- Split clocks: detector timers/cooldowns run on a MONOTONIC clock (immune to an NTP step on an RTC-less Pi); wall time is used only for the HMAC X-Timestamp and Event.occurred_at. Fixes false IMMOBILITY / dropped tracks after a clock jump. - Heartbeat is time-based (30s, predictable regardless of load) and now carries temp/throttle/queue_pending/config_version telemetry. - A dead (no-frame) camera counts as erroring instead of a healthy frame, so a silent monitoring outage no longer looks green. - Offline queue: isolate one undecodable row instead of wedging every event behind it; classify 401 (stale clock) as transient, never a poison-drop. - New edge/health.py: vcgencmd temp/throttle parsing, None off-Pi (no fake 0).
86 lines
4 KiB
Python
86 lines
4 KiB
Python
import base64
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import hashlib
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import hmac
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import json
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from enum import Enum
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from edge.events import Event
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# Shared-hosting WAFs (cafe24) frequently block the default "python-requests/x.y" User-Agent
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# with an HTML 403 while curl passes — so every event would silently 403 with a correct HMAC
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# and URL. Send an explicit UA on every request. ServerClient imports this too.
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USER_AGENT = "move-detect-edge/1.0"
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class SendResult(Enum):
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"""Outcome of one upload attempt. The offline queue must tell a transient outage (retry
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forever — a real fall alert has to survive an overnight internet outage) apart from a
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permanent rejection (poison — count toward the drop cap), which a bare bool cannot express.
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DELIVERED is the only truthy value, so `if client.send(...)` keeps working unchanged."""
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DELIVERED = "delivered"
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REJECTED = "rejected" # a definite 4xx (not 429): the server will never accept this event
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TRANSIENT = "transient" # network error / timeout / 429 / 5xx — connectivity or server hiccup
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def __bool__(self) -> bool:
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return self is SendResult.DELIVERED
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def sign(secret: str, nonce: str, ts: str, body: str | bytes) -> str:
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if isinstance(body, str):
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body = body.encode()
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msg = nonce.encode() + ts.encode() + body
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return hmac.new(secret.encode(), msg, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
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class PostClient:
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def __init__(self, url: str, device_id: str, secret: str,
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nonce_fn, now_fn, http_post=None, timeout: float = 5.0):
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self.url = url
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self.device_id = device_id
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self.secret = secret
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self.nonce_fn = nonce_fn
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self.now_fn = now_fn
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self.timeout = timeout
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if http_post is None:
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import requests
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http_post = requests.post
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self._post = http_post
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def send(self, event: Event, snapshots: list[bytes]) -> SendResult:
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payload = event.to_payload(self.device_id)
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payload["snapshots"] = [base64.b64encode(s).decode() for s in snapshots]
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body = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True)
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nonce = self.nonce_fn()
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ts = str(self.now_fn())
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headers = {
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"Content-Type": "application/json",
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"User-Agent": USER_AGENT,
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"X-Nonce": nonce,
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"X-Timestamp": ts,
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"X-Signature": sign(self.secret, nonce, ts, body.encode()),
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}
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try:
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# allow_redirects=False: the .htaccess http->https 302 must not silently become a
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# GET (405/404). A redirect is a CAFE24_URL misconfiguration to surface, not follow.
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resp = self._post(self.url, data=body, headers=headers, timeout=self.timeout,
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allow_redirects=False)
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except Exception:
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# Connection refused / DNS / timeout — the server is unreachable, not rejecting us.
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return SendResult.TRANSIENT
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code = resp.status_code
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if 200 <= code < 300:
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return SendResult.DELIVERED
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# Transient — "back off and retry", NOT a permanent verdict on the event: all 5xx plus the
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# 4xx codes that explicitly mean try-again (408 Request Timeout, 425 Too Early, 429 Too
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# Many Requests). Counting these toward the poison drop cap would delete real events during
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# a proxy/server hiccup. Only a definite "bad request" 4xx is a permanent rejection.
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#
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# 401 is transient too: the server returns it for a STALE timestamp (abs(now-ts) > window),
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# which is exactly what an RTC-less Pi hits after a power cut until NTP steps the clock —
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# the event is valid and will be accepted verbatim once time syncs. The only permanent 401
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# cause is a wrong/rotated secret, a provisioning error to fix; retrying (events stay queued,
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# bounded by max_rows) is far safer than poison-dropping a real fall alert. Poison-drop is
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# reserved for a definite CONTENT rejection (400/422), never an auth/clock condition.
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if code in (401, 408, 425, 429) or code >= 500:
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return SendResult.TRANSIENT
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return SendResult.REJECTED
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