-gate.
DONE — `head_below_hips` returns False when nose conf < nose_thr (0.2), so an unconfident/
hallucinated nose no longer fires the fall cue. test_geometry.py locks it; test_fall.py stays
green (the cue's confident-nose path is unchanged).
## Phase 3 — Privacy / PIPA (delivery compliance)
- [x] **P3-1 [H]** `edge/app.py:18` — `FaceBlurrer` blurs a fixed ~40×40px patch regardless of
face size; close faces stay identifiable. **Fix:** size the blur box from the person bbox.
DONE — `_head_boxes` sizes the box from the person bbox (scales with distance) + bbox-top
fallback when the nose keypoint is low-confidence. test_faceblur.py locks both.
- [x] **P3-2 [H]** `server/src/Ingest/IngestController.php:68` — worker snapshots are stored
forever; no retention/purge anywhere. PIPA violation. **Fix:** `snapshot_retention_days`
config + a token-guarded purge route + `SnapshotRepository::purgeOlderThan`.
DONE (retention = **7 days**) — `snapshot_retention_days` config; `purgeOlderThan` on the
interface + Pdo + double (files then rows, bounded batch); opportunistic purge in the
ingest path (cafe24 has no cron; the edge POSTs 24/7). IngestControllerTest locks it.
- [x] **P3-2b [M]** `server/src/Dashboard/EventListController.php:17` — `site_scope` is stored
in the session but never enforced; any authenticated user sees every device's worker
snapshots. **Fix:** scope event/snapshot queries by the session's `site_scope`.
DONE (site↔device model approved) — added `devices.site`; ingest denormalizes it onto
`events.site` (server-derived, never client-supplied). `App\Security\SiteScope` centralizes the
rule (NULL scope = global operator). The event LIST filters in SQL (`page(...,$site)`); event
DETAIL + ACK and the SNAPSHOT proxy guard per-row and return 404 (not 403) cross-site so
existence never leaks. Migration ALTERs + provisioning UPDATEs documented in schema.sql.
Tests: list scoped, detail cross-site 404, snapshot cross-site 404 / same-site 200.
- [x] **P3-3 [H]** `edge/tools/fetch_movenet.py:12` — downloads the ONNX from a mutable ref
with no checksum; spec mandates SHA256. **Fix:** pin URL to a commit + sha256+size, mirror
`fetch_hailo_hef.py`.
DONE (with a caveat) — rewrote to stage-validate: rejects HTML/LFS-pointer, optional pinned
sha256+size, temp-file staging, fails LOUD. DISCOVERY: the old URL is DEAD (GitHub 404 / HTML
— PINTO hosts models off-repo), so it was silently saving garbage. No known-good sha256 to
pin until a valid MOVENET_ONNX_URL is set. NON-BLOCKING for the Hailo delivery path (MoveNet
is the optional CPU fallback); flag for whoever needs CPU MoveNet.
## Phase 4 — Server hardening (shared hosting)
- [x] **P4-1 [H]** `server/public/index.php:106` — no top-level try/catch; a PDOException
becomes a raw 500 that leaks DSN/db_user if `display_errors` is on (cafe24 often ships On).
**Fix:** global try/catch → generic 500 + `error_log`; `ini_set('display_errors','0')`;
ship `.user.ini`.
DONE — index.php sets display_errors=0 + a set_exception_handler → generic {"error":"internal"}
+ error_log; a `.user.ini` (display_errors=Off) ships in www/move_detect/ as the pre-parse
backstop. Package build verified.
- [x] **P4-2 [H]** `server/src/Api/ConfigController.php:22`, `HeartbeatController.php` — no rate
limiting (unlike /api/events). **Fix:** per-IP + per-device limiter, fail-open on storage
error.
DONE — both take an optional RateLimiterRepository + clientIp; pre-auth per-IP limit
(shared ingest_ip cap) returns 429; index.php passes REMOTE_ADDR. ApiSyncTest locks the flood.
- [x] **P4-3 [M]** `server/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoNonceRepository.php:30` — nonces + rate_limits
grow without bound; no cron on cafe24. **Fix:** opportunistic in-request reap of expired
rows.
DONE — remember() reaps expired nonces; hit() reaps stale rate-limit windows (bounded,
gated 1/100). Full PHP suite green.
- [x] **P4-4 [M]** `server/src/Http/Router.php:18` — route params are never `rawurldecode`d; a
`camera_id` with a space/`+`/Korean saves zones but never loads them. **Fix:** decode
captured params.
DONE — dispatch rawurldecodes captured params; BasePathTest locks space + Korean cases.
- [x] **P4-5 [M]** `server/src/Dashboard/EventListController.php:17` — event list hard-capped at
newest 100, no pagination/date filter; older events unreachable. **Fix:** cursor pagination.
DONE — added keyset `EventRepository::page(limit, severity, beforeTs, beforeId)` (Pdo + InMemory),
a `(occurred_at DESC, event_id DESC)` cursor stable under concurrent inserts. Controller takes
`limit` (default 50, cap 200) + `cursor` ("occurred_at:event_id"), returns `next_cursor` on full
pages. `recent()` kept for existing callers. The live-tail dashboard consumes page 1; a
history-browse UI can layer on the same cursor later. Test `testListPaginatesWithCursor`.
- [x] **P4-6 [M]** `server/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoZoneRepository.php:86` — editing a zone with a
changed device_id/camera_id throws an uncaught RuntimeException → 500. **Fix:** 400 with a
clear error.
DONE — ZoneConfigController::save wraps `$this->zones->save()` in try/catch(\RuntimeException)
→ `invalid_zone` 400; test `testSaveOwnershipMismatchIs400NotError` with a throwing repo double.
- [x] **P4-7 [L]** `server/src/Ingest/IngestController.php:64` — snapshot write failure is
swallowed (201 with evidence lost); file-write/DB-insert non-atomic → orphan JPEGs. **Fix:**
order write→insert, log failures, reconcile orphans.
DONE — extracted `storeSnapshot()`: re-encode→write→index in order; every failure (re-encode,
file write, DB index) now `error_log`s instead of a silent `continue`; a DB-index failure after
the file lands `@unlink`s the orphan. A snapshot problem no longer fails the ingest — the event
is already stored, 201 stands. Test `testSnapshotIndexFailureCleansOrphanFileButKeepsEvent`
(throwing repo double → asserts 201, event stored, no leftover *.jpg).
- [x] **P4-8 [L]** `server/src/Auth/AuthController.php:31` — login form emits a CSRF token that
`login` never checks. **Fix:** verify it (or drop it).
DONE — verified (completed the half-built defense, not dropped). login() checks
`Csrf::check($sess->get('csrf'), $req->post('csrf'))` → 403 before the user lookup, closing the
login-CSRF / session-fixation hole. Tests updated to seed the session+body token; added
`testLoginRejectsMissingOrWrongCsrf`.
- [x] **P4-9 [L]** `server/src/Auth/AuthController.php:71` — logout calls `regenerate()` after
`session_destroy()` → E_WARNING, old cookie not replaced. **Fix:** reorder.
DONE — logout() rotates the id then wipes (was regenerate-after-destroy).
- [x] **P4-10 [L]** `server/src/Ingest/EventValidator.php:26` — no string length caps → an
overlong id becomes a MySQL 'Data too long' 500 retry loop instead of a 400. **Fix:** cap
lengths in the validator.
DONE — EventValidator caps device_id/camera_id (64) + zone_id (32); EventValidatorTest.
- [x] **P4-11 [L]** `server/src/Http/Request.php:45` — `pathFor` routes any `//...` URI to `/`
(parse_url scheme-relative). **Fix:** collapse/normalize.
## Phase 5 — Install / bundle / supply-chain
DONE — pathFor collapses leading slashes before parse_url; BasePathTest locks it.
- [x] **P5-1 [B]** `deploy/bundle/install_offline.sh:79` — the OFFLINE installer has no
backend-usability gate (setup_online's [6/8] does): it installs `POSE_BACKEND=movenet`
verbatim even when the bundle carries no working backend. **Fix:** mirror the [6/8] probe.
DONE — [5/6] probes HEF+hailo_platform / onnx+onnxruntime, reconciles POSE_BACKEND in the
installed env, hard-fails if neither. test_deploy_artifacts.py locks the gate.
- [x] **P5-2 [H]** `deploy/bundle/build_offline_bundle.sh:55` — a native build on x86 produces
an aarch64-named tarball full of x86_64 wheels. **Fix:** assert `uname -m == TARGET_ARCH`.
DONE — native branch now hard-fails when uname -m != TARGET_ARCH.
- [x] **P5-3 [M]** `deploy/bundle/build_offline_bundle.sh:65` — the air-gapped bundle never
carries the Hailo HEF, so offline Hailo install is impossible. **Fix:** stage the HEF (via
`fetch_hailo_hef --arch`) into the bundle.
DONE — build now fetches the `$HAILO_ARCH` (default hailo8) HEF via `fetch_hailo_hef` (pinned
sha256, aborts on mismatch) and stages `yolov8s_pose.hef`. Also fixed two latent breaks that
made the offline path unusable regardless: the MoveNet ONNX fetch was unconditional so its dead
source aborted the whole build under `set -e` (now guarded/optional → Hailo-only bundle), and
`install_offline.sh` copied only `*.onnx` so a bundled HEF never reached `$PREFIX/models` for the
backend gate to find (now copies `*.hef` too). MANIFEST lists models + available pose_backends.
Tests: fetches/stages HEF, MoveNet optional, installer copies the HEF.
- [x] **P5-4 [M]** `deploy/bundle/build_offline_bundle.sh:28` — pip deps unpinned, no digests,
MANIFEST has no hashes, bundle unsigned; spec requires SHA256/GPG + SBOM. **Fix:** pin +
hash + manifest digests.
DONE — build emits `SHA256SUMS` (sha256 of every wheel + model), `requirements.lock` (exact
`name==version` pins for a reproducible rebuild), and `sbom.json` (CycloneDX 1.5: name, version,
pypi purl, sha256). Optional detached GPG signature via `SIGN_KEY` → `SHA256SUMS.asc`.
`install_offline.sh` runs `sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS` (and verifies the signature if present)
BEFORE any pip install, hard-failing on mismatch. Generation logic verified end-to-end on a
synthetic stage (valid JSON, `sha256sum -c` passes). Tests lock the manifest + the install-time
check.
- [x] **P5-5 [H]** `deploy/systemd/move-detect-edge.service:46` `OFF-HW` — `DeviceAllow` omits
`/dev/media*` and `/dev/dma_heap`; picamera2/libcamera on Pi 5 needs them, so the CSI camera
is denied by the unit's own policy. **Fix:** add the device classes; verify on hardware.
DONE — added `char-media` + `/dev/dma_heap/`. OFF-HW: confirm on the Pi with the CSI camera.
- [x] **P5-6 [L]** `server/deploy/build_cafe24_package.sh` — dev cache dirs
(`.impeccable/`, `.ruff_cache/`) can ship inside the web-served package. **Fix:** exclude.
---
## Progress log
(updated as each item lands — newest first)
- **2026-07-17 — P1-9 + P3-2b landed (both approved data-model changes).** 40/43 done.
P1-9: edge `event_uuid` idempotency key (stable through the queue) + server dedup on a UNIQUE
column. P3-2b: `devices.site` → denormalized `events.site`; `SiteScope` enforced on the event
list (SQL filter), event detail/ack, and snapshot proxy (per-row 404). Schema migration +
provisioning UPDATEs documented in schema.sql. phpunit 97, pytest 158 — all green. REMAINING 3:
P2-6/7/8 (safety-timing / tracking-match — deferred to on-hardware commissioning).
- **2026-07-17 — off-hardware solo work COMPLETE (35/43).** Landed this pass, each test-locked:
P4-8 (login CSRF), P4-6 (zone 400-not-500), P4-5 (cursor pagination), P4-7 (snapshot atomicity
+ orphan cleanup), P5-3 (HEF in the offline bundle + fixed the broken build), P5-4 (pin + hash +
SBOM + install-time verify), P2-9/10/11 (keypoint confidence gating + MoveNet single-person
warning). phpunit 90, pytest 157 — all green.
REMAINING 8, none solo-doable:
· P1-9, P3-2b — need a DATA-MODEL decision (event dedup key + schema column; site↔device model).
· P2-6, P2-7, P2-8 — safety-timing / tracking-match logic that must be validated ON HARDWARE.
Changing them blind could make fall detection MISS events (worse than today's over-alarm,
which is fail-safe), so they are deliberately deferred to on-device commissioning.
· (P2 threshold notes: motion_thr and the sustained-prone/staleness windows are commissioning
knobs — tune with real camera footage on the Pi.)
- **2026-07-17 — P4-6 + P4-8 landed (server error/auth hardening).** ZoneConfig ownership-mismatch
now 400 not 500 (P4-6); login CSRF token now verified — closes login-CSRF/session-fixation
(P4-8). phpunit 88 green (4 skipped: PDO). Remaining solo: P4-5 (pagination), P4-7 (atomic
snapshot), P5-3 (HEF in bundle), P5-4 (pin+hash+SBOM).
- **2026-07-17 — 17 items landed, all with tests, full suite green.** ALL 4 BLOCKERS cleared
(P1-2, P2-1, P2-2, P5-1) + all Phase-1 silent-failure (P1-1,3,4,5,6,7,8,10,11) + Phase-2 HIGH
correctness (P2-3,4,5). Remaining: P1-9 (deferred to server batch), P2-6..11 (mostly threshold
tuning — needs on-device validation), Phase 3 (privacy — P3-2 retention needs a policy
decision: how many days), Phase 4 (server hardening, 11 items — mostly clear), Phase 5 (P5-2..6).
Nothing committed yet.
DONE — build prunes .ruff_cache/.impeccable/__pycache__/etc from the staged package.

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@ -1,45 +1,17 @@
# 파일럿 · 운영 런북
# P1 파일럿 런북 (노트북 웹캠 엔드투엔드)
이 문서는 두 경로를 다룬다. **자신의 상황에 맞는 절에서 시작하라:**
이 문서는 노트북 웹캠 하나로 **엣지 → 클라우드 → 관리자 응답**의 최소 경로를 돌리는 절차다.
실장비(Hailo·Pi5)·폐쇄망 전체 번들·드릴 게이트·SMS 연동은 후속(범위 밖, §6).
- **§0 폐쇄망 Pi 현장 설치·운영** — Hailo·Pi5 실장비를 오프라인 번들로 설치한 경우. systemd 유닛의
`Documentation=`이 이 문서를 가리키므로 현장 운영자는 **§0만** 보면 된다.
- **§1~§6 노트북 웹캠 개발 파일럿** — 개발/데모 머신에서 CPU MoveNet로 엔드투엔드를 돌리는 최소 경로.
**이 절들의 `pip install`·모델 `fetch` 명령은 개발/빌드 머신 전용이다 — 폐쇄망 Pi에서 실행하지 말 것.**
- 엣지: `python -m edge` (또는 `move-detect-edge`) — pose → 감지 → HMAC 서명 POST.
- 서버: 기존 `server/` PHP 앱 — ingest + 대시보드 + 사고 상세 + 데스크 Web Audio 알림.
- 엣지: `python -m edge` (또는 `move-detect-edge`) — CPU MoveNet pose → 감지 → HMAC 서명 POST.
- 클라우드: 기존 `cloud/` PHP 앱 — ingest + 대시보드 + 사고 상세 + 데스크 Web Audio 알림.
---
## 0. 폐쇄망 Pi 현장 설치·운영
## 1. 빌드 머신 준비 (모델 · onnxruntime)
실장비 Hailo·Pi5는 **오프라인 전체 번들**로 설치한다. 런타임 휠·pose 모델(HEF)·소스·systemd 유닛이
모두 번들에 동봉되어 있으므로 **Pi에서 인터넷을 받지 않는다** (아래 §1의 `pip install`/`fetch`는 절대
실행 금지 — 빌드 머신 전용).
1. **설치:** 번들 절차는 [deploy/README.md](../deploy/README.md)를 따른다. 빌드 머신에서
`deploy/bundle/build_offline_bundle.sh`(aarch64)로 번들을 만들어 Pi로 옮기고,
`sudo ./install_offline.sh`가 SHA256SUMS 검증 → 오프라인 휠 설치 → HEF 배치 → 유닛 설치를 수행한다.
(온라인 프로비저닝은 `sudo deploy/setup_online.sh` — 카메라 프로브까지 자동.)
2. **멀티카메라:** `/etc/move-detect/edge.env`의 `CAMERAS=csi:0:cam-01,uvc:0:cam-02`
형식으로 1 Pi에 2~4대를 배선한다(형식 `backend:device:camera_id`).
3. **enable 전 카메라 프로브** (설치 스크립트가 출력하는 명령) — 잘못된 인덱스/미체결 리본이 만드는
"초록불인데 한 대 덜 감시" 상태를 현장에서 잡는다.
4. **기동·확인:** `sudo systemctl enable --now move-detect-edge` → `journalctl -u move-detect-edge -f`.
5. **시크릿 위생:** 프로비저닝에 `deploy/device.env`를 썼다면 설치 후 삭제·필요시 로테이션
(deploy/README.md "Secret handling").
> 시크릿·서버 URL·모델 경로 등 env 키는 §3 표와 동일하다. 감지 임계값은 서버 대시보드의 구역·임계값이
> 다음 config 폴링에 반영된다.
---
## 1. 빌드/개발 머신 준비 (모델 · onnxruntime) — 폐쇄망 Pi에서 실행 금지
> **폐쇄망 원칙:** onnxruntime 휠과 `.onnx` 모델은 **빌드 머신에서 받아 번들**한다. 타깃(폐쇄망 Pi)에서는
> 인터넷을 받지 않으며, 아래 두 명령을 Pi에서 실행하면 안 된다(§0 참조 — Pi는 이미 번들로 설치됨).
> 노트북 파일럿은 빌드=타깃이 같은 머신이라 아래를 그대로 실행하면 된다.
> **폐쇄망 원칙:** onnxruntime 휠과 `.onnx` 모델은 **빌드 머신에서 받아 번들**한다. 타깃(폐쇄망)에서
> 인터넷을 받지 않는다. 노트북 파일럿은 빌드=타깃이 같은 머신이라 아래를 그대로 실행하면 된다.
```bash
pip install onnxruntime # CPU 추론 런타임 (에어갭 타깃엔 오프라인 휠로 번들)
@ -53,23 +25,23 @@ COCO-17 remap 로직은 그대로). 어댑터 remap은 `tests/test_movenet_pose.
---
## 2. 서버 로컬 기동
## 2. 클라우드 로컬 기동
로컬 MySQL 8(스키마 CHECK 제약은 8.0.16+)과 PHP 8.2+ 필요. 상세 배포·전제조건(gd/argon2/HTTPS 등)은
[server/docs/server-deploy.md](../server/docs/server-deploy.md) 참조 — 여기선 로컬 최소 절차만.
[cloud/docs/cloud-deploy.md](../cloud/docs/cloud-deploy.md) 참조 — 여기선 로컬 최소 절차만.
1. DB 생성 후 스키마 임포트: `mysql <db> < server/schema.sql` (10개 테이블).
2. `server/config.php`를 `server/config.example.php`에서 복사, 로컬 DB DSN/계정 기입
1. DB 생성 후 스키마 임포트: `mysql <db> < cloud/schema.sql` (10개 테이블).
2. `cloud/config.php`를 `cloud/config.example.php`에서 복사, 로컬 DB DSN/계정 기입
(`snapshot_dir`는 쓰기 가능 경로로).
3. **관리자 계정 · 디바이스 시크릿 등록** — 앱에 셀프 가입 흐름이 없으므로 직접 넣는다.
CLI 스니펫과 SQL은 server-deploy.md **§6(디바이스 시크릿)** · **§7(첫 관리자)** 그대로 사용:
CLI 스니펫과 SQL은 cloud-deploy.md **§6(디바이스 시크릿)** · **§7(첫 관리자)** 그대로 사용:
- 시크릿 생성: `php -r "echo bin2hex(random_bytes(32)), \"\n\";"`
- `INSERT INTO devices (device_id, name, secret, config_version) VALUES ('pi-01','노트북','<시크릿>',1);`
- 관리자 해시: `php -r "echo password_hash('바꿀-암구호', PASSWORD_ARGON2ID), \"\n\";"`
- `INSERT INTO users (username, password_hash, role, ...) VALUES ('admin','<해시>','admin',NULL,0,0);`
4. 기동: `php -S localhost:8000 -t server/public`
4. 기동: `php -S localhost:8000 -t cloud/public`
- 세션 쿠키가 `cookie_secure`라 순수 HTTP에선 로그인 쿠키가 안 붙을 수 있다. 로컬은 대개
`localhost`가 secure-context로 취급돼 동작하지만, 안 되면 server-deploy.md §8(HTTPS) 참조.
`localhost`가 secure-context로 취급돼 동작하지만, 안 되면 cloud-deploy.md §8(HTTPS) 참조.
---
@ -81,7 +53,7 @@ COCO-17 remap 로직은 그대로). 어댑터 remap은 `tests/test_movenet_pose.
|-----|------|------|
| `DEVICE_ID` | `devices.device_id`와 일치 | `pi-01` |
| `DEVICE_SECRET` | `devices.secret`와 일치(HMAC) | `<§2에서 생성한 값>` |
| `CAFE24_URL` | 서버 베이스 URL | `http://localhost:8000` |
| `CAFE24_URL` | 클라우드 베이스 URL | `http://localhost:8000` |
| `CAMERA_ID` | 이벤트/구역의 camera_id | `cam-01` |
| `MOVENET_ONNX` | 모델 경로 **(필수, 없으면 즉시 KeyError)** | `models/movenet_lightning.onnx` |
| `UVC_DEVICE` | OpenCV 캡처 인덱스 | `0` |
@ -111,13 +83,10 @@ python -m edge # 또는 move-detect-edge
≈ 12fps에서 약 12초. 저장 후 ~15초 기다렸다가 진입할 것.
6. **오프라인 큐:** 네트워크(또는 `php -S`) 중단 상태에서 이벤트 발생 → 큐에 적재 →
복구 후 `flush_every=300` 프레임(≈25초)마다 flush로 밀린 이벤트 전송.
7. **하트비트:** **30초 시간기반**(`heartbeat_interval_s=30`)으로 `POST /api/heartbeat`(서명).
부하와 무관하게 주기가 일정해 서버의 오프라인 판정(120초, 4배 마진)이 정상 장치를 오프라인으로
깜빡이지 않는다. temp/throttle/queue_pending/config_version 텔레메트리를 함께 싣는다.
7. **하트비트:** `heartbeat_every=900` 프레임(≈75초)마다 `POST /api/heartbeat`(서명).
> cadence(`sync_every`/`flush_every`는 프레임 수, `heartbeat_interval_s`는 초)는 `daemon.main()`
> 기본값이며 env로 노출돼 있지 않다. 데모에서 더 빠른 주기가 필요하면 `run_loop(...)` 호출 인자를
> 임시 조정한다. 감지 타이머는 monotonic 시계로 돌아 NTP 시각 점프에 영향받지 않는다(occurred_at만 벽시계).
> cadence(`sync_every`/`heartbeat_every`/`flush_every`)는 `daemon.main()` 기본값이며 env로
> 노출돼 있지 않다. 데모에서 더 빠른 주기가 필요하면 `run_loop(...)` 호출 인자를 임시 조정한다.
---
@ -125,7 +94,7 @@ python -m edge # 또는 move-detect-edge
```bash
pytest -q # 엣지 유닛(하드웨어 스모크는 모델 없으면 skip)
cd server && ./vendor/bin/phpunit --display-warnings --display-deprecations # 서버(0 warnings)
cd cloud && ./vendor/bin/phpunit --display-warnings --display-deprecations # 클라우드(0 warnings)
```
모델을 번들한 뒤 실추론 경로까지 확인하려면 `models/movenet_lightning.onnx` 존재 상태로 `pytest -q` —
@ -133,15 +102,11 @@ cd server && ./vendor/bin/phpunit --display-warnings --display-deprecations #
---
## 6. 한계 (명시)
## 6. 파일럿 한계 (명시)
> **이 절은 §1~§5의 노트북 웹캠 파일럿에 대한 것이다.** 폐쇄망 Pi 현장 설치(§0)는 아래 항목 다수를
> 이미 해소했다 — 실장비 Hailo 가속, 멀티카메라, 오프라인 전체 번들이 제공된다.
- **노트북 파일럿은 단일 카메라 · CPU pose(저 fps)** — 폐쇄망 Pi(§0)는 Hailo 가속 + 멀티카메라
(`CAMERAS=` 다중 배선)를 사용한다.
- **단일 프레임 스냅샷** — 前中後 링버퍼 다중 프레임은 P2(양끝 인프라는 존재, 배선 대기).
- **알림 1채널(데스크 Web Audio)** — critical SMS/webhook·미확인 에스컬레이션 메일은 후속(P3).
- **폐쇄망 전체 번들은 이미 존재한다** — `deploy/bundle/`에 오프라인 휠·HEF·소스·SHA256SUMS 검증
설치를 제공한다(§0). 노트북 파일럿만 `pip install`/`fetch`로 편의 실행할 뿐이다.
- **단일 카메라 · CPU pose(저 fps)** — 실장비 Hailo 가속은 후속.
- **단일 프레임 스냅샷** — 前中後 링버퍼 다중 프레임은 P2.
- **알림 1채널(데스크 Web Audio)** — critical SMS/webhook 실연동은 후속(게이트 정보 필요).
- **폐쇄망 전체 번들 아님** — onnxruntime/모델 fetch만 제공. 오프라인 휠·차단 설치·`docker save`
패키징은 별도 후속 태스크.
- **드릴 게이트 · F14 컴플라이언스 · 감사 해시체인** — 범위 밖(P1-C/P3).

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# P1-B 서버 수신·대시보드 (Server Ingest + Dashboard) Implementation Plan
# P1-B 클라우드 수신·대시보드 (Cloud Ingest + Dashboard) Implementation Plan
> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development (recommended) or superpowers:executing-plans to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
@ -10,22 +10,22 @@
## Global Constraints
- **PHP 8.5**, `declare(strict_types=1);` 모든 파일. PSR-4 오토로드(`App\` → `server/src/`).
- **폐쇄망/공유호스팅:** 런타임 composer 의존성 금지(대시보드는 vendor 없이 동작). phpunit은 개발 전용. Cafe24 `public_html`에 `server/public/`만 웹 노출.
- **PHP 8.5**, `declare(strict_types=1);` 모든 파일. PSR-4 오토로드(`App\` → `cloud/src/`).
- **폐쇄망/공유호스팅:** 런타임 composer 의존성 금지(대시보드는 vendor 없이 동작). phpunit은 개발 전용. Cafe24 `public_html`에 `cloud/public/`만 웹 노출.
- **HMAC 계약(P1-A와 정확히 일치):** 서명 = `hmac-sha256(nonce + timestamp + body, per_device_secret)` hex. P1-A `edge/alert.py::sign`과 바이트 동일하게 검증. 헤더 `X-Signature`, `X-Nonce`, `X-Timestamp`.
- **replay 방지:** nonce 1회성(저장·재사용 거부) + timestamp 윈도우(기본 300초).
- **스냅샷:** base64 JPEG를 **gd로 재인코딩**(페이로드 제거·강제 .jpg·랜덤 UUID 파일명), **웹루트 밖**(`server/storage/snapshots/`) 저장, 인증 프록시로만 서빙. 원본 바이트 절대 그대로 저장 금지.
- **스냅샷:** base64 JPEG를 **gd로 재인코딩**(페이로드 제거·강제 .jpg·랜덤 UUID 파일명), **웹루트 밖**(`cloud/storage/snapshots/`) 저장, 인증 프록시로만 서빙. 원본 바이트 절대 그대로 저장 금지.
- **SQL:** 전부 prepared statement(placeholder). event_type/severity/level 등은 **화이트리스트 enum** 검증.
- **인증:** 로그인 필수(argon2id), 세션 쿠키 HttpOnly+Secure+SameSite=Lax, CSRF 토큰, brute-force 잠금. RBAC: admin/operator/viewer.
- **심각도 색상 단독 금지(NF9):** 텍스트(위급/높음/경고)+아이콘+색, 색맹안전 팔레트.
- **시크릿:** per-device secret·DB 자격증명은 env/시크릿 파일(`server/config.php`는 `.gitignore`), 하드코딩 금지.
- **시크릿:** per-device secret·DB 자격증명은 env/시크릿 파일(`cloud/config.php`는 `.gitignore`), 하드코딩 금지.
- **테스트:** 로직은 mock repository로 DB 없이 단위테스트. DB 통합은 마지막 게이트 태스크(로컬 pdo_sqlite or Cafe24).
- 파일 작고 단일책임. 컨트롤러는 얇게(검증·오케스트레이션), 로직은 서비스/헬퍼로.
## File Structure
```
server/
cloud/
composer.json # PSR-4 autoload + phpunit(dev)
phpunit.xml
config.example.php # DB dsn, snapshot dir, nonce ttl 등 (실배포 config.php는 gitignore)
@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ server/
## Task 1: 스캐폴드 (composer, autoload, Config, PHPUnit)
**Files:**
- Create: `server/composer.json`, `server/phpunit.xml`, `server/src/Config.php`, `server/config.example.php`, `server/tests/ConfigTest.php`, `server/.gitignore`
- Create: `cloud/composer.json`, `cloud/phpunit.xml`, `cloud/src/Config.php`, `cloud/config.example.php`, `cloud/tests/ConfigTest.php`, `cloud/.gitignore`
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: (없음)
@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ server/
```json
{
"name": "move-detect/server",
"name": "move-detect/cloud",
"type": "project",
"require": { "php": ">=8.2" },
"require-dev": { "phpunit/phpunit": "^11" },
@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ server/
</phpunit>
```
- [ ] **Step 3: `.gitignore`** (server/)
- [ ] **Step 3: `.gitignore`** (cloud/)
```
/vendor/
@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ server/
!/storage/snapshots/.gitkeep
```
- [ ] **Step 4: 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/ConfigTest.php`
- [ ] **Step 4: 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/ConfigTest.php`
```php
<?php
@ -135,10 +135,10 @@ final class ConfigTest extends TestCase
- [ ] **Step 5: 실패 확인**
Run: `cd server && composer install -q && ./vendor/bin/phpunit tests/ConfigTest.php`
Run: `cd cloud && composer install -q && ./vendor/bin/phpunit tests/ConfigTest.php`
Expected: FAIL — `Class "App\Config" not found`
- [ ] **Step 6: 구현** — `server/src/Config.php`
- [ ] **Step 6: 구현** — `cloud/src/Config.php`
```php
<?php
@ -180,8 +180,8 @@ return [
Run: `./vendor/bin/phpunit tests/ConfigTest.php` → PASS
```bash
git add server/composer.json server/phpunit.xml server/.gitignore server/config.example.php server/src/Config.php server/tests/ConfigTest.php
git commit -m "feat(server): P1-B scaffold — composer autoload + Config"
git add cloud/composer.json cloud/phpunit.xml cloud/.gitignore cloud/config.example.php cloud/src/Config.php cloud/tests/ConfigTest.php
git commit -m "feat(cloud): P1-B scaffold — composer autoload + Config"
```
---
@ -189,13 +189,13 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): P1-B scaffold — composer autoload + Config"
## Task 2: HMAC 검증 (Hmac::sign/verify) — P1-A 계약 일치
**Files:**
- Create: `server/src/Security/Hmac.php`, `server/tests/HmacTest.php`
- Create: `cloud/src/Security/Hmac.php`, `cloud/tests/HmacTest.php`
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: (없음)
- Produces: `App\Security\Hmac::sign(string $secret, string $nonce, string $ts, string $body): string` (hex), `Hmac::verify(string $secret, string $nonce, string $ts, string $body, string $sig): bool` (hash_equals, 상수시간).
- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/HmacTest.php`
- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/HmacTest.php`
```php
<?php
@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ final class HmacTest extends TestCase
Run: `./vendor/bin/phpunit tests/HmacTest.php` → FAIL (class not found)
- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `server/src/Security/Hmac.php`
- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `cloud/src/Security/Hmac.php`
```php
<?php
@ -256,8 +256,8 @@ final class Hmac
Run: `./vendor/bin/phpunit tests/HmacTest.php` → PASS
```bash
git add server/src/Security/Hmac.php server/tests/HmacTest.php
git commit -m "feat(server): HMAC sign/verify matching P1-A edge contract"
git add cloud/src/Security/Hmac.php cloud/tests/HmacTest.php
git commit -m "feat(cloud): HMAC sign/verify matching P1-A edge contract"
```
---
@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): HMAC sign/verify matching P1-A edge contract"
## Task 3: Repository 인터페이스 + InMemory 테스트더블
**Files:**
- Create: `server/src/Repository/{EventRepository,UserRepository,DeviceRepository,ZoneRepository,ThresholdRepository,NonceRepository,RateLimiterRepository,AuditRepository,SnapshotRepository}.php`, `server/tests/Support/InMemoryRepositories.php`, `server/tests/RepositoryContractTest.php`
- Create: `cloud/src/Repository/{EventRepository,UserRepository,DeviceRepository,ZoneRepository,ThresholdRepository,NonceRepository,RateLimiterRepository,AuditRepository,SnapshotRepository}.php`, `cloud/tests/Support/InMemoryRepositories.php`, `cloud/tests/RepositoryContractTest.php`
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: (없음)
@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): HMAC sign/verify matching P1-A edge contract"
- [ ] **Step 1: 인터페이스들 작성** — 각 파일에 `interface` 정의.
`server/src/Repository/DeviceRepository.php`:
`cloud/src/Repository/DeviceRepository.php`:
```php
<?php
@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ interface AuditRepository
}
```
- [ ] **Step 2: InMemory 더블 + 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/Support/InMemoryRepositories.php` (테스트 전용 구현)
- [ ] **Step 2: InMemory 더블 + 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/Support/InMemoryRepositories.php` (테스트 전용 구현)
```php
<?php
@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ final class InMemoryAuditRepository implements AuditRepository {
}
```
그리고 `server/tests/RepositoryContractTest.php`:
그리고 `cloud/tests/RepositoryContractTest.php`:
```php
<?php
@ -523,8 +523,8 @@ Expected: FAIL (interfaces/doubles absent) → 작성 후 PASS.
- [ ] **Step 4: 커밋**
```bash
git add server/src/Repository/*.php server/tests/Support/InMemoryRepositories.php server/tests/RepositoryContractTest.php
git commit -m "feat(server): repository interfaces + in-memory test doubles"
git add cloud/src/Repository/*.php cloud/tests/Support/InMemoryRepositories.php cloud/tests/RepositoryContractTest.php
git commit -m "feat(cloud): repository interfaces + in-memory test doubles"
```
---
@ -532,13 +532,13 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): repository interfaces + in-memory test doubles"
## Task 4: EventValidator (enum 화이트리스트 + 스키마 검증)
**Files:**
- Create: `server/src/Ingest/EventValidator.php`, `server/tests/EventValidatorTest.php`
- Create: `cloud/src/Ingest/EventValidator.php`, `cloud/tests/EventValidatorTest.php`
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: (없음)
- Produces: `App\Ingest\EventValidator::validate(array $payload): array` — `['ok' => bool, 'errors' => string[], 'clean' => array]`. 화이트리스트: event_type ∈ {fall,no_motion,immobility,ghost,zone_warning,zone_restricted,pinch,monitoring_degraded,device_fault}; severity ∈ {critical,high,warning,info}. 필수: device_id, camera_id, event_type, severity, occurred_at. snapshots는 배열(≤3), 문자열 항목.
- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/EventValidatorTest.php`
- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/EventValidatorTest.php`
```php
<?php
@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ final class EventValidatorTest extends TestCase
- [ ] **Step 2: 실패 확인** → FAIL
- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `server/src/Ingest/EventValidator.php`
- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `cloud/src/Ingest/EventValidator.php`
```php
<?php
@ -627,8 +627,8 @@ final class EventValidator
- [ ] **Step 4: 통과 + 커밋**
```bash
git add server/src/Ingest/EventValidator.php server/tests/EventValidatorTest.php
git commit -m "feat(server): event payload validator with enum whitelist"
git add cloud/src/Ingest/EventValidator.php cloud/tests/EventValidatorTest.php
git commit -m "feat(cloud): event payload validator with enum whitelist"
```
---
@ -636,13 +636,13 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): event payload validator with enum whitelist"
## Task 5: ImageProcessor (gd 재인코딩 + UUID)
**Files:**
- Create: `server/src/Ingest/ImageProcessor.php`, `server/tests/ImageProcessorTest.php`
- Create: `cloud/src/Ingest/ImageProcessor.php`, `cloud/tests/ImageProcessorTest.php`
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: (없음)
- Produces: `App\Ingest\ImageProcessor::reencode(string $base64, int $quality = 80): array` — `['ok'=>bool, 'bytes'=>string, 'uuid'=>string, 'hash'=>string]`. base64 디코드 → gd로 로드 → 순수 JPEG로 재출력(원본 메타/페이로드 제거). 실패 시 `['ok'=>false]`. uuid=랜덤 32hex, hash=sha256(재인코딩 바이트).
- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/ImageProcessorTest.php`
- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/ImageProcessorTest.php`
```php
<?php
@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ final class ImageProcessorTest extends TestCase
- [ ] **Step 2: 실패 확인** → FAIL
- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `server/src/Ingest/ImageProcessor.php`
- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `cloud/src/Ingest/ImageProcessor.php`
```php
<?php
@ -710,8 +710,8 @@ final class ImageProcessor
- [ ] **Step 4: 통과 + 커밋**
```bash
git add server/src/Ingest/ImageProcessor.php server/tests/ImageProcessorTest.php
git commit -m "feat(server): gd image re-encode (strip payload, uuid, hash)"
git add cloud/src/Ingest/ImageProcessor.php cloud/tests/ImageProcessorTest.php
git commit -m "feat(cloud): gd image re-encode (strip payload, uuid, hash)"
```
---
@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): gd image re-encode (strip payload, uuid, hash)"
## Task 6: Http Request/Response
**Files:**
- Create: `server/src/Http/Request.php`, `server/src/Http/Response.php`, `server/tests/HttpTest.php`
- Create: `cloud/src/Http/Request.php`, `cloud/src/Http/Response.php`, `cloud/tests/HttpTest.php`
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: (없음)
@ -727,7 +727,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): gd image re-encode (strip payload, uuid, hash)"
- `App\Http\Request(string $method, string $path, array $headers, string $body, array $query, array $post)` with getters `method(), path(), header(string $name): ?string, body(), json(): array, query(string $k): ?string, post(string $k): ?string`, and static `fromGlobals(): self`.
- `App\Http\Response`: static `json(array $data, int $status=200): self`, `text(string $s, int $status=200): self`, `bytes(string $b, string $contentType, int $status=200): self`, `redirect(string $to): self`; getters `status(), headers(), body()`; `send(): void`.
- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/HttpTest.php`
- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/HttpTest.php`
```php
<?php
@ -755,7 +755,7 @@ final class HttpTest extends TestCase
- [ ] **Step 2: 실패 확인** → FAIL
- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `server/src/Http/Request.php`
- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `cloud/src/Http/Request.php`
```php
<?php
@ -792,7 +792,7 @@ final class Request
}
```
`server/src/Http/Response.php`:
`cloud/src/Http/Response.php`:
```php
<?php
@ -829,8 +829,8 @@ final class Response
- [ ] **Step 4: 통과 + 커밋**
```bash
git add server/src/Http/Request.php server/src/Http/Response.php server/tests/HttpTest.php
git commit -m "feat(server): Http Request/Response primitives"
git add cloud/src/Http/Request.php cloud/src/Http/Response.php cloud/tests/HttpTest.php
git commit -m "feat(cloud): Http Request/Response primitives"
```
---
@ -838,13 +838,13 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): Http Request/Response primitives"
## Task 7: IngestController (POST /api/events) — 보안 파이프라인 통합
**Files:**
- Create: `server/src/Ingest/IngestController.php`, `server/tests/IngestControllerTest.php`
- Create: `cloud/src/Ingest/IngestController.php`, `cloud/tests/IngestControllerTest.php`
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: `Hmac` (T2), `EventValidator`/`ImageProcessor` (T4/T5), `Request`/`Response` (T6), `DeviceRepository`/`NonceRepository`/`RateLimiterRepository`/`EventRepository`/`SnapshotRepository` (T3), `Config` (T1)
- Produces: `App\Ingest\IngestController(Config, DeviceRepository, NonceRepository, RateLimiterRepository, EventRepository, SnapshotRepository)` with `handle(Request $req, int $now): Response`. 순서: rate limit → device secret 조회 → HMAC 검증 → timestamp 윈도우 → nonce replay → 검증 → 이미지 재인코딩·저장 → 이벤트+스냅샷 insert. 실패는 401/400/429, 성공 201 `{event_id}`.
- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/IngestControllerTest.php`
- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/IngestControllerTest.php`
```php
<?php
@ -919,7 +919,7 @@ final class IngestControllerTest extends TestCase
- [ ] **Step 2: 실패 확인** → FAIL
- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `server/src/Ingest/IngestController.php`
- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `cloud/src/Ingest/IngestController.php`
```php
<?php
@ -991,8 +991,8 @@ final class IngestController
- [ ] **Step 4: 통과 + 커밋**
```bash
git add server/src/Ingest/IngestController.php server/tests/IngestControllerTest.php
git commit -m "feat(server): ingest controller (HMAC+nonce+ratelimit+reencode+persist)"
git add cloud/src/Ingest/IngestController.php cloud/tests/IngestControllerTest.php
git commit -m "feat(cloud): ingest controller (HMAC+nonce+ratelimit+reencode+persist)"
```
---
@ -1000,7 +1000,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): ingest controller (HMAC+nonce+ratelimit+reencode+pe
## Task 8: Password (argon2id) + Csrf
**Files:**
- Create: `server/src/Security/Password.php`, `server/src/Security/Csrf.php`, `server/tests/PasswordCsrfTest.php`
- Create: `cloud/src/Security/Password.php`, `cloud/src/Security/Csrf.php`, `cloud/tests/PasswordCsrfTest.php`
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: (없음)
@ -1008,7 +1008,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): ingest controller (HMAC+nonce+ratelimit+reencode+pe
- `App\Security\Password::hash(string $p): string` (PASSWORD_ARGON2ID), `Password::verify(string $p, string $hash): bool`.
- `App\Security\Csrf::issue(callable $randHex): string`, `Csrf::check(string $expected, string $given): bool` (hash_equals).
- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/PasswordCsrfTest.php`
- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/PasswordCsrfTest.php`
```php
<?php
@ -1036,7 +1036,7 @@ final class PasswordCsrfTest extends TestCase
- [ ] **Step 2: 실패 확인** → FAIL
- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `server/src/Security/Password.php`
- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `cloud/src/Security/Password.php`
```php
<?php
@ -1054,7 +1054,7 @@ final class Password
}
```
`server/src/Security/Csrf.php`:
`cloud/src/Security/Csrf.php`:
```php
<?php
@ -1073,8 +1073,8 @@ final class Csrf
- [ ] **Step 4: 통과 + 커밋**
```bash
git add server/src/Security/Password.php server/src/Security/Csrf.php server/tests/PasswordCsrfTest.php
git commit -m "feat(server): argon2id password + CSRF token helpers"
git add cloud/src/Security/Password.php cloud/src/Security/Csrf.php cloud/tests/PasswordCsrfTest.php
git commit -m "feat(cloud): argon2id password + CSRF token helpers"
```
---
@ -1082,13 +1082,13 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): argon2id password + CSRF token helpers"
## Task 9: Rbac (역할→권한)
**Files:**
- Create: `server/src/Auth/Rbac.php`, `server/tests/RbacTest.php`
- Create: `cloud/src/Auth/Rbac.php`, `cloud/tests/RbacTest.php`
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: (없음)
- Produces: `App\Auth\Rbac::can(string $role, string $permission): bool`. 권한: `view_events`(all), `acknowledge`(admin,operator), `edit_zones`(admin,operator), `manage_thresholds`(admin), `manage_compliance`(admin).
- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/RbacTest.php`
- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/RbacTest.php`
```php
<?php
@ -1123,7 +1123,7 @@ final class RbacTest extends TestCase
- [ ] **Step 2: 실패 확인** → FAIL
- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `server/src/Auth/Rbac.php`
- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `cloud/src/Auth/Rbac.php`
```php
<?php
@ -1146,8 +1146,8 @@ final class Rbac
- [ ] **Step 4: 통과 + 커밋**
```bash
git add server/src/Auth/Rbac.php server/tests/RbacTest.php
git commit -m "feat(server): RBAC permission matrix"
git add cloud/src/Auth/Rbac.php cloud/tests/RbacTest.php
git commit -m "feat(cloud): RBAC permission matrix"
```
---
@ -1155,7 +1155,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): RBAC permission matrix"
## Task 10: Session + AuthController (로그인/brute-force 잠금)
**Files:**
- Create: `server/src/Auth/Session.php`, `server/src/Auth/AuthController.php`, `server/tests/AuthControllerTest.php`
- Create: `cloud/src/Auth/Session.php`, `cloud/src/Auth/AuthController.php`, `cloud/tests/AuthControllerTest.php`
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: `Password` (T8), `Request`/`Response` (T6), `UserRepository`/`AuditRepository` (T3)
@ -1163,7 +1163,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): RBAC permission matrix"
- `interface App\Auth\SessionStore { get(string $k): mixed; set(string $k, mixed $v): void; clear(): void; }`, `ArraySessionStore` (test), `PhpSessionStore` (prod, secure cookie).
- `App\Auth\AuthController(UserRepository $users, AuditRepository $audit, int $maxAttempts=5, int $lockSeconds=900)` with `login(Request $req, SessionStore $sess, int $now): Response` and `logout(SessionStore $sess): Response`. Locks after maxAttempts; 200 on success (sets user in session), 401 on bad creds, 423 when locked.
- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/AuthControllerTest.php`
- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/AuthControllerTest.php`
```php
<?php
@ -1210,7 +1210,7 @@ final class AuthControllerTest extends TestCase
- [ ] **Step 2: 실패 확인** → FAIL
- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `server/src/Auth/Session.php`
- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `cloud/src/Auth/Session.php`
```php
<?php
@ -1240,7 +1240,7 @@ final class PhpSessionStore implements SessionStore {
}
```
`server/src/Auth/AuthController.php`:
`cloud/src/Auth/AuthController.php`:
```php
<?php
@ -1300,8 +1300,8 @@ final class AuthController
- [ ] **Step 4: 통과 + 커밋**
```bash
git add server/src/Auth/Session.php server/src/Auth/AuthController.php server/tests/AuthControllerTest.php
git commit -m "feat(server): session store + auth controller with lockout"
git add cloud/src/Auth/Session.php cloud/src/Auth/AuthController.php cloud/tests/AuthControllerTest.php
git commit -m "feat(cloud): session store + auth controller with lockout"
```
---
@ -1309,13 +1309,13 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): session store + auth controller with lockout"
## Task 11: Router + 프론트컨트롤러 준비
**Files:**
- Create: `server/src/Http/Router.php`, `server/tests/RouterTest.php`
- Create: `cloud/src/Http/Router.php`, `cloud/tests/RouterTest.php`
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: `Request`/`Response` (T6)
- Produces: `App\Http\Router` with `add(string $method, string $path, callable $handler): void` and `dispatch(Request $req): Response` (404 if no match; path params `{id}` → passed to handler as second arg assoc array).
- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/RouterTest.php`
- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/RouterTest.php`
```php
<?php
@ -1347,7 +1347,7 @@ final class RouterTest extends TestCase
- [ ] **Step 2: 실패 확인** → FAIL
- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `server/src/Http/Router.php`
- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `cloud/src/Http/Router.php`
```php
<?php
@ -1379,8 +1379,8 @@ final class Router
- [ ] **Step 4: 통과 + 커밋**
```bash
git add server/src/Http/Router.php server/tests/RouterTest.php
git commit -m "feat(server): path-param router + dispatch"
git add cloud/src/Http/Router.php cloud/tests/RouterTest.php
git commit -m "feat(cloud): path-param router + dispatch"
```
---
@ -1388,7 +1388,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): path-param router + dispatch"
## Task 12: 대시보드 컨트롤러 (목록·상세·확인) + 스냅샷 프록시
**Files:**
- Create: `server/src/Dashboard/EventListController.php`, `server/src/Dashboard/EventDetailController.php`, `server/src/Dashboard/SnapshotProxy.php`, `server/tests/DashboardTest.php`
- Create: `cloud/src/Dashboard/EventListController.php`, `cloud/src/Dashboard/EventDetailController.php`, `cloud/src/Dashboard/SnapshotProxy.php`, `cloud/tests/DashboardTest.php`
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: `Request`/`Response` (T6), `SessionStore`/`Rbac` (T9/T10), `EventRepository`/`SnapshotRepository`/`AuditRepository` (T3)
@ -1397,7 +1397,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): path-param router + dispatch"
- `EventDetailController(EventRepository, SnapshotRepository, AuditRepository, SessionStore)::show(Request, array $params): Response`; `acknowledge(Request, array $params): Response` (RBAC `acknowledge`).
- `SnapshotProxy(SnapshotRepository, SessionStore)::serve(Request, array $params): Response` — 인증 필요, uuid→웹루트밖 파일 바이트 서빙(image/jpeg), 미인증 401, 없음 404.
- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/DashboardTest.php`
- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/DashboardTest.php`
```php
<?php
@ -1451,7 +1451,7 @@ final class DashboardTest extends TestCase
- [ ] **Step 2: 실패 확인** → FAIL
- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `server/src/Dashboard/EventListController.php`
- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `cloud/src/Dashboard/EventListController.php`
```php
<?php
@ -1476,7 +1476,7 @@ final class EventListController
}
```
`server/src/Dashboard/EventDetailController.php`:
`cloud/src/Dashboard/EventDetailController.php`:
```php
<?php
@ -1516,7 +1516,7 @@ final class EventDetailController
}
```
`server/src/Dashboard/SnapshotProxy.php`:
`cloud/src/Dashboard/SnapshotProxy.php`:
```php
<?php
@ -1545,8 +1545,8 @@ final class SnapshotProxy
- [ ] **Step 4: 통과 + 커밋**
```bash
git add server/src/Dashboard/EventListController.php server/src/Dashboard/EventDetailController.php server/src/Dashboard/SnapshotProxy.php server/tests/DashboardTest.php
git commit -m "feat(server): dashboard list/detail/ack + auth-gated snapshot proxy"
git add cloud/src/Dashboard/EventListController.php cloud/src/Dashboard/EventDetailController.php cloud/src/Dashboard/SnapshotProxy.php cloud/tests/DashboardTest.php
git commit -m "feat(cloud): dashboard list/detail/ack + auth-gated snapshot proxy"
```
---
@ -1554,7 +1554,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): dashboard list/detail/ack + auth-gated snapshot pro
## Task 13: Polygon 검증 + ZoneConfigController
**Files:**
- Create: `server/src/Geometry/Polygon.php`, `server/src/Dashboard/ZoneConfigController.php`, `server/tests/ZoneConfigTest.php`
- Create: `cloud/src/Geometry/Polygon.php`, `cloud/src/Dashboard/ZoneConfigController.php`, `cloud/tests/ZoneConfigTest.php`
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: `Request`/`Response` (T6), `SessionStore`/`Rbac`, `ZoneRepository`/`AuditRepository` (T3)
@ -1562,7 +1562,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): dashboard list/detail/ack + auth-gated snapshot pro
- `App\Geometry\Polygon::validate(array $points): bool` — ≥3점, 각 점 `[x,y]` 숫자.
- `ZoneConfigController(ZoneRepository, AuditRepository, SessionStore)`: `list(Request, array): Response` (camera별), `save(Request): Response` (RBAC edit_zones; level ∈ {warning,restricted,pinch}; polygon 검증; zone_id 반환), `delete(Request, array): Response`.
- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/ZoneConfigTest.php`
- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/ZoneConfigTest.php`
```php
<?php
@ -1610,7 +1610,7 @@ final class ZoneConfigTest extends TestCase
- [ ] **Step 2: 실패 확인** → FAIL
- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `server/src/Geometry/Polygon.php`
- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `cloud/src/Geometry/Polygon.php`
```php
<?php
@ -1631,7 +1631,7 @@ final class Polygon
}
```
`server/src/Dashboard/ZoneConfigController.php`:
`cloud/src/Dashboard/ZoneConfigController.php`:
```php
<?php
@ -1698,8 +1698,8 @@ final class ZoneConfigController
- [ ] **Step 4: 통과 + 커밋**
```bash
git add server/src/Geometry/Polygon.php server/src/Dashboard/ZoneConfigController.php server/tests/ZoneConfigTest.php
git commit -m "feat(server): polygon validation + zone config controller (RBAC)"
git add cloud/src/Geometry/Polygon.php cloud/src/Dashboard/ZoneConfigController.php cloud/tests/ZoneConfigTest.php
git commit -m "feat(cloud): polygon validation + zone config controller (RBAC)"
```
---
@ -1707,7 +1707,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): polygon validation + zone config controller (RBAC)"
## Task 14: ConfigController + HeartbeatController (Pi 동기 API)
**Files:**
- Create: `server/src/Api/ConfigController.php`, `server/src/Api/HeartbeatController.php`, `server/tests/ApiSyncTest.php`
- Create: `cloud/src/Api/ConfigController.php`, `cloud/src/Api/HeartbeatController.php`, `cloud/tests/ApiSyncTest.php`
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: `Request`/`Response` (T6), `Hmac` (T2), `DeviceRepository`/`ZoneRepository`/`ThresholdRepository` (T3), `Config` (T1)
@ -1715,7 +1715,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): polygon validation + zone config controller (RBAC)"
- `App\Api\ConfigController(DeviceRepository, ZoneRepository, ThresholdRepository)::get(Request): Response` — `?device_id=`; device secret HMAC 검증(엣지 폴링). 반환 `{version, zones, thresholds}`.
- `App\Api\HeartbeatController(Config, DeviceRepository)::post(Request, int $now): Response` — HMAC 검증 후 `touchHeartbeat(device_id, {fps,temp,throttle,config_version,at})`. 200.
- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/ApiSyncTest.php`
- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/ApiSyncTest.php`
```php
<?php
@ -1768,7 +1768,7 @@ final class ApiSyncTest extends TestCase
- [ ] **Step 2: 실패 확인** → FAIL
- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `server/src/Api/ConfigController.php`
- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `cloud/src/Api/ConfigController.php`
```php
<?php
@ -1802,7 +1802,7 @@ final class ConfigController
}
```
`server/src/Api/HeartbeatController.php`:
`cloud/src/Api/HeartbeatController.php`:
```php
<?php
@ -1840,8 +1840,8 @@ final class HeartbeatController
- [ ] **Step 4: 통과 + 커밋**
```bash
git add server/src/Api/ConfigController.php server/src/Api/HeartbeatController.php server/tests/ApiSyncTest.php
git commit -m "feat(server): device config + heartbeat sync API (HMAC)"
git add cloud/src/Api/ConfigController.php cloud/src/Api/HeartbeatController.php cloud/tests/ApiSyncTest.php
git commit -m "feat(cloud): device config + heartbeat sync API (HMAC)"
```
---
@ -1849,11 +1849,11 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): device config + heartbeat sync API (HMAC)"
## Task 15: 프론트컨트롤러 배선 + 뷰 + .htaccess (통합)
**Files:**
- Create: `server/public/index.php`, `server/public/.htaccess`, `server/public/assets/{app.css,app.js,zone-draw.js}`, `server/src/View/{layout.php,login.php,events.php,event_detail.php,zones.php}`, `server/tests/WiringSmokeTest.php`
- Create: `cloud/public/index.php`, `cloud/public/.htaccess`, `cloud/public/assets/{app.css,app.js,zone-draw.js}`, `cloud/src/View/{layout.php,login.php,events.php,event_detail.php,zones.php}`, `cloud/tests/WiringSmokeTest.php`
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: 전 태스크. `Router`, 모든 컨트롤러, `PhpSessionStore`, PDO repos (T16에서 실제 구현; 여기선 배선만).
- Produces: `server/public/index.php` — Config 로드 → PDO repos 생성 → Router에 모든 경로 등록 → dispatch → send. 뷰는 서버렌더 PHP. **테스트는 라우팅 표만 스모크 검증**(핸들러 스텁).
- Produces: `cloud/public/index.php` — Config 로드 → PDO repos 생성 → Router에 모든 경로 등록 → dispatch → send. 뷰는 서버렌더 PHP. **테스트는 라우팅 표만 스모크 검증**(핸들러 스텁).
라우트 표:
| method | path | handler |
@ -1872,7 +1872,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): device config + heartbeat sync API (HMAC)"
| GET | /snap/{uuid} | SnapshotProxy::serve |
| GET | /, /zones, /login | View render |
- [ ] **Step 1: 라우터 스모크 테스트** — `server/tests/WiringSmokeTest.php`
- [ ] **Step 1: 라우터 스모크 테스트** — `cloud/tests/WiringSmokeTest.php`
```php
<?php
@ -1902,7 +1902,7 @@ final class WiringSmokeTest extends TestCase
- [ ] **Step 2: 실패/통과 확인** → 라우터만 검증(회귀 방지). `./vendor/bin/phpunit tests/WiringSmokeTest.php` → PASS.
- [ ] **Step 3: 프론트컨트롤러** — `server/public/index.php`
- [ ] **Step 3: 프론트컨트롤러** — `cloud/public/index.php`
```php
<?php
@ -1970,7 +1970,7 @@ $r->add('GET', '/zones', fn() => $render('zones'));
$r->dispatch(Request::fromGlobals())->send();
```
- [ ] **Step 4: .htaccess** — `server/public/.htaccess`
- [ ] **Step 4: .htaccess** — `cloud/public/.htaccess`
```apache
RewriteEngine On
@ -1994,8 +1994,8 @@ RewriteRule ^ index.php [QSA,L]
Run: `./vendor/bin/phpunit` (전체) — green.
```bash
git add server/public server/src/View server/tests/WiringSmokeTest.php
git commit -m "feat(server): front controller wiring + views + zone-draw UI"
git add cloud/public cloud/src/View cloud/tests/WiringSmokeTest.php
git commit -m "feat(cloud): front controller wiring + views + zone-draw UI"
```
---
@ -2005,13 +2005,13 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): front controller wiring + views + zone-draw UI"
> ⚠️ **DB 통합 태스크.** 로컬에 PDO 드라이버 미로드 시 이 태스크의 DB 실행 테스트는 **게이트**(로컬에서 `pdo_sqlite` 활성 or Cafe24 MySQL). 단위 로직은 이미 T1~T15에서 mock repo로 검증됨. 이 태스크는 PDO 구현 + DDL + 배포 절차.
**Files:**
- Create: `server/src/Db/Database.php`, `server/src/Repository/Pdo/Pdo{Device,Nonce,RateLimiter,Event,Snapshot,User,Zone,Threshold,Audit}Repository.php` (9개), `server/schema.sql`, `server/docs/server-deploy.md`, `server/tests/PdoIntegrationTest.php`
- Create: `cloud/src/Db/Database.php`, `cloud/src/Repository/Pdo/Pdo{Device,Nonce,RateLimiter,Event,Snapshot,User,Zone,Threshold,Audit}Repository.php` (9개), `cloud/schema.sql`, `cloud/docs/cloud-deploy.md`, `cloud/tests/PdoIntegrationTest.php`
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: repository 인터페이스(T3), `Config`(T1)
- Produces: `App\Db\Database::connect(Config): PDO` (ERRMODE_EXCEPTION, prepared). 각 `Pdo*Repository`가 인터페이스 구현(전부 prepared statement).
- [ ] **Step 1: Database factory** — `server/src/Db/Database.php`
- [ ] **Step 1: Database factory** — `cloud/src/Db/Database.php`
```php
<?php
@ -2035,7 +2035,7 @@ final class Database
- [ ] **Step 2: schema.sql** — MySQL DDL (P1-B 서브셋: users, devices, cameras, zones, events, event_snapshots, thresholds, nonces, rate_limits, audit_log). §7.4 스펙 기준. `event_type`/`severity`/`level`은 애플리케이션 화이트리스트(+ 선택 CHECK). `nonces(nonce PK, expires_at INDEX)`, `rate_limits(rate_key, window)` 유니크. sqlite 호환 노트(AUTOINCREMENT 등) 주석. metrics/polygon_json은 TEXT/JSON.
- [ ] **Step 3: PDO repositories (9개)** — 각 인터페이스를 prepared statement로 구현. 예 `server/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoNonceRepository.php`:
- [ ] **Step 3: PDO repositories (9개)** — 각 인터페이스를 prepared statement로 구현. 예 `cloud/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoNonceRepository.php`:
```php
<?php
@ -2069,7 +2069,7 @@ final class PdoNonceRepository implements NonceRepository
- `PdoThresholdRepository`: forDevice(SELECT key/value → assoc).
- `PdoAuditRepository`: append(INSERT, before/after=json_encode).
- [ ] **Step 4: (게이트) sqlite 통합 테스트** — `server/tests/PdoIntegrationTest.php`:
- [ ] **Step 4: (게이트) sqlite 통합 테스트** — `cloud/tests/PdoIntegrationTest.php`:
```php
protected function setUp(): void {
@ -2082,15 +2082,15 @@ protected function setUp(): void {
로컬 PDO 미로드 환경에서도 `markTestSkipped`로 스위트 green 유지.
- [ ] **Step 5: 배포 문서** — `server/docs/server-deploy.md`: Cafe24 업로드 절차(`public/`만 웹루트; `storage/`·`src/`·`config.php`는 웹루트 밖 또는 상위 디렉토리), `config.php` 작성(config.example.php 복사), `schema.sql` phpMyAdmin import, per-device secret 발급(admin), 최초 admin 계정 생성 CLI 스니펫(`password_hash` argon2id), HTTPS/HSTS 강제, PHP 버전·gd·openssl 확인, `vendor/`는 배포 제외(런타임 의존성 0), storage/snapshots 쓰기권한.
- [ ] **Step 5: 배포 문서** — `cloud/docs/cloud-deploy.md`: Cafe24 업로드 절차(`public/`만 웹루트; `storage/`·`src/`·`config.php`는 웹루트 밖 또는 상위 디렉토리), `config.php` 작성(config.example.php 복사), `schema.sql` phpMyAdmin import, per-device secret 발급(admin), 최초 admin 계정 생성 CLI 스니펫(`password_hash` argon2id), HTTPS/HSTS 강제, PHP 버전·gd·openssl 확인, `vendor/`는 배포 제외(런타임 의존성 0), storage/snapshots 쓰기권한.
- [ ] **Step 6: 전체 스위트 + 커밋**
Run: `./vendor/bin/phpunit` — green(통합은 sqlite 없으면 skip).
```bash
git add server/src/Db server/src/Repository/Pdo server/schema.sql server/docs/server-deploy.md server/tests/PdoIntegrationTest.php
git commit -m "feat(server): PDO repositories + schema + Cafe24 deploy doc"
git add cloud/src/Db cloud/src/Repository/Pdo cloud/schema.sql cloud/docs/cloud-deploy.md cloud/tests/PdoIntegrationTest.php
git commit -m "feat(cloud): PDO repositories + schema + Cafe24 deploy doc"
```
---
@ -2118,7 +2118,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): PDO repositories + schema + Cafe24 deploy doc"
## Execution Handoff
**Plan complete. 저장: `docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-11-p1b-server-ingest-dashboard.md`.**
**Plan complete. 저장: `docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-11-p1b-cloud-ingest-dashboard.md`.**
실행 옵션:
1. **Subagent-Driven (추천)** — 태스크마다 새 subagent + 리뷰. `superpowers:subagent-driven-development`.

84
docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-12-p1-pilot-integration.md
View file

@ -2,18 +2,18 @@
> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development (recommended) or superpowers:executing-plans to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
**Goal:** 이미 구현·병합된 P1-A(엣지 감지 라이브러리) + P1-B(서버) 사이의 **끊긴 배선을 연결**해, 노트북 웹캠으로 실행되는 **엔드투엔드 파일럿**을 만든다: 실제 프레임 → CPU pose → 감지 → 서명 POST → 서버 → 관리자가 **사진 보고 알림 받고 확인**. 역루프(대시보드 구역 → 엣지 적용)와 하트비트도 살린다. (실장비 Hailo·폐쇄망 번들·드릴 게이트는 별도 후속.)
**Goal:** 이미 구현·병합된 P1-A(엣지 감지 라이브러리) + P1-B(클라우드) 사이의 **끊긴 배선을 연결**해, 노트북 웹캠으로 실행되는 **엔드투엔드 파일럿**을 만든다: 실제 프레임 → CPU pose → 감지 → 서명 POST → 클라우드 → 관리자가 **사진 보고 알림 받고 확인**. 역루프(대시보드 구역 → 엣지 적용)와 하트비트도 살린다. (실장비 Hailo·폐쇄망 번들·드릴 게이트는 별도 후속.)
**Architecture:** 순수 배선. 기존 부품(`run_once`, EventEngine, PostClient, OfflineQueue, ZoneIntrusionDetector, 서버 ingest/detail/snapshot)은 그대로 두고 (1) 엣지 데몬(main 루프)이 부품을 조립·구동, (2) ServerClient가 config 폴링·하트비트, (3) MoveNet ONNX 어댑터가 PosePort 구현, (4) 서버 detail 뷰·Web Audio가 응답루프 완성. 모든 데몬/클라이언트 로직은 주입(fake source/pose/clock/http)으로 TDD; 실 pose는 정적이미지로 게이트 테스트.
**Architecture:** 순수 배선. 기존 부품(`run_once`, EventEngine, PostClient, OfflineQueue, ZoneIntrusionDetector, 클라우드 ingest/detail/snapshot)은 그대로 두고 (1) 엣지 데몬(main 루프)이 부품을 조립·구동, (2) CloudClient가 config 폴링·하트비트, (3) MoveNet ONNX 어댑터가 PosePort 구현, (4) 클라우드 detail 뷰·Web Audio가 응답루프 완성. 모든 데몬/클라이언트 로직은 주입(fake source/pose/clock/http)으로 TDD; 실 pose는 정적이미지로 게이트 테스트.
**Tech Stack:** Python 3.11+(dev 3.13), pytest, numpy, opencv, requests, **onnxruntime**(CPU) + **MoveNet SinglePose Lightning ONNX**(COCO-17, Apache-2). 서버는 기존 바닐라 PHP + JS(Web Audio, 의존성 0). 런타임 ultralytics(AGPL) 금지 유지.
**Tech Stack:** Python 3.11+(dev 3.13), pytest, numpy, opencv, requests, **onnxruntime**(CPU) + **MoveNet SinglePose Lightning ONNX**(COCO-17, Apache-2). 클라우드는 기존 바닐라 PHP + JS(Web Audio, 의존성 0). 런타임 ultralytics(AGPL) 금지 유지.
## Global Constraints
- Python **3.11+**, 타입힌트, `edge/` 기존 패턴 준수. PHP 8.5 `declare(strict_types=1)`, 서버 스위트 **0 warnings/0 deprecations** 유지.
- Python **3.11+**, 타입힌트, `edge/` 기존 패턴 준수. PHP 8.5 `declare(strict_types=1)`, 클라우드 스위트 **0 warnings/0 deprecations** 유지.
- **판정/루프 로직은 주입 타임스탬프·주입 의존성으로 TDD** — 데몬 루프 내부에서 `time.sleep`/`time.time` 직접 호출 금지(주입된 clock/sleeper 사용). 실 pose 추론만 게이트(모델/onnxruntime 없으면 `skip`).
- **폐쇄망 지속:** 새 의존성(onnxruntime)·모델(.onnx)은 **빌드머신서 받아 번들**할 것 — 후속 패키징 태스크 대상. 런타임 인터넷은 Cafe24 POST + config 폴링뿐.
- **HMAC 계약 유지:** config 폴링·하트비트도 P1-A `sign(nonce+ts+body)` 동일 서명(서버 T14가 이미 검증). PostClient 서명 재사용.
- **HMAC 계약 유지:** config 폴링·하트비트도 P1-A `sign(nonce+ts+body)` 동일 서명(클라우드 T14가 이미 검증). PostClient 서명 재사용.
- **키포인트 계약:** PosePort는 `list[Person]` (COCO-17 `Keypoint`) 반환 — MoveNet 17관절을 그 순서로 매핑.
- YAGNI: 파일럿에 필요한 배선만. 멀티캠·감도·처리결과 등 P2/P3는 손대지 않음.
@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
```
edge/
serverclient.py # ServerClient: fetch_config(HMAC GET), send_heartbeat(HMAC POST)
cloudclient.py # CloudClient: fetch_config(HMAC GET), send_heartbeat(HMAC POST)
zones.py # zone rows(dict) -> Zone objects; thresholds
runtime.py # PipelineRuntime: assemble source/pose/tracker/smoother/engine/ring/snapshotter/sink; step(); apply_zones()
daemon.py # main loop: step every frame + periodic sync/heartbeat/queue-flush; signals; main()
@ -30,33 +30,33 @@ edge/
movenet_pose.py # MoveNetPoseAdapter(PosePort) via onnxruntime + COCO-17 remap
tools/
fetch_movenet.py # build-machine: download MoveNet Lightning ONNX to models/
server/
cloud/
src/View/event_detail.php # (replace stub) HTML detail shell + script
public/assets/detail.js # fetch GET /events/{id} -> render meta + <img src=/snap/{uuid}>
public/assets/app.js # (edit) link rows to /events/{id}/view, desk Web Audio on new critical
public/index.php # (edit) add GET /events/{id}/view HTML route
tests/ (edge) + server/tests/
tests/ (edge) + cloud/tests/
docs/pilot-runbook.md
```
---
## Task 1: ServerClient — config 폴링 + 하트비트 (HMAC 서명)
## Task 1: CloudClient — config 폴링 + 하트비트 (HMAC 서명)
**Files:** Create `edge/serverclient.py`, `tests/test_serverclient.py`
**Files:** Create `edge/cloudclient.py`, `tests/test_cloudclient.py`
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: `sign` (edge/alert.py), injected `http_get`/`http_post`, `nonce_fn`, `now_fn`.
- Produces:
- `ServerClient(base_url, device_id, secret, nonce_fn, now_fn, http_get=None, http_post=None, timeout=5.0)`
- `CloudClient(base_url, device_id, secret, nonce_fn, now_fn, http_get=None, http_post=None, timeout=5.0)`
- `fetch_config() -> dict | None` — GET `{base}/api/config?device_id=`, headers X-Nonce/X-Timestamp/X-Signature (sign over empty body), returns parsed `{version, zones, thresholds}` on 200 else None.
- `send_heartbeat(metrics: dict) -> bool` — POST `{base}/api/heartbeat` body `{device_id, **metrics}` signed, True on 2xx.
- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `tests/test_serverclient.py`
- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `tests/test_cloudclient.py`
```python
import json
from edge.serverclient import ServerClient
from edge.cloudclient import CloudClient
from edge.alert import sign
class _Resp:
@ -68,30 +68,30 @@ def test_fetch_config_signs_and_parses():
def fake_get(url, headers=None, timeout=None):
captured["url"] = url; captured["headers"] = headers
return _Resp(200, json.dumps({"version": 3, "zones": [], "thresholds": {}}))
c = ServerClient("https://x", "pi-1", "sek", nonce_fn=lambda: "n1", now_fn=lambda: 1000.0, http_get=fake_get)
c = CloudClient("https://x", "pi-1", "sek", nonce_fn=lambda: "n1", now_fn=lambda: 1000.0, http_get=fake_get)
cfg = c.fetch_config()
assert cfg["version"] == 3
assert "device_id=pi-1" in captured["url"]
assert captured["headers"]["X-Signature"] == sign("sek", "n1", "1000.0", "")
def test_fetch_config_none_on_error():
c = ServerClient("https://x", "pi-1", "sek", lambda: "n", lambda: 1.0, http_get=lambda *a, **k: _Resp(401))
c = CloudClient("https://x", "pi-1", "sek", lambda: "n", lambda: 1.0, http_get=lambda *a, **k: _Resp(401))
assert c.fetch_config() is None
def test_send_heartbeat_signs_body():
captured = {}
def fake_post(url, data=None, headers=None, timeout=None):
captured["data"] = data; captured["headers"] = headers; return _Resp(200)
c = ServerClient("https://x", "pi-1", "sek", lambda: "n1", lambda: 1000.0, http_post=fake_post)
c = CloudClient("https://x", "pi-1", "sek", lambda: "n1", lambda: 1000.0, http_post=fake_post)
assert c.send_heartbeat({"fps": 12.0}) is True
body = captured["data"]
assert json.loads(body)["device_id"] == "pi-1"
assert captured["headers"]["X-Signature"] == sign("sek", "n1", "1000.0", body)
```
- [ ] **Step 2: 실패 확인** — `pytest tests/test_serverclient.py -v` → FAIL (ModuleNotFoundError)
- [ ] **Step 2: 실패 확인** — `pytest tests/test_cloudclient.py -v` → FAIL (ModuleNotFoundError)
- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `edge/serverclient.py`
- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `edge/cloudclient.py`
```python
import json
@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ import json
from edge.alert import sign
class ServerClient:
class CloudClient:
def __init__(self, base_url: str, device_id: str, secret: str,
nonce_fn, now_fn, http_get=None, http_post=None, timeout: float = 5.0):
self.base_url = base_url.rstrip("/")
@ -146,16 +146,16 @@ class ServerClient:
return 200 <= resp.status_code < 300
```
- [ ] **Step 4: 통과 + 커밋** — `pytest tests/test_serverclient.py -v` → PASS
- [ ] **Step 4: 통과 + 커밋** — `pytest tests/test_cloudclient.py -v` → PASS
```bash
git add edge/serverclient.py tests/test_serverclient.py
git commit -m "feat(edge): ServerClient for config poll + heartbeat (HMAC-signed)"
git add edge/cloudclient.py tests/test_cloudclient.py
git commit -m "feat(edge): CloudClient for config poll + heartbeat (HMAC-signed)"
```
---
## Task 2: 서버 zone 행 → Zone 객체 로딩
## Task 2: 클라우드 zone 행 → Zone 객체 로딩
**Files:** Create `edge/zones.py`, `tests/test_zones.py`
@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ def thresholds_from_config(config: dict) -> dict:
```bash
git add edge/zones.py tests/test_zones.py
git commit -m "feat(edge): parse server config zones/thresholds into Zone objects"
git commit -m "feat(edge): parse cloud config zones/thresholds into Zone objects"
```
---
@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(edge): PipelineRuntime assembles components + hot-swaps zone
**Files:** Create `edge/daemon.py`, `edge/__main__.py`, `tests/test_daemon.py`; Modify `pyproject.toml`
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: `PipelineRuntime` (T3), `ServerClient` (T1), `zones_from_config` (T2), `OfflineQueue` (edge/queue.py), `PostClient` (edge/alert.py).
- Consumes: `PipelineRuntime` (T3), `CloudClient` (T1), `zones_from_config` (T2), `OfflineQueue` (edge/queue.py), `PostClient` (edge/alert.py).
- Produces:
- `run_loop(runtime, client, queue, *, clock, sleep, iterations=None, sync_every=150, heartbeat_every=900, flush_every=300, frame_interval=0.0) -> dict` — `iterations` 프레임 루프(None이면 무한, 테스트는 유한). 매 프레임 `runtime.step(clock())`(예외 삼켜 카운트); sync_every 프레임마다 `client.fetch_config()`→`runtime.apply_zones(zones_from_config(...))`; heartbeat_every마다 `send_heartbeat`; flush_every마다 `queue.flush()`. 반환 카운터 dict.
- `main()` — env로 구성 후 무한 루프. `edge/__main__.py`가 호출. (`# pragma: no cover` — 실장비 엔트리)
@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ def run_loop(runtime, client, queue, *, clock, sleep, iterations=None,
def main() -> None: # pragma: no cover (integration entrypoint, exercised on device)
import time
from edge.config import load_config
from edge.serverclient import ServerClient
from edge.cloudclient import CloudClient
from edge.alert import PostClient
from edge.queue import OfflineQueue
from edge.runtime import PipelineRuntime
@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ def main() -> None: # pragma: no cover (integration entrypoint, exercised on de
nonce = lambda: os.urandom(8).hex()
now = time.time
base = cfg.cafe24_url.rstrip("/")
client = ServerClient(base, cfg.device_id, cfg.secret, nonce, now)
client = CloudClient(base, cfg.device_id, cfg.secret, nonce, now)
post = PostClient(base + "/api/events", cfg.device_id, cfg.secret, nonce, now)
queue = OfflineQueue(os.environ.get("QUEUE_DB", "queue.db"), post)
source = UvcSource(int(os.environ.get("UVC_DEVICE", "0")))
@ -591,15 +591,15 @@ git commit -m "feat(edge): MoveNet ONNX CPU pose adapter (COCO-17 remap)"
---
## Task 6: 서버 사고 상세 뷰 — 스냅샷 표시
## Task 6: 클라우드 사고 상세 뷰 — 스냅샷 표시
**Files:** Modify `server/src/View/event_detail.php`; Create `server/public/assets/detail.js`; Modify `server/public/index.php`; Modify `server/tests/WiringSmokeTest.php`
**Files:** Modify `cloud/src/View/event_detail.php`; Create `cloud/public/assets/detail.js`; Modify `cloud/public/index.php`; Modify `cloud/tests/WiringSmokeTest.php`
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: existing `GET /events/{id}` (JSON: event+snapshots) + `GET /snap/{uuid}` (auth image).
- Produces: `GET /events/{id}/view` → renders `event_detail.php` (HTML shell + `<script src="/assets/detail.js">`). `detail.js` parses the id from the URL, fetches `GET /events/{id}`, renders meta + each snapshot as `<img src="/snap/{uuid}">` (createElement, XSS-safe).
- [ ] **Step 1: 스모크 테스트 갱신** — `server/tests/WiringSmokeTest.php`의 paths 배열에 `['GET','/events/{id}/view']` 추가. `cd server && ./vendor/bin/phpunit tests/WiringSmokeTest.php` — (index 라우트 추가 전이라 실제 앱엔 없지만 스모크는 자체 라우터에 등록하므로) 통과 유지 확인. (스모크는 라우터 매칭만 검증.)
- [ ] **Step 1: 스모크 테스트 갱신** — `cloud/tests/WiringSmokeTest.php`의 paths 배열에 `['GET','/events/{id}/view']` 추가. `cd cloud && ./vendor/bin/phpunit tests/WiringSmokeTest.php` — (index 라우트 추가 전이라 실제 앱엔 없지만 스모크는 자체 라우터에 등록하므로) 통과 유지 확인. (스모크는 라우터 매칭만 검증.)
- [ ] **Step 2: event_detail.php (스텁 교체)**
@ -612,7 +612,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(edge): MoveNet ONNX CPU pose adapter (COCO-17 remap)"
<script src="/assets/detail.js" defer></script>
```
- [ ] **Step 3: detail.js** — `server/public/assets/detail.js`
- [ ] **Step 3: detail.js** — `cloud/public/assets/detail.js`
```javascript
(function () {
@ -653,18 +653,18 @@ git commit -m "feat(edge): MoveNet ONNX CPU pose adapter (COCO-17 remap)"
$r->add('GET', '/events/{id}/view', fn() => $render('event_detail'));
```
- [ ] **Step 5: 통과 + 커밋** — 전체 `cd server && ./vendor/bin/phpunit --display-warnings --display-deprecations` green; `php -l server/public/index.php`.
- [ ] **Step 5: 통과 + 커밋** — 전체 `cd cloud && ./vendor/bin/phpunit --display-warnings --display-deprecations` green; `php -l cloud/public/index.php`.
```bash
git add server/src/View/event_detail.php server/public/assets/detail.js server/public/index.php server/tests/WiringSmokeTest.php
git commit -m "feat(server): incident detail view renders snapshot images"
git add cloud/src/View/event_detail.php cloud/public/assets/detail.js cloud/public/index.php cloud/tests/WiringSmokeTest.php
git commit -m "feat(cloud): incident detail view renders snapshot images"
```
---
## Task 7: 응답 루프 — 목록 링크 + 데스크 Web Audio
**Files:** Modify `server/public/assets/app.js`
**Files:** Modify `cloud/public/assets/app.js`
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: `GET /api/events` (기존 폴링).
@ -702,11 +702,11 @@ function updateAlarm(events) {
그리고: (a) 행 빌더에서 각 행을 `/events/{event_id}/view` 링크로 감싸기 — `var a = document.createElement('a'); a.href = '/events/' + e.event_id + '/view'; a.appendChild(rowEl);` 후 컨테이너에 append. (b) 폴링 성공 콜백에서 `renderList(events)` 뒤에 `updateAlarm(events)` 호출.
- [ ] **Step 2: 통과 + 커밋** — `node --check server/public/assets/app.js`(node 있으면), 전체 phpunit green(JS만 변경).
- [ ] **Step 2: 통과 + 커밋** — `node --check cloud/public/assets/app.js`(node 있으면), 전체 phpunit green(JS만 변경).
```bash
git add server/public/assets/app.js
git commit -m "feat(server): dashboard rows link to detail + desk Web Audio on critical"
git add cloud/public/assets/app.js
git commit -m "feat(cloud): dashboard rows link to detail + desk Web Audio on critical"
```
---
@ -735,8 +735,8 @@ def test_real_movenet_runs():
- [ ] **Step 2: 파일럿 런북** — `docs/pilot-runbook.md`, 노트북 파일럿 절차:
1. **빌드:** `pip install onnxruntime`; `python -m edge.tools.fetch_movenet` (모델 → `models/`).
2. **서버:** `php -S localhost:8000 -t server/public` (config.php에 로컬 DB) 또는 Cafe24. admin 계정 생성 + device secret을 `devices` 테이블에 등록.
3. **env:** `DEVICE_ID`, `DEVICE_SECRET`(서버와 일치), `CAFE24_URL`(예 http://localhost:8000), `MOVENET_ONNX=models/movenet_lightning.onnx`, `UVC_DEVICE=0`, `TARGET_FPS=12`.
2. **클라우드:** `php -S localhost:8000 -t cloud/public` (config.php에 로컬 DB) 또는 Cafe24. admin 계정 생성 + device secret을 `devices` 테이블에 등록.
3. **env:** `DEVICE_ID`, `DEVICE_SECRET`(클라우드와 일치), `CAFE24_URL`(예 http://localhost:8000), `MOVENET_ONNX=models/movenet_lightning.onnx`, `UVC_DEVICE=0`, `TARGET_FPS=12`.
4. **실행:** `move-detect-edge` (또는 `python -m edge`).
5. **데모:** 웹캠 앞 눕기 → 3초 후 fall, 10초 후 no_motion(위급, 데스크 비프) → 목록행 클릭 → 상세서 스냅샷 확인 → 확인처리(비프 멈춤). 대시보드서 구역 그리기 → 발끝 진입 → 침입 이벤트(역루프). 네트워크 끊고 이벤트 → 복구 후 큐 flush.
6. **한계(명시):** 단일캠·CPU pose(저fps)·SMS 미연동(Web Audio만)·前中後 아닌 단일프레임. 실장비 Hailo·폐쇄망 번들·드릴 게이트·F14 컴플라이언스는 후속.
@ -753,7 +753,7 @@ git commit -m "docs: pilot runbook + gated MoveNet smoke test"
## Self-Review
**1. 최소경로 커버리지 (기능검토 1~7):**
- 엣지 데몬(1) → T4 ✓ · CPU pose(2) → T5 ✓ · edge→서버 흐름(3) → T4 데몬+기존 PostClient ✓
- 엣지 데몬(1) → T4 ✓ · CPU pose(2) → T5 ✓ · edge→클라우드 흐름(3) → T4 데몬+기존 PostClient ✓
- 사고 가시화(4) → T6 ✓ · 응답 1채널(5) → T7 Web Audio ✓
- config-sync 역루프(6) → T1+T2+T3(apply_zones)+T4(주기 sync) ✓ · 하트비트(7) → T1+T4 ✓ · 큐 flush(rank7) → T4 ✓
- **범위 밖(명시):** 실 Hailo(하드웨어), 폐쇄망 전체 번들(T5/T8은 fetch+게이트만; 번들·차단설치는 후속 패키징), 드릴 게이트(P1-C), F14 컴플라이언스(별도), 前中後 링버퍼(rank11 — 파일럿 단일프레임 유지).
@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ git commit -m "docs: pilot runbook + gated MoveNet smoke test"
**2. Placeholder scan:** 데몬/클라이언트/런타임/어댑터/zone은 실코드+TDD. T5 실모델 스모크·T8은 게이트(모델 없으면 skip) — 의도적. fetch URL은 빌드 편의(구현자 노트로 검증 지시).
**3. Type consistency:** `ServerClient.sign` = PostClient/서버 T14 동일(`nonce+ts+body`). `PipelineRuntime.step`가 `run_once(source,pose,tracker,pool,engine,ring,snapshotter,sink,now_fn)` — P1-A 최종형(per-track smoother 수정 후) 일치. `apply_zones`가 `ZoneIntrusionDetector.zones` 재할당. MoveNet [1,1,17,3](y,x,score)→COCO-17 Keypoint(x,y,conf) 일관.
**3. Type consistency:** `CloudClient.sign` = PostClient/클라우드 T14 동일(`nonce+ts+body`). `PipelineRuntime.step`가 `run_once(source,pose,tracker,pool,engine,ring,snapshotter,sink,now_fn)` — P1-A 최종형(per-track smoother 수정 후) 일치. `apply_zones`가 `ZoneIntrusionDetector.zones` 재할당. MoveNet [1,1,17,3](y,x,score)→COCO-17 Keypoint(x,y,conf) 일관.
---

6
edge/adapters/hailo_pose.py
View file

@ -169,11 +169,7 @@ class HailoPoseAdapter:
for info in out_infos}
bindings = configured.create_bindings(output_buffers=buffers)
bindings.input().set_buffer(np.ascontiguousarray(frame))
# Positional, NOT timeout_ms=. Upstream is `def run(self, bindings, timeout)` in
# every HailoRT that supports Hailo-8 (v4.19.0 / v4.20.0 / v4.23.0 / master), so
# the keyword form is a TypeError on EVERY frame — and run_loop swallows it
# (edge/daemon.py:23-24), so it presents as a green unit emitting zero events.
configured.run([bindings], 10000)
configured.run([bindings], timeout_ms=10000)
return [buffers[info.name][None, ...] if buffers[info.name].ndim == 3
else buffers[info.name] for info in out_infos]

9
edge/adapters/movenet_pose.py
View file

@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
import logging
import cv2
import numpy as np
@ -19,13 +17,6 @@ class MoveNetPoseAdapter:
session = onnxruntime.InferenceSession(onnx_path, providers=["CPUExecutionProvider"])
self.session = session
self._input_name = session.get_inputs()[0].name
# MoveNet SinglePose returns ONE person per frame. At a multi-worker site every worker
# but one is invisible to fall/zone/ghost detection with no other symptom — so say it
# loudly at startup. The Hailo backend (yolov8s_pose) is multi-person.
logging.getLogger("edge.pose").warning(
"MoveNet CPU fallback is SINGLE-PERSON: only one worker is tracked per frame; any "
"additional workers are invisible to fall/zone/ghost detection. Use the Hailo "
"backend (POSE_BACKEND=hailo) at multi-person sites.")
def infer(self, frame) -> list:
h, w = frame.shape[:2]

43
edge/adapters/uvc_source.py
View file

@ -4,43 +4,10 @@ import cv2
class UvcSource:
def __init__(self, dev, mjpeg: bool = True, *, reopen_after: int = 30, _open=None):
# _open lets tests inject a fake capture; production uses cv2.VideoCapture.
self._dev = dev
self._mjpeg = mjpeg
self._reopen_after = reopen_after
self._open = _open or (lambda d: cv2.VideoCapture(d))
self._fail_streak = 0
self.cap = self._open_cap()
def _open_cap(self):
cap = self._open(self._dev)
# Fail LOUD: a device that never opens must not become a silently-dead capture that
# returns (False, None) forever while the daemon looks healthy. build_runtimes catches
# this and logs+skips the camera.
if not cap.isOpened():
raise RuntimeError(f"UVC device {self._dev!r} failed to open")
if self._mjpeg:
cap.set(cv2.CAP_PROP_FOURCC, cv2.VideoWriter_fourcc(*"MJPG"))
return cap
def __init__(self, dev, mjpeg: bool = True):
self.cap = cv2.VideoCapture(dev)
if mjpeg:
self.cap.set(cv2.CAP_PROP_FOURCC, cv2.VideoWriter_fourcc(*"MJPG"))
def read(self):
ok, frame = self.cap.read()
if ok:
self._fail_streak = 0
return ok, frame
# A USB cam that browns out / is unplugged returns (False, None) indefinitely. After a
# streak, release and reopen so a recovered device resumes on its own rather than the
# camera staying dead until someone restarts the service.
self._fail_streak += 1
if self._fail_streak >= self._reopen_after:
self._fail_streak = 0
try:
self.cap.release()
except Exception:
pass
try:
self.cap = self._open_cap()
except Exception:
pass # still dead — the daemon's error/heartbeat path surfaces it
return False, None
return self.cap.read()

48
edge/alert.py
View file

@ -2,28 +2,9 @@ import base64
import hashlib
import hmac
import json
from enum import Enum
from edge.events import Event
# Shared-hosting WAFs (cafe24) frequently block the default "python-requests/x.y" User-Agent
# with an HTML 403 while curl passes — so every event would silently 403 with a correct HMAC
# and URL. Send an explicit UA on every request. ServerClient imports this too.
USER_AGENT = "move-detect-edge/1.0"
class SendResult(Enum):
"""Outcome of one upload attempt. The offline queue must tell a transient outage (retry
forever — a real fall alert has to survive an overnight internet outage) apart from a
permanent rejection (poison — count toward the drop cap), which a bare bool cannot express.
DELIVERED is the only truthy value, so `if client.send(...)` keeps working unchanged."""
DELIVERED = "delivered"
REJECTED = "rejected" # a definite 4xx (not 429): the server will never accept this event
TRANSIENT = "transient" # network error / timeout / 429 / 5xx — connectivity or server hiccup
def __bool__(self) -> bool:
return self is SendResult.DELIVERED
def sign(secret: str, nonce: str, ts: str, body: str | bytes) -> str:
if isinstance(body, str):
@ -46,7 +27,7 @@ class PostClient:
http_post = requests.post
self._post = http_post
def send(self, event: Event, snapshots: list[bytes]) -> SendResult:
def send(self, event: Event, snapshots: list[bytes]) -> bool:
payload = event.to_payload(self.device_id)
payload["snapshots"] = [base64.b64encode(s).decode() for s in snapshots]
body = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True)
@ -54,33 +35,12 @@ class PostClient:
ts = str(self.now_fn())
headers = {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"User-Agent": USER_AGENT,
"X-Nonce": nonce,
"X-Timestamp": ts,
"X-Signature": sign(self.secret, nonce, ts, body.encode()),
}
try:
# allow_redirects=False: the .htaccess http->https 302 must not silently become a
# GET (405/404). A redirect is a CAFE24_URL misconfiguration to surface, not follow.
resp = self._post(self.url, data=body, headers=headers, timeout=self.timeout,
allow_redirects=False)
resp = self._post(self.url, data=body, headers=headers, timeout=self.timeout)
except Exception:
# Connection refused / DNS / timeout — the server is unreachable, not rejecting us.
return SendResult.TRANSIENT
code = resp.status_code
if 200 <= code < 300:
return SendResult.DELIVERED
# Transient — "back off and retry", NOT a permanent verdict on the event: all 5xx plus the
# 4xx codes that explicitly mean try-again (408 Request Timeout, 425 Too Early, 429 Too
# Many Requests). Counting these toward the poison drop cap would delete real events during
# a proxy/server hiccup. Only a definite "bad request" 4xx is a permanent rejection.
#
# 401 is transient too: the server returns it for a STALE timestamp (abs(now-ts) > window),
# which is exactly what an RTC-less Pi hits after a power cut until NTP steps the clock —
# the event is valid and will be accepted verbatim once time syncs. The only permanent 401
# cause is a wrong/rotated secret, a provisioning error to fix; retrying (events stay queued,
# bounded by max_rows) is far safer than poison-dropping a real fall alert. Poison-drop is
# reserved for a definite CONTENT rejection (400/422), never an auth/clock condition.
if code in (401, 408, 425, 429) or code >= 500:
return SendResult.TRANSIENT
return SendResult.REJECTED
return False
return 200 <= resp.status_code < 300

28
edge/app.py
View file

@ -11,32 +11,18 @@ from edge.models import BBox
def _head_boxes(persons: list) -> list:
# Head region for face anonymization (PIPA). Sized from the PERSON bbox, not a fixed
# ~40x40 patch — a close worker fills far more than 40px, so a constant box left the face
# fully identifiable. Centered on the nose when it is confident, else on the bbox's top
# (the head is the upper part of the person) so a bad keypoint can't move the blur off it.
# 배경인물 머리영역 근사: 코 주변 작은 박스 (MVP; 실제는 얼굴 검출 포트로 교체)
boxes = []
for p in persons:
bb = p.bbox
nose = p.keypoints[0]
half_w = max(8.0, 0.25 * bb.width)
if nose.conf >= 0.3:
cx, cy = nose.x, nose.y
else:
cx, cy = bb.cx, bb.y1 + 0.12 * bb.height
boxes.append(BBox(cx - half_w, cy - 0.18 * bb.height,
cx + half_w, cy + 0.08 * bb.height))
boxes.append(BBox(nose.x - 20, nose.y - 25, nose.x + 20, nose.y + 15))
return boxes
def run_once(source, pose, tracker, pool, engine, ring, snapshotter, sink, now_fn, wall_fn=None):
def run_once(source, pose, tracker, pool, engine, ring, snapshotter, sink, now_fn):
ok, frame = source.read()
if not ok:
# No frame this tick. Return None (not []) so the daemon can tell "camera produced no
# frame" apart from "frame processed, no events" — a dead/unplugged USB camera returns
# (False, None) forever, and counting it as a healthy frame made a monitoring outage
# look perfectly green (fps~=target, cameras_erroring=0).
return None
return []
now = now_fn()
persons = pose.infer(frame)
tracks = tracker.update(persons, now) # RAW keypoints; smoothing happens per-track below
@ -45,11 +31,7 @@ def run_once(source, pose, tracker, pool, engine, ring, snapshotter, sink, now_f
f = tr.latest
f.keypoints = pool.smoother_for(tr.track_id).smooth(f.keypoints, now)
ring.push(now, frame)
h, w = frame.shape[:2]
# `now` (monotonic) drives detector timers; wall time stamps the event (occurred_at). Off the
# daemon (direct callers / tests) wall_fn is None → engine falls back to now, as before.
wall_now = wall_fn() if wall_fn is not None else None
events = engine.process(tracks, lost, now, frame_wh=(w, h), wall_now=wall_now)
events = engine.process(tracks, lost, now)
for tr in lost:
pool.forget(tr.track_id)
if events:

12
edge/serverclient.py → edge/cloudclient.py
View file

@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
import json
from edge.alert import USER_AGENT, sign
from edge.alert import sign
class ServerClient:
class CloudClient:
def __init__(self, base_url: str, device_id: str, secret: str,
nonce_fn, now_fn, http_get=None, http_post=None, timeout: float = 5.0):
self.base_url = base_url.rstrip("/")
@ -22,15 +22,13 @@ class ServerClient:
def _headers(self, body: str) -> dict:
nonce = self.nonce_fn()
ts = str(self.now_fn())
# User-Agent: cafe24's WAF 403s the default python-requests UA (see edge/alert.py).
return {"User-Agent": USER_AGENT, "X-Nonce": nonce, "X-Timestamp": ts,
return {"X-Nonce": nonce, "X-Timestamp": ts,
"X-Signature": sign(self.secret, nonce, ts, body)}
def fetch_config(self) -> dict | None:
url = f"{self.base_url}/api/config?device_id={self.device_id}"
try:
resp = self._get(url, headers=self._headers(""), timeout=self.timeout,
allow_redirects=False)
resp = self._get(url, headers=self._headers(""), timeout=self.timeout)
except Exception:
return None
if 200 <= resp.status_code < 300:
@ -46,7 +44,7 @@ class ServerClient:
headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json", **self._headers(body)}
try:
resp = self._post(f"{self.base_url}/api/heartbeat", data=body,
headers=headers, timeout=self.timeout, allow_redirects=False)
headers=headers, timeout=self.timeout)
except Exception:
return False
return 200 <= resp.status_code < 300

79
edge/config.py
View file

@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
import math
from dataclasses import dataclass
from edge.detectors.fall import FallConfig
@ -25,89 +24,13 @@ def _f(env: dict, key: str, default: float) -> float:
return float(env[key]) if key in env else default
def frame_interval_from_env(env: dict) -> float:
"""Seconds per frame from TARGET_FPS, validated. TARGET_FPS=0 (ZeroDivisionError) or a
non-numeric value (ValueError) would otherwise crash at every startup into an infinite
systemd restart loop (Restart=always + StartLimitIntervalSec=0)."""
raw = env.get("TARGET_FPS", "12")
try:
fps = float(raw)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
raise ValueError(f"TARGET_FPS={raw!r} is not a number")
if fps <= 0:
raise ValueError(f"TARGET_FPS={raw!r} must be > 0")
return 1.0 / fps
def queue_db_path(env: dict) -> str:
"""Absolute sqlite path for the offline queue. A relative 'queue.db' resolves against the
unit's read-only WorkingDirectory under ProtectSystem=strict and cannot be created ->
crash loop. Default to the systemd StateDirectory, the one writable path."""
return env.get("QUEUE_DB") or "/var/lib/move-detect/queue.db"
# Ship-time placeholders that are non-empty (so they pass a blank check) yet are never a real
# provisioned value. A unit left at any of these uploads nothing while looking healthy.
_PLACEHOLDER_MARKERS = ("changeme", "your-domain.example", "example.com", "todo", "xxxx")
# Per-device secrets issued by the server are HMAC-derived (long hex); anything shorter is a
# stub left in the template, not a real key.
_MIN_SECRET_LEN = 16
def require_upload_config(cfg: Config) -> None:
"""Fail LOUD at startup when the daemon cannot possibly deliver events.
load_config defaults cafe24_url and secret to '' so unit tests can build a Config from a
minimal env — but a real daemon with either blank, left at a ship-time placeholder, or on
plaintext http runs perfectly green while every upload fails (a bad/empty URL makes requests
raise, which PostClient catches and returns False; http is refused by allow_redirects=False),
and the offline queue grows until the SD card is full. The operator sees a healthy unit and
an empty dashboard, or worker snapshots leave the Pi in plaintext. Refuse to start instead.
"""
problems: list[str] = []
url = cfg.cafe24_url.strip()
secret = cfg.secret.strip()
if not url:
problems.append("CAFE24_URL not set")
elif not url.lower().startswith("https://"):
problems.append(f"CAFE24_URL must be https:// (got {url!r}) — plaintext would leak "
"worker snapshots and the .htaccess redirect is not followed")
elif any(m in url.lower() for m in _PLACEHOLDER_MARKERS):
problems.append(f"CAFE24_URL is still a template placeholder ({url!r})")
if not secret:
problems.append("DEVICE_SECRET not set")
elif any(m in secret.lower() for m in _PLACEHOLDER_MARKERS):
problems.append("DEVICE_SECRET is still a template placeholder (e.g. CHANGEME)")
elif len(secret) < _MIN_SECRET_LEN:
problems.append(f"DEVICE_SECRET is too short (<{_MIN_SECRET_LEN} chars) — use the "
"per-device secret issued by the server, not a stub")
if problems:
raise ValueError(
"FATAL /etc/move-detect/edge.env: " + "; ".join(problems) + ". The daemon would run "
"but upload nothing. CAFE24_URL must include the app path, e.g. "
"https://<domain>/move_detect ; DEVICE_SECRET is the per-device secret from the server."
)
def load_config(env: dict) -> Config:
camera_id = env.get("CAMERA_ID", "cam-01")
# Per-second stillness threshold (units/second), shared by fall no-motion and immobility.
# track_displacement is now frame-rate-normalized, so this must be tuned per device — expose
# it via env instead of forcing a code edit + redeploy. Reject a non-finite or non-positive
# value at startup (a 0 or NaN would make everything read as "still" -> constant no_motion).
motion_thr = _f(env, "MOTION_THR", 0.25)
if not math.isfinite(motion_thr) or motion_thr <= 0:
raise ValueError(f"MOTION_THR must be a finite positive number, got {motion_thr!r}")
fall = FallConfig(
prone_confirm_s=_f(env, "FALL_PRONE_S", 3.0),
no_motion_s=_f(env, "FALL_NO_MOTION_S", 10.0),
motion_thr=motion_thr,
)
immobility = ImmobilityConfig(immobile_s=_f(env, "IMMOBILE_S", 120.0),
motion_thr=motion_thr)
immobility = ImmobilityConfig(immobile_s=_f(env, "IMMOBILE_S", 120.0))
ghost = GhostConfig(reappear_s=_f(env, "GHOST_REAPPEAR_S", 10.0))
zone = ZoneConfig(debounce_s=_f(env, "ZONE_DEBOUNCE_S", 0.75))
engine = EngineConfig(camera_id=camera_id, cooldown_s=_f(env, "COOLDOWN_S", 30.0))

167
edge/daemon.py
View file

@ -1,136 +1,42 @@
import os
# Rate-limit for the swallowed-exception log: a camera failing every frame must be VISIBLE
# (not a silent green unit) but must not spam the journal. Log the 1st of a run of consecutive
# failures, then every LOG_EVERY-th, and again after any recovery.
_LOG_EVERY = 300
def _default_log(msg, exc=None): # pragma: no cover (thin stderr wrapper)
import sys
import traceback
print(msg, file=sys.stderr)
if exc is not None:
traceback.print_exception(type(exc), exc, exc.__traceback__, file=sys.stderr)
def run_loop(runtime, client, queue, *, clock, sleep, iterations=None,
sync_every=150, heartbeat_every=900, flush_every=300,
frame_interval=0.0, zones_for=None, log=None,
heartbeat_interval_s=None, health_fn=None, configured_cameras=None):
frame_interval=0.0, zones_for=None):
# `runtime` may be a single PipelineRuntime or a list of them (multi-camera). All
# cameras share this loop, one shared clock read per tick, and the periodic
# sync/heartbeat/flush. A per-camera step exception is counted and rate-limit-logged,
# never fatal — but it is no longer SILENT (a permanently broken pipeline used to look
# perfectly green).
# sync/heartbeat/flush. A per-camera step exception is counted, never fatal.
runtimes = list(runtime) if isinstance(runtime, (list, tuple)) else [runtime]
if zones_for is None:
from edge.zones import zones_from_config
zones_for = lambda cfg, rt: zones_from_config(cfg)
if log is None:
log = _default_log
if health_fn is None:
from edge.health import read_health
health_fn = read_health
counters = {"frames": 0, "syncs": 0, "beats": 0, "flushes": 0, "errors": 0}
streak = {} # id(rt)/"periodic" -> consecutive-error count, for rate-limited logging
def note(key, label, exc=None):
counters["errors"] += 1
n = streak.get(key, 0) + 1
streak[key] = n
if n == 1 or n % _LOG_EVERY == 0:
if exc is not None:
log(f"{label}: {type(exc).__name__}: {exc} (consecutive #{n})", exc)
else:
log(f"{label} (consecutive #{n})", None)
beat_anchor = None # (wall_time, frames) at the previous heartbeat, for measured fps
last_beat = None # wall time of the last heartbeat, for the time-based cadence
reported_version = None # last config version the server told us; echoed in heartbeats
i = 0
while iterations is None or i < iterations:
i += 1
now = clock() # one timestamp per tick, shared across cameras
if beat_anchor is None:
beat_anchor = (now, 0)
if last_beat is None:
last_beat = now
for rt in runtimes:
try:
produced = rt.step(now)
except Exception as e:
cam = getattr(rt, "camera_id", "?")
note(id(rt), f"camera {cam} step failed", e)
continue
if produced is None:
# step() returned no frame (unplugged/browned-out camera). Count it toward the
# erroring streak instead of as a healthy frame — otherwise a dead camera ticks
# frames++ forever and reports fps~=target with cameras_erroring=0 (a silent
# monitoring outage that looks green). A single dropped frame self-clears on the
# next good frame, so only SUSTAINED starvation shows as erroring.
cam = getattr(rt, "camera_id", "?")
note(id(rt), f"camera {cam} produced no frame")
else:
rt.step(now)
counters["frames"] += 1
streak.pop(id(rt), None) # recovered — reset the streak
except Exception:
counters["errors"] += 1
try:
if sync_every and i % sync_every == 0:
cfg = client.fetch_config()
if cfg is not None:
for rt in runtimes:
rt.apply_zones(zones_for(cfg, rt))
# Remember the config version so heartbeats can echo it back — the server's
# config-drift indicator is meaningless until the device reports what it runs.
if isinstance(cfg, dict) and cfg.get("version") is not None:
reported_version = int(cfg["version"])
counters["syncs"] += 1
# Heartbeat cadence: time-based when heartbeat_interval_s is set (production), so the
# interval is predictable regardless of per-tick cost (CPU MoveNet, multi-cam, thermal
# throttle can push a tick past 100ms) — an iteration count cannot guarantee a wall-clock
# cadence, and the server marks a device offline on ELAPSED time. Falls back to the
# iteration count when unset (used by the deterministic unit tests).
if heartbeat_interval_s:
do_beat = (now - last_beat) >= heartbeat_interval_s
else:
do_beat = bool(heartbeat_every) and (i % heartbeat_every == 0)
if do_beat:
# Measured fps over the window since the last beat, and per-camera health, so
# the server can tell a live device from a degraded/dead one (was hardcoded 0.0
# + a frames counter that ticked even when no frame was read).
t0, f0 = beat_anchor
elapsed = now - t0
fps = (counters["frames"] - f0) / elapsed if elapsed > 0 else 0.0
# cameras_total is the CONFIGURED count, not just the started one: a camera that
# failed to construct at boot (wrong /dev index, unseated ribbon) is skipped by
# build_runtimes and would otherwise vanish from the heartbeat entirely — the
# server could never see that a configured camera is missing. Count the not-started
# cameras as erroring so a 4-cam device that lost one reports 4 total / 1 erroring.
total = configured_cameras if configured_cameras is not None else len(runtimes)
not_started = max(0, total - len(runtimes))
erroring = not_started + sum(1 for rt in runtimes if id(rt) in streak)
metrics = {"fps": round(fps, 2), "frames": counters["frames"],
"cameras_total": total, "cameras_erroring": erroring,
"errors": counters["errors"], "queue_pending": queue.pending()}
# Pi thermal telemetry (None off-Pi or on failure → field omitted, never a fake 0).
health = health_fn()
if health.get("temp") is not None:
metrics["temp"] = health["temp"]
if health.get("throttle") is not None:
metrics["throttle"] = health["throttle"]
if reported_version is not None:
metrics["config_version"] = reported_version
if client.send_heartbeat(metrics):
if heartbeat_every and i % heartbeat_every == 0:
if client.send_heartbeat({"fps": 0.0, "frames": counters["frames"]}):
counters["beats"] += 1
beat_anchor = (now, counters["frames"])
last_beat = now
if flush_every and i % flush_every == 0:
queue.flush()
counters["flushes"] += 1
streak.pop("periodic", None)
except Exception as e:
note("periodic", "periodic op (sync/heartbeat/flush) failed", e)
except Exception:
counters["errors"] += 1
if frame_interval:
sleep(frame_interval)
return counters
@ -159,31 +65,11 @@ def parse_cameras(env, default_camera_id):
return [(backend, device, default_camera_id)]
def build_runtimes(cameras, make_source, make_runtime, log=None):
"""Build one (source -> runtime) per camera. A camera that fails to CONSTRUCT
(e.g. an unseated/absent CSI camera whose Picamera2(...) raises) is logged and
SKIPPED so it never crash-loops the whole daemon and the other cameras still run.
Raises if no camera comes up (never run monitoring nothing)."""
if log is None:
import sys
log = lambda m: print(m, file=sys.stderr)
runtimes = []
for backend, device, cam in cameras:
try:
runtimes.append(make_runtime(cam, make_source(backend, device)))
except Exception as e:
log(f"camera {cam} ({backend}:{device}) failed to start, skipping: {e}")
if not runtimes:
raise RuntimeError("no cameras could be started")
return runtimes
def main() -> None: # pragma: no cover (integration entrypoint, exercised on device)
import time
from dataclasses import replace
from edge.config import (frame_interval_from_env, load_config, queue_db_path,
require_upload_config)
from edge.serverclient import ServerClient
from edge.config import load_config
from edge.cloudclient import CloudClient
from edge.alert import PostClient
from edge.queue import OfflineQueue
from edge.runtime import PipelineRuntime
@ -207,33 +93,20 @@ def main() -> None: # pragma: no cover (integration entrypoint, exercised on de
return MoveNetPoseAdapter(os.environ["MOVENET_ONNX"])
cfg = load_config(dict(os.environ))
require_upload_config(cfg) # fail loud now, not silently upload nothing forever
nonce = lambda: os.urandom(8).hex()
# Two clocks, deliberately: the loop/detector timers run on a MONOTONIC clock so an NTP step
# (a Pi 5 has no RTC battery; it boots on stale fake-hwclock time until chrony corrects it)
# cannot instantly satisfy immobile_s, expire every track, or reset an immobility countdown.
# Wall time is used only where a real timestamp is required: the HMAC X-Timestamp headers,
# which the server validates against its own wall clock, and Event.occurred_at.
mono = time.monotonic
wall = time.time
now = time.time
base = cfg.cafe24_url.rstrip("/")
client = ServerClient(base, cfg.device_id, cfg.secret, nonce, wall)
post = PostClient(base + "/api/events", cfg.device_id, cfg.secret, nonce, wall)
queue = OfflineQueue(queue_db_path(dict(os.environ)), post)
client = CloudClient(base, cfg.device_id, cfg.secret, nonce, now)
post = PostClient(base + "/api/events", cfg.device_id, cfg.secret, nonce, now)
queue = OfflineQueue(os.environ.get("QUEUE_DB", "queue.db"), post)
pose = build_pose() # shared across cameras
def make_runtime(cam, source):
runtimes = []
for backend, device, cam in parse_cameras(dict(os.environ), cfg.camera_id):
# Per-camera config so events are stamped with that camera's id.
cam_cfg = replace(cfg, camera_id=cam, engine=replace(cfg.engine, camera_id=cam))
return PipelineRuntime(cam_cfg, source, pose, queue, wall_clock=wall)
runtimes.append(PipelineRuntime(cam_cfg, build_source(backend, device), pose, queue))
# A missing/unseated camera is skipped (logged), not fatal — the others still run.
cameras = parse_cameras(dict(os.environ), cfg.camera_id)
runtimes = build_runtimes(cameras, build_source, make_runtime)
run_loop(runtimes, client, queue, clock=mono, sleep=time.sleep, iterations=None,
frame_interval=frame_interval_from_env(dict(os.environ)),
heartbeat_interval_s=30, # predictable cadence; server marks offline after 120s (4x)
configured_cameras=len(cameras), # so a camera that failed to start stays visible
run_loop(runtimes, client, queue, clock=now, sleep=time.sleep, iterations=None,
frame_interval=1.0 / float(os.environ.get("TARGET_FPS", "12")),
zones_for=lambda c, rt: zones_from_config(c, rt.camera_id))

47
edge/detectors/fall.py
View file

@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ class FallConfig:
height_collapse: float = 0.35 # baseline 대비 남은 높이 비율(이 값 미만이면 급붕괴)
prone_confirm_s: float = 3.0
no_motion_s: float = 10.0
motion_thr: float = 0.25 # per-second normalized joint speed (units/s); MOTION_THR env
motion_thr: float = 0.02 # 정규화 관절변위 임계
min_conf: float = 0.5
min_visible: int = 10
recover_grace_s: float = 1.0 # 사고 상태에서 회복 판정까지 요구되는 지속 비-prone 시간
@ -40,19 +40,18 @@ class FallDetector:
def forget(self, track_id: int) -> None:
self._states.pop(track_id, None)
def _prone(self, kps, bbox, st: _State, kp_ok: bool) -> tuple[bool, dict]:
def _prone(self, kps, bbox, st: _State) -> tuple[bool, dict]:
angle = torso_angle_deg(kps)
ar = bbox.aspect
remaining = 1.0
if st.baseline_height:
remaining = bbox.height / st.baseline_height
# bbox cues need NO keypoints — a fallen person is wide-and-short, or their bbox height
# collapsed. These stay live even when the pose model has lost confidence (occluded /
# on the floor), which is exactly when a fall must not be missed.
prone = ar > self.cfg.aspect_ratio or remaining < self.cfg.height_collapse
angle = torso_angle_deg(kps)
# keypoint cues only when the keypoints are actually trustworthy, else they are noise.
if kp_ok:
prone = prone or angle > self.cfg.fallen_angle or head_below_hips(kps)
prone = (
angle > self.cfg.fallen_angle
or ar > self.cfg.aspect_ratio
or remaining < self.cfg.height_collapse # 높이 급붕괴(정면/후면 낙상)
or head_below_hips(kps)
)
return prone, {"torso_angle": round(angle, 1),
"aspect_ratio": round(ar, 2),
"height_remaining": round(remaining, 2)}
@ -62,34 +61,20 @@ class FallDetector:
f = track.latest
kps, bbox = f.keypoints, f.bbox
# Confidence gate — no longer a blanket early-return (that disabled fall/no_motion/
# ghost for the occluded person on the ground). It now only decides whether the
# KEYPOINT-based cues are trustworthy; the bbox cues always run.
kp_ok = core_visible(kps, self.cfg.min_conf) and visible_count(kps) >= self.cfg.min_visible
# 신뢰도 게이트
if not core_visible(kps, self.cfg.min_conf) or visible_count(kps) < self.cfg.min_visible:
return None, {}
prone, meta = self._prone(kps, bbox, st, kp_ok)
prone, meta = self._prone(kps, bbox, st)
# incident 비활성일 때만 baseline(정상 키높이) 갱신 = incident 중 freeze. Only trust a
# confident standing frame for the baseline so a bad low-conf bbox can't corrupt it.
if st.name == "STANDING" and not prone and kp_ok:
# incident 비활성일 때만 baseline(정상 키높이) 갱신 = incident 중 freeze
if st.name == "STANDING" and not prone:
st.baseline_height = bbox.height
if not prone:
if st.name in ("FALLING", "FALLEN", "NO_MOTION"):
# Only a CONFIDENT non-prone frame may recover an active incident. A low-conf
# (kp_ok False) frame's bbox-only "not prone" reading is untrusted: occlusion of
# a still-fallen worker must FREEZE the incident, not run the recovery countdown
# on noise. Freezing also protects baseline_height below (only seeded here, when
# kp_ok holds, so a bad low-conf bbox can't corrupt the next fall's collapse cue).
if not kp_ok:
# Occlusion PAUSES recovery — it must not count toward the grace window. Reset
# so recovery requires a FRESH, continuous run of confident non-prone frames;
# otherwise a confident frame at t0 plus a lone confident frame after a long
# low-conf gap would recover instantly on wall-clock elapsed alone.
st.not_prone_since = None
return None, {}
# 단일 튐(noisy) 프레임만으로 CRITICAL 사고를 즉시 취소하지 않도록
# recover_grace_s만큼 지속된 (신뢰) 비-prone을 요구한다.
# recover_grace_s만큼 지속된 비-prone을 요구한다.
if st.not_prone_since is None:
st.not_prone_since = now
return None, {}

15
edge/detectors/ghost.py
View file

@ -26,20 +26,13 @@ class GhostIncidentDetector:
state = self._states.get(tr.track_id, "STANDING")
if state in _DANGEROUS:
b = tr.latest.bbox
# Snapshot the OTHER tracks active at loss time. Only a track that did NOT
# exist then can be the victim re-appearing (a re-acquired track gets a new
# id); a track already present is a bystander/colleague and must not cancel
# the incident by walking over the loss point.
bystanders = set(self._states) - {tr.track_id}
self._candidates[tr.track_id] = ((b.cx, b.cy), state, b.height, now, bystanders)
self._candidates[tr.track_id] = ((b.cx, b.cy), state, b.height, now)
self._states.pop(tr.track_id, None)
def update(self, active_tracks: list[Track], now: float) -> list[dict]:
# 인근 재출현이면 후보 취소 — 단, 손실 시점에 없던 새 트랙만 (진짜 재출현).
for tid, (spatial, _state, height, _lost_at, bystanders) in list(self._candidates.items()):
# 인근 재출현이면 후보 취소
for tid, (spatial, _state, height, _lost_at) in list(self._candidates.items()):
for tr in active_tracks:
if tr.track_id in bystanders:
continue # a colleague who was already here — not the reappearing victim
b = tr.latest.bbox
dist = ((b.cx - spatial[0]) ** 2 + (b.cy - spatial[1]) ** 2) ** 0.5
if dist <= self.cfg.reappear_dist * (height or 1.0):
@ -47,7 +40,7 @@ class GhostIncidentDetector:
break
# 대기 초과 방출
out = []
for tid, (spatial, state, _height, lost_at, _by) in list(self._candidates.items()):
for tid, (spatial, state, _height, lost_at) in list(self._candidates.items()):
if now - lost_at >= self.cfg.reappear_s:
out.append({"track_id": tid, "spatial": spatial, "last_state": state,
"waited_s": round(now - lost_at, 1)})

2
edge/detectors/immobility.py
View file

@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ from edge.geometry import track_displacement
@dataclass
class ImmobilityConfig:
motion_thr: float = 0.25 # per-second normalized joint speed (units/s); MOTION_THR env
motion_thr: float = 0.02
immobile_s: float = 120.0
zone_immobile_s: float = 30.0

35
edge/detectors/zone.py
View file

@ -3,9 +3,6 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass
from edge.tracking import Track
from edge.models import L_ANKLE, R_ANKLE
# Below this an ankle keypoint is treated as unusable (typically hallucinated at conf~0).
MIN_ANKLE_CONF = 0.2
def point_in_polygon(x: float, y: float, poly: list[tuple[float, float]]) -> bool:
inside = False
@ -43,36 +40,16 @@ class ZoneIntrusionDetector:
self._inside_since = {k: v for k, v in self._inside_since.items() if k[0] != track_id}
self._fired = {k for k in self._fired if k[0] != track_id}
def _foot(self, track: Track, frame_wh=None) -> tuple[float, float]:
p = track.latest
a, b = p.keypoints[L_ANKLE], p.keypoints[R_ANKLE]
# Average only the ankles the model is confident about. A hallucinated ankle (conf~0,
# often pinned to (0,0) or a frame corner) would otherwise drag the foot point into or
# out of a zone. With neither ankle trustworthy, fall back to the bbox bottom-centre — a
# robust standing-foot proxy (same bbox-fallback discipline as fall.py's cues).
good = [k for k in (a, b) if k.conf >= MIN_ANKLE_CONF]
if good:
fx = sum(k.x for k in good) / len(good)
fy = sum(k.y for k in good) / len(good)
else:
fx, fy = p.bbox.cx, p.bbox.y2
# Zones are stored NORMALIZED (0..1 of the image) by the dashboard, which stretches the
# camera snapshot to a fixed canvas. The foot is camera-native pixels, so normalize it
# by the frame size to compare in the same space — otherwise every zone is misplaced
# (a zone drawn at image-centre would be checked against a raw pixel like 480, matching
# nothing on a 1280-wide frame). frame_wh=None keeps raw coords for unit tests that
# supply their own matching space.
if frame_wh:
w, h = frame_wh
if w > 0 and h > 0:
fx, fy = fx / w, fy / h
return (fx, fy)
def _foot(self, track: Track) -> tuple[float, float]:
kps = track.latest.keypoints
a, b = kps[L_ANKLE], kps[R_ANKLE]
return ((a.x + b.x) / 2, (a.y + b.y) / 2)
def active_zone_ids(self, track_id: int) -> set:
return {z for (tid, z) in self._inside_since if tid == track_id}
def update(self, track: Track, now: float, frame_wh=None) -> list[dict]:
fx, fy = self._foot(track, frame_wh)
def update(self, track: Track, now: float) -> list[dict]:
fx, fy = self._foot(track)
out = []
for zone in self.zones:
key = (track.track_id, zone.zone_id)

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