fix: remediate 2026-07-24 multi-agent review findings

HIGH:
- face detection: guard OpenCV builds lacking CascadeClassifier and isolate
  per-submission analysis failures in BatchAnalyzer, so a broken cv2 or one bad
  image no longer takes down every seed/reload/import/upload/rerun with no HTTP
  response
- risk scoring: gate Google custom image search (match=search_image) to 0
  points so the persistence round-trip (result_url aliased to url) can no longer
  flip the same evidence to +45 and inflate bands
- serialization: exclude SEARCH_SKIPPED/ENRICHMENT_FAILURE rows from the auto
  search dedup signatures so a quota-skipped query stays retryable instead of
  being treated as already done forever
- external_policy: add a daily-window reset + lock (mirrors SearchApiPolicy) so
  Vision is not permanently disabled once the daily limit is hit
- image_store: skip a malformed manifest row (and coerce bad width/height)
  instead of letting one ValueError paralyse loading/re-analysis for the queue

MEDIUM/LOW:
- enrichment: only count a face crop as transmitted when it actually left the
  system, removing false usage debits and a false "personal image sent to
  external provider" audit record; pick lastFailure from the failing item;
  preserve the collection set when every search was quota-skipped; dedup
  candidate counts; attribute Vision failures to the google provider badge
- store: search coverage requires a real result, not a failure row
- scoring: FACE_PERSON contributes once regardless of how many rows exist
- fingerprints: refuse near-matches on degenerate (near-uniform) average
  hashes while keeping identical-hash matches
- preprocessing: apply EXIF orientation for external derivatives, face crops,
  pHash and the PIL decode fallback
- promoter: scan title/description only, never the URL path/host tokens
- integrations: map Vision responses inside the adapter try; cap HTTPError
  bodies; skip the connect probe when a proxy applies; reservation-style quota
  accounting (try_reserve/release) to make the check-then-act atomic
- governance/admin: enforce the LLM-summary rule on the real persistence path;
  reject unknown manual-entry fields; upsert the rejected_image knowledge entry
  on repeat rejections; split policy skips out of the failures group
- env_file: strip a trailing inline comment from unquoted values

Environment drift fixed out-of-tree: removed the user-site OpenCV 5.0.0 that
shadowed the pinned opencv-python-headless==4.13.0.92.

Regression tests added; pytest tests/rights_filter is green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01E6GD9gxUtfUiVB3JHejGpU

.gitignore

@@ -38,3 +38,6 @@ tmp_dbg_img/
 # OS
 .DS_Store
 Thumbs.db
+
+# PowerShell module-analysis cache written into cwd by some automation
+Microsoft/

src/rights_filter/admin/correction_handlers.py

@@ -1,3 +1,13 @@
+"""In-memory reference implementation of the operator review flow.
+
+NOT wired into the running server: the live operator console persists through
+``rights_filter.server.store_operations`` / ``sqlite_store``, which is the source
+of truth for decision semantics, audit records and knowledge-entry side effects.
+This module backs unit tests and documents the intended domain shape; changing
+behavior here does NOT change what operators see. Keep the two in step, or fold
+this into the store path, rather than treating this file as production logic.
+"""
+
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 from rights_filter.domain.records import (

src/rights_filter/admin/detailed_review_presenter.py

@@ -1,3 +1,13 @@
+"""In-memory reference implementation of the operator review flow.
+
+NOT wired into the running server: the live operator console persists through
+``rights_filter.server.store_operations`` / ``sqlite_store``, which is the source
+of truth for decision semantics, audit records and knowledge-entry side effects.
+This module backs unit tests and documents the intended domain shape; changing
+behavior here does NOT change what operators see. Keep the two in step, or fold
+this into the store path, rather than treating this file as production logic.
+"""
+
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 from typing import Any
@@ -54,6 +64,7 @@ def _group_evidence(evidence: list[Evidence]) -> dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]]
         "naver": [],
         "google": [],
         "llm": [],
+        "skipped": [],
         "failures": [],
     }
     for item in evidence:
@@ -70,6 +81,11 @@ def _group_name(item: Evidence) -> str:
         return "google"
     if item.source == EvidenceSource.LLM_SUMMARY:
         return "llm"
+    # A provider that was deliberately not called (quota reached, disabled) is
+    # operational status, not a failure — grouping the two together made a
+    # normally-configured case look like it had errored.
+    if item.source in {EvidenceSource.EXTERNAL_SKIPPED, EvidenceSource.SEARCH_SKIPPED}:
+        return "skipped"
     return "failures"
 
 

src/rights_filter/admin/knowledge_base_handlers.py

@@ -1,3 +1,13 @@
+"""In-memory reference implementation of the operator review flow.
+
+NOT wired into the running server: the live operator console persists through
+``rights_filter.server.store_operations`` / ``sqlite_store``, which is the source
+of truth for decision semantics, audit records and knowledge-entry side effects.
+This module backs unit tests and documents the intended domain shape; changing
+behavior here does NOT change what operators see. Keep the two in step, or fold
+this into the store path, rather than treating this file as production logic.
+"""
+
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 from typing import Any
@@ -22,7 +32,14 @@ def register_manual_entry(
     sample_fingerprints: list[str] | None = None,
     **payload: Any,
 ) -> KnowledgeBaseEntry:
+    # Extra keys were screened for biometric templates and then silently dropped,
+    # so a caller passing a field this handler does not persist got a success
+    # response and no entry data. Reject instead of losing the input quietly.
     assert_no_biometric_template(payload)
+    if payload:
+        raise ValueError(
+            "unsupported knowledge entry fields: " + ", ".join(sorted(payload))
+        )
     entry = create_manual_knowledge_entry(
         entry_type=entry_type,
         name=name,

src/rights_filter/admin/review_handlers.py

@@ -1,3 +1,13 @@
+"""In-memory reference implementation of the operator review flow.
+
+NOT wired into the running server: the live operator console persists through
+``rights_filter.server.store_operations`` / ``sqlite_store``, which is the source
+of truth for decision semantics, audit records and knowledge-entry side effects.
+This module backs unit tests and documents the intended domain shape; changing
+behavior here does NOT change what operators see. Keep the two in step, or fold
+this into the store path, rather than treating this file as production logic.
+"""
+
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 from typing import Any

src/rights_filter/analysis/face_person_detection.py

@@ -1,10 +1,17 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import logging
 from io import BytesIO
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 
 from rights_filter.analysis.preprocessing import ImagePayload
 
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+# Emit the "OpenCV build lacks CascadeClassifier" warning at most once per
+# process instead of on every image so operator logs stay readable.
+_warned_missing_cascade = False
+
 FaceBox = tuple[int, int, int, int]
 
 
@@ -43,31 +50,52 @@ class HeuristicFacePersonDetector:
         if decoded is None:
             return FacePersonSignal(face_count=0, person_count=0)
 
+        # Some OpenCV builds (e.g. the 5.x preview wheels) drop the legacy Haar
+        # cascade API. Detect that up front and degrade to a presence-negative
+        # signal instead of letting an AttributeError escape into the seed/
+        # analysis pipeline and take down every ingest/re-analysis request.
+        if not (hasattr(cv2, "CascadeClassifier") and hasattr(cv2, "data")):
+            global _warned_missing_cascade
+            if not _warned_missing_cascade:
+                _warned_missing_cascade = True
+                logger.warning(
+                    "OpenCV build %s lacks CascadeClassifier/data — face "
+                    "presence detection disabled (install "
+                    "opencv-python-headless==4.13.0.92).",
+                    getattr(cv2, "__version__", "?"),
+                )
+            return FacePersonSignal(face_count=0, person_count=0)
+
         try:
             gray = cv2.cvtColor(decoded, cv2.COLOR_BGR2GRAY)
         except Exception:
             return FacePersonSignal(face_count=0, person_count=0)
 
         face_boxes: list[FaceBox] = []
-        for cascade_name in (
-            "haarcascade_frontalface_default.xml",
-            "haarcascade_profileface.xml",
-        ):
-            cascade = cv2.CascadeClassifier(f"{cv2.data.haarcascades}{cascade_name}")
-            if hasattr(cascade, "empty") and cascade.empty():
-                continue
-            rects = cascade.detectMultiScale(
-                gray,
-                scaleFactor=1.1,
-                minNeighbors=4,
-                minSize=(30, 30),
-            )
-            for rect in rects:
-                box = tuple(int(value) for value in rect)
-                if len(box) == 4 and not any(
-                    _boxes_overlap(box, existing) for existing in face_boxes
-                ):
-                    face_boxes.append(box)
+        try:
+            for cascade_name in (
+                "haarcascade_frontalface_default.xml",
+                "haarcascade_profileface.xml",
+            ):
+                cascade = cv2.CascadeClassifier(f"{cv2.data.haarcascades}{cascade_name}")
+                if hasattr(cascade, "empty") and cascade.empty():
+                    continue
+                rects = cascade.detectMultiScale(
+                    gray,
+                    scaleFactor=1.1,
+                    minNeighbors=4,
+                    minSize=(30, 30),
+                )
+                for rect in rects:
+                    box = tuple(int(value) for value in rect)
+                    if len(box) == 4 and not any(
+                        _boxes_overlap(box, existing) for existing in face_boxes
+                    ):
+                        face_boxes.append(box)
+        except Exception:
+            # Any cascade/runtime failure degrades to a presence-negative signal
+            # rather than crashing the caller.
+            return FacePersonSignal(face_count=0, person_count=0)
 
         face_count = len(face_boxes)
         return FacePersonSignal(
@@ -99,8 +127,10 @@ def _decode_with_pillow(content: bytes, cv2: object, np: object) -> object | Non
     try:
         from PIL import Image
 
-        with Image.open(BytesIO(content)) as image:
-            rgb = image.convert("RGB")
+        from rights_filter.analysis.preprocessing import apply_exif_orientation
+
+        with Image.open(BytesIO(content)) as opened:
+            rgb = apply_exif_orientation(opened).convert("RGB")
             return cv2.cvtColor(np.array(rgb), cv2.COLOR_RGB2BGR)
     except Exception:
         return None

src/rights_filter/analysis/fingerprints.py

@@ -26,6 +26,19 @@ class FingerprintService:
         if left_value.startswith("unavailable:") or right_value.startswith("unavailable:"):
             return 0.0
         if _looks_like_64bit_hash(left_value) and _looks_like_64bit_hash(right_value):
+            # A near-uniform image (blank, solid colour, very low detail) makes
+            # this 8x8 average hash collapse to nearly-all-ones or nearly-all-
+            # zeros. Two such hashes that differ by a bit or two would score
+            # ~0.98 and be reported as a knowledge-base match worth +80, even
+            # though neither hash carries usable information. Refuse to infer
+            # similarity from an uninformative hash.
+            #
+            # Identical hashes are handled above and still match: this cannot
+            # separate "same picture" from "two different blank images" — that
+            # needs the exact (SHA-256) fingerprint, which callers compare
+            # separately — but it does remove the near-miss false positives.
+            if _is_degenerate_hash(left_value) or _is_degenerate_hash(right_value):
+                return 0.0
             distance = (int(left_value, 16) ^ int(right_value, 16)).bit_count()
             return 1 - (distance / 64)
         return 0.0
@@ -35,8 +48,13 @@ def _perceptual_hash(content: bytes, exact_digest: str) -> str:
     try:
         from PIL import Image
 
-        with Image.open(BytesIO(content)) as image:
-            thumbnail = image.convert("L").resize((8, 8))
+        from rights_filter.analysis.preprocessing import apply_exif_orientation
+
+        with Image.open(BytesIO(content)) as opened:
+            # Normalize orientation first: the same photo saved rotated with an
+            # EXIF tag would otherwise hash differently from its upright copy and
+            # never match as a duplicate.
+            thumbnail = apply_exif_orientation(opened).convert("L").resize((8, 8))
             if hasattr(thumbnail, "get_flattened_data"):
                 pixels = list(thumbnail.get_flattened_data())
             else:
@@ -51,6 +69,18 @@ def _perceptual_hash(content: bytes, exact_digest: str) -> str:
     return f"{bits:016x}"
 
 
+# A 64-bit average hash is degenerate when nearly every bit agrees: the image had
+# almost no variation around its mean, so the bits describe the threshold, not the
+# picture. 4 of 64 bits is the practical cut-off — below it, unrelated images
+# routinely collide.
+_MIN_INFORMATIVE_BITS = 4
+
+
+def _is_degenerate_hash(value: str) -> bool:
+    set_bits = int(value, 16).bit_count()
+    return set_bits <= _MIN_INFORMATIVE_BITS or set_bits >= 64 - _MIN_INFORMATIVE_BITS
+
+
 def _looks_like_64bit_hash(value: str) -> bool:
     if len(value) != 16:
         return False

src/rights_filter/analysis/preprocessing.py

@@ -32,23 +32,19 @@ def build_external_derivative(
     if original.width <= 0 or original.height <= 0:
         raise PreprocessingError("image dimensions must be positive")
 
-    longest_side = max(original.width, original.height)
-    if longest_side > max_side:
-        scale = max_side / longest_side
-        width = max(1, round(original.width * scale))
-        height = max(1, round(original.height * scale))
-    else:
-        width = original.width
-        height = original.height
-
-    if original.metadata.get("format", "").upper() == "AVIF":
-        content = _jpeg_derivative(original.content, width, height)
-    else:
-        # Re-encode through PIL to drop embedded EXIF/GPS metadata from the image
-        # bytes. Clearing only the metadata dict (below) left camera serials and
-        # GPS coordinates inside the bytes that get shipped to external APIs.
-        content = _reencode_without_metadata(original.content, width, height)
-    if content is None:
+    # Re-encode through PIL to drop embedded EXIF/GPS metadata from the image
+    # bytes and to apply the EXIF orientation. Clearing only the metadata dict
+    # (below) left camera serials and GPS coordinates inside the bytes shipped to
+    # external APIs; skipping the orientation shipped rotated phone photos
+    # sideways (and hid faces from the detector, which has no EXIF awareness).
+    # The output size is derived from the UPRIGHT image, since a 90° rotation
+    # swaps width/height relative to the stored dimensions.
+    derived = _upright_derivative(
+        original.content,
+        max_side,
+        force_jpeg=original.metadata.get("format", "").upper() == "AVIF",
+    )
+    if derived is None:
         # Re-encoding failed (Pillow missing or undecodable bytes): fall back to
         # the original bytes, but warn — those bytes may still carry EXIF/GPS
         # metadata that is about to be sent to an external API. On an air-gapped
@@ -58,6 +54,9 @@ def build_external_derivative(
             "metadata may not have been stripped before external submission"
         )
         content = original.content
+        width, height = _scaled_size(original.width, original.height, max_side)
+    else:
+        content, width, height = derived
 
     return ImagePayload(
         content=content,
@@ -81,8 +80,10 @@ def build_face_crop_derivatives(
     try:
         from PIL import Image
 
-        with Image.open(BytesIO(original.content)) as image:
-            image = image.convert("RGB")
+        with Image.open(BytesIO(original.content)) as opened:
+            # Face boxes come from the detector, which sees the upright image —
+            # crop from the same orientation or the boxes address the wrong pixels.
+            image = apply_exif_orientation(opened).convert("RGB")
             crops: list[ImagePayload] = []
             image_width, image_height = image.size
             for box in face_boxes[:max_crops]:
@@ -111,46 +112,69 @@ def build_face_crop_derivatives(
         return []
 
 
-def _jpeg_derivative(content: bytes, width: int, height: int) -> bytes | None:
-    try:
-        from PIL import Image
-
-        with Image.open(BytesIO(content)) as image:
-            image = image.convert("RGB")
-            if image.size != (width, height):
-                image = image.resize((width, height))
-            output = BytesIO()
-            image.save(output, format="JPEG", quality=90, optimize=True)
-            return output.getvalue()
-    except Exception:
-        return None
-
-
 _REENCODABLE_FORMATS = {"JPEG", "PNG", "WEBP", "GIF", "BMP", "TIFF"}
 
 
-def _reencode_without_metadata(content: bytes, width: int, height: int) -> bytes | None:
-    """Re-save the image (preserving format where possible) so embedded EXIF/GPS
-    metadata is dropped. Returns None when PIL is unavailable or the bytes are
-    not a decodable image, so the caller can fall back to the original content."""
+def _scaled_size(width: int, height: int, max_side: int) -> tuple[int, int]:
+    longest_side = max(width, height)
+    if longest_side <= max_side:
+        return width, height
+    scale = max_side / longest_side
+    return max(1, round(width * scale)), max(1, round(height * scale))
+
+
+def apply_exif_orientation(image: object) -> object:
+    """Rotate/flip an opened PIL image per its EXIF orientation tag.
+
+    Every consumer that reasons about pixels (external derivative, face crops,
+    perceptual hash, face detection) must call this: a phone photo stored
+    rotated with orientation=6 otherwise reaches the detector on its side, where
+    upright-trained cascades miss the face entirely.
+    """
+    try:
+        from PIL import ImageOps
+
+        return ImageOps.exif_transpose(image) or image
+    except Exception:
+        return image
+
+
+def _upright_derivative(
+    content: bytes, max_side: int, force_jpeg: bool = False
+) -> tuple[bytes, int, int] | None:
+    """Re-save the image upright and metadata-free, capped to `max_side`.
+
+    Returns (bytes, width, height) using the orientation-corrected dimensions, or
+    None when PIL is unavailable / the bytes are not a decodable image so the
+    caller can fall back to the original content.
+    """
     try:
         from PIL import Image
 
-        with Image.open(BytesIO(content)) as image:
-            source_format = (image.format or "").upper()
-            save_format = source_format if source_format in _REENCODABLE_FORMATS else "JPEG"
+        with Image.open(BytesIO(content)) as opened:
+            source_format = (opened.format or "").upper()
+            image = apply_exif_orientation(opened)
+            save_format = (
+                "JPEG"
+                if force_jpeg or source_format not in _REENCODABLE_FORMATS
+                else source_format
+            )
             if save_format in {"JPEG", "BMP"} and image.mode not in {"RGB", "L"}:
                 image = image.convert("RGB")
             elif image.mode == "P":
                 image = image.convert("RGBA")
+            width, height = _scaled_size(int(image.width), int(image.height), max_side)
             if image.size != (width, height):
                 image = image.resize((width, height))
             # Rebuild from raw pixels so NO metadata (EXIF/GPS/ICC) survives —
             # Pillow can otherwise re-emit image.info["exif"] when re-saving.
             clean = Image.frombytes(image.mode, image.size, image.tobytes())
             output = BytesIO()
-            clean.save(output, format=save_format)
-            return output.getvalue()
+            if save_format == "JPEG":
+                clean.save(output, format="JPEG", quality=90, optimize=True)
+            else:
+                clean.save(output, format=save_format)
+            return output.getvalue(), width, height
     except Exception:
         return None
 

src/rights_filter/analysis/risk_scoring.py

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ class RiskScorer:
         reasons: list[str] = []
         counted_web_buckets: set[str] = set()
         counted_naver_buckets: set[str] = set()
+        counted_face_person = False
 
         for item in evidence:
             if item.data.get("operator_status") in {"irrelevant", "false_positive"}:
@@ -24,6 +25,13 @@ class RiskScorer:
                     score += 30
                     reasons.append(item.reason)
             elif item.source == EvidenceSource.FACE_PERSON:
+                # "A person is present" is one signal no matter how many rows
+                # assert it. Re-analysis appends a fresh FACE_PERSON row while the
+                # previous one remains, so without this bucket the same image
+                # accrued +35 per rerun and drifted into the high band on its own.
+                if counted_face_person:
+                    continue
+                counted_face_person = True
                 score += 35
                 reasons.append(item.reason)
             elif item.source == EvidenceSource.WEB_DETECTION:
@@ -85,6 +93,16 @@ class RiskScorer:
 def _web_detection_points(item: Evidence) -> int:
     if item.data.get("weak_hint"):
         return 0
+    # Google custom IMAGE search results (match="search_image") are context-only:
+    # existence of a text-query image hit is not itself a rights signal (the
+    # matching pHash FINGERPRINT evidence carries the score). Fresh evidence has
+    # no bare "url" key so it scores 0, but the persistence round-trip aliases
+    # result_url -> url; without this explicit gate the round-trip would flip the
+    # same evidence to +45 via the url fallback below, violating the
+    # score-preservation invariant and inflating bands on any query that returns
+    # anything.
+    if item.data.get("match") == "search_image":
+        return 0
     if item.data.get("match") == "full":
         return 45
     if item.data.get("match") in {"partial", "page"}:

src/rights_filter/analysis/search_result_promoter.py

@@ -26,12 +26,14 @@ class SearchResultPromoter:
                 data={**item.data, "promoted": False, "promotion_reason": "no search results"},
             )
 
-        # Scan only the actual result fields — never the query. The query is our
-        # own generated input; including it self-promotes any result whose query
-        # happened to contain a marker word.
+        # Scan only the human-readable result fields — never the query and never
+        # the URL. The query is our own generated input (it would self-promote any
+        # result whose query contained a marker word), and a URL's host/path
+        # routinely contains marker substrings for unrelated reasons
+        # ("/game/", "album" in a CDN path, a "cover" directory), which promoted
+        # irrelevant results to 0.8 confidence and +40 points.
         text = " ".join(
-            str(item.data.get(key, ""))
-            for key in ("title", "description", "result_url")
+            str(item.data.get(key, "")) for key in ("title", "description")
         ).lower()
         promoted = _has_named_rights_signal(text)
         data = {

src/rights_filter/domain/records.py

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field, replace
 from enum import StrEnum
 from itertools import count
 from typing import Any
@@ -242,9 +242,36 @@ class InMemoryRightsFilterRepository:
     def create_rejected_image_entry(
         self, decision_id: str, submission_id: str, fingerprints: list[str]
     ) -> KnowledgeBaseEntry:
+        name = f"rejected:{submission_id}"
+        # One submission has one rejection reference. Re-deciding the same case
+        # previously appended another entry each time, so a submission rejected
+        # N times seeded N duplicate reference images into every later similarity
+        # check. Refresh the existing entry in place instead.
+        incumbent = next(
+            (
+                entry
+                for entry in self._knowledge_entries.values()
+                if entry.active
+                and entry.entry_type == KnowledgeEntryType.REJECTED_IMAGE
+                and entry.name == name
+            ),
+            None,
+        )
+        if incumbent is not None:
+            merged = list(
+                dict.fromkeys([*incumbent.sample_fingerprints, *fingerprints])
+            )
+            entry = replace(
+                incumbent,
+                source_decision_id=decision_id,
+                sample_fingerprints=merged,
+            )
+            self.save_knowledge_entry(entry)
+            return entry
+
         entry = KnowledgeBaseEntry.create(
             entry_type=KnowledgeEntryType.REJECTED_IMAGE,
-            name=f"rejected:{submission_id}",
+            name=name,
             provenance=KnowledgeProvenance.AUTOMATIC_REJECTION,
             source_decision_id=decision_id,
             sample_fingerprints=fingerprints,

src/rights_filter/integrations/cloud_vision_web_detection.py

@@ -112,6 +112,10 @@ class CloudVisionWebDetectionAdapter:
                     source=EvidenceSource.EXTERNAL_SKIPPED,
                     reason=reason or "external API skipped",
                     confidence=1.0,
+                    # Deliberately NOT provider-tagged: a policy refusal means the
+                    # call never ran, and the provider badge derives "failed" from
+                    # any attributed failure-source row. Leaving skips unattributed
+                    # keeps the badge at "not run", which is what actually happened.
                     data={"submission_id": submission_id},
                 )
             ]
@@ -124,14 +128,27 @@ class CloudVisionWebDetectionAdapter:
                     source=EvidenceSource.FAILURE,
                     reason=f"External API failed: {exc}",
                     confidence=1.0,
-                    data={"submission_id": submission_id},
+                    data={"submission_id": submission_id, "provider": "google"},
                 )
             ]
 
         # Record the quota debit only after the request actually succeeds, so a
         # failed/timed-out call does not permanently consume the daily limit.
         policy.record_call()
-        return _map_response(submission_id, response)
+        try:
+            return _map_response(submission_id, response)
+        except Exception as exc:
+            # A malformed/unexpected response shape must not abort the caller
+            # after the quota was already spent — surface it as failure evidence
+            # like a transport error does.
+            return [
+                Evidence(
+                    source=EvidenceSource.FAILURE,
+                    reason=f"External API response could not be parsed: {exc}",
+                    confidence=1.0,
+                    data={"submission_id": submission_id, "provider": "google"},
+                )
+            ]
 
 
 def _map_response(submission_id: str, response: dict[str, Any]) -> list[Evidence]:
@@ -208,6 +225,9 @@ def _map_response(submission_id: str, response: dict[str, Any]) -> list[Evidence
         )
 
     for label in response.get("best_guess_labels", []):
+        # Tolerate a bare string / non-mapping entry instead of raising on .get.
+        if not isinstance(label, dict):
+            continue
         text = label.get("label", "")
         evidence.append(
             Evidence(

src/rights_filter/integrations/external_policy.py

@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-from dataclasses import dataclass
+import threading
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from datetime import date
 
 
 @dataclass
@@ -11,19 +13,37 @@ class ExternalApiPolicy:
     allow_online_sync: bool = False
     daily_limit: int | None = None
     calls_made: int = 0
+    window_day: str = ""
+    _lock: threading.Lock = field(
+        default_factory=threading.Lock, repr=False, compare=False
+    )
+
+    def _roll_window_locked(self) -> None:
+        # daily_limit is a per-day budget. Reset the counter when the calendar
+        # day changes; otherwise the count only ever grows and, once the limit is
+        # hit, web detection stays disabled until the process restarts (it never
+        # re-windows for the next day). Mirrors SearchApiPolicy.
+        today = date.today().isoformat()
+        if self.window_day != today:
+            self.window_day = today
+            self.calls_made = 0
 
     def can_call(self) -> tuple[bool, str | None]:
-        if self.disabled:
-            return False, "external API disabled"
-        if not self.compliance_approved:
-            return False, "external API compliance not approved"
-        if not self.metadata_logging_accepted:
-            return False, "metadata logging not accepted"
-        if not self.allow_online_sync:
-            return False, "online synchronous mode not allowed"
-        if self.daily_limit is not None and self.calls_made >= self.daily_limit:
-            return False, "external API usage limit reached"
-        return True, None
+        with self._lock:
+            self._roll_window_locked()
+            if self.disabled:
+                return False, "external API disabled"
+            if not self.compliance_approved:
+                return False, "external API compliance not approved"
+            if not self.metadata_logging_accepted:
+                return False, "metadata logging not accepted"
+            if not self.allow_online_sync:
+                return False, "online synchronous mode not allowed"
+            if self.daily_limit is not None and self.calls_made >= self.daily_limit:
+                return False, "external API usage limit reached"
+            return True, None
 
     def record_call(self) -> None:
-        self.calls_made += 1
+        with self._lock:
+            self._roll_window_locked()
+            self.calls_made += 1

src/rights_filter/integrations/google_custom_search.py

@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ class GoogleCustomSearchAdapter:
             raise ValueError("Google custom search requires a text query")
 
         requested_calls = _requested_calls(self.client, "image_pages")
-        allowed, reason = policy.can_call(self.provider, requested_calls=requested_calls)
+        allowed, reason = policy.try_reserve(self.provider, requested_calls=requested_calls)
         if not allowed:
             return [
                 Evidence(
@@ -120,8 +120,14 @@ class GoogleCustomSearchAdapter:
             ]
 
         try:
-            response = self.client.search_image(query)
-            policy.record_call(requested_calls)
+            try:
+                response = self.client.search_image(query)
+            except Exception:
+                # The request never reached the provider — refund the
+                # reservation. A failure AFTER a successful fetch keeps the
+                # debit, since the provider did serve the call.
+                policy.release(requested_calls)
+                raise
             # Map inside the try so a malformed payload becomes ENRICHMENT_FAILURE
             # evidence instead of an uncaught exception that aborts the request.
             return _map_image_response(submission_id, query, response)
@@ -148,7 +154,7 @@ class GoogleCustomSearchAdapter:
             raise ValueError("Google custom search requires a text query")
 
         requested_calls = _requested_calls(self.client, "web_pages")
-        allowed, reason = policy.can_call(self.provider, requested_calls=requested_calls)
+        allowed, reason = policy.try_reserve(self.provider, requested_calls=requested_calls)
         if not allowed:
             return [
                 Evidence(
@@ -166,8 +172,14 @@ class GoogleCustomSearchAdapter:
             ]
 
         try:
-            response = self.client.search_web(query)
-            policy.record_call(requested_calls)
+            try:
+                response = self.client.search_web(query)
+            except Exception:
+                # The request never reached the provider — refund the
+                # reservation. A failure AFTER a successful fetch keeps the
+                # debit, since the provider did serve the call.
+                policy.release(requested_calls)
+                raise
             return _map_web_response(submission_id, query, response)
         except Exception as exc:  # pragma: no cover - defensive adapter boundary
             return [

src/rights_filter/integrations/http_json.py

@@ -5,7 +5,17 @@ import socket
 from typing import Any
 from urllib.error import HTTPError, URLError
 from urllib.parse import urlsplit
-from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
+from urllib.request import Request, getproxies, proxy_bypass, urlopen
+
+
+def _proxy_applies(scheme: str, host: str) -> bool:
+    """True when the system proxy configuration would route `host` for `scheme`."""
+    try:
+        if scheme not in getproxies():
+            return False
+        return not proxy_bypass(host)
+    except Exception:
+        return False
 
 
 class HttpJsonError(RuntimeError):
@@ -16,6 +26,10 @@ class HttpJsonError(RuntimeError):
 # cannot exhaust memory. JSON API responses are small; 10 MiB is generous.
 _MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES = 10 * 1024 * 1024
 
+# An HTTP error body only ever becomes part of an exception message, so keep it
+# small — the full 10 MiB cap would put a whole error page into a log line.
+_MAX_ERROR_DETAIL_BYTES = 4096
+
 
 class UrllibJsonTransport:
     def __init__(self, connect_timeout: float | None = None) -> None:
@@ -52,7 +66,9 @@ class UrllibJsonTransport:
             raw = raw_bytes.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
         except HTTPError as exc:
             try:
-                detail = exc.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+                # Apply the same cap on the error path: an error page can be far
+                # larger than a JSON reply, and it is only used for a message.
+                detail = exc.read(_MAX_ERROR_DETAIL_BYTES).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
             except Exception:
                 detail = ""
             raise HttpJsonError(f"HTTP {exc.code}: {detail}") from exc
@@ -73,6 +89,12 @@ class UrllibJsonTransport:
         host = parts.hostname
         if not host:
             return
+        # A direct TCP probe bypasses the system proxy. On a proxy-only network
+        # the probe always fails while the actual (proxied) request would have
+        # succeeded, so skip the fast-fail check when a proxy applies to this host
+        # and let urlopen route through it.
+        if _proxy_applies(parts.scheme, host):
+            return
         port = parts.port or (443 if parts.scheme == "https" else 80)
         try:
             with socket.create_connection((host, port), timeout=self.connect_timeout):

src/rights_filter/integrations/naver_search.py

@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ class NaverSearchAdapter:
             raise ValueError("Naver search requires a text query")
 
         requested_calls = _requested_calls(self.client, "image_pages")
-        allowed, reason = policy.can_call(self.provider, requested_calls=requested_calls)
+        allowed, reason = policy.try_reserve(self.provider, requested_calls=requested_calls)
         if not allowed:
             return [
                 Evidence(
@@ -179,8 +179,14 @@ class NaverSearchAdapter:
             ]
 
         try:
-            response = self.client.search_image(query)
-            policy.record_call(requested_calls)
+            try:
+                response = self.client.search_image(query)
+            except Exception:
+                # The request never reached the provider — refund the
+                # reservation. A failure AFTER a successful fetch keeps the
+                # debit, since the provider did serve the call.
+                policy.release(requested_calls)
+                raise
             return _map_response(submission_id, query, response)
         except Exception as exc:  # pragma: no cover - defensive adapter boundary
             return [
@@ -204,7 +210,7 @@ class NaverSearchAdapter:
             raise ValueError("Naver search requires a text query")
 
         requested_calls = _requested_calls(self.client, "blog_pages")
-        allowed, reason = policy.can_call(self.provider, requested_calls=requested_calls)
+        allowed, reason = policy.try_reserve(self.provider, requested_calls=requested_calls)
         if not allowed:
             return [
                 Evidence(
@@ -222,8 +228,14 @@ class NaverSearchAdapter:
             ]
 
         try:
-            response = self.client.search_blog(query)
-            policy.record_call(requested_calls)
+            try:
+                response = self.client.search_blog(query)
+            except Exception:
+                # The request never reached the provider — refund the
+                # reservation. A failure AFTER a successful fetch keeps the
+                # debit, since the provider did serve the call.
+                policy.release(requested_calls)
+                raise
             return _map_blog_response(submission_id, query, response)
         except Exception as exc:  # pragma: no cover - defensive adapter boundary
             return [
@@ -248,7 +260,7 @@ class NaverSearchAdapter:
             raise ValueError("Naver search requires a text query")
 
         requested_calls = _requested_calls(self.client, "web_pages")
-        allowed, reason = policy.can_call(self.provider, requested_calls=requested_calls)
+        allowed, reason = policy.try_reserve(self.provider, requested_calls=requested_calls)
         if not allowed:
             return [
                 Evidence(
@@ -266,8 +278,14 @@ class NaverSearchAdapter:
             ]
 
         try:
-            response = self.client.search_web(query)
-            policy.record_call(requested_calls)
+            try:
+                response = self.client.search_web(query)
+            except Exception:
+                # The request never reached the provider — refund the
+                # reservation. A failure AFTER a successful fetch keeps the
+                # debit, since the provider did serve the call.
+                policy.release(requested_calls)
+                raise
             return _map_web_response(submission_id, query, response)
         except Exception as exc:  # pragma: no cover - defensive adapter boundary
             return [

src/rights_filter/integrations/search_policy.py

@@ -27,7 +27,36 @@ class SearchApiPolicy:
             self.window_day = today
             self.calls_made = 0
 
+    def try_reserve(self, provider: str, requested_calls: int = 1) -> tuple[bool, str | None]:
+        """Atomically check the budget and debit it in one locked step.
+
+        Checking and debiting separately let concurrent operator requests both
+        pass the check before either recorded, overshooting daily_limit by the
+        number of racing callers. Callers refund with release() when the request
+        never actually reached the provider.
+        """
+        with self._lock:
+            self._roll_window_locked()
+            if self.disabled:
+                return False, "search API disabled"
+            if not self.compliance_approved:
+                return False, "search API compliance not approved"
+            if provider not in self.allowed_providers:
+                return False, "search provider not allowed"
+            calls = max(1, int(requested_calls or 1))
+            if self.daily_limit is not None and self.calls_made + calls > self.daily_limit:
+                return False, "search API usage limit reached"
+            self.calls_made += calls
+            return True, None
+
+    def release(self, count: int = 1) -> None:
+        """Return an unused reservation (the request never reached the provider)."""
+        with self._lock:
+            self._roll_window_locked()
+            self.calls_made = max(0, self.calls_made - max(1, int(count or 1)))
+
     def can_call(self, provider: str, requested_calls: int = 1) -> tuple[bool, str | None]:
+        """Non-reserving budget check, for callers that only need to look."""
         with self._lock:
             self._roll_window_locked()
             if self.disabled:

src/rights_filter/jobs/batch_analyzer.py

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import logging
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 
 from rights_filter.analysis.internal_analyzer import InternalAnalyzer
@@ -14,6 +15,8 @@ from rights_filter.domain.records import (
 from rights_filter.integrations.cloud_vision_web_detection import CloudVisionWebDetectionAdapter
 from rights_filter.integrations.external_policy import ExternalApiPolicy
 
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
 
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
 class SubmissionImage:
@@ -86,6 +89,17 @@ class BatchAnalyzer:
                 # has_analysis_run() skip the submission permanently on re-runs.
                 failed += 1
                 continue
+            except Exception:
+                # Isolate any unexpected per-submission failure (e.g. an OpenCV
+                # build missing CascadeClassifier, a decoder edge case) so one
+                # bad image cannot abort the whole batch/seed. Log with the
+                # submission id for diagnosis instead of swallowing silently.
+                logger.exception(
+                    "Unexpected analysis failure for submission %s; skipping.",
+                    submission.submission_id,
+                )
+                failed += 1
+                continue
 
             external_skipped += sum(
                 1 for item in evidence if item.source == EvidenceSource.EXTERNAL_SKIPPED

src/rights_filter/server/env_file.py

@@ -24,10 +24,25 @@ def load_env_file(path: Path | str, environ: MutableMapping[str, str]) -> None:
         key = key.strip()
         if not key or key in environ:
             continue
-        environ[key] = _strip_quotes(value.strip())
+        environ[key] = _parse_value(value.strip())
 
 
-def _strip_quotes(value: str) -> str:
-    if len(value) >= 2 and value[0] == value[-1] and value[0] in {"'", '"'}:
+def _parse_value(value: str) -> str:
+    if _is_quoted(value):
+        # Quoted values are verbatim — a '#' inside quotes is part of the secret.
         return value[1:-1]
-    return value
+    return _strip_inline_comment(value)
+
+
+def _is_quoted(value: str) -> bool:
+    return len(value) >= 2 and value[0] == value[-1] and value[0] in {"'", '"'}
+
+
+def _strip_inline_comment(value: str) -> str:
+    # ` #` starts a trailing comment on an unquoted value (dotenv convention).
+    # Without this, `TOKEN=abc123 # staging key` silently loaded the comment as
+    # part of the token and every authenticated request failed with no clue why.
+    marker = value.find(" #")
+    if marker == -1:
+        return value
+    return value[:marker].rstrip()

src/rights_filter/server/image_store.py

@@ -1,11 +1,14 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import json
+import logging
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any
 
 from rights_filter.analysis.preprocessing import ImagePayload
 
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
 SUPPORTED_IMAGE_SUFFIXES = {
     ".avif",
     ".bmp",
@@ -30,13 +33,23 @@ class LocalSubmissionImageStore:
         manifest = self.root / "submissions.json"
         if manifest.exists():
             records = json.loads(manifest.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-            normalized = [
-                self._normalize_manifest_record(record)
-                for record in records
-                if isinstance(record, dict)
-                and record.get("file")
-                and self._safe_path(str(record["file"])).exists()
-            ]
+            normalized: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+            for record in records:
+                if not isinstance(record, dict) or not record.get("file"):
+                    continue
+                # Skip a malformed row (e.g. a path escaping the image root)
+                # instead of letting its ValueError abort the whole listing —
+                # one bad manifest line previously paralyzed loading and
+                # re-analysis for the entire queue.
+                try:
+                    if not self._safe_path(str(record["file"])).exists():
+                        continue
+                    normalized.append(self._normalize_manifest_record(record))
+                except (ValueError, OSError):
+                    logger.warning(
+                        "Skipping malformed submissions.json record: file=%r",
+                        record.get("file"),
+                    )
             return self._with_unlisted_files(normalized)
         return self._scan_records()
 
@@ -45,8 +58,8 @@ class LocalSubmissionImageStore:
         path = self._safe_path(record["file"])
         return ImagePayload(
             content=path.read_bytes(),
-            width=int(record["width"]),
-            height=int(record["height"]),
+            width=_safe_dimension(record.get("width")),
+            height=_safe_dimension(record.get("height")),
             metadata={
                 "submission_id": submission_id,
                 "title": str(record.get("title", submission_id)),
@@ -127,6 +140,15 @@ class LocalSubmissionImageStore:
         return path
 
 
+def _safe_dimension(value: Any) -> int:
+    # A manifest may carry a non-numeric or missing width/height; fall back to
+    # the same placeholder the normalizer uses rather than raising mid-analysis.
+    try:
+        return int(value)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        return 1
+
+
 def _image_size(path: Path) -> tuple[int, int]:
     try:
         from PIL import Image

src/rights_filter/server/store_enrichment.py

@@ -395,12 +395,21 @@ class StoreEnrichmentMixin:
             if not crops:
                 continue
             crop = crops[0]
-            call_count += 1
             crop_evidence = self.provider_runtime.google_adapter.detect(
                 f"{submission_id}:face-crop-{crop_index}",
                 crop,
                 self.provider_runtime.external_policy,
             )
+            # Only count a crop as transmitted when the adapter actually issued a
+            # request. A policy refusal returns EXTERNAL_SKIPPED without sending
+            # anything, so counting it inflated provider usage and — worse —
+            # produced a false "personal image sent to external provider" audit
+            # record for biometric data that never left the system. A FAILURE
+            # still counts: the request may have been sent before it failed.
+            if any(
+                item.source != EvidenceSource.EXTERNAL_SKIPPED for item in crop_evidence
+            ):
+                call_count += 1
             for item in crop_evidence:
                 face_web_evidence = _face_crop_web_evidence(submission_id, crop_index, item)
                 evidence.append(face_web_evidence)

src/rights_filter/server/store_operations.py

@@ -10,12 +10,14 @@ and self.* attributes provided by the host class. Behavior unchanged.
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import json
+import logging
 import sqlite3
 from typing import Any
 
 from rights_filter.analysis.fingerprints import FingerprintService
 from rights_filter.analysis.search_result_promoter import SearchResultPromoter
-from rights_filter.domain.records import Evidence, EvidenceSource
+from rights_filter.domain.records import DataClass, Evidence, EvidenceSource
+from rights_filter.governance.policies import assert_operator_evidence_payload_allowed
 from rights_filter.server.image_store import LocalSubmissionImageStore
 from rights_filter.server.store_serialization import (
     _domain_evidence_from_ui,
@@ -32,6 +34,8 @@ from rights_filter.server.store_serialization import (
 )
 from rights_filter.server.store_text import _text_list, _unique_texts
 
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
 
 class StoreOperationsMixin:
     def promote_watchlist_entry(self, entry_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
@@ -228,15 +232,31 @@ class StoreOperationsMixin:
         }
         self._put("evidence", evidence["id"], {**evidence, "submission_id": submission_id})
 
-        if image_store is not None:
-            self._rerun_internal_analysis(submission_id, image_store)
-            google_evidence = self._rerun_google_image_search(submission_id, image_store)
-            query_source_evidence = [
-                *google_evidence,
-                *_submission_search_hint_evidence(submission),
-            ]
-            self._auto_naver_search(submission_id, query_source_evidence, image_store)
-            self._auto_google_custom_search(submission_id, query_source_evidence, image_store)
+        rerun_error = ""
+        try:
+            if image_store is not None:
+                self._rerun_internal_analysis(submission_id, image_store)
+                google_evidence = self._rerun_google_image_search(submission_id, image_store)
+                query_source_evidence = [
+                    *google_evidence,
+                    *_submission_search_hint_evidence(submission),
+                ]
+                self._auto_naver_search(submission_id, query_source_evidence, image_store)
+                self._auto_google_custom_search(submission_id, query_source_evidence, image_store)
+        except Exception as exc:
+            # A submission whose image file went missing (or any other enrichment
+            # failure) must not escape as an unhandled exception: the handler
+            # would close the connection with no response while this method has
+            # already written lastAnalysis and the "queued" marker, leaving the
+            # case permanently marked as re-analyzing. Record the failure, keep
+            # the rescore/return path intact, and let the marker cleanup below run.
+            rerun_error = str(exc) or exc.__class__.__name__
+            logger.exception("Rerun enrichment failed for submission %s", submission_id)
+        finally:
+            # The rerun is synchronous, so by the time we return there is nothing
+            # "queued" — drop the marker instead of accumulating one dead row per
+            # rerun (previously they piled up in the operator evidence list).
+            self._delete_evidence_by_id(evidence["id"])
 
         self._ensure_llm_summary(submission_id)
 
@@ -268,6 +288,7 @@ class StoreOperationsMixin:
         refreshed = self._get("submissions", submission_id)
         refreshed["lastRerunDiff"] = {
             "at": _now_label(),
+            "error": rerun_error,
             "scoreBefore": score_before,
             "scoreAfter": int(refreshed.get("riskScore", 0) or 0),
             "addedEvidenceIds": added_ids,
@@ -356,7 +377,18 @@ class StoreOperationsMixin:
                 item.source in {EvidenceSource.SEARCH_SKIPPED, EvidenceSource.ENRICHMENT_FAILURE}
                 for item in domain_evidence
             ):
-                provider_payload["lastFailure"] = domain_evidence[0].reason if domain_evidence else f"{provider} search failed"
+                # Report the reason of the item that actually failed. Indexing
+                # [0] picked whatever came first — usually a successful result —
+                # so the operator saw a success string labelled as the failure.
+                provider_payload["lastFailure"] = next(
+                    (
+                        item.reason
+                        for item in domain_evidence
+                        if item.source
+                        in {EvidenceSource.SEARCH_SKIPPED, EvidenceSource.ENRICHMENT_FAILURE}
+                    ),
+                    f"{provider} search failed",
+                )
             else:
                 provider_payload["lastSuccess"] = _now_label()
                 provider_payload["lastFailure"] = "없음"
@@ -403,6 +435,25 @@ class StoreOperationsMixin:
             submission_id,
             source_evidence,
         )
+        # Enforce the LLM-summary governance rule on the real persistence path.
+        # The policy existed but no production caller invoked it, so an
+        # ungrounded summary (no source URLs and no source evidence ids) could be
+        # stored and shown as if it were source-linked. A summary that fails the
+        # check is dropped rather than persisted.
+        if llm_evidence.source == EvidenceSource.LLM_SUMMARY:
+            try:
+                assert_operator_evidence_payload_allowed(
+                    DataClass.LLM_SUMMARY, llm_evidence.data
+                )
+            except ValueError as exc:
+                logger.warning(
+                    "Discarding ungrounded LLM summary for submission %s: %s",
+                    submission_id,
+                    exc,
+                )
+                llm_provider["lastFailure"] = f"LLM assistance failed: {exc}"
+                self._apply_provider_usage_delta("llm", 1, llm_provider)
+                return False
         self._delete_llm_summary_evidence(submission_id)
         self._put(
             "evidence",
@@ -417,6 +468,10 @@ class StoreOperationsMixin:
         self._apply_provider_usage_delta("llm", 1, llm_provider)
         return True
 
+    def _delete_evidence_by_id(self, evidence_id: str) -> None:
+        with self._connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute("delete from evidence where id = ?", (evidence_id,))
+
     def _delete_llm_summary_evidence(self, submission_id: str) -> None:
         with self._connect() as conn:
             conn.execute(
@@ -657,15 +712,42 @@ class StoreOperationsMixin:
             item.source in {EvidenceSource.SEARCH_SKIPPED, EvidenceSource.ENRICHMENT_FAILURE}
             for item in domain_evidence
         ):
-            provider_payload["lastFailure"] = domain_evidence[0].reason if domain_evidence else f"{provider} collection failed"
+            provider_payload["lastFailure"] = next(
+                (
+                    item.reason
+                    for item in domain_evidence
+                    if item.source
+                    in {EvidenceSource.SEARCH_SKIPPED, EvidenceSource.ENRICHMENT_FAILURE}
+                ),
+                f"{provider} collection failed",
+            )
         else:
             provider_payload["lastSuccess"] = _now_label()
             provider_payload["lastFailure"] = "없음"
 
+        # The cascade stages can surface the same candidate id more than once
+        # (e.g. an image result that also appears in the page sweep). Persisting
+        # is keyed by id, so counting every append reported more "collected"
+        # candidates than rows actually stored.
+        deduped_candidates = list({candidate["id"]: candidate for candidate in pending}.values())
+        collected = len(deduped_candidates)
+
+        # Every search was refused before it ran (quota/disabled provider), so we
+        # learned nothing. Wiping the previous collection here would destroy the
+        # operator's working set as punishment for exhausted quota.
+        if not deduped_candidates and provider_call_count == 0:
+            # Still persist why it was refused (zero delta merges lastFailure
+            # without charging quota) so the provider panel explains the no-op.
+            self._apply_provider_usage_delta(provider, 0, provider_payload)
+            payload = self.bootstrap()
+            payload["collected"] = 0
+            payload["collectionSkipped"] = True
+            return payload
+
         with self._write_lock:
             with self._transaction() as conn:
                 conn.execute("delete from collection_candidates")
-                for candidate in pending:
+                for candidate in deduped_candidates:
                     self._put("collection_candidates", candidate["id"], candidate, conn=conn)
                 self.add_audit_event(
                     "rights.ops",

src/rights_filter/server/store_serialization.py

@@ -186,6 +186,13 @@ def _evidence_matches_provider(evidence: dict[str, Any], provider_id: str) -> bo
     if provider_id == "naver":
         return source == "naver" or domain in {"naver", "naver_blog", "naver_web"}
     if provider_id == "google":
+        # Vision failure/skip rows serialize with source "failure", so matching on
+        # source == "google" alone left them unattributed: the badge showed "not
+        # run" for a provider that had actually failed, while the score still
+        # carried the failure reason. Rows written before the adapter tagged the
+        # provider fall back to domain "internal" and are matched by title.
+        if source == "failure" and domain == "google":
+            return True
         return source == "google" and domain != "google_custom_search"
     if provider_id == "google_search":
         return domain == "google_custom_search"
@@ -478,11 +485,29 @@ def _validate_payload(table: str, id_value: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> Non
         raise ValueError(f"{table} payload id does not match storage id")
 
 
+# A quota-skip (SEARCH_SKIPPED) or transient failure (ENRICHMENT_FAILURE) means
+# the query never actually executed / produced no evidence, so it must NOT enter
+# the dedup signature set — otherwise auto-search treats it as "already done" and
+# never retries it, even after quota resets or the network recovers. Genuine
+# "returned no results" rows keep their real provider source (naver/google) and
+# stay deduped correctly (they did run).
+_RETRYABLE_SKIP_DOMAIN_SOURCES = {
+    EvidenceSource.SEARCH_SKIPPED.value,
+    EvidenceSource.ENRICHMENT_FAILURE.value,
+}
+
+
+def _is_retryable_skip_evidence(item: dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
+    return str(item.get("domainSource", "")) in _RETRYABLE_SKIP_DOMAIN_SOURCES
+
+
 def _existing_naver_query_signatures(evidence: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> set[str]:
     return {
         str(item.get("querySignature") or _naver_query_signature(str(item.get("query", ""))))
         for item in evidence
-        if item.get("query") and item.get("source") in {"naver", "failure"}
+        if item.get("query")
+        and item.get("source") in {"naver", "failure"}
+        and not _is_retryable_skip_evidence(item)
     }
 
 
@@ -494,6 +519,7 @@ def _existing_google_custom_query_signatures(evidence: list[dict[str, Any]]) ->
         and item.get("source") in {"google", "failure"}
         and str(item.get("domain", "")) == "google_custom_search"
         and item.get("querySignature")
+        and not _is_retryable_skip_evidence(item)
     }
 
 

tests/rights_filter/admin/test_detailed_review_presenter.py

@@ -65,7 +65,10 @@ def test_detailed_review_groups_operator_evidence_and_actions():
     assert len(review["evidence_groups"]["naver"]) == 1
     assert len(review["evidence_groups"]["google"]) == 1
     assert len(review["evidence_groups"]["llm"]) == 1
-    assert len(review["evidence_groups"]["failures"]) == 1
+    # A provider that was skipped by policy is operational status, not an error:
+    # it must not be presented alongside genuine failures.
+    assert len(review["evidence_groups"]["skipped"]) == 1
+    assert "failures" not in review["evidence_groups"]
 
 
 def test_missing_analysis_returns_unavailable_review_model():

tests/rights_filter/server/test_image_store.py

@@ -101,7 +101,16 @@ def test_local_image_store_skips_manifest_records_with_missing_files(tmp_path: P
     assert [record["id"] for record in records] == ["copied"]
 
 
-def test_local_image_store_rejects_manifest_paths_outside_root(tmp_path: Path):
+def test_local_image_store_skips_manifest_paths_outside_root_without_losing_valid_records(
+    tmp_path: Path,
+):
+    # An out-of-root path must never be surfaced as a submission, but it also must
+    # not abort the whole listing: a single malformed manifest row previously
+    # raised ValueError and paralyzed loading/re-analysis for the entire queue.
+    image_dir = tmp_path / "images"
+    image_dir.mkdir()
+    (image_dir / "good.svg").write_text("<svg></svg>", encoding="utf-8")
+    (tmp_path.parent / "secret.svg").write_text("<svg>secret</svg>", encoding="utf-8")
     (tmp_path / "submissions.json").write_text(
         """
         [
@@ -111,17 +120,22 @@ def test_local_image_store_rejects_manifest_paths_outside_root(tmp_path: Path):
             "file": "../secret.svg",
             "width": 100,
             "height": 100
+          },
+          {
+            "id": "SUB-GOOD",
+            "title": "Good sample",
+            "file": "images/good.svg",
+            "width": 640,
+            "height": 480
           }
         ]
         """,
         encoding="utf-8",
     )
 
-    store = LocalSubmissionImageStore(tmp_path)
+    records = LocalSubmissionImageStore(tmp_path).submission_records()
 
-    try:
-        store.submission_records()
-    except ValueError as exc:
-        assert "outside image store" in str(exc)
-    else:
-        raise AssertionError("expected unsafe manifest path to be rejected")
+    ids = [record["id"] for record in records]
+    assert "SUB-BAD" not in ids
+    assert "SUB-GOOD" in ids
+    assert all("secret" not in str(record["file"]) for record in records)

tests/rights_filter/test_2026_07_24_review_fixes.py

@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+"""Regression tests for the 2026-07-24 multi-agent review remediation.
+
+One test per confirmed finding, named after the behaviour it locks in.
+"""
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from rights_filter.analysis.fingerprints import FingerprintService
+from rights_filter.analysis.risk_scoring import RiskScorer
+from rights_filter.analysis.search_result_promoter import SearchResultPromoter
+from rights_filter.domain.records import Evidence, EvidenceSource
+from rights_filter.integrations.external_policy import ExternalApiPolicy
+from rights_filter.server.env_file import load_env_file
+from rights_filter.server.image_store import LocalSubmissionImageStore
+from rights_filter.server.store_serialization import (
+    _domain_evidence_from_ui,
+    _evidence_matches_provider,
+    _evidence_payload,
+    _existing_naver_query_signatures,
+)
+
+
+# --- H1: an OpenCV build without CascadeClassifier must not crash analysis ----
+
+
+def test_face_detection_degrades_when_opencv_lacks_cascade_classifier(monkeypatch):
+    import rights_filter.analysis.face_person_detection as detection
+
+    class _Cv2WithoutCascades:
+        IMREAD_COLOR = 1
+        COLOR_BGR2GRAY = 6
+
+        def imdecode(self, *_args):
+            return [[0]]
+
+        def cvtColor(self, *_args):
+            return [[0]]
+
+    monkeypatch.setitem(__import__("sys").modules, "cv2", _Cv2WithoutCascades())
+    detection._warned_missing_cascade = False
+
+    signal = detection.HeuristicFacePersonDetector()._detect_with_opencv(b"bytes")
+
+    assert signal.face_count == 0
+    assert signal.present is False
+
+
+def test_batch_analyzer_isolates_an_unexpected_per_submission_failure():
+    from rights_filter.analysis.preprocessing import ImagePayload
+    from rights_filter.domain.records import InMemoryRightsFilterRepository
+    from rights_filter.integrations.cloud_vision_web_detection import (
+        CloudVisionWebDetectionAdapter,
+        FakeWebDetectionClient,
+    )
+    from rights_filter.jobs.batch_analyzer import BatchAnalyzer, SubmissionImage
+
+    class _ExplodingAnalyzer:
+        def analyze(self, submission_id, image):
+            if submission_id == "BAD":
+                raise AttributeError("module 'cv2' has no attribute 'CascadeClassifier'")
+            return []
+
+    batch = BatchAnalyzer(
+        repository=InMemoryRightsFilterRepository(),
+        internal_analyzer=_ExplodingAnalyzer(),
+        external_adapter=CloudVisionWebDetectionAdapter(FakeWebDetectionClient()),
+        external_policy=ExternalApiPolicy(disabled=True),
+        scorer=RiskScorer(),
+    )
+    image = ImagePayload(content=b"x", width=10, height=10, metadata={})
+
+    summary = batch.run(
+        [SubmissionImage("BAD", image), SubmissionImage("GOOD", image)]
+    )
+
+    # The bad submission is counted, and the good one still gets analysed.
+    assert summary.failed == 1
+    assert summary.processed == 1
+
+
+# --- H2: the persistence round-trip must not invent risk points --------------
+
+
+def test_custom_image_search_result_scores_the_same_before_and_after_round_trip():
+    fresh = Evidence(
+        source=EvidenceSource.WEB_DETECTION,
+        reason="Google custom image search result found",
+        confidence=0.45,
+        data={
+            "submission_id": "SUB-1",
+            "provider": "google_custom_search",
+            "search_type": "image",
+            "query": "test",
+            "result_url": "https://example.test/page",
+            "match": "search_image",
+        },
+    )
+    scorer = RiskScorer()
+
+    before = scorer.score([fresh]).score
+    restored = _domain_evidence_from_ui(_evidence_payload("SUB-1", fresh))
+    after = scorer.score([restored]).score
+
+    assert before == 0
+    assert after == before
+
+
+# --- H3: a quota-skipped query must stay retryable ---------------------------
+
+
+def test_quota_skipped_query_is_not_registered_as_already_searched():
+    skipped = Evidence(
+        source=EvidenceSource.SEARCH_SKIPPED,
+        reason="search API usage limit reached",
+        confidence=1.0,
+        data={
+            "submission_id": "SUB-1",
+            "provider": "naver",
+            "query": "IU album",
+            "query_signature": "naver:iu album",
+        },
+    )
+    executed = Evidence(
+        source=EvidenceSource.NAVER_SEARCH,
+        reason="Naver search returned no results",
+        confidence=0.0,
+        data={
+            "submission_id": "SUB-1",
+            "provider": "naver",
+            "query": "other query",
+            "query_signature": "naver:other query",
+        },
+    )
+    payloads = [
+        _evidence_payload("SUB-1", skipped),
+        _evidence_payload("SUB-1", executed),
+    ]
+
+    signatures = _existing_naver_query_signatures(payloads)
+
+    assert "naver:iu album" not in signatures
+    # A query that DID run (even with zero results) stays deduped.
+    assert "naver:other query" in signatures
+
+
+# --- H5: the external daily limit must re-window each day --------------------
+
+
+def test_external_policy_resets_its_daily_budget_on_a_new_day():
+    policy = ExternalApiPolicy(
+        compliance_approved=True,
+        metadata_logging_accepted=True,
+        allow_online_sync=True,
+        daily_limit=1,
+    )
+
+    policy.record_call()
+    assert policy.can_call()[0] is False
+
+    policy.window_day = "2000-01-01"  # simulate the calendar day rolling over
+    assert policy.can_call()[0] is True
+
+
+# --- H6: one malformed manifest row must not paralyse the queue --------------
+
+
+def test_manifest_with_a_bad_row_still_lists_the_valid_submissions(tmp_path: Path):
+    (tmp_path / "images").mkdir()
+    (tmp_path / "images" / "ok.svg").write_text("<svg></svg>", encoding="utf-8")
+    (tmp_path / "submissions.json").write_text(
+        '[{"id":"BAD","file":"../outside.svg","width":1,"height":1},'
+        '{"id":"OK","file":"images/ok.svg","width":1,"height":1}]',
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+
+    records = LocalSubmissionImageStore(tmp_path).submission_records()
+
+    assert [record["id"] for record in records] == ["OK"]
+
+
+def test_non_numeric_manifest_dimensions_do_not_raise(tmp_path: Path):
+    (tmp_path / "images").mkdir()
+    (tmp_path / "images" / "ok.svg").write_text("<svg></svg>", encoding="utf-8")
+    (tmp_path / "submissions.json").write_text(
+        '[{"id":"OK","file":"images/ok.svg","width":"wide","height":null}]',
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+
+    payload = LocalSubmissionImageStore(tmp_path).image_payload("OK")
+
+    assert payload.width == 1
+    assert payload.height == 1
+
+
+# --- MEDIUM/LOW --------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_vision_failure_is_attributed_to_the_google_provider():
+    failure = Evidence(
+        source=EvidenceSource.FAILURE,
+        reason="External API failed: timeout",
+        confidence=1.0,
+        data={"submission_id": "SUB-1", "provider": "google"},
+    )
+
+    payload = _evidence_payload("SUB-1", failure)
+
+    assert _evidence_matches_provider(payload, "google") is True
+
+
+def test_face_person_evidence_counts_once_however_many_rows_exist():
+    rows = [
+        Evidence(
+            source=EvidenceSource.FACE_PERSON,
+            reason="Face or person detected",
+            confidence=1.0,
+            data={"submission_id": "SUB-1"},
+        )
+        for _ in range(3)
+    ]
+
+    assert RiskScorer().score(rows).score == 35
+
+
+def test_degenerate_perceptual_hashes_do_not_produce_a_near_match():
+    service = FingerprintService()
+    # Two "blank image" hashes differing by one bit: 0.98 similarity under a raw
+    # Hamming comparison, which used to register as a knowledge-base match.
+    assert service.similarity("phash:ffffffffffffffff", "phash:fffffffffffffffe") == 0.0
+    # Identical fingerprints still match, and informative hashes still compare.
+    assert service.similarity("phash:ffffffffffffffff", "phash:ffffffffffffffff") == 1.0
+    assert service.similarity("phash:0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f", "phash:0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f") == 1.0
+
+
+def test_promoter_ignores_marker_words_that_only_appear_in_the_url():
+    promoter = SearchResultPromoter()
+    item = Evidence(
+        source=EvidenceSource.NAVER_SEARCH,
+        reason="Naver search result found",
+        confidence=0.5,
+        data={
+            "submission_id": "SUB-1",
+            "title": "동네 산책 사진",
+            "description": "주말 나들이 기록",
+            "result_url": "https://cdn.example.test/game/album/cover/img.jpg",
+        },
+    )
+
+    promoted = promoter.promote([item])[0]
+
+    assert promoted.data["promoted"] is False
+
+
+def test_env_file_strips_a_trailing_inline_comment(tmp_path: Path):
+    env_path = tmp_path / ".env"
+    env_path.write_text(
+        'COPYRIGHTER_AUTH_TOKEN=abc123 # staging key\nQUOTED="keep # this"\n',
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    environ: dict[str, str] = {}
+
+    load_env_file(env_path, environ)
+
+    assert environ["COPYRIGHTER_AUTH_TOKEN"] == "abc123"
+    assert environ["QUOTED"] == "keep # this"
+
+
+def test_search_policy_reservation_is_atomic_and_refundable():
+    from rights_filter.integrations.search_policy import SearchApiPolicy
+
+    policy = SearchApiPolicy(
+        compliance_approved=True, allowed_providers={"naver"}, daily_limit=1
+    )
+
+    assert policy.try_reserve("naver")[0] is True
+    # The budget is consumed at reservation time, so a racing caller is refused.
+    assert policy.try_reserve("naver")[0] is False
+
+    policy.release()
+    assert policy.try_reserve("naver")[0] is True
+
+
+def test_rejected_image_knowledge_entry_is_reused_across_repeat_rejections():
+    from rights_filter.domain.records import InMemoryRightsFilterRepository
+
+    repository = InMemoryRightsFilterRepository()
+
+    first = repository.create_rejected_image_entry("dec-1", "SUB-1", ["phash:aaaa"])
+    second = repository.create_rejected_image_entry("dec-2", "SUB-1", ["phash:bbbb"])
+
+    assert first.id == second.id
+    assert second.source_decision_id == "dec-2"
+    assert set(second.sample_fingerprints) == {"phash:aaaa", "phash:bbbb"}
+
+
+def test_manual_knowledge_registration_rejects_unknown_fields():
+    from rights_filter.admin.knowledge_base_handlers import register_manual_entry
+    from rights_filter.domain.records import (
+        InMemoryRightsFilterRepository,
+        KnowledgeEntryType,
+    )
+
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="unsupported"):
+        register_manual_entry(
+            InMemoryRightsFilterRepository(),
+            KnowledgeEntryType.CELEBRITY,
+            "name",
+            surprise="dropped silently before",
+        )