.gitattributes

@@ -4,13 +4,3 @@
 *.sh text eol=lf
 *.service text eol=lf
 move-detect-edge.env.example text eol=lf
-
-# The cafe24 package is assembled on Windows but unpacked onto Linux hosting. A CRLF
-# .htaccess makes Apache read directives with a trailing \r; PHP/JS tolerate CRLF but there
-# is no reason to ship it. Normalize everything the package carries.
-*.php text eol=lf
-*.js text eol=lf
-*.css text eol=lf
-*.sql text eol=lf
-*.md text eol=lf
-htaccess.* text eol=lf

.gitignore

@@ -12,12 +12,7 @@ dist/
 # Edge runtime artifacts
 *.db
 *.hef
-# Root-anchored on purpose. A bare `snapshots/` matches at EVERY depth, which swallowed
+snapshots/
-# cloud/storage/snapshots/ — and since git cannot re-include a file whose parent directory
-# is excluded, it silently killed cloud/.gitignore's `!/storage/snapshots/.gitkeep`. The
-# edge never writes a snapshots directory anyway: they stay in memory and are base64'd into
-# the queue db or POSTed (edge/queue.py, edge/alert.py).
-/snapshots/
 queue.db
 
 # Secrets / local config
@@ -30,6 +25,3 @@ Thumbs.db
 
 # Tool caches
 .impeccable/
-
-# Pi provisioning (real device secret) — never commit
-deploy/device.env

cloud/.gitignore

@@ -2,4 +2,3 @@
 /config.php
 /storage/snapshots/*
 !/storage/snapshots/.gitkeep
-/.phpunit.result.cache

cloud/composer.json

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 {
-  "name": "move-detect/server",
+  "name": "move-detect/cloud",
   "type": "project",
   "require": { "php": ">=8.2" },
   "require-dev": { "phpunit/phpunit": "^11" },

cloud/config.example.php

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+<?php
+return [
+    'db_dsn'  => 'mysql:host=localhost;dbname=move_detect;charset=utf8mb4',
+    'db_user' => 'CHANGEME',
+    'db_pass' => 'CHANGEME',
+    'snapshot_dir' => __DIR__ . '/storage/snapshots',
+    'timestamp_window' => 300,
+    'rate_limit_per_min' => 60,
+];

cloud/docs/cloud-deploy.md

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
-# Cafe24 Server Deploy Guide (P1-B)
+# Cafe24 Cloud Deploy Guide (P1-B)
 
-This document covers deploying the `server/` PHP application (ingest API + dashboard) to a
+This document covers deploying the `cloud/` PHP application (ingest API + dashboard) to a
 Cafe24 shared/managed PHP hosting plan. The application has **zero runtime Composer
 dependencies** (PHPUnit is dev-only) and speaks to MySQL exclusively through `PDO` with
 prepared statements — there is nothing to `composer install` on the production host.
 
 ## 1. Directory layout on the server
 
-Only `server/public/` may be reachable from the web. Everything else must sit **outside**
+Only `cloud/public/` may be reachable from the web. Everything else must sit **outside**
 the web root (one level up, or wherever your Cafe24 plan's "web root" / "html" folder is),
 or be blocked by hosting-level access rules if your plan cannot place files outside the
 web root at all.
@@ -15,73 +15,38 @@ web root at all.
 ```
 /home/<account>/                <- NOT web-reachable
 ├── src/                        <- App\ classes (App\Db, App\Repository\Pdo, ...)
-├── vendor/                     <- Composer's generated autoloader ONLY (see below)
 ├── storage/
 │   └── snapshots/               <- re-encoded JPEGs; must be writable by the PHP process
 ├── config.php                  <- copied from config.example.php, secrets filled in (see §3)
 ├── schema.sql                  <- only needed transiently for the phpMyAdmin import (§4);
 │                                    delete it from the server afterwards
-└── public/                     <- web root. On Cafe24 it is named `www`; when that `www`
+└── public/                     <- web root ("html" folder in Cafe24's control panel)
-    ├── index.php                  already serves another site the app is mounted in a
+    ├── index.php
-    ├── .htaccess                  subdirectory (`www/move_detect/`) and the entries above
+    ├── .htaccess
-    └── assets/                    sit at the FTP root — see below.
+    └── assets/
 ```
 
-`server/public/index.php` finds `config.php`, `src/`, and `vendor/` by **walking up** from
+`cloud/public/index.php` resolves its dependencies as `__DIR__ . '/../config.php'`,
-itself until it sees both `config.php` and `vendor/autoload.php` (max 4 levels). It does not
+`__DIR__ . '/../src/View/...'`, etc. — so `src/`, `config.php`, and `storage/` must be
-hardcode `/..`, so the same tree works whether the app owns the web root or is mounted in a
+exactly one directory above `public/`, matching the layout above.
-subdirectory of one — in the latter case the app root is two levels up, not one, because
-nothing secret may sit under a docroot the other site also serves.
 
-The URL prefix comes from `SCRIPT_NAME` (`App\Http\Request::baseFrom()`), which the web
+**Do not upload `vendor/`.** It contains only `phpunit` and its dev dependencies (see
-server sets — never from client input. `Request::pathFor()` strips it before routing, and
+`cloud/composer.json` — `require-dev` only, `require` has no packages beyond the `php`
-views/JS prefix every link with it (`view_url()` / `window.APP_BASE`). Without that, routes
+version constraint). Shipping it would put a large, unused, occasionally-vulnerable
-declared as `/login` would 404 under `https://host/move_detect/login` and every asset would
+dependency tree on a production box for no benefit; leave it off the transfer entirely.
-resolve against the co-hosted site.
 
-`server/deploy/build_cafe24_package.sh` emits `www/move_detect/` by default; set `APP_DIR=`
+If your Cafe24 plan cannot place folders outside the web root, upload `src/`, `storage/`,
-(empty) to mount the app directly in `www/`.
+and `config.php` into `public/` but add explicit deny rules for them in
-
+`public/.htaccess` (e.g. `RewriteRule ^(src|storage)/ - [F]` and
-**`vendor/` must ship — but only the autoloader.** `public/index.php:3` is an unconditional
+`RewriteRule ^config\.php$ - [F]`, placed **before** the existing rewrite-to-index rule) —
-`require __DIR__ . '/../vendor/autoload.php'`, so a transfer without `vendor/` fatals on
+placing them outside the web root is strongly preferred and should be the default choice.
-every request, including §10's own smoke check. There are no runtime Composer *packages*
-(`composer.lock`'s `packages` is empty), but the app does need Composer's generated
-autoloader to map `App\` → `src/`. Generate the no-dev one on the build machine:
-
-```bash
-cd server && composer dump-autoload --no-dev --classmap-authoritative --no-interaction
-```
-
-That emits ~8 files (~30 KB): `vendor/autoload.php` plus `vendor/composer/*.php`. Copy
-exactly those. Do **not** upload the working tree's `vendor/` as-is — it carries PHPUnit
-and a dev `autoload_files.php` that eagerly `require`s
-`tests/Support/InMemoryRepositories.php` on every request, a file this deployment
-deliberately excludes.
-
-`--classmap-authoritative` is not optional: `src/Auth/Session.php` declares three symbols
-(`SessionStore`, `ArraySessionStore`, `PhpSessionStore`) under a filename matching none of
-them — which is why `composer.json` carries an explicit `classmap` entry for it. Plain
-PSR-4 would look for `src/Auth/PhpSessionStore.php`, miss, and fatal at `index.php:19`.
-
-`server/deploy/build_cafe24_package.sh` does all of this, verifies it, and lays out the
-tree below automatically — prefer it over assembling the transfer by hand.
-
-If your Cafe24 plan cannot place folders outside the web root, **stop — this layout is
-unsupported, and the obvious workaround does not work.** `public/index.php` resolves
-`../vendor/autoload.php` (line 3), `../config.php` (line 17), and `../src/View/` (line 43)
-relative to itself, so moving those *into* `public/` puts them exactly where those three
-`require`s do not look: every request fatals. Making it work needs source changes to
-`index.php`'s path resolution plus deny rules for `src/`, `vendor/`, `storage/` **and**
-`config.php` — not deny rules alone. Raise it before deploying rather than improvising:
-`config.php` holds the DB password, and a half-applied version of this is how it ends up
-web-readable.
 
 ## 2. Host prerequisites — verify before importing data
 
 Check these on the actual Cafe24 PHP build (a `phpinfo()` page or `php -m` / `php -v` over
 SSH if available) — do not assume, since PHP builds vary by hosting plan:
 
-- [ ] **PHP version** matches `server/composer.json`'s `"php": ">=8.2"` (the app is written
+- [ ] **PHP version** matches `cloud/composer.json`'s `"php": ">=8.2"` (the app is written
       and tested against PHP 8.5; anything ≥ 8.2 should run it, but confirm the exact
       version Cafe24 provisions for your plan).
 - [ ] **`pdo_mysql`** extension is enabled (`PDO::getAvailableDrivers()` must include
@@ -112,7 +77,7 @@ SSH if available) — do not assume, since PHP builds vary by hosting plan:
 ## 3. `config.php`
 
 Copy the example and fill in real values — **never commit `config.php`** (already covered
-by `server/.gitignore`):
+by `cloud/.gitignore`):
 
 ```bash
 cp config.example.php config.php
@@ -139,7 +104,7 @@ or version control.
 
 ## 4. Import the schema
 
-`server/schema.sql` contains the full MySQL 8.0+ DDL (`users`, `devices`, `cameras`, `zones`,
+`cloud/schema.sql` contains the full MySQL 8.0+ DDL (`users`, `devices`, `cameras`, `zones`,
 `events`, `event_snapshots`, `thresholds`, `nonces`, `rate_limits`, `audit_log`).
 
 1. Open **phpMyAdmin** from the Cafe24 control panel, select the database created for this
@@ -151,19 +116,12 @@ or version control.
    on the host afterwards, and leaving DDL lying around outside the web root is unnecessary
    attack surface for no benefit.
 
-**Minimum version — MySQL 8.0.13+ (or MariaDB 10.2+).** Several tables use an expression
+If your Cafe24 MySQL version predates 8.0.16, the `CHECK (...)` constraints in the DDL
-default `... DEFAULT (UNIX_TIMESTAMP())` (e.g. `move_nonces`, `move_audit_log`), which is a
+(on `role`, `event_type`, `severity`, `level`) will be parsed but silently not enforced —
-hard syntax requirement: MySQL added function/expression defaults in **8.0.13**, and on an
+harmless, since the application already whitelists these values before every insert
-older server the very first such `CREATE TABLE` fails the import with `ERROR 1064` — a day-1
-blocker, not a silent degradation. **Check the version in the Cafe24 hosting control panel
-(or `SELECT VERSION();`) before importing.** If the account only offers MySQL 5.7, either
-request an 8.0 database or replace each `DEFAULT (UNIX_TIMESTAMP())` with an application-supplied
-timestamp (the code already passes one on every insert).
-
-Separately, if your MySQL version predates 8.0.16, the `CHECK (...)` constraints in the DDL
-(on `role`, `event_type`, `severity`, `level`) are parsed but silently not enforced — harmless,
-since the application already whitelists these values before every insert
 (`App\Ingest\EventValidator`, `App\Auth\Rbac`, `App\Dashboard\ZoneConfigController::LEVELS`).
+Everything else in the schema (tables, keys, indexes, `JSON` columns) requires only
+MySQL 5.7+.
 
 ## 5. Storage directory
 
@@ -195,14 +153,14 @@ php -r "echo bin2hex(random_bytes(32)), \"\n\";"
 ```
 
 ```sql
-INSERT INTO move_devices (device_id, name, secret, config_version)
+INSERT INTO devices (device_id, name, secret, config_version)
 VALUES ('pi-01', 'Line 3 — Fall Cam', '<paste the generated secret here>', 1);
 ```
 
 Deliver the secret to the device provisioning process out-of-band (not email/chat) and
 configure it as the device's `HMAC` signing key for `X-Signature` on
 `/api/events`, `/api/heartbeat`, and `/api/config`. Rotate a compromised secret by
-`UPDATE move_devices SET secret = ? WHERE device_id = ?` with a freshly generated value — the
+`UPDATE devices SET secret = ? WHERE device_id = ?` with a freshly generated value — the
 old value stops working immediately since `secretFor()` always reads the current row.
 
 ## 7. First admin account
@@ -222,7 +180,7 @@ php -r "echo password_hash('CHANGE-ME-to-a-real-passphrase', PASSWORD_ARGON2ID),
 `PASSWORD_ARGON2ID`.)
 
 ```sql
-INSERT INTO move_users (username, password_hash, role, site_scope, failed_attempts, locked_until)
+INSERT INTO users (username, password_hash, role, site_scope, failed_attempts, locked_until)
 VALUES ('admin', '<paste the argon2id hash here>', 'admin', NULL, 0, 0);
 ```
 

cloud/public/assets/app.css

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+/* Base layout ------------------------------------------------------- */
+:root {
+  color-scheme: light;
+  --border: #d1d5db;
+  --text: #1f2937;
+}
+* { box-sizing: border-box; }
+body {
+  margin: 0;
+  font-family: system-ui, -apple-system, "Segoe UI", sans-serif;
+  color: var(--text);
+  background: #f9fafb;
+}
+.app-header {
+  display: flex;
+  justify-content: space-between;
+  align-items: center;
+  padding: 0.75rem 1rem;
+  background: #111827;
+  color: #fff;
+}
+.app-nav a { color: #fff; margin-right: 1rem; text-decoration: none; }
+.app-nav a:hover, .app-nav a:focus { text-decoration: underline; }
+.app-session { display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 0.5rem; }
+.app-session a { color: #fff; }
+.app-main { padding: 1rem; max-width: 960px; margin: 0 auto; }
+
+.login-form, .zone-controls { display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 0.5rem; max-width: 320px; }
+.zone-controls { flex-direction: row; align-items: end; flex-wrap: wrap; max-width: none; }
+.zone-controls label { display: flex; flex-direction: column; font-size: 0.85rem; }
+.form-error { color: #991b1b; }
+
+#zone-canvas {
+  border: 1px solid var(--border);
+  background: #111827 center / contain no-repeat;
+  cursor: crosshair;
+  max-width: 100%;
+}
+
+button {
+  cursor: pointer;
+  padding: 0.4rem 0.8rem;
+  border: 1px solid var(--border);
+  border-radius: 4px;
+  background: #fff;
+}
+button:hover { background: #f3f4f6; }
+
+/* Event list ---------------------------------------------------------- */
+.event-row {
+  display: flex;
+  align-items: center;
+  gap: 0.75rem;
+  padding: 0.6rem 0.75rem;
+  border: 1px solid var(--border);
+  border-radius: 6px;
+  margin-bottom: 0.5rem;
+  background: #fff;
+}
+.event-row.is-unacknowledged { border-left: 4px solid #4b5563; }
+.event-meta { flex: 1; }
+.event-meta .event-type { font-weight: 600; }
+.event-meta .event-time { color: #4b5563; font-size: 0.85rem; }
+
+/* Severity badges (NF9): color-blind-safe — icon + text label + color.
+   Never rely on color alone. Pastel background + dark text pairs are
+   chosen for WCAG-AA contrast (>= 4.5:1 for normal-size text). */
+.severity-badge {
+  display: inline-flex;
+  align-items: center;
+  gap: 0.35rem;
+  padding: 0.15rem 0.5rem;
+  border-radius: 999px;
+  font-weight: 700;
+  font-size: 0.85rem;
+  white-space: nowrap;
+}
+.severity-badge .icon { font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1; }
+
+.sev-critical { background: #fee2e2; color: #991b1b; border: 1px solid #991b1b; }
+.sev-high     { background: #ffedd5; color: #9a3412; border: 1px solid #9a3412; }
+.sev-warning  { background: #fef9c3; color: #854d0e; border: 1px solid #854d0e; }
+.sev-info     { background: #e5e7eb; color: #374151; border: 1px solid #374151; }
+
+.ack-btn { margin-left: auto; }
+.ack-btn:disabled { opacity: 0.6; cursor: default; }
+
+/* Dashboard row -> incident detail link (keyboard-focusable affordance). */
+.event-detail-link { color: inherit; text-decoration: none; }
+.event-detail-link:hover,
+.event-detail-link:focus-visible { text-decoration: underline; }
+
+/* Incident detail view (event_detail.php + detail.js). */
+.detail-row { margin: 0.25rem 0; }
+.detail-row .detail-label { color: #4b5563; font-weight: 600; }
+#event-detail-snapshots { display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap; gap: 0.75rem; margin-top: 1rem; }
+.detail-snapshot { max-width: 100%; height: auto; border: 1px solid #d1d5db; border-radius: 4px; }

cloud/public/assets/app.js

@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+/**
+ * Events dashboard: polls GET /api/events every 5s, renders the list with
+ * severity text+icon+color (never color alone, per NF9), pins unacknowledged
+ * events to the top, and wires the acknowledge button to POST /events/{id}/ack.
+ *
+ * XSS-safe: all dynamic values are set via textContent, never innerHTML.
+ */
+(function () {
+  'use strict';
+
+  var POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 5000;
+
+  var SEVERITY_LABELS = {
+    critical: { icon: '⛔', text: '위급', cls: 'sev-critical' }, // ⛔
+    high:     { icon: '⚠', text: '높음', cls: 'sev-high' },     // ⚠
+    warning:  { icon: '△', text: '경고', cls: 'sev-warning' },  // △
+    info:     { icon: 'ℹ', text: '정보', cls: 'sev-info' }      // ℹ
+  };
+
+  var root = document.getElementById('events-root');
+  if (!root) return;
+
+  var csrfToken = null;
+  function loadCsrfToken() {
+    return fetch('/api/csrf', { headers: { Accept: 'application/json' } })
+      .then(function (res) { return res.ok ? res.json() : null; })
+      .then(function (data) { if (data && data.token) csrfToken = data.token; })
+      .catch(function () { /* ack will fail with 403 and re-enable the button */ });
+  }
+
+  function severityInfo(sev) {
+    return SEVERITY_LABELS[sev] || { icon: 'ℹ', text: sev || '알수없음', cls: 'sev-info' };
+  }
+
+  function formatTime(occurredAt) {
+    if (!occurredAt && occurredAt !== 0) return '';
+    var d = new Date(Number(occurredAt) * 1000);
+    if (isNaN(d.getTime())) return '';
+    return d.toLocaleString('ko-KR');
+  }
+
+  function buildBadge(sev) {
+    var info = severityInfo(sev);
+    var badge = document.createElement('span');
+    badge.className = 'severity-badge ' + info.cls;
+    var icon = document.createElement('span');
+    icon.className = 'icon';
+    icon.setAttribute('aria-hidden', 'true');
+    icon.textContent = info.icon;
+    var label = document.createElement('span');
+    label.className = 'label';
+    label.textContent = info.text;
+    badge.appendChild(icon);
+    badge.appendChild(label);
+    return badge;
+  }
+
+  // --- desk audio alert: repeating beep while any unacknowledged critical exists ---
+  // No binary asset (air-gapped friendly): a WebAudio oscillator tone. The browser
+  // blocks audio until a user gesture, so the context is created on first click.
+  var audioCtx = null;
+  var alarmTimer = null;
+  var beepedCritical = {}; // event_id -> true; each new critical beeps once immediately
+
+  function unlockAudio() {
+    if (!audioCtx) {
+      var AC = window.AudioContext || window.webkitAudioContext;
+      if (AC) audioCtx = new AC();
+    }
+    document.removeEventListener('click', unlockAudio);
+  }
+
+  function beep() {
+    if (!audioCtx) return;
+    try {
+      var osc = audioCtx.createOscillator();
+      var gain = audioCtx.createGain();
+      osc.type = 'sine';
+      osc.frequency.value = 880;
+      gain.gain.value = 0.2;
+      osc.connect(gain);
+      gain.connect(audioCtx.destination);
+      osc.start();
+      osc.stop(audioCtx.currentTime + 0.4);
+    } catch (e) {
+      // audio unavailable; the visual list still surfaces the critical event
+    }
+  }
+
+  function updateAlarm(events) {
+    var hasUnackedCritical = false;
+    events.forEach(function (ev) {
+      var acked = ev.acknowledged_by !== null && ev.acknowledged_by !== undefined && ev.acknowledged_by !== '';
+      if (ev.severity === 'critical' && !acked) {
+        hasUnackedCritical = true;
+        if (!beepedCritical[ev.event_id]) { beepedCritical[ev.event_id] = true; beep(); }
+      }
+    });
+    if (hasUnackedCritical && !alarmTimer) {
+      alarmTimer = setInterval(beep, 3000);
+    } else if (!hasUnackedCritical && alarmTimer) {
+      clearInterval(alarmTimer);
+      alarmTimer = null;
+    }
+  }
+
+  function buildRow(ev) {
+    var isAcked = ev.acknowledged_by !== null && ev.acknowledged_by !== undefined && ev.acknowledged_by !== '';
+
+    var row = document.createElement('div');
+    row.className = 'event-row' + (isAcked ? '' : ' is-unacknowledged');
+
+    row.appendChild(buildBadge(ev.severity));
+
+    var meta = document.createElement('div');
+    meta.className = 'event-meta';
+
+    var type = document.createElement('div');
+    type.className = 'event-type';
+    var typeLink = document.createElement('a');
+    typeLink.className = 'event-detail-link';
+    typeLink.href = '/events/' + encodeURIComponent(ev.event_id) + '/view';
+    typeLink.textContent = String(ev.event_type || '');
+    type.appendChild(typeLink);
+    meta.appendChild(type);
+
+    var sub = document.createElement('div');
+    sub.className = 'event-time';
+    var cam = ev.camera_id ? String(ev.camera_id) : '';
+    var time = formatTime(ev.occurred_at);
+    sub.textContent = [cam, time].filter(Boolean).join(' · ');
+    meta.appendChild(sub);
+
+    row.appendChild(meta);
+
+    var btn = document.createElement('button');
+    btn.type = 'button';
+    btn.className = 'ack-btn';
+    if (isAcked) {
+      btn.textContent = '확인됨 (' + String(ev.acknowledged_by) + ')';
+      btn.disabled = true;
+    } else {
+      btn.textContent = '확인';
+      btn.addEventListener('click', function () { acknowledge(ev.event_id, btn); });
+    }
+    row.appendChild(btn);
+
+    return row;
+  }
+
+  function acknowledge(eventId, btn) {
+    btn.disabled = true;
+    fetch('/events/' + encodeURIComponent(eventId) + '/ack', {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { 'X-Csrf-Token': csrfToken || '' }
+    })
+      .then(function (res) {
+        if (!res.ok) throw new Error('ack_failed:' + res.status);
+        return loadEvents();
+      })
+      .catch(function () {
+        btn.disabled = false;
+      });
+  }
+
+  function render(events) {
+    var sorted = events.slice().sort(function (a, b) {
+      var aAcked = a.acknowledged_by !== null && a.acknowledged_by !== undefined && a.acknowledged_by !== '';
+      var bAcked = b.acknowledged_by !== null && b.acknowledged_by !== undefined && b.acknowledged_by !== '';
+      if (aAcked === bAcked) return 0;
+      return aAcked ? 1 : -1; // unacknowledged first
+    });
+
+    updateAlarm(sorted); // before any early return, so an emptied list also silences the alarm
+
+    root.textContent = '';
+    root.removeAttribute('aria-busy');
+    if (sorted.length === 0) {
+      root.textContent = '표시할 이벤트가 없습니다.';
+      return;
+    }
+    var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();
+    sorted.forEach(function (ev) { frag.appendChild(buildRow(ev)); });
+    root.appendChild(frag);
+  }
+
+  function loadEvents() {
+    return fetch('/api/events', { headers: { Accept: 'application/json' } })
+      .then(function (res) {
+        if (res.status === 401) {
+          window.location.href = '/login';
+          return null;
+        }
+        if (!res.ok) throw new Error('list_failed:' + res.status);
+        return res.json();
+      })
+      .then(function (data) {
+        if (data && Array.isArray(data.events)) render(data.events);
+      })
+      .catch(function () {
+        // Leave the last rendered state on transient poll failure.
+      });
+  }
+
+  var logoutBtn = document.getElementById('logout-btn');
+  if (logoutBtn) {
+    logoutBtn.addEventListener('click', function () {
+      fetch('/logout', { method: 'POST' }).then(function () { window.location.href = '/login'; });
+    });
+  }
+
+  document.addEventListener('click', unlockAudio);
+
+  loadCsrfToken();
+  loadEvents();
+  setInterval(loadEvents, POLL_INTERVAL_MS);
+})();

cloud/public/assets/detail.js

@@ -10,10 +10,6 @@
 (function () {
   'use strict';
 
-  // Mount prefix: '' at the web root, '/move_detect' when the app shares a www/ with another
-  // site. Injected by src/View/layout.php from the server's SCRIPT_NAME.
-  var B = window.APP_BASE || '';
-
   var SEVERITY_LABELS = {
     critical: { icon: '⛔', text: '위급', cls: 'sev-critical' },
     high:     { icon: '⚠', text: '높음', cls: 'sev-high' },
@@ -101,7 +97,7 @@
     snaps.forEach(function (s) {
       if (!s || !s.file_uuid) return;
       var img = document.createElement('img');
-      img.src = B + '/snap/' + encodeURIComponent(s.file_uuid);
+      img.src = '/snap/' + encodeURIComponent(s.file_uuid);
       img.alt = '사고 스냅샷';
       img.className = 'detail-snapshot';
       img.loading = 'lazy';
@@ -109,9 +105,9 @@
     });
   }
 
-  fetch(B + '/events/' + encodeURIComponent(id), { headers: { Accept: 'application/json' } })
+  fetch('/events/' + encodeURIComponent(id), { headers: { Accept: 'application/json' } })
     .then(function (res) {
-      if (res.status === 401) { window.location.href = B + '/login'; return null; }
+      if (res.status === 401) { window.location.href = '/login'; return null; }
       if (!res.ok) throw new Error('detail_failed:' + res.status);
       return res.json();
     })

cloud/public/assets/login.js

@@ -8,10 +8,6 @@
 (function () {
   'use strict';
 
-  // Mount prefix: '' at the web root, '/move_detect' when the app shares a www/ with another
-  // site. Injected by src/View/layout.php from the server's SCRIPT_NAME.
-  var B = window.APP_BASE || '';
-
   var form = document.querySelector('.login-form');
   if (!form) return;
 
@@ -30,7 +26,7 @@
     var formData = new FormData(form);
     var body = new URLSearchParams(formData).toString();
 
-    fetch(B + '/login', {
+    fetch('/login', {
       method: 'POST',
       headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' },
       body: body
@@ -38,7 +34,7 @@
       .then(function (res) {
         if (res.status === 200) {
           // Success: redirect to dashboard
-          window.location.href = B + '/';
+          window.location.href = '/';
           return null;
         }
         // Error: parse response and show error message

cloud/public/assets/zone-draw.js

@@ -4,22 +4,15 @@
  * - Choose a level (warning/restricted/pinch), then Save -> POST /api/zones.
  * - "Load" fetches existing zones for the camera via GET /api/zones/{camera}
  *   and redraws them; each has a Delete button -> POST /api/zones/{id}/delete.
- * - "현재 화면 불러오기" fetches the camera's newest snapshot uuid via
+ * - If a `?snapshot={uuid}` query param is present, that image (served via
- *   GET /api/cameras/{camera}/latest-snapshot and draws it as the canvas
+ *   the authenticated /snap/{uuid} proxy) is drawn as the canvas background;
- *   background, so zones are drawn over what the camera actually sees.
+ *   otherwise the canvas keeps its plain dark backdrop.
- * - A `?snapshot={uuid}` query param does the same for one specific image
- *   (the event-detail page links here that way); otherwise the canvas keeps
- *   its plain dark backdrop.
  *
  * XSS-safe: all dynamic text is set via textContent, never innerHTML.
  */
 (function () {
   'use strict';
 
-  // Mount prefix: '' at the web root, '/move_detect' when the app shares a www/ with another
-  // site. Injected by src/View/layout.php from the server's SCRIPT_NAME.
-  var B = window.APP_BASE || '';
-
   var canvas = document.getElementById('zone-canvas');
   if (!canvas) return;
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
@@ -28,7 +21,6 @@
   var cameraInput = document.getElementById('camera-id');
   var levelSelect = document.getElementById('zone-level');
   var loadBtn = document.getElementById('zone-load-btn');
-  var frameBtn = document.getElementById('zone-frame-btn');
   var clearBtn = document.getElementById('zone-clear-btn');
   var saveBtn = document.getElementById('zone-save-btn');
   var listEl = document.getElementById('zone-list');
@@ -50,23 +42,16 @@
   }
 
   function loadCsrfToken() {
-    return fetch(B + '/api/csrf', { headers: { Accept: 'application/json' } })
+    return fetch('/api/csrf', { headers: { Accept: 'application/json' } })
       .then(function (res) { return res.ok ? res.json() : null; })
       .then(function (data) { if (data && data.token) csrfToken = data.token; })
       .catch(function () { /* save/delete will fail with 403 if the token is missing */ });
   }
 
-  // WIRE CONTRACT: zone polygons are stored NORMALIZED (0..1 of the image), so the edge can
-  // compare them against a foot point normalized by the camera's own resolution regardless of
-  // how big the camera is. On this canvas we draw in canvas pixels, so convert at the two wire
-  // boundaries only: denormalize on load (here), normalize on save (saveZone).
   function parsePolygon(zone) {
     try {
       var pts = JSON.parse(zone.polygon_json || '[]');
-      if (!Array.isArray(pts)) return [];
+      return Array.isArray(pts) ? pts : [];
-      return pts.map(function (p) {
-        return [p[0] * canvas.width, p[1] * canvas.height];
-      });
     } catch (e) {
       return [];
     }
@@ -131,32 +116,16 @@
     var img = new Image();
     img.onload = function () { backgroundImage = img; redraw(); };
     img.onerror = function () { backgroundImage = null; redraw(); };
-    img.src = B + '/snap/' + encodeURIComponent(uuid);
+    img.src = '/snap/' + encodeURIComponent(uuid);
-  }
-
-  // Load the camera's most recent frame as the drawing background. The uuid comes from the
-  // API; the image itself still goes through /snap/{uuid}, which re-checks session + site scope.
-  function loadLatestFrame() {
-    var camera = cameraInput.value.trim();
-    if (!camera) { setStatus('카메라 ID를 입력하세요.'); return; }
-    setStatus('현재 화면을 불러오는 중...');
-    fetch(B + '/api/cameras/' + encodeURIComponent(camera) + '/latest-snapshot', { credentials: 'same-origin' })
-      .then(function (r) {
-        if (r.status === 404) throw new Error('이 카메라의 저장된 화면이 아직 없습니다. 이벤트가 한 번 발생해야 배경이 생깁니다.');
-        if (!r.ok) throw new Error('불러오기 실패 (' + r.status + ')');
-        return r.json();
-      })
-      .then(function (data) { loadBackground(data.uuid); setStatus('현재 화면을 배경으로 불러왔습니다.'); })
-      .catch(function (e) { setStatus(e.message); });
   }
 
   function loadZones() {
     var camera = cameraInput.value.trim();
     if (!camera) { setStatus('카메라 ID를 입력하세요.'); return; }
     setStatus('불러오는 중...');
-    fetch(B + '/api/zones/' + encodeURIComponent(camera), { headers: { Accept: 'application/json' } })
+    fetch('/api/zones/' + encodeURIComponent(camera), { headers: { Accept: 'application/json' } })
       .then(function (res) {
-        if (res.status === 401) { window.location.href = B + '/login'; return null; }
+        if (res.status === 401) { window.location.href = '/login'; return null; }
         if (!res.ok) throw new Error('load_failed:' + res.status);
         return res.json();
       })
@@ -179,22 +148,18 @@
     if (!camera) { setStatus('카메라 ID를 입력하세요.'); return; }
     if (currentPoints.length < 3) { setStatus('폴리곤 점을 3개 이상 클릭하세요.'); return; }
     setStatus('저장 중...');
-    fetch(B + '/api/zones', {
+    fetch('/api/zones', {
       method: 'POST',
       headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', 'X-Csrf-Token': csrfToken || '' },
       body: JSON.stringify({
         device_id: device,
         camera_id: camera,
         level: levelSelect.value,
-        // Normalize canvas pixels -> 0..1 of the image (the edge un-normalizes with the
+        polygon: currentPoints
-        // camera's own resolution). See the parsePolygon contract note above.
-        polygon: currentPoints.map(function (p) {
-          return [p[0] / canvas.width, p[1] / canvas.height];
-        })
       })
     })
       .then(function (res) {
-        if (res.status === 401) { window.location.href = B + '/login'; return null; }
+        if (res.status === 401) { window.location.href = '/login'; return null; }
         if (!res.ok) throw new Error('save_failed:' + res.status);
         return res.json();
       })
@@ -208,12 +173,12 @@
   }
 
   function deleteZone(zoneId) {
-    fetch(B + '/api/zones/' + encodeURIComponent(zoneId) + '/delete', {
+    fetch('/api/zones/' + encodeURIComponent(zoneId) + '/delete', {
       method: 'POST',
       headers: { 'X-Csrf-Token': csrfToken || '' }
     })
       .then(function (res) {
-        if (res.status === 401) { window.location.href = B + '/login'; return; }
+        if (res.status === 401) { window.location.href = '/login'; return; }
         if (!res.ok) throw new Error('delete_failed:' + res.status);
         loadZones();
       })
@@ -232,7 +197,6 @@
 
   levelSelect.addEventListener('change', redraw);
   loadBtn.addEventListener('click', loadZones);
-  if (frameBtn) frameBtn.addEventListener('click', loadLatestFrame);
   clearBtn.addEventListener('click', function () { currentPoints = []; redraw(); setStatus('현재 폴리곤을 지웠습니다.'); });
   saveBtn.addEventListener('click', saveZone);
 

cloud/public/index.php

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+<?php
+declare(strict_types=1);
+require __DIR__ . '/../vendor/autoload.php';
+
+use App\Config;
+use App\Http\{Request, Router, Response};
+use App\Db\Database;
+use App\Auth\PhpSessionStore;
+use App\Repository\Pdo\{PdoDeviceRepository, PdoNonceRepository, PdoRateLimiterRepository,
+    PdoEventRepository, PdoSnapshotRepository, PdoUserRepository, PdoZoneRepository,
+    PdoThresholdRepository, PdoAuditRepository};
+use App\Ingest\IngestController;
+use App\Api\{ConfigController, HeartbeatController};
+use App\Auth\{AuthController, CsrfController};
+use App\Dashboard\{EventListController, EventDetailController, SnapshotProxy, ZoneConfigController};
+
+$cfg = Config::fromArray(require __DIR__ . '/../config.php');
+$pdo = Database::connect($cfg);
+$sess = new PhpSessionStore();
+$now = time();
+
+$devices = new PdoDeviceRepository($pdo);
+$nonces = new PdoNonceRepository($pdo);
+$rate = new PdoRateLimiterRepository($pdo);
+$events = new PdoEventRepository($pdo);
+$snaps = new PdoSnapshotRepository($pdo, $cfg->snapshotDir());
+$users = new PdoUserRepository($pdo);
+$zones = new PdoZoneRepository($pdo);
+$thr = new PdoThresholdRepository($pdo);
+$audit = new PdoAuditRepository($pdo);
+
+$ingest = new IngestController($cfg, $devices, $nonces, $rate, $events, $snaps);
+$config = new ConfigController($devices, $zones, $thr, $nonces, $cfg);
+$heartbeat = new HeartbeatController($cfg, $devices, $nonces);
+$auth = new AuthController($users, $audit, $rate);
+$csrfCtl = new CsrfController();
+$list = new EventListController($events, $sess);
+$detail = new EventDetailController($events, $snaps, $audit, $sess);
+$proxy = new SnapshotProxy($snaps, $sess);
+$zoneCtl = new ZoneConfigController($zones, $audit, $sess);
+
+$render = function (string $view): Response {
+    ob_start(); require __DIR__ . '/../src/View/' . $view . '.php';
+    return Response::text((string)ob_get_clean());
+};
+
+$r = new Router();
+$r->add('POST', '/api/events', fn(Request $q) => $ingest->handle($q, $now, (string)($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'] ?? '')));
+$r->add('POST', '/api/heartbeat', fn(Request $q) => $heartbeat->post($q, $now));
+$r->add('GET', '/api/config', fn(Request $q) => $config->get($q, $now));
+$r->add('GET', '/api/csrf', fn(Request $q) => $csrfCtl->token($q, $sess));
+$r->add('POST', '/login', fn(Request $q) => $auth->login($q, $sess, $now, (string)($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'] ?? '')));
+$r->add('POST', '/logout', fn(Request $q) => $auth->logout($sess));
+$r->add('GET', '/api/events', fn(Request $q) => $list->json($q));
+$r->add('GET', '/events/{id}', fn(Request $q, array $p) => $detail->show($q, $p));
+$r->add('POST', '/events/{id}/ack', fn(Request $q, array $p) => $detail->acknowledge($q, $p));
+$r->add('GET', '/api/zones/{camera}', fn(Request $q, array $p) => $zoneCtl->list($q, $p));
+$r->add('POST', '/api/zones', fn(Request $q) => $zoneCtl->save($q));
+$r->add('POST', '/api/zones/{id}/delete', fn(Request $q, array $p) => $zoneCtl->delete($q, $p));
+$r->add('GET', '/snap/{uuid}', fn(Request $q, array $p) => $proxy->serve($q, $p));
+$r->add('GET', '/', fn() => $render('events'));
+$r->add('GET', '/login', fn() => $render('login'));
+$r->add('GET', '/zones', fn() => $render('zones'));
+$r->add('GET', '/events/{id}/view', fn(Request $q, array $p) => $render('event_detail'));
+
+$r->dispatch(Request::fromGlobals())->send();

cloud/schema.sql

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ SET NAMES utf8mb4;
 -- No PdoUserRepository::create() exists in P1-B -- the first admin account is
 -- provisioned out-of-band via the CLI snippet in cloud/docs/cloud-deploy.md.
 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-CREATE TABLE move_users (
+CREATE TABLE users (
     id              INT UNSIGNED    NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
     username        VARCHAR(190)    NOT NULL,
     password_hash   VARCHAR(255)    NOT NULL,            -- Argon2id, see App\Security\Password::hash()
@@ -55,10 +55,9 @@ CREATE TABLE move_users (
 -- No PdoDeviceRepository::create() exists -- rows are provisioned by an admin
 -- (per-device secret issuance) before the device is allowed to sync/ingest.
 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-CREATE TABLE move_devices (
+CREATE TABLE devices (
     device_id                VARCHAR(64)     NOT NULL,
     name                     VARCHAR(190)    NULL,
-    site                     VARCHAR(64)     NULL,        -- access-control scope; matches users.site_scope (NULL = unassigned)
     secret                   VARCHAR(255)    NOT NULL,    -- per-device HMAC key; rotate via admin CLI, never log
     config_version           INT UNSIGNED    NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,  -- authoritative version served by GET /api/config
     last_fps                 DOUBLE          NULL,
@@ -67,8 +66,7 @@ CREATE TABLE move_devices (
     reported_config_version  INT UNSIGNED    NULL,        -- version the device last claimed via heartbeat
     last_heartbeat_at        BIGINT UNSIGNED NULL,
     created_at                BIGINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL DEFAULT (UNIX_TIMESTAMP()),
-    PRIMARY KEY (device_id),
+    PRIMARY KEY (device_id)
-    KEY ix_devices_site (site)
 ) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8mb4;
 
 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -77,7 +75,7 @@ CREATE TABLE move_devices (
 -- directly as a free-form string. Kept for documentation/future per-camera
 -- config and to avoid a breaking migration when that repository is added.
 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-CREATE TABLE move_cameras (
+CREATE TABLE cameras (
     camera_id   VARCHAR(64)     NOT NULL,
     device_id   VARCHAR(64)     NOT NULL,
     name        VARCHAR(190)    NULL,
@@ -94,7 +92,7 @@ CREATE TABLE move_cameras (
 -- `cameras` row exists for a given camera_id (no camera-registration flow in
 -- P1-B), so a FK here would spuriously reject valid app writes.
 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-CREATE TABLE move_zones (
+CREATE TABLE zones (
     zone_id       CHAR(32)        NOT NULL,   -- bin2hex(random_bytes(16)), same convention as snapshot uuids
     device_id     VARCHAR(64)     NOT NULL,
     camera_id     VARCHAR(64)     NOT NULL,
@@ -112,11 +110,9 @@ CREATE TABLE move_zones (
 -- App\Ingest\EventValidator before insert(); the CHECK constraints below are
 -- defense-in-depth only, not the primary validation layer.
 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-CREATE TABLE move_events (
+CREATE TABLE events (
     event_id          INT UNSIGNED    NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    event_uuid        CHAR(32)        NULL,       -- edge-generated idempotency key (dedup a re-sent event); NULL for legacy rows
     device_id         VARCHAR(64)     NOT NULL,
-    site              VARCHAR(64)     NULL,       -- denormalized from move_devices.site at ingest; access-control scope
     camera_id         VARCHAR(64)     NOT NULL,
     event_type        VARCHAR(32)     NOT NULL,
     severity          VARCHAR(16)     NOT NULL,
@@ -129,15 +125,9 @@ CREATE TABLE move_events (
     acknowledged_at   BIGINT UNSIGNED NULL,
     received_at       BIGINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL,   -- server receipt time (PHP time()), for clock-skew flagging (design doc §8)
     PRIMARY KEY (event_id),
-    -- Idempotency: a UNIQUE key on event_uuid makes a re-sent event (POST succeeded server-side
-    -- but the ACK timed out client-side) collide instead of duplicating. MySQL allows multiple
-    -- NULLs in a UNIQUE index, so legacy rows without a uuid do not conflict.
-    UNIQUE KEY uq_events_uuid (event_uuid),
     KEY ix_events_occurred_at (occurred_at),
     KEY ix_events_severity_occurred_at (severity, occurred_at),
-    KEY ix_events_site_occurred_at (site, occurred_at),  -- site-scoped dashboard list (P3-2b)
     KEY ix_events_device (device_id),
-    KEY ix_events_camera (camera_id, event_id),  -- zone editor: newest snapshot per camera
     CONSTRAINT chk_events_type CHECK (event_type IN (
         'fall','no_motion','immobility','ghost','zone_warning',
         'zone_restricted','pinch','monitoring_degraded','device_fault'
@@ -151,7 +141,7 @@ CREATE TABLE move_events (
 -- events is safe because IngestController always inserts the parent event row
 -- before calling SnapshotRepository::add() for its snapshots.
 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-CREATE TABLE move_event_snapshots (
+CREATE TABLE event_snapshots (
     snapshot_id   INT UNSIGNED    NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
     event_id      INT UNSIGNED    NOT NULL,
     file_uuid     CHAR(32)        NOT NULL,   -- bin2hex(random_bytes(16)); on-disk filename = <uuid>.jpg
@@ -159,13 +149,8 @@ CREATE TABLE move_event_snapshots (
     created_at    BIGINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL,
     PRIMARY KEY (snapshot_id),
     UNIQUE KEY uq_event_snapshots_uuid (file_uuid),
-    -- Idempotent snapshot recovery: a re-sent event carries the SAME re-encoded bytes (same
-    -- content_hash), so this makes a duplicate/racing store collide instead of writing a second
-    -- copy. Lets the dedup path safely re-store missing evidence without duplication.
-    UNIQUE KEY uq_event_snapshots_event_hash (event_id, content_hash),
     KEY ix_event_snapshots_event (event_id),
-    KEY ix_event_snapshots_created (created_at),  -- retention purge scans WHERE created_at < ?
+    CONSTRAINT fk_event_snapshots_event FOREIGN KEY (event_id) REFERENCES events (event_id)
-    CONSTRAINT fk_event_snapshots_event FOREIGN KEY (event_id) REFERENCES move_events (event_id)
         ON DELETE CASCADE
 ) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8mb4;
 
@@ -174,7 +159,7 @@ CREATE TABLE move_event_snapshots (
 -- GET /api/config. No PdoThresholdRepository write method exists in P1-B --
 -- rows are seeded/edited directly (phpMyAdmin) until a management UI lands.
 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-CREATE TABLE move_thresholds (
+CREATE TABLE thresholds (
     id          INT UNSIGNED  NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
     device_id   VARCHAR(64)   NOT NULL,
     camera_id   VARCHAR(64)   NULL,
@@ -195,11 +180,11 @@ CREATE TABLE move_thresholds (
 -- TOCTOU flagged in the Task 7 review -- the PK uniqueness is the real guard,
 -- not the earlier seen() check).
 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-CREATE TABLE move_nonces (
+CREATE TABLE nonces (
     nonce       VARCHAR(190)    NOT NULL,
     expires_at  BIGINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL,
     PRIMARY KEY (nonce),
-    KEY ix_nonces_expires_at (expires_at)  -- for a periodic `DELETE FROM move_nonces WHERE expires_at < ?` cleanup job
+    KEY ix_nonces_expires_at (expires_at)  -- for a periodic `DELETE FROM nonces WHERE expires_at < ?` cleanup job
 ) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8mb4;
 
 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -208,14 +193,11 @@ CREATE TABLE move_nonces (
 -- `INSERT ... ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE count = count + 1` upsert in
 -- PdoRateLimiterRepository::hit() -- no read-modify-write race window.
 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-CREATE TABLE move_rate_limits (
+CREATE TABLE rate_limits (
     rate_key      VARCHAR(190)    NOT NULL,
     window_start  BIGINT UNSIGNED NOT NULL,  -- floor(now / 60): the minute bucket
     count         INT UNSIGNED    NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
-    PRIMARY KEY (rate_key, window_start),
+    PRIMARY KEY (rate_key, window_start)
-    -- The reap `DELETE ... WHERE window_start < ?` cannot use the PK (window_start is its trailing
-    -- column), so give it its own index to avoid a locking full-scan on the pre-auth hot path.
-    KEY ix_rate_limits_window (window_start)
 ) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8mb4;
 
 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -223,7 +205,7 @@ CREATE TABLE move_rate_limits (
 -- Tamper-evident hash-chaining (design doc §9.2) is deferred to P3 per the
 -- Task 16 brief self-review -- this table is the plain append-only record only.
 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-CREATE TABLE move_audit_log (
+CREATE TABLE audit_log (
     id           INT UNSIGNED    NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
     actor        VARCHAR(190)    NOT NULL,
     action       VARCHAR(64)     NOT NULL,
@@ -235,25 +217,3 @@ CREATE TABLE move_audit_log (
     KEY ix_audit_log_ts (ts),
     KEY ix_audit_log_actor (actor)
 ) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8mb4;
-
--- ===========================================================================
--- UPGRADING AN EXISTING DATABASE (fresh installs already have everything above):
--- do NOT copy the statements below by hand — they are SQL comments and will not
--- run. Apply the RUNNABLE migration instead:
---
---   cloud/migrations/2026-07-17-p1-9-p3-2b.sql
---   cloud/migrations/2026-07-20-move-table-prefix.sql   (run this one LAST)
---
--- The second migration renames every table to the `move_` prefix used above and
--- by App\Repository\Pdo\* -- an existing DB must be renamed before deploy or all
--- queries fail with "table doesn't exist".
---
--- It adds devices.site / events.site / events.event_uuid, the retention and
--- rate-limit reap indexes, AND backfills events.site from move_devices.site (without
--- that backfill, historical events vanish for a scoped operator). Run it once in
--- phpMyAdmin BEFORE deploying code that reads these columns, then provision:
---   UPDATE move_devices SET site = 'factory-a' WHERE device_id = 'pi-1';
---   UPDATE move_users   SET site_scope = 'factory-a' WHERE username = 'operator-a';
--- A user with site_scope = NULL is a global operator; '' is NOT global (matches
--- nothing — a blank scope fails closed).
--- ===========================================================================

cloud/src/Api/ConfigController.php

@@ -5,23 +5,17 @@ namespace App\Api;
 use App\Config;
 use App\Http\{Request, Response};
 use App\Security\Hmac;
-use App\Repository\{DeviceRepository, ZoneRepository, ThresholdRepository, NonceRepository, RateLimiterRepository};
+use App\Repository\{DeviceRepository, ZoneRepository, ThresholdRepository, NonceRepository};
 
 final class ConfigController
 {
     public function __construct(
         private DeviceRepository $devices, private ZoneRepository $zones, private ThresholdRepository $thresholds,
         private NonceRepository $nonces, private Config $cfg,
-        private ?RateLimiterRepository $rateLimiter = null,
     ) {}
 
-    public function get(Request $req, int $now, string $clientIp = ''): Response
+    public function get(Request $req, int $now): Response
     {
-        // Pre-auth per-IP anti-flood, like /api/events — HMAC + DB reads on every hit.
-        if ($this->rateLimiter !== null && $clientIp !== ''
-            && $this->rateLimiter->hit('ip:' . $clientIp, intdiv($now, 60)) > $this->cfg->ingestIpRateLimitPerMin()) {
-            return Response::json(['error' => 'rate_limited'], 429);
-        }
         $deviceId = (string)$req->query('device_id');
         $secret = $deviceId !== '' ? $this->devices->secretFor($deviceId) : null;
         $nonce = $req->header('X-Nonce') ?? ''; $ts = $req->header('X-Timestamp') ?? ''; $sig = $req->header('X-Signature') ?? '';

cloud/src/Api/HeartbeatController.php

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+<?php
+declare(strict_types=1);
+namespace App\Api;
+
+use App\Config;
+use App\Http\{Request, Response};
+use App\Security\Hmac;
+use App\Repository\{DeviceRepository, NonceRepository};
+
+final class HeartbeatController
+{
+    public function __construct(private Config $cfg, private DeviceRepository $devices, private NonceRepository $nonces) {}
+
+    public function post(Request $req, int $now): Response
+    {
+        $b = $req->json();
+        $deviceId = (string)($b['device_id'] ?? '');
+        $secret = $deviceId !== '' ? $this->devices->secretFor($deviceId) : null;
+        $nonce = $req->header('X-Nonce') ?? ''; $ts = $req->header('X-Timestamp') ?? ''; $sig = $req->header('X-Signature') ?? '';
+        if ($secret === null || !Hmac::verify($secret, $nonce, $ts, $req->body(), $sig)) {
+            return Response::json(['error' => 'unauthorized'], 401);
+        }
+        if (abs($now - (int)(float)$ts) > $this->cfg->timestampWindow()) {
+            return Response::json(['error' => 'stale'], 401);
+        }
+        if ($nonce === '' || $this->nonces->seen($nonce)) {
+            return Response::json(['error' => 'replay'], 401);
+        }
+        $this->nonces->remember($nonce, $now + $this->cfg->nonceTtl());
+
+        $this->devices->touchHeartbeat($deviceId, [
+            'fps' => (float)($b['fps'] ?? 0), 'temp' => (float)($b['temp'] ?? 0),
+            'throttle' => (bool)($b['throttle'] ?? false), 'config_version' => (int)($b['config_version'] ?? 0),
+            'at' => $now,
+        ]);
+        return Response::json(['ok' => true], 200);
+    }
+}

cloud/src/Auth/AuthController.php

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ declare(strict_types=1);
 namespace App\Auth;
 
 use App\Http\{Request, Response};
-use App\Security\{Password, Csrf};
+use App\Security\Password;
 use App\Repository\{UserRepository, AuditRepository, RateLimiterRepository};
 
 final class AuthController
@@ -28,14 +28,6 @@ final class AuthController
             return Response::json(['error' => 'rate_limited'], 429);
         }
 
-        // Login CSRF: the GET /login render seeds $_SESSION['csrf'] and embeds it as a hidden
-        // field; the POST must echo it back. Without this an attacker can silently log a victim
-        // into the attacker's account (session fixation via forged login). Checked before the
-        // user lookup so a forged request never triggers the (expensive) Argon2id verify.
-        if (!Csrf::check((string)$sess->get('csrf'), (string)$req->post('csrf'))) {
-            return Response::json(['error' => 'csrf'], 403);
-        }
-
         $username = (string)$req->post('username');
         $password = (string)$req->post('password');
         $u = $this->users->byUsername($username);
@@ -75,11 +67,8 @@ final class AuthController
 
     public function logout(SessionStore $sess): Response
     {
-        // Rotate the id FIRST (invalidates the old cookie) while the session is still active,
-        // then wipe. The old order called session_regenerate_id() AFTER session_destroy(),
-        // which warns on an inactive session and leaves the old cookie unreplaced.
-        $sess->regenerate();
         $sess->clear();
+        $sess->regenerate();
         return Response::json(['ok' => true], 200);
     }
 }

cloud/src/Auth/Session.php

@@ -18,15 +18,9 @@ final class ArraySessionStore implements SessionStore {
 }
 
 final class PhpSessionStore implements SessionStore {
-    /** @param string $cookiePath Scope the cookie to the mount ('/' at the web root,
+    public function __construct() { if (session_status() !== PHP_SESSION_ACTIVE) session_start([
-     *                            '/move_detect/' in a subdirectory) so a co-hosted site
+        'cookie_httponly' => true, 'cookie_secure' => true, 'cookie_samesite' => 'Lax',
-     *                            sharing the same www/ is never sent this session id. */
+    ]); }
-    public function __construct(string $cookiePath = '/') {
-        if (session_status() !== PHP_SESSION_ACTIVE) session_start([
-            'cookie_httponly' => true, 'cookie_secure' => true, 'cookie_samesite' => 'Lax',
-            'cookie_path' => $cookiePath,
-        ]);
-    }
     public function get(string $k): mixed { return $_SESSION[$k] ?? null; }
     public function set(string $k, mixed $v): void { $_SESSION[$k] = $v; }
     public function clear(): void { $_SESSION = []; session_destroy(); }

cloud/src/Config.php

@@ -16,5 +16,4 @@ final class Config
     public function timestampWindow(): int { return (int)($this->a['timestamp_window'] ?? 300); }
     public function rateLimitPerMin(): int { return (int)($this->a['rate_limit_per_min'] ?? 60); }
     public function ingestIpRateLimitPerMin(): int { return (int)($this->a['ingest_ip_rate_limit_per_min'] ?? 300); }
-    public function snapshotRetentionDays(): int { return (int)($this->a['snapshot_retention_days'] ?? 7); }
 }

cloud/src/Dashboard/EventDetailController.php

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ namespace App\Dashboard;
 
 use App\Http\{Request, Response};
 use App\Auth\{SessionStore, Rbac};
-use App\Security\{Csrf, SiteScope};
+use App\Security\Csrf;
 use App\Repository\{EventRepository, SnapshotRepository, AuditRepository};
 
 final class EventDetailController
@@ -14,20 +14,12 @@ final class EventDetailController
         private AuditRepository $audit, private SessionStore $sess
     ) {}
 
-    // A scoped operator must not read — or acknowledge — an event outside their site. Return
-    // 404 (not 403) so a cross-site id is indistinguishable from a non-existent one (no leak).
-    private function outOfScope(array $event): bool
-    {
-        $scope = $this->sess->get('site_scope');
-        return !SiteScope::allows(is_string($scope) ? $scope : null, $event['site'] ?? null);
-    }
-
     public function show(Request $req, array $params): Response
     {
         if ($this->sess->get('user_id') === null) return Response::json(['error' => 'unauthorized'], 401);
         $id = (int)($params['id'] ?? 0);
         $event = $this->events->find($id);
-        if ($event === null || $this->outOfScope($event)) return Response::json(['error' => 'not_found'], 404);
+        if ($event === null) return Response::json(['error' => 'not_found'], 404);
         return Response::json(['event' => $event, 'snapshots' => $this->snaps->forEvent($id)], 200);
     }
 
@@ -39,10 +31,6 @@ final class EventDetailController
             return Response::json(['error' => 'csrf'], 403);
         }
         $id = (int)($params['id'] ?? 0);
-        // Scope BEFORE the write: without the find()+guard a scoped user could acknowledge another
-        // site's event by guessing its id.
-        $event = $this->events->find($id);
-        if ($event === null || $this->outOfScope($event)) return Response::json(['error' => 'not_found'], 404);
         $user = (string)$this->sess->get('username');
         if (!$this->events->acknowledge($id, $user)) return Response::json(['error' => 'not_found'], 404);
         $this->audit->append($user, 'acknowledge', "event:$id", [], []);

cloud/src/Dashboard/EventListController.php

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+<?php
+declare(strict_types=1);
+namespace App\Dashboard;
+
+use App\Http\{Request, Response};
+use App\Auth\SessionStore;
+use App\Repository\EventRepository;
+
+final class EventListController
+{
+    public function __construct(private EventRepository $events, private SessionStore $sess) {}
+
+    public function json(Request $req): Response
+    {
+        if ($this->sess->get('user_id') === null) return Response::json(['error' => 'unauthorized'], 401);
+        $severity = $req->query('severity');
+        $rows = $this->events->recent(100, $severity);
+        return Response::json(['events' => $rows], 200);
+    }
+}

cloud/src/Dashboard/SnapshotProxy.php

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+<?php
+declare(strict_types=1);
+namespace App\Dashboard;
+
+use App\Http\{Request, Response};
+use App\Auth\SessionStore;
+use App\Repository\SnapshotRepository;
+
+final class SnapshotProxy
+{
+    public function __construct(private SnapshotRepository $snaps, private SessionStore $sess) {}
+
+    public function serve(Request $req, array $params): Response
+    {
+        if ($this->sess->get('user_id') === null) return Response::json(['error' => 'unauthorized'], 401);
+        $uuid = (string)($params['uuid'] ?? '');
+        $path = $this->snaps->pathByUuid($uuid);
+        if ($path === null || !is_file($path)) return Response::json(['error' => 'not_found'], 404);
+        return Response::bytes((string)file_get_contents($path), 'image/jpeg', 200);
+    }
+}

cloud/src/Dashboard/ZoneConfigController.php

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+<?php
+declare(strict_types=1);
+namespace App\Dashboard;
+
+use App\Http\{Request, Response};
+use App\Auth\{SessionStore, Rbac};
+use App\Security\Csrf;
+use App\Geometry\Polygon;
+use App\Repository\{ZoneRepository, AuditRepository};
+
+final class ZoneConfigController
+{
+    private const LEVELS = ['warning','restricted','pinch'];
+
+    public function __construct(
+        private ZoneRepository $zones, private AuditRepository $audit, private SessionStore $sess
+    ) {}
+
+    private function guard(string $perm): ?Response
+    {
+        if ($this->sess->get('user_id') === null) return Response::json(['error' => 'unauthorized'], 401);
+        if (!Rbac::can((string)$this->sess->get('role'), $perm)) return Response::json(['error' => 'forbidden'], 403);
+        return null;
+    }
+
+    public function list(Request $req, array $params): Response
+    {
+        if ($this->sess->get('user_id') === null) return Response::json(['error' => 'unauthorized'], 401);
+        return Response::json(['zones' => $this->zones->forCamera((string)($params['camera'] ?? ''))], 200);
+    }
+
+    public function save(Request $req): Response
+    {
+        if ($g = $this->guard('edit_zones')) return $g;
+        if (!Csrf::check((string)$this->sess->get('csrf'), (string)$req->header('X-Csrf-Token'))) {
+            return Response::json(['error' => 'csrf'], 403);
+        }
+        $b = $req->json();
+        $level = (string)($b['level'] ?? '');
+        $polygon = $b['polygon'] ?? [];
+        if (!in_array($level, self::LEVELS, true) || !is_array($polygon) || !Polygon::validate($polygon)) {
+            return Response::json(['error' => 'invalid_zone'], 400);
+        }
+        $zoneId = $this->zones->save([
+            'zone_id' => $b['zone_id'] ?? null,
+            'device_id' => (string)($b['device_id'] ?? ''),
+            'camera_id' => (string)($b['camera_id'] ?? ''),
+            'level' => $level,
+            'polygon_json' => json_encode($polygon),
+        ]);
+        $this->audit->append((string)$this->sess->get('username'), 'zone_save', "zone:$zoneId", [], ['level' => $level]);
+        return Response::json(['zone_id' => $zoneId], 201);
+    }
+
+    public function delete(Request $req, array $params): Response
+    {
+        if ($g = $this->guard('edit_zones')) return $g;
+        if (!Csrf::check((string)$this->sess->get('csrf'), (string)$req->header('X-Csrf-Token'))) {
+            return Response::json(['error' => 'csrf'], 403);
+        }
+        $id = (string)($params['id'] ?? '');
+        if (!$this->zones->delete($id)) return Response::json(['error' => 'not_found'], 404);
+        $this->audit->append((string)$this->sess->get('username'), 'zone_delete', "zone:$id", [], []);
+        return Response::json(['ok' => true], 200);
+    }
+}

cloud/src/Http/Request.php

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+<?php
+declare(strict_types=1);
+namespace App\Http;
+
+final class Request
+{
+    private array $headers;
+    public function __construct(
+        private string $method, private string $path, array $headers,
+        private string $body, private array $query = [], private array $post = []
+    ) {
+        $this->headers = [];
+        foreach ($headers as $k => $v) $this->headers[strtolower($k)] = $v;
+    }
+    public function method(): string { return $this->method; }
+    public function path(): string { return $this->path; }
+    public function header(string $name): ?string { return $this->headers[strtolower($name)] ?? null; }
+    public function body(): string { return $this->body; }
+    public function json(): array { $d = json_decode($this->body, true); return is_array($d) ? $d : []; }
+    public function query(string $k): ?string { return isset($this->query[$k]) ? (string)$this->query[$k] : null; }
+    public function post(string $k): ?string { return isset($this->post[$k]) ? (string)$this->post[$k] : null; }
+
+    public static function fromGlobals(): self
+    {
+        $headers = function_exists('getallheaders') ? (getallheaders() ?: []) : [];
+        return new self(
+            $_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] ?? 'GET',
+            parse_url($_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'] ?? '/', PHP_URL_PATH) ?: '/',
+            $headers, file_get_contents('php://input') ?: '', $_GET, $_POST
+        );
+    }
+}

cloud/src/Http/Response.php

@@ -12,9 +12,8 @@ final class Response
     public static function text(string $s, int $status = 200): self {
         return new self($status, ['Content-Type' => 'text/html; charset=utf-8'], $s);
     }
-    public static function bytes(string $b, string $contentType, int $status = 200, array $headers = []): self {
+    public static function bytes(string $b, string $contentType, int $status = 200): self {
-        // Content-Type stays authoritative; extra headers (e.g. Cache-Control) are added, not overridden.
+        return new self($status, ['Content-Type' => $contentType], $b);
-        return new self($status, ['Content-Type' => $contentType] + $headers, $b);
     }
     public static function redirect(string $to): self {
         return new self(302, ['Location' => $to], '');

cloud/src/Http/Router.php

@@ -15,11 +15,7 @@ final class Router
         foreach ($this->routes as [$method, $regex, $handler]) {
             if ($req->method() !== $method) continue;
             if (preg_match($regex, $req->path(), $m)) {
-                // Decode captured params: a camera_id/zone_id with a space or Korean text is
+                $params = array_filter($m, 'is_string', ARRAY_FILTER_USE_KEY);
-                // %-encoded in the URL, so without this GET /api/zones/{camera} never matches
-                // what POST /api/zones stored.
-                $params = array_map('rawurldecode',
-                    array_filter($m, 'is_string', ARRAY_FILTER_USE_KEY));
                 return $handler($req, $params);
             }
         }

cloud/src/Ingest/EventValidator.php

@@ -31,24 +31,10 @@ final class EventValidator
         if (isset($p['track_id']) && !is_numeric($p['track_id'])) $errors[] = 'bad:track_id';
         if (isset($p['zone_id']) && !is_string($p['zone_id'])) $errors[] = 'bad:zone_id';
         if (isset($p['duration_s']) && !is_numeric($p['duration_s'])) $errors[] = 'bad:duration_s';
-        // Optional idempotency key: the edge generates a stable 32-hex uuid per event and re-sends
-        // it on retry so the server can dedup. Enforce the exact shape (matches CHAR(32) + the
-        // snapshot-uuid convention); a malformed key is a bug, not a silent pass.
-        if (isset($p['event_uuid']) && (!is_string($p['event_uuid']) || !preg_match('/^[0-9a-f]{32}$/', $p['event_uuid']))) {
-            $errors[] = 'bad:event_uuid';
-        }
-
-        // Length caps matching the DB columns (device_id/camera_id VARCHAR(64), zone_id
-        // CHAR(32)). Without these an overlong id is a MySQL 'Data too long' 500 that the edge
-        // re-queues and retries forever; a 400 lets it drop the poison event instead.
-        foreach (['device_id' => 64, 'camera_id' => 64, 'zone_id' => 32] as $k => $max) {
-            if (isset($p[$k]) && is_string($p[$k]) && mb_strlen($p[$k]) > $max) $errors[] = "too_long:$k";
-        }
 
         if ($errors) return ['ok' => false, 'errors' => $errors, 'clean' => []];
 
         $clean = [
-            'event_uuid' => isset($p['event_uuid']) ? (string)$p['event_uuid'] : null,
             'device_id' => (string)$p['device_id'],
             'camera_id' => (string)$p['camera_id'],
             'event_type' => (string)$p['event_type'],

cloud/src/Ingest/IngestController.php

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+<?php
+declare(strict_types=1);
+namespace App\Ingest;
+
+use App\Config;
+use App\Http\{Request, Response};
+use App\Security\Hmac;
+use App\Repository\{DeviceRepository, NonceRepository, RateLimiterRepository,
+    EventRepository, SnapshotRepository};
+
+final class IngestController
+{
+    public function __construct(
+        private Config $cfg,
+        private DeviceRepository $devices,
+        private NonceRepository $nonces,
+        private RateLimiterRepository $rateLimiter,
+        private EventRepository $events,
+        private SnapshotRepository $snapshots,
+    ) {}
+
+    public function handle(Request $req, int $now, string $clientIp): Response
+    {
+        $payload = $req->json();
+        $deviceId = (string)($payload['device_id'] ?? '');
+        $window = intdiv($now, 60);
+
+        // Pre-auth IP limit (cheap, anti-flood): guards the endpoint before any
+        // HMAC/device-secret work, so an unauthenticated attacker can't burn
+        // a real device's own quota (see per-device limit below, moved post-auth).
+        if ($clientIp !== '' && $this->rateLimiter->hit('ip:' . $clientIp, $window) > $this->cfg->ingestIpRateLimitPerMin()) {
+            return Response::json(['error' => 'rate_limited'], 429);
+        }
+
+        $nonce = $req->header('X-Nonce') ?? '';
+        $ts = $req->header('X-Timestamp') ?? '';
+        $sig = $req->header('X-Signature') ?? '';
+        $secret = $deviceId !== '' ? $this->devices->secretFor($deviceId) : null;
+        if ($secret === null || $nonce === '' || $ts === '' || $sig === '') {
+            return Response::json(['error' => 'unauthorized'], 401);
+        }
+        if (!Hmac::verify($secret, $nonce, $ts, $req->body(), $sig)) {
+            return Response::json(['error' => 'unauthorized'], 401);
+        }
+        if (abs($now - (int)(float)$ts) > $this->cfg->timestampWindow()) {
+            return Response::json(['error' => 'unauthorized'], 401);
+        }
+        if ($this->nonces->seen($nonce)) {
+            return Response::json(['error' => 'unauthorized'], 401);
+        }
+        $this->nonces->remember($nonce, $now + $this->cfg->nonceTtl());
+
+        // Post-auth per-device limit: only authenticated (HMAC-verified) requests
+        // count toward a device's quota, so an attacker guessing device_id can no
+        // longer 429-lock a real camera.
+        if ($this->rateLimiter->hit($deviceId, $window) > $this->cfg->rateLimitPerMin()) {
+            return Response::json(['error' => 'rate_limited'], 429);
+        }
+
+        $v = EventValidator::validate($payload);
+        if (!$v['ok']) return Response::json(['error' => 'invalid', 'details' => $v['errors']], 400);
+
+        $eventId = $this->events->insert($v['clean']);
+        foreach (($payload['snapshots'] ?? []) as $b64) {
+            $img = ImageProcessor::reencode((string)$b64);
+            if (!$img['ok']) continue;
+            $path = rtrim($this->cfg->snapshotDir(), '/\\') . '/' . $img['uuid'] . '.jpg';
+            if (file_put_contents($path, $img['bytes']) === false) continue;
+            $this->snapshots->add($eventId, $img['uuid'], $img['hash']);
+        }
+        return Response::json(['event_id' => $eventId], 201);
+    }
+}

cloud/src/Repository/DeviceRepository.php

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+<?php
+declare(strict_types=1);
+namespace App\Repository;
+
+interface DeviceRepository
+{
+    public function secretFor(string $deviceId): ?string;
+    public function touchHeartbeat(string $deviceId, array $meta): void;
+    public function configVersion(string $deviceId): int;
+}

cloud/src/Repository/EventRepository.php

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+<?php
+declare(strict_types=1);
+namespace App\Repository;
+
+interface EventRepository
+{
+    public function insert(array $event): int;
+    public function recent(int $limit, ?string $severity): array;
+    public function find(int $id): ?array;
+    public function acknowledge(int $id, string $user): bool;
+}

cloud/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoAuditRepository.php

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ final class PdoAuditRepository implements AuditRepository
     public function append(string $actor, string $action, string $target, array $before, array $after): void
     {
         $st = $this->pdo->prepare(
-            'INSERT INTO move_audit_log (actor, action, target, before_json, after_json, ts)
+            'INSERT INTO audit_log (actor, action, target, before_json, after_json, ts)
              VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)'
         );
         $st->execute([

cloud/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoDeviceRepository.php

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+<?php
+declare(strict_types=1);
+namespace App\Repository\Pdo;
+
+use App\Repository\DeviceRepository;
+use PDO;
+
+final class PdoDeviceRepository implements DeviceRepository
+{
+    public function __construct(private PDO $pdo) {}
+
+    public function secretFor(string $deviceId): ?string
+    {
+        $st = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT secret FROM devices WHERE device_id = ? LIMIT 1');
+        $st->execute([$deviceId]);
+        $secret = $st->fetchColumn();
+        return $secret === false ? null : (string)$secret;
+    }
+
+    public function touchHeartbeat(string $deviceId, array $meta): void
+    {
+        // A plain UPDATE (not upsert) is safe here: the caller (HeartbeatController)
+        // only reaches this after secretFor() already succeeded for the same
+        // device_id, so the row is guaranteed to exist. Device rows are provisioned
+        // out-of-band by an admin (see cloud/docs/cloud-deploy.md), never created
+        // implicitly from an inbound heartbeat.
+        $st = $this->pdo->prepare(
+            'UPDATE devices
+                SET last_fps = ?, last_temp = ?, last_throttle = ?,
+                    reported_config_version = ?, last_heartbeat_at = ?
+              WHERE device_id = ?'
+        );
+        $st->execute([
+            (float)($meta['fps'] ?? 0.0),
+            (float)($meta['temp'] ?? 0.0),
+            !empty($meta['throttle']) ? 1 : 0,
+            (int)($meta['config_version'] ?? 0),
+            (int)($meta['at'] ?? time()),
+            $deviceId,
+        ]);
+    }
+
+    public function configVersion(string $deviceId): int
+    {
+        $st = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT config_version FROM devices WHERE device_id = ? LIMIT 1');
+        $st->execute([$deviceId]);
+        $version = $st->fetchColumn();
+        return $version === false ? 1 : (int)$version;
+    }
+}

cloud/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoEventRepository.php

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ use PDO;
 final class PdoEventRepository implements EventRepository
 {
     private const SELECT_COLUMNS =
-        'event_id, event_uuid, device_id, site, camera_id, event_type, severity, track_id, zone_id,
+        'event_id, device_id, camera_id, event_type, severity, track_id, zone_id,
          occurred_at, duration_s, metrics_json, acknowledged_by, acknowledged_at';
 
     public function __construct(private PDO $pdo) {}
@@ -16,15 +16,13 @@ final class PdoEventRepository implements EventRepository
     public function insert(array $event): int
     {
         $st = $this->pdo->prepare(
-            'INSERT INTO move_events
+            'INSERT INTO events
-                (event_uuid, device_id, site, camera_id, event_type, severity, track_id, zone_id,
+                (device_id, camera_id, event_type, severity, track_id, zone_id,
                  occurred_at, duration_s, metrics_json, received_at)
-             VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)'
+             VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)'
         );
         $st->execute([
-            $event['event_uuid'] ?? null,   // NULL when the edge sent no idempotency key (legacy)
             (string)$event['device_id'],
-            $event['site'] ?? null,          // denormalized from move_devices.site by IngestController
             (string)$event['camera_id'],
             (string)$event['event_type'],
             (string)$event['severity'],
@@ -38,20 +36,12 @@ final class PdoEventRepository implements EventRepository
         return (int)$this->pdo->lastInsertId();
     }
 
-    public function idByUuid(string $uuid): ?int
-    {
-        $st = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT event_id FROM move_events WHERE event_uuid = ? LIMIT 1');
-        $st->execute([$uuid]);
-        $id = $st->fetchColumn();
-        return $id === false ? null : (int)$id;
-    }
-
     public function recent(int $limit, ?string $severity): array
     {
         if ($severity !== null) {
             $st = $this->pdo->prepare(
                 'SELECT ' . self::SELECT_COLUMNS . '
-                   FROM move_events WHERE severity = ?
+                   FROM events WHERE severity = ?
                ORDER BY occurred_at DESC, event_id DESC LIMIT ?'
             );
             $st->bindValue(1, $severity, PDO::PARAM_STR);
@@ -59,7 +49,7 @@ final class PdoEventRepository implements EventRepository
         } else {
             $st = $this->pdo->prepare(
                 'SELECT ' . self::SELECT_COLUMNS . '
-                   FROM move_events
+                   FROM events
                ORDER BY occurred_at DESC, event_id DESC LIMIT ?'
             );
             $st->bindValue(1, $limit, PDO::PARAM_INT);
@@ -68,45 +58,9 @@ final class PdoEventRepository implements EventRepository
         return array_map(self::mapRow(...), $st->fetchAll());
     }
 
-    public function page(int $limit, ?string $severity, ?string $beforeTs, ?int $beforeId, ?string $site = null): array
-    {
-        // Bind list as [value, PDO type] pairs, positional in SQL order.
-        $where = [];
-        $binds = [];
-        if ($severity !== null) {
-            $where[] = 'severity = ?';
-            $binds[] = [$severity, PDO::PARAM_STR];
-        }
-        if ($site !== null) {
-            // Site-scope access control: a scoped operator sees only their site's events.
-            $where[] = 'site = ?';
-            $binds[] = [$site, PDO::PARAM_STR];
-        }
-        // Keyset predicate: strictly "older" than the client's last-seen (occurred_at, event_id)
-        // on the (occurred_at DESC, event_id DESC) order. occurred_at arrives as its exact numeric
-        // STRING (never round-tripped through a PHP float) and is bound as a string, so MySQL
-        // parses it to the same DOUBLE the column holds — the page-edge boundary stays exact.
-        if ($beforeTs !== null && $beforeId !== null) {
-            $where[] = '(occurred_at < ? OR (occurred_at = ? AND event_id < ?))';
-            $binds[] = [$beforeTs, PDO::PARAM_STR];
-            $binds[] = [$beforeTs, PDO::PARAM_STR];
-            $binds[] = [$beforeId, PDO::PARAM_INT];
-        }
-        $sql = 'SELECT ' . self::SELECT_COLUMNS . ' FROM move_events';
-        if ($where) $sql .= ' WHERE ' . implode(' AND ', $where);
-        $sql .= ' ORDER BY occurred_at DESC, event_id DESC LIMIT ?';
-        $binds[] = [$limit, PDO::PARAM_INT];
-
-        $st = $this->pdo->prepare($sql);
-        $pos = 1;
-        foreach ($binds as [$val, $type]) $st->bindValue($pos++, $val, $type);
-        $st->execute();
-        return array_map(self::mapRow(...), $st->fetchAll());
-    }
-
     public function find(int $id): ?array
     {
-        $st = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT ' . self::SELECT_COLUMNS . ' FROM move_events WHERE event_id = ?');
+        $st = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT ' . self::SELECT_COLUMNS . ' FROM events WHERE event_id = ?');
         $st->execute([$id]);
         $row = $st->fetch();
         return $row === false ? null : self::mapRow($row);
@@ -119,13 +73,13 @@ final class PdoEventRepository implements EventRepository
         // "changed rows" rather than "matched rows": re-acknowledging an
         // already-acknowledged event by the same user would otherwise report
         // 0 affected rows and this method would wrongly return false.
-        $exists = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT 1 FROM move_events WHERE event_id = ? LIMIT 1');
+        $exists = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT 1 FROM events WHERE event_id = ? LIMIT 1');
         $exists->execute([$id]);
         if ($exists->fetchColumn() === false) {
             return false;
         }
         $st = $this->pdo->prepare(
-            'UPDATE move_events SET acknowledged_by = ?, acknowledged_at = ? WHERE event_id = ?'
+            'UPDATE events SET acknowledged_by = ?, acknowledged_at = ? WHERE event_id = ?'
         );
         $st->execute([$user, time(), $id]);
         return true;
@@ -135,9 +89,7 @@ final class PdoEventRepository implements EventRepository
     {
         return [
             'event_id' => (int)$row['event_id'],
-            'event_uuid' => $row['event_uuid'] ?? null,
             'device_id' => $row['device_id'],
-            'site' => $row['site'] ?? null,
             'camera_id' => $row['camera_id'],
             'event_type' => $row['event_type'],
             'severity' => $row['severity'],

cloud/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoNonceRepository.php

@@ -20,21 +20,14 @@ final class PdoNonceRepository implements NonceRepository
 
     public function seen(string $nonce): bool
     {
-        $st = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT 1 FROM move_nonces WHERE nonce = ? LIMIT 1');
+        $st = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT 1 FROM nonces WHERE nonce = ? LIMIT 1');
         $st->execute([$nonce]);
         return (bool)$st->fetchColumn();
     }
 
     public function remember(string $nonce, int $expiresAt): void
     {
-        $st = $this->pdo->prepare('INSERT INTO move_nonces (nonce, expires_at) VALUES (?, ?)');
+        $st = $this->pdo->prepare('INSERT INTO nonces (nonce, expires_at) VALUES (?, ?)');
         $st->execute([$nonce, $expiresAt]);
-        // Cron-less reap: Cafe24 has no scheduler, so expired nonces accumulate forever until
-        // the table bloats and inserts slow/fail. Opportunistically prune a bounded batch of
-        // already-expired rows (safe: seen() only cares about unexpired ones).
-        if (mt_rand(1, 100) === 1) {
-            $del = $this->pdo->prepare('DELETE FROM move_nonces WHERE expires_at < ? LIMIT 5000');
-            $del->execute([time()]);
-        }
     }
 }

cloud/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoRateLimiterRepository.php

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+<?php
+declare(strict_types=1);
+namespace App\Repository\Pdo;
+
+use App\Repository\RateLimiterRepository;
+use PDO;
+
+/**
+ * Atomic upsert via MySQL's INSERT ... ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE against the
+ * unique (rate_key, window_start) primary key (see schema.sql) -- no
+ * read-modify-write race between reading the current count and writing the
+ * incremented value back.
+ */
+final class PdoRateLimiterRepository implements RateLimiterRepository
+{
+    public function __construct(private PDO $pdo) {}
+
+    public function hit(string $key, int $windowStart): int
+    {
+        $upsert = $this->pdo->prepare(
+            'INSERT INTO rate_limits (rate_key, window_start, count) VALUES (?, ?, 1)
+             ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE count = count + 1'
+        );
+        $upsert->execute([$key, $windowStart]);
+
+        $select = $this->pdo->prepare(
+            'SELECT count FROM rate_limits WHERE rate_key = ? AND window_start = ?'
+        );
+        $select->execute([$key, $windowStart]);
+        return (int)$select->fetchColumn();
+    }
+}

cloud/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoSnapshotRepository.php

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+<?php
+declare(strict_types=1);
+namespace App\Repository\Pdo;
+
+use App\Repository\SnapshotRepository;
+use PDO;
+
+final class PdoSnapshotRepository implements SnapshotRepository
+{
+    public function __construct(private PDO $pdo, private string $snapshotDir) {}
+
+    public function add(int $eventId, string $fileUuid, string $contentHash): void
+    {
+        $st = $this->pdo->prepare(
+            'INSERT INTO event_snapshots (event_id, file_uuid, content_hash, created_at)
+             VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)'
+        );
+        $st->execute([$eventId, $fileUuid, $contentHash, time()]);
+    }
+
+    public function forEvent(int $eventId): array
+    {
+        $st = $this->pdo->prepare(
+            'SELECT file_uuid, content_hash FROM event_snapshots
+              WHERE event_id = ? ORDER BY snapshot_id ASC'
+        );
+        $st->execute([$eventId]);
+        return $st->fetchAll();
+    }
+
+    public function pathByUuid(string $uuid): ?string
+    {
+        // Validate BEFORE building any filesystem path or touching the DB --
+        // SnapshotProxy trusts whatever this method returns and does
+        // file_get_contents() on it, so a non-hex/wrong-length uuid must never
+        // reach path construction (closes the path-traversal risk flagged in
+        // the Task 12 review).
+        if (strlen($uuid) !== 32 || !ctype_xdigit($uuid)) {
+            return null;
+        }
+
+        $st = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT 1 FROM event_snapshots WHERE file_uuid = ? LIMIT 1');
+        $st->execute([$uuid]);
+        if ($st->fetchColumn() === false) {
+            return null;
+        }
+
+        return rtrim($this->snapshotDir, '/\\') . '/' . $uuid . '.jpg';
+    }
+}

cloud/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoThresholdRepository.php

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ final class PdoThresholdRepository implements ThresholdRepository
 
     public function forDevice(string $deviceId): array
     {
-        $st = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT `key`, `value` FROM move_thresholds WHERE device_id = ?');
+        $st = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT `key`, `value` FROM thresholds WHERE device_id = ?');
         $st->execute([$deviceId]);
 
         $out = [];

cloud/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoUserRepository.php

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ final class PdoUserRepository implements UserRepository
     {
         $st = $this->pdo->prepare(
             'SELECT id, username, password_hash, role, site_scope, failed_attempts, locked_until
-               FROM move_users WHERE username = ? LIMIT 1'
+               FROM users WHERE username = ? LIMIT 1'
         );
         $st->execute([$username]);
         $row = $st->fetch();
@@ -36,14 +36,14 @@ final class PdoUserRepository implements UserRepository
         // Increment in SQL (not read-then-write in PHP) so concurrent failed
         // logins for the same account can't clobber each other's count.
         $st = $this->pdo->prepare(
-            'UPDATE move_users SET failed_attempts = failed_attempts + 1, locked_until = ? WHERE id = ?'
+            'UPDATE users SET failed_attempts = failed_attempts + 1, locked_until = ? WHERE id = ?'
         );
         $st->execute([$lockUntil, $userId]);
     }
 
     public function clearFailures(int $userId): void
     {
-        $st = $this->pdo->prepare('UPDATE move_users SET failed_attempts = 0, locked_until = 0 WHERE id = ?');
+        $st = $this->pdo->prepare('UPDATE users SET failed_attempts = 0, locked_until = 0 WHERE id = ?');
         $st->execute([$userId]);
     }
 }

cloud/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoZoneRepository.php

@@ -3,27 +3,17 @@ declare(strict_types=1);
 namespace App\Repository\Pdo;
 
 use App\Repository\ZoneRepository;
-use App\Repository\ZoneOwnershipException;
 use PDO;
+use RuntimeException;
 
 final class PdoZoneRepository implements ZoneRepository
 {
     public function __construct(private PDO $pdo) {}
 
-    public function find(string $zoneId): ?array
-    {
-        $st = $this->pdo->prepare(
-            'SELECT zone_id, device_id, camera_id, level, polygon_json FROM move_zones WHERE zone_id = ? LIMIT 1'
-        );
-        $st->execute([$zoneId]);
-        $row = $st->fetch();
-        return $row === false ? null : $row;
-    }
-
     public function forDevice(string $deviceId): array
     {
         $st = $this->pdo->prepare(
-            'SELECT zone_id, device_id, camera_id, level, polygon_json FROM move_zones WHERE device_id = ?'
+            'SELECT zone_id, device_id, camera_id, level, polygon_json FROM zones WHERE device_id = ?'
         );
         $st->execute([$deviceId]);
         return $st->fetchAll();
@@ -32,7 +22,7 @@ final class PdoZoneRepository implements ZoneRepository
     public function forCamera(string $cameraId): array
     {
         $st = $this->pdo->prepare(
-            'SELECT zone_id, device_id, camera_id, level, polygon_json FROM move_zones WHERE camera_id = ?'
+            'SELECT zone_id, device_id, camera_id, level, polygon_json FROM zones WHERE camera_id = ?'
         );
         $st->execute([$cameraId]);
         return $st->fetchAll();
@@ -52,7 +42,7 @@ final class PdoZoneRepository implements ZoneRepository
 
         $newId = bin2hex(random_bytes(16));
         $st = $this->pdo->prepare(
-            'INSERT INTO move_zones (zone_id, device_id, camera_id, level, polygon_json, updated_at)
+            'INSERT INTO zones (zone_id, device_id, camera_id, level, polygon_json, updated_at)
              VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)'
         );
         $st->execute([$newId, $deviceId, $cameraId, $level, $polygonJson, time()]);
@@ -61,7 +51,7 @@ final class PdoZoneRepository implements ZoneRepository
 
     public function delete(string $zoneId): bool
     {
-        $st = $this->pdo->prepare('DELETE FROM move_zones WHERE zone_id = ?');
+        $st = $this->pdo->prepare('DELETE FROM zones WHERE zone_id = ?');
         $st->execute([$zoneId]);
         return $st->rowCount() > 0;
     }
@@ -89,15 +79,15 @@ final class PdoZoneRepository implements ZoneRepository
         string $polygonJson,
     ): string {
         $owns = $this->pdo->prepare(
-            'SELECT 1 FROM move_zones WHERE zone_id = ? AND device_id = ? AND camera_id = ? LIMIT 1'
+            'SELECT 1 FROM zones WHERE zone_id = ? AND device_id = ? AND camera_id = ? LIMIT 1'
         );
         $owns->execute([$zoneId, $deviceId, $cameraId]);
         if ($owns->fetchColumn() === false) {
-            throw new ZoneOwnershipException('zone not found or not owned by the given device/camera');
+            throw new RuntimeException('zone not found or not owned by the given device/camera');
         }
 
         $st = $this->pdo->prepare(
-            'UPDATE move_zones SET level = ?, polygon_json = ?, updated_at = ?
+            'UPDATE zones SET level = ?, polygon_json = ?, updated_at = ?
               WHERE zone_id = ? AND device_id = ? AND camera_id = ?'
         );
         $st->execute([$level, $polygonJson, time(), $zoneId, $deviceId, $cameraId]);
@@ -108,10 +98,10 @@ final class PdoZoneRepository implements ZoneRepository
             // error) or (b) the zone was deleted between the ownership check
             // above and this UPDATE. Disambiguate with a targeted existence
             // check instead of assuming either case.
-            $stillExists = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT 1 FROM move_zones WHERE zone_id = ? LIMIT 1');
+            $stillExists = $this->pdo->prepare('SELECT 1 FROM zones WHERE zone_id = ? LIMIT 1');
             $stillExists->execute([$zoneId]);
             if ($stillExists->fetchColumn() === false) {
-                throw new ZoneOwnershipException('zone was deleted concurrently');
+                throw new RuntimeException('zone was deleted concurrently');
             }
         }
         return $zoneId;

cloud/src/Repository/SnapshotRepository.php

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+<?php
+declare(strict_types=1);
+namespace App\Repository;
+
+interface SnapshotRepository
+{
+    public function add(int $eventId, string $fileUuid, string $contentHash): void;
+    public function forEvent(int $eventId): array;
+    public function pathByUuid(string $uuid): ?string;
+}

cloud/src/Repository/ZoneRepository.php

@@ -6,8 +6,6 @@ interface ZoneRepository
 {
     public function forDevice(string $deviceId): array;
     public function forCamera(string $cameraId): array;
-    /** The single zone row (incl. device_id) by id, or null — for site-scope resolution. */
-    public function find(string $zoneId): ?array;
     public function save(array $zone): string;
     public function delete(string $zoneId): bool;
 }

cloud/src/View/event_detail.php

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ render_header('이벤트 상세');
 <h1>이벤트 상세</h1>
 <div id="event-detail-meta" role="status" aria-live="polite" aria-busy="true">불러오는 중...</div>
 <div id="event-detail-snapshots"></div>
-<p><a href="<?= view_url('/') ?>">← 목록으로</a></p>
+<p><a href="/">← 목록으로</a></p>
-<script src="<?= view_url('/assets/detail.js') ?>"></script>
+<script src="/assets/detail.js"></script>
 <?php
 render_footer();

cloud/src/View/events.php

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+<?php
+require __DIR__ . '/layout.php';
+render_header('이벤트');
+?>
+<h1>이벤트</h1>
+<div id="events-root" aria-live="polite" aria-busy="true">불러오는 중...</div>
+<script src="/assets/app.js"></script>
+<?php
+render_footer();

cloud/src/View/layout.php

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+<?php
+/**
+ * Shared header/nav + footer for server-rendered views.
+ * No business logic: only static markup + minimal session-derived display state
+ * (username is read from $_SESSION purely for display, not decisioning).
+ * render_header()/render_footer() bracket the page-specific <main> content.
+ */
+
+if (!function_exists('view_e')) {
+    function view_e(string $s): string { return htmlspecialchars($s, ENT_QUOTES | ENT_SUBSTITUTE, 'UTF-8'); }
+}
+
+if (!function_exists('render_header')) {
+    function render_header(string $title): void {
+        $username = is_string($_SESSION['username'] ?? null) ? $_SESSION['username'] : null;
+        ?>
+<!doctype html>
+<html lang="ko">
+<head>
+<meta charset="utf-8">
+<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
+<title><?= view_e($title) ?> · 이동 감지 대시보드</title>
+<link rel="stylesheet" href="/assets/app.css">
+</head>
+<body>
+<header class="app-header">
+  <nav class="app-nav">
+    <a href="/">이벤트</a>
+    <a href="/zones">구역 설정</a>
+  </nav>
+  <div class="app-session">
+<?php if ($username !== null): ?>
+    <span><?= view_e($username) ?></span>
+    <button type="button" id="logout-btn">로그아웃</button>
+<?php else: ?>
+    <a href="/login">로그인</a>
+<?php endif; ?>
+  </div>
+</header>
+<main class="app-main">
+<?php
+    }
+}
+
+if (!function_exists('render_footer')) {
+    function render_footer(): void {
+?>
+</main>
+</body>
+</html>
+<?php
+    }
+}

cloud/src/View/login.php

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ $csrf = $_SESSION['csrf'];
 
 render_header('로그인');
 ?>
-<form method="post" action="<?= view_url('/login') ?>" class="login-form">
+<form method="post" action="/login" class="login-form">
   <h1>로그인</h1>
   <input type="hidden" name="csrf" value="<?= view_e($csrf) ?>">
   <label for="username">아이디</label>
@@ -20,6 +20,6 @@ render_header('로그인');
   <button type="submit">로그인</button>
   <p id="login-error" class="form-error" role="alert" hidden></p>
 </form>
-<script src="<?= view_url('/assets/login.js') ?>" defer></script>
+<script src="/assets/login.js" defer></script>
 <?php
 render_footer();

cloud/src/View/zones.php

@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ render_header('구역 설정');
   <label for="camera-id">카메라 ID</label>
   <input type="text" id="camera-id" placeholder="cam-01">
   <button type="button" id="zone-load-btn">불러오기</button>
-  <button type="button" id="zone-frame-btn">현재 화면 불러오기</button>
 </div>
 <div class="zone-controls">
   <label for="zone-level">등급</label>
@@ -24,6 +23,6 @@ render_header('구역 설정');
 <canvas id="zone-canvas" width="960" height="540" tabindex="0" aria-label="구역 편집 캔버스: 클릭하여 폴리곤 점을 추가합니다"></canvas>
 <ul id="zone-list" aria-live="polite"></ul>
 <p id="zone-status" role="status"></p>
-<script src="<?= view_url('/assets/zone-draw.js') ?>"></script>
+<script src="/assets/zone-draw.js"></script>
 <?php
 render_footer();

cloud/tests/ApiSyncTest.php

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ use App\Config;
 use App\Http\Request;
 use App\Security\Hmac;
 use App\Api\{ConfigController, HeartbeatController};
-use App\Tests\Support\{InMemoryDeviceRepository, InMemoryZoneRepository, InMemoryThresholdRepository, InMemoryNonceRepository, InMemoryRateLimiter};
+use App\Tests\Support\{InMemoryDeviceRepository, InMemoryZoneRepository, InMemoryThresholdRepository, InMemoryNonceRepository};
 use PHPUnit\Framework\TestCase;
 
 final class ApiSyncTest extends TestCase
@@ -65,19 +65,6 @@ final class ApiSyncTest extends TestCase
         $res = $c->post($this->signed('POST', '/api/heartbeat', 'sek', [], $body), now: 1000);
         $this->assertSame(200, $res->status());
         $this->assertSame(12.0, $dev->heartbeats['pi-1']['fps']);
-        $this->assertSame(7, $dev->heartbeats['pi-1']['config_version']);
-    }
-    public function testHeartbeatStoresNullConfigVersionWhenNotReported(): void {
-        // An older edge build sends no config_version. The server must store NULL, not a fake 0 —
-        // storing 0 made the dashboard's config-drift check fire on every device forever (0 != 1),
-        // training operators to ignore the device-warning line.
-        $cfg = Config::fromArray([]);
-        $dev = new InMemoryDeviceRepository(['pi-1' => 'sek']);
-        $c = new HeartbeatController($cfg, $dev, new InMemoryNonceRepository());
-        $body = ['device_id' => 'pi-1', 'fps' => 12.0];   // no config_version reported
-        $res = $c->post($this->signed('POST', '/api/heartbeat', 'sek', [], $body), now: 1000);
-        $this->assertSame(200, $res->status());
-        $this->assertNull($dev->heartbeats['pi-1']['config_version']);
     }
     public function testHeartbeatRejectsReplayedNonce(): void {
         $cfg = Config::fromArray([]);
@@ -98,15 +85,4 @@ final class ApiSyncTest extends TestCase
         $req = $this->signed('POST', '/api/heartbeat', 'sek', [], $body, 'hb-stale', '1000');
         $this->assertSame(401, $c->post($req, now: 5000)->status()); // 4000s > 300 default window
     }
-    public function testHeartbeatIpFloodRateLimited(): void {
-        // An unauthenticated attacker flooding /api/heartbeat from one IP must be throttled
-        // pre-auth, before the HMAC + DB write on every hit (was: no limit at all).
-        $cfg = Config::fromArray(['ingest_ip_rate_limit_per_min' => 2]);
-        $dev = new InMemoryDeviceRepository(['pi-1' => 'sek']);
-        $c = new HeartbeatController($cfg, $dev, new InMemoryNonceRepository(), new InMemoryRateLimiter());
-        $garbage = new Request('POST', '/api/heartbeat', [], 'not-json', [], []);
-        $this->assertSame(401, $c->post($garbage, now: 1000, clientIp: '9.9.9.9')->status());
-        $this->assertSame(401, $c->post($garbage, now: 1000, clientIp: '9.9.9.9')->status());
-        $this->assertSame(429, $c->post($garbage, now: 1000, clientIp: '9.9.9.9')->status()); // 3rd from same IP
-    }
 }

cloud/tests/AuthControllerTest.php

@@ -15,16 +15,12 @@ final class AuthControllerTest extends TestCase
             'role' => 'operator', 'site_scope' => null, 'failed_attempts' => 0, 'locked_until' => 0,
         ]]);
     }
-    private function sess(): ArraySessionStore {
-        // Model the real flow: GET /login already seeded the session csrf token before POST.
-        $s = new ArraySessionStore(); $s->set('csrf', 'tok'); return $s;
-    }
     private function req(string $u, string $p): Request {
-        return new Request('POST', '/login', [], '', [], ['username' => $u, 'password' => $p, 'csrf' => 'tok']);
+        return new Request('POST', '/login', [], '', [], ['username' => $u, 'password' => $p]);
     }
     public function testLoginSuccessSetsSession(): void {
         $c = new AuthController($this->users(), new InMemoryAuditRepository(), new InMemoryRateLimiter());
-        $sess = $this->sess();
+        $sess = new ArraySessionStore();
         $res = $c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), $sess, now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4');
         $this->assertSame(200, $res->status());
         $this->assertSame(1, $sess->get('user_id'));
@@ -32,39 +28,39 @@ final class AuthControllerTest extends TestCase
     }
     public function testBadPasswordIs401(): void {
         $c = new AuthController($this->users(), new InMemoryAuditRepository(), new InMemoryRateLimiter());
-        $this->assertSame(401, $c->login($this->req('alice', 'nope'), $this->sess(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status());
+        $this->assertSame(401, $c->login($this->req('alice', 'nope'), new ArraySessionStore(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status());
     }
     public function testLockoutAfterMaxAttempts(): void {
         $repo = $this->users();
         $c = new AuthController($repo, new InMemoryAuditRepository(), new InMemoryRateLimiter(), maxAttempts: 3, lockSeconds: 900);
-        for ($i = 0; $i < 3; $i++) $c->login($this->req('alice', 'bad'), $this->sess(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4');
+        for ($i = 0; $i < 3; $i++) $c->login($this->req('alice', 'bad'), new ArraySessionStore(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4');
         // now locked, even correct password is 423
-        $this->assertSame(423, $c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), $this->sess(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status());
+        $this->assertSame(423, $c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), new ArraySessionStore(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status());
     }
     public function testExpiredLockResetsAttempts(): void {
         $repo = $this->users();
         $c = new AuthController($repo, new InMemoryAuditRepository(), new InMemoryRateLimiter(), maxAttempts: 3, lockSeconds: 900);
         // lock the account with 3 bad tries at now=1000
-        for ($i = 0; $i < 3; $i++) $c->login($this->req('alice', 'bad'), $this->sess(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4');
+        for ($i = 0; $i < 3; $i++) $c->login($this->req('alice', 'bad'), new ArraySessionStore(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4');
         // locked_until is now 1000 + 900 = 1900, verify it's locked
-        $this->assertSame(423, $c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), $this->sess(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status());
+        $this->assertSame(423, $c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), new ArraySessionStore(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status());
         // now at now=2000 (after lock window expires at 1900), login with correct password should succeed
-        $sess = $this->sess();
+        $sess = new ArraySessionStore();
         $res = $c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), $sess, now: 2000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4');
         $this->assertSame(200, $res->status());
         $this->assertSame(1, $sess->get('user_id'));
     }
     public function testUnknownUsernameReturns401GenericBody(): void {
         $c = new AuthController($this->users(), new InMemoryAuditRepository(), new InMemoryRateLimiter());
-        $res = $c->login($this->req('nobody', 'whatever'), $this->sess(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4');
+        $res = $c->login($this->req('nobody', 'whatever'), new ArraySessionStore(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4');
         $this->assertSame(401, $res->status());
         // identical generic body to the wrong-password case (no user-enumeration leak)
-        $wrong = $c->login($this->req('alice', 'nope'), $this->sess(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4');
+        $wrong = $c->login($this->req('alice', 'nope'), new ArraySessionStore(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4');
         $this->assertSame($wrong->body(), $res->body());
     }
     public function testLogoutClearsSession(): void {
         $c = new AuthController($this->users(), new InMemoryAuditRepository(), new InMemoryRateLimiter());
-        $sess = $this->sess();
+        $sess = new ArraySessionStore();
         $c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), $sess, now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4');
         $this->assertSame(1, $sess->get('user_id'));
         $res = $c->logout($sess);
@@ -76,22 +72,8 @@ final class AuthControllerTest extends TestCase
         // throttled before the (expensive) Argon2id verify runs repeatedly.
         $c = new AuthController($this->users(), new InMemoryAuditRepository(), new InMemoryRateLimiter(), loginIpLimitPerMin: 2);
         $ip = '9.9.9.9';
-        $this->assertSame(200, $c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), $this->sess(), now: 1000, clientIp: $ip)->status());
+        $this->assertSame(200, $c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), new ArraySessionStore(), now: 1000, clientIp: $ip)->status());
-        $this->assertSame(200, $c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), $this->sess(), now: 1000, clientIp: $ip)->status());
+        $this->assertSame(200, $c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), new ArraySessionStore(), now: 1000, clientIp: $ip)->status());
-        $this->assertSame(429, $c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), $this->sess(), now: 1000, clientIp: $ip)->status());
+        $this->assertSame(429, $c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), new ArraySessionStore(), now: 1000, clientIp: $ip)->status());
-    }
-    public function testLoginRejectsMissingOrWrongCsrf(): void {
-        // Login CSRF: a forged cross-site POST would carry no (or a wrong) csrf field and must be
-        // rejected 403 BEFORE any credential check — even with an otherwise-valid password.
-        $c = new AuthController($this->users(), new InMemoryAuditRepository(), new InMemoryRateLimiter());
-        // missing csrf field in the body
-        $missing = new Request('POST', '/login', [], '', [], ['username' => 'alice', 'password' => 'pw']);
-        $this->assertSame(403, $c->login($missing, $this->sess(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status());
-        // wrong csrf token
-        $wrong = new Request('POST', '/login', [], '', [], ['username' => 'alice', 'password' => 'pw', 'csrf' => 'nope']);
-        $this->assertSame(403, $c->login($wrong, $this->sess(), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status());
-        // session that never seeded a token (empty expected) also rejects, even with a matching-looking field
-        $noTok = new ArraySessionStore();
-        $this->assertSame(403, $c->login($this->req('alice', 'pw'), $noTok, now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status());
     }
 }

cloud/tests/DashboardTest.php

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+<?php
+declare(strict_types=1);
+namespace App\Tests;
+use App\Http\Request;
+use App\Auth\ArraySessionStore;
+use App\Dashboard\{EventListController, EventDetailController, SnapshotProxy};
+use App\Tests\Support\{InMemoryEventRepository, InMemorySnapshotRepository, InMemoryAuditRepository};
+use PHPUnit\Framework\TestCase;
+
+final class DashboardTest extends TestCase
+{
+    private function authed(string $role = 'operator'): ArraySessionStore {
+        $s = new ArraySessionStore(); $s->set('user_id', 1); $s->set('username', 'u'); $s->set('role', $role); $s->set('csrf', 'tok'); return $s;
+    }
+    public function testListRequiresAuth(): void {
+        $repo = new InMemoryEventRepository();
+        $c = new EventListController($repo, new ArraySessionStore());
+        $this->assertSame(401, $c->json(new Request('GET', '/api/events', [], '', [], []))->status());
+    }
+    public function testListReturnsRecent(): void {
+        $repo = new InMemoryEventRepository();
+        $repo->insert(['severity' => 'high', 'event_type' => 'fall']);
+        $c = new EventListController($repo, $this->authed());
+        $res = $c->json(new Request('GET', '/api/events', [], '', [], []));
+        $this->assertSame(200, $res->status());
+        $this->assertCount(1, json_decode($res->body(), true)['events']);
+    }
+    public function testAcknowledgeRequiresPermissionAndSetsUser(): void {
+        $repo = new InMemoryEventRepository();
+        $id = $repo->insert(['severity' => 'critical', 'event_type' => 'no_motion']);
+        $req = new Request('POST', "/events/$id/ack", ['X-Csrf-Token' => 'tok'], '', [], []);
+        // viewer denied (RBAC check fires before CSRF)
+        $cv = new EventDetailController($repo, new InMemorySnapshotRepository(), new InMemoryAuditRepository(), $this->authed('viewer'));
+        $this->assertSame(403, $cv->acknowledge($req, ['id' => (string)$id])->status());
+        // operator allowed
+        $co = new EventDetailController($repo, new InMemorySnapshotRepository(), new InMemoryAuditRepository(), $this->authed('operator'));
+        $this->assertSame(200, $co->acknowledge($req, ['id' => (string)$id])->status());
+        $this->assertSame('u', $repo->find($id)['acknowledged_by']);
+    }
+    public function testAcknowledgeRejectsMissingOrWrongCsrfToken(): void {
+        $repo = new InMemoryEventRepository();
+        $id = $repo->insert(['severity' => 'critical', 'event_type' => 'no_motion']);
+        $c = new EventDetailController($repo, new InMemorySnapshotRepository(), new InMemoryAuditRepository(), $this->authed('operator'));
+        // missing header
+        $missing = new Request('POST', "/events/$id/ack", [], '', [], []);
+        $this->assertSame(403, $c->acknowledge($missing, ['id' => (string)$id])->status());
+        // wrong token
+        $wrong = new Request('POST', "/events/$id/ack", ['X-Csrf-Token' => 'nope'], '', [], []);
+        $this->assertSame(403, $c->acknowledge($wrong, ['id' => (string)$id])->status());
+        // acknowledge did not proceed
+        $this->assertNull($repo->find($id)['acknowledged_by']);
+    }
+    public function testSnapshotProxyAuthAnd404(): void {
+        $snaps = new InMemorySnapshotRepository();
+        $proxy = new SnapshotProxy($snaps, new ArraySessionStore()); // unauth
+        $this->assertSame(401, $proxy->serve(new Request('GET', '/snap/x', [], '', [], []), ['uuid' => 'x'])->status());
+        $proxy2 = new SnapshotProxy($snaps, $this->authed());
+        $this->assertSame(404, $proxy2->serve(new Request('GET', '/snap/missing', [], '', [], []), ['uuid' => 'missing'])->status());
+    }
+}

cloud/tests/EventValidatorTest.php

@@ -15,35 +15,6 @@ final class EventValidatorTest extends TestCase
         $this->assertTrue($r['ok'], implode(',', $r['errors']));
         $this->assertSame('fall', $r['clean']['event_type']);
     }
-    public function testRejectsOverlongIds(): void {
-        // An overlong id must be a 400 (invalid), not a MySQL 'Data too long' 500 that the edge
-        // then retries forever. Columns: device_id/camera_id VARCHAR(64), zone_id CHAR(32).
-        $long = $this->valid(); $long['device_id'] = str_repeat('x', 65);
-        $this->assertFalse(EventValidator::validate($long)['ok']);
-        $cam = $this->valid(); $cam['camera_id'] = str_repeat('y', 65);
-        $this->assertFalse(EventValidator::validate($cam)['ok']);
-        $zone = $this->valid(); $zone['zone_id'] = str_repeat('z', 33);
-        $this->assertFalse(EventValidator::validate($zone)['ok']);
-        // a normal-length id still passes
-        $ok = $this->valid(); $ok['device_id'] = str_repeat('x', 64);
-        $this->assertTrue(EventValidator::validate($ok)['ok']);
-    }
-    public function testAcceptsAndCleansEventUuid(): void {
-        $p = $this->valid(); $p['event_uuid'] = str_repeat('a', 32);
-        $r = EventValidator::validate($p);
-        $this->assertTrue($r['ok'], implode(',', $r['errors']));
-        $this->assertSame(str_repeat('a', 32), $r['clean']['event_uuid']);
-        // Optional: omitting it is valid and clean carries null (legacy edges send no uuid).
-        $none = EventValidator::validate($this->valid());
-        $this->assertTrue($none['ok']);
-        $this->assertNull($none['clean']['event_uuid']);
-    }
-    public function testRejectsMalformedEventUuid(): void {
-        foreach (['XYZ', str_repeat('a', 31), str_repeat('A', 32), 'g' . str_repeat('a', 31)] as $bad) {
-            $p = $this->valid(); $p['event_uuid'] = $bad;
-            $this->assertFalse(EventValidator::validate($p)['ok'], "uuid '$bad' must be rejected");
-        }
-    }
     public function testRejectsUnknownEventType(): void {
         $p = $this->valid(); $p['event_type'] = 'explode';
         $this->assertFalse(EventValidator::validate($p)['ok']);

cloud/tests/IngestControllerTest.php

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+<?php
+declare(strict_types=1);
+namespace App\Tests;
+use App\Config;
+use App\Http\Request;
+use App\Security\Hmac;
+use App\Ingest\IngestController;
+use App\Tests\Support\{InMemoryDeviceRepository, InMemoryNonceRepository,
+    InMemoryRateLimiter, InMemoryEventRepository, InMemorySnapshotRepository};
+use PHPUnit\Framework\TestCase;
+
+final class IngestControllerTest extends TestCase
+{
+    private string $dir;
+    protected function setUp(): void { $this->dir = sys_get_temp_dir() . '/snaps' . bin2hex(random_bytes(4)); mkdir($this->dir); }
+
+    private function make(array $secrets = ['pi-1' => 'sekret']): array {
+        $cfg = Config::fromArray(['snapshot_dir' => $this->dir, 'timestamp_window' => 300, 'rate_limit_per_min' => 60]);
+        $dev = new InMemoryDeviceRepository($secrets);
+        $nonce = new InMemoryNonceRepository();
+        $rl = new InMemoryRateLimiter();
+        $events = new InMemoryEventRepository();
+        $snaps = new InMemorySnapshotRepository();
+        $c = new IngestController($cfg, $dev, $nonce, $rl, $events, $snaps);
+        return [$c, $events, $snaps, $nonce];
+    }
+    private function jpegB64(): string { $im = imagecreatetruecolor(8, 8); ob_start(); imagejpeg($im); $b = ob_get_clean(); return base64_encode($b); }
+
+    private function signedReq(string $secret, array $payload, string $nonce = 'n1', string $ts = '1000'): Request {
+        $body = json_encode($payload, JSON_UNESCAPED_UNICODE);
+        $sig = Hmac::sign($secret, $nonce, $ts, $body);
+        return new Request('POST', '/api/events',
+            ['X-Nonce' => $nonce, 'X-Timestamp' => $ts, 'X-Signature' => $sig], $body, [], []);
+    }
+    private function payload(): array {
+        return ['device_id' => 'pi-1', 'camera_id' => 'cam-1', 'event_type' => 'fall',
+                'severity' => 'high', 'occurred_at' => 1000.0, 'snapshots' => [$this->jpegB64()]];
+    }
+
+    public function testAcceptsValidSignedEvent(): void {
+        [$c, $events, $snaps] = $this->make();
+        $res = $c->handle($this->signedReq('sekret', $this->payload()), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4');
+        $this->assertSame(201, $res->status());
+        $this->assertCount(1, $events->rows);
+        $id = json_decode($res->body(), true)['event_id'];
+        $this->assertCount(1, $snaps->forEvent($id)); // snapshot re-encoded + stored
+    }
+    public function testRejectsBadSignature(): void {
+        [$c] = $this->make();
+        $req = $this->signedReq('WRONG', $this->payload());
+        $this->assertSame(401, $c->handle($req, now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status());
+    }
+    public function testRejectsReplayedNonce(): void {
+        [$c] = $this->make();
+        $req = $this->signedReq('sekret', $this->payload());
+        $this->assertSame(201, $c->handle($req, now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status());
+        $this->assertSame(401, $c->handle($req, now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status()); // same nonce again
+    }
+    public function testRejectsStaleTimestamp(): void {
+        [$c] = $this->make();
+        $req = $this->signedReq('sekret', $this->payload(), ts: '1000');
+        $this->assertSame(401, $c->handle($req, now: 5000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status()); // 4000s > 300 window
+    }
+    public function testRejectsUnknownDevice(): void {
+        [$c] = $this->make([]); // no secrets
+        $this->assertSame(401, $c->handle($this->signedReq('x', $this->payload()), now: 1000, clientIp: '1.2.3.4')->status());
+    }
+    public function testIpFloodRateLimited(): void {
+        // Attacker without a valid device secret floods from one IP; the pre-auth
+        // IP limiter must trip BEFORE any HMAC/device-secret work, protecting
+        // real devices from having their own per-device quota consumed.
+        $cfg = Config::fromArray(['snapshot_dir' => $this->dir, 'timestamp_window' => 300, 'ingest_ip_rate_limit_per_min' => 2]);
+        $dev = new InMemoryDeviceRepository(['pi-1' => 'sekret']);
+        $nonce = new InMemoryNonceRepository();
+        $rl = new InMemoryRateLimiter();
+        $events = new InMemoryEventRepository();
+        $snaps = new InMemorySnapshotRepository();
+        $c = new IngestController($cfg, $dev, $nonce, $rl, $events, $snaps);
+
+        $garbage = new Request('POST', '/api/events', [], 'not-json', [], []);
+        $this->assertSame(401, $c->handle($garbage, now: 1000, clientIp: '9.9.9.9')->status());
+        $this->assertSame(401, $c->handle($garbage, now: 1000, clientIp: '9.9.9.9')->status());
+        $res = $c->handle($garbage, now: 1000, clientIp: '9.9.9.9');
+        $this->assertSame(429, $res->status()); // 3rd request from same IP: rate limited pre-auth
+    }
+}

cloud/tests/PdoIntegrationTest.php

@@ -47,11 +47,8 @@ final class PdoIntegrationTest extends TestCase
     public function testEventInsertFindAcknowledge(): void
     {
         $repo = new PdoEventRepository($this->pdo);
-        $uuid = str_repeat('a', 32);
         $id = $repo->insert([
-            'event_uuid' => $uuid,
             'device_id' => 'dev-1',
-            'site' => 'factory-a',
             'camera_id' => 'cam-1',
             'event_type' => 'fall',
             'severity' => 'critical',
@@ -66,20 +63,10 @@ final class PdoIntegrationTest extends TestCase
         $found = $repo->find($id);
         $this->assertNotNull($found);
         $this->assertSame('dev-1', $found['device_id']);
-        $this->assertSame('factory-a', $found['site']);
-        $this->assertSame($uuid, $found['event_uuid']);
         $this->assertSame('critical', $found['severity']);
         $this->assertSame(['confidence' => 0.9], $found['metrics']);
         $this->assertNull($found['acknowledged_by']);
 
-        // Idempotency key lookup (P1-9).
-        $this->assertSame($id, $repo->idByUuid($uuid));
-        $this->assertNull($repo->idByUuid(str_repeat('z', 32)));
-
-        // Site-scoped page (P3-2b): matches its own site, excluded from another.
-        $this->assertCount(1, $repo->page(10, null, null, null, 'factory-a'));
-        $this->assertCount(0, $repo->page(10, null, null, null, 'factory-b'));
-
         $recent = $repo->recent(10, 'critical');
         $this->assertCount(1, $recent);
         $this->assertSame([], $repo->recent(10, 'info'));
@@ -148,16 +135,14 @@ final class PdoIntegrationTest extends TestCase
     private static function sqliteSchema(): string
     {
         return <<<'SQL'
-            CREATE TABLE move_nonces (
+            CREATE TABLE nonces (
                 nonce      TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
                 expires_at INTEGER NOT NULL
             );
 
-            CREATE TABLE move_events (
+            CREATE TABLE events (
                 event_id        INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
-                event_uuid      TEXT UNIQUE,
                 device_id       TEXT NOT NULL,
-                site            TEXT,
                 camera_id       TEXT NOT NULL,
                 event_type      TEXT NOT NULL,
                 severity        TEXT NOT NULL,
@@ -171,7 +156,7 @@ final class PdoIntegrationTest extends TestCase
                 received_at     INTEGER NOT NULL
             );
 
-            CREATE TABLE move_zones (
+            CREATE TABLE zones (
                 zone_id      TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
                 device_id    TEXT NOT NULL,
                 camera_id    TEXT NOT NULL,

cloud/tests/Support/InMemoryRepositories.php

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+<?php
+declare(strict_types=1);
+namespace App\Tests\Support;
+use App\Repository\{DeviceRepository, NonceRepository, RateLimiterRepository,
+    EventRepository, SnapshotRepository, UserRepository, ZoneRepository,
+    ThresholdRepository, AuditRepository};
+
+final class InMemoryDeviceRepository implements DeviceRepository {
+    public array $heartbeats = [];
+    public function __construct(private array $secrets = [], private array $versions = []) {}
+    public function secretFor(string $d): ?string { return $this->secrets[$d] ?? null; }
+    public function touchHeartbeat(string $d, array $m): void { $this->heartbeats[$d] = $m; }
+    public function configVersion(string $d): int { return $this->versions[$d] ?? 1; }
+}
+final class InMemoryNonceRepository implements NonceRepository {
+    public array $store = [];
+    public function seen(string $n): bool { return isset($this->store[$n]); }
+    public function remember(string $n, int $exp): void { $this->store[$n] = $exp; }
+}
+final class InMemoryRateLimiter implements RateLimiterRepository {
+    public array $counts = [];
+    public function hit(string $k, int $w): int { $key = "$k:$w"; return $this->counts[$key] = ($this->counts[$key] ?? 0) + 1; }
+}
+final class InMemoryEventRepository implements EventRepository {
+    public array $rows = []; private int $seq = 0;
+    public function insert(array $e): int { $id = ++$this->seq; $this->rows[$id] = $e + ['event_id' => $id, 'acknowledged_by' => null]; return $id; }
+    public function recent(int $limit, ?string $sev): array {
+        $r = array_reverse($this->rows, true);
+        if ($sev !== null) $r = array_filter($r, fn($x) => $x['severity'] === $sev);
+        return array_slice(array_values($r), 0, $limit);
+    }
+    public function find(int $id): ?array { return $this->rows[$id] ?? null; }
+    public function acknowledge(int $id, string $u): bool { if (!isset($this->rows[$id])) return false; $this->rows[$id]['acknowledged_by'] = $u; return true; }
+}
+final class InMemorySnapshotRepository implements SnapshotRepository {
+    public array $rows = []; public array $paths = [];
+    public function add(int $e, string $uuid, string $hash): void { $this->rows[$e][] = ['file_uuid' => $uuid, 'content_hash' => $hash]; $this->paths[$uuid] = "/tmp/$uuid.jpg"; }
+    public function forEvent(int $e): array { return $this->rows[$e] ?? []; }
+    public function pathByUuid(string $u): ?string { return $this->paths[$u] ?? null; }
+}
+final class InMemoryUserRepository implements UserRepository {
+    public function __construct(public array $users = []) {}
+    public function byUsername(string $u): ?array { return $this->users[$u] ?? null; }
+    public function recordFailure(int $id, int $lock): void { foreach ($this->users as &$row) if ($row['id'] === $id) { $row['failed_attempts'] = ($row['failed_attempts'] ?? 0) + 1; $row['locked_until'] = $lock; } }
+    public function clearFailures(int $id): void { foreach ($this->users as &$row) if ($row['id'] === $id) { $row['failed_attempts'] = 0; $row['locked_until'] = 0; } }
+}
+final class InMemoryZoneRepository implements ZoneRepository {
+    public array $zones = []; private int $seq = 0;
+    public function forDevice(string $d): array { return array_values(array_filter($this->zones, fn($z) => ($z['device_id'] ?? '') === $d)); }
+    public function forCamera(string $c): array { return array_values(array_filter($this->zones, fn($z) => $z['camera_id'] === $c)); }
+    public function save(array $z): string { $id = $z['zone_id'] ?? ('z' . (++$this->seq)); $this->zones[$id] = $z + ['zone_id' => $id]; return $id; }
+    public function delete(string $id): bool { if (!isset($this->zones[$id])) return false; unset($this->zones[$id]); return true; }
+}
+final class InMemoryThresholdRepository implements ThresholdRepository {
+    public function __construct(private array $data = []) {}
+    public function forDevice(string $d): array { return $this->data[$d] ?? []; }
+}
+final class InMemoryAuditRepository implements AuditRepository {
+    public array $log = [];
+    public function append(string $a, string $act, string $t, array $b, array $af): void { $this->log[] = compact('a', 'act', 't', 'b', 'af'); }
+}

cloud/tests/ZoneConfigTest.php

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+<?php
+declare(strict_types=1);
+namespace App\Tests;
+use App\Http\Request;
+use App\Auth\ArraySessionStore;
+use App\Geometry\Polygon;
+use App\Dashboard\ZoneConfigController;
+use App\Tests\Support\{InMemoryZoneRepository, InMemoryAuditRepository};
+use PHPUnit\Framework\TestCase;
+
+final class ZoneConfigTest extends TestCase
+{
+    private function authed(string $role = 'operator'): ArraySessionStore {
+        $s = new ArraySessionStore(); $s->set('user_id', 1); $s->set('username', 'u'); $s->set('role', $role); $s->set('csrf', 'tok'); return $s;
+    }
+    public function testPolygonValidation(): void {
+        $this->assertTrue(Polygon::validate([[0,0],[10,0],[10,10]]));
+        $this->assertFalse(Polygon::validate([[0,0],[10,0]])); // <3
+        $this->assertFalse(Polygon::validate([[0,0],[10,0],['x',10]])); // non-numeric
+    }
+    private function saveReq(array $body, array $headers = ['X-Csrf-Token' => 'tok']): Request {
+        return new Request('POST', '/api/zones', $headers, json_encode($body), [], []);
+    }
+    public function testSaveRequiresPermission(): void {
+        $c = new ZoneConfigController(new InMemoryZoneRepository(), new InMemoryAuditRepository(), $this->authed('viewer'));
+        $res = $c->save($this->saveReq(['camera_id' => 'cam-1', 'level' => 'restricted', 'polygon' => [[0,0],[9,0],[9,9]]]));
+        $this->assertSame(403, $res->status());
+    }
+    public function testSaveValidZone(): void {
+        $repo = new InMemoryZoneRepository();
+        $c = new ZoneConfigController($repo, new InMemoryAuditRepository(), $this->authed('operator'));
+        $res = $c->save($this->saveReq(['device_id' => 'pi-1', 'camera_id' => 'cam-1', 'level' => 'restricted', 'polygon' => [[0,0],[9,0],[9,9]]]));
+        $this->assertSame(201, $res->status());
+        $this->assertCount(1, $repo->forCamera('cam-1'));
+    }
+    public function testSaveRejectsBadLevelOrPolygon(): void {
+        $c = new ZoneConfigController(new InMemoryZoneRepository(), new InMemoryAuditRepository(), $this->authed('operator'));
+        $this->assertSame(400, $c->save($this->saveReq(['camera_id' => 'cam-1', 'level' => 'BOOM', 'polygon' => [[0,0],[9,0],[9,9]]]))->status());
+        $this->assertSame(400, $c->save($this->saveReq(['camera_id' => 'cam-1', 'level' => 'warning', 'polygon' => [[0,0]]]))->status());
+    }
+    public function testSaveRejectsMissingOrWrongCsrf(): void {
+        $repo = new InMemoryZoneRepository();
+        $c = new ZoneConfigController($repo, new InMemoryAuditRepository(), $this->authed('operator'));
+        $body = ['device_id' => 'pi-1', 'camera_id' => 'cam-1', 'level' => 'restricted', 'polygon' => [[0,0],[9,0],[9,9]]];
+        // missing header
+        $this->assertSame(403, $c->save($this->saveReq($body, []))->status());
+        // wrong token
+        $this->assertSame(403, $c->save($this->saveReq($body, ['X-Csrf-Token' => 'nope']))->status());
+        // save did not proceed
+        $this->assertCount(0, $repo->forCamera('cam-1'));
+    }
+    public function testDeleteRejectsMissingOrWrongCsrf(): void {
+        $repo = new InMemoryZoneRepository();
+        $repo->save(['zone_id' => 'z1', 'device_id' => 'pi-1', 'camera_id' => 'cam-1', 'level' => 'restricted', 'polygon_json' => '[[0,0],[9,0],[9,9]]']);
+        $c = new ZoneConfigController($repo, new InMemoryAuditRepository(), $this->authed('operator'));
+        // missing header
+        $missing = new Request('POST', '/api/zones/z1/delete', [], '', [], []);
+        $this->assertSame(403, $c->delete($missing, ['id' => 'z1'])->status());
+        // wrong token
+        $wrong = new Request('POST', '/api/zones/z1/delete', ['X-Csrf-Token' => 'nope'], '', [], []);
+        $this->assertSame(403, $c->delete($wrong, ['id' => 'z1'])->status());
+        // delete did not proceed
+        $this->assertCount(1, $repo->forCamera('cam-1'));
+        // valid token proceeds
+        $ok = new Request('POST', '/api/zones/z1/delete', ['X-Csrf-Token' => 'tok'], '', [], []);
+        $this->assertSame(200, $c->delete($ok, ['id' => 'z1'])->status());
+        $this->assertCount(0, $repo->forCamera('cam-1'));
+    }
+}

deploy/README.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 Offline-installable bundle + systemd unit for the `move-detect` edge daemon.
 The bundle is fully self-contained (all wheels + pose model + source): the Pi
 performs **zero network fetches** at install or run time. The only runtime
-network use is the server POST / config-poll / heartbeat, and even that tolerates
+network use is the cloud POST / config-poll / heartbeat, and even that tolerates
 being offline (events buffer in the local sqlite queue and flush on reconnect).
 
 > Scope: this covers the **CPU MoveNet + USB (UVC) webcam** path — the one the
@@ -23,41 +23,19 @@ being offline (events buffer in the local sqlite queue and flush on reconnect).
 
 ## Quick start — Pi with internet (one command)
 
-If the Pi itself has internet, skip the offline bundle entirely. Copy the built delivery
+If the Pi itself has internet, skip the offline bundle entirely. Copy this repo onto
-folder onto the Pi — **copy the working tree, not a fresh `git clone`**: the pose model
+the Pi (git clone or scp), then:
-`models/yolov8s_pose.hef` is git-ignored (a build artifact), so a clone arrives without it.
-Use `scp -r`/USB from a build machine that has already staged `models/` (see step 1). Then:
 
 ```bash
 sudo deploy/setup_online.sh
 ```
 
-It installs the system packages (`python3-picamera2`, and `hailo-all` if present), builds
+It installs the system packages (`python3-picamera2`, and `hailo-all` if present),
-the venv, pip-installs the runtime deps, **places the pose model from the delivery's
+builds the venv, pip-installs the runtime deps, fetches the MoveNet model, writes
-`models/`** (it does NOT download models on the Pi — the HEF/ONNX are fetched on the build
+`/etc/move-detect/edge.env` (prompting for `DEVICE_ID` / `DEVICE_SECRET` / `CAFE24_URL` /
-machine per the air-gap rule, `build pulls, target doesn't`), writes `/etc/move-detect/edge.env`
+`CAMERAS`, or take them from env vars), installs the systemd unit, and starts the service.
-(prompting for `DEVICE_ID` / `DEVICE_SECRET` / `CAFE24_URL` / `CAMERAS`, or take them from env
+It begins on CPU MoveNet; drop a `yolov8s_pose.hef` in and pass `HAILO_HEF=...` (or edit
-vars), probes every camera, installs the systemd unit, and starts the service. It uses Hailo
+`edge.env`) to switch to Hailo. The rest of this doc is the **air-gapped** path.
-when `models/yolov8s_pose.hef` is present (or pass `HAILO_HEF=/path/to.hef`), else CPU MoveNet
-when `models/movenet_lightning.onnx` + onnxruntime are present. The rest of this doc is the
-**air-gapped** path.
-
-### Secret handling (`deploy/device.env`)
-
-If you pre-provision with `deploy/device.env`, that file holds this device's **HMAC secret in
-plaintext**. It is gitignored (never committed), but it rides onto the Pi with the "copy the
-working tree" transfer. After a successful install:
-
-1. **Delete it:** `shred -u deploy/device.env` (the live secret now lives only in
-   `/etc/move-detect/edge.env`, `0640 root:movedetect`). The installer already `chmod 600`s it
-   while running, but that is defense-in-depth, not a substitute for removing it.
-2. **Rotate if it was ever exposed** (shared over chat, a shell history, a shared drive):
-   update `move_devices.secret` on the server and the `DEVICE_SECRET` in the Pi's
-   `/etc/move-detect/edge.env`, then restart the service. A leaked secret lets anyone forge
-   signed events/heartbeats for this device.
-
-Prefer `device.env` over passing `DEVICE_SECRET=...` on the `sudo` command line, which leaves the
-secret in the shell history.
 
 ---
 
@@ -77,18 +55,16 @@ wheel tags may not resolve; if it fails, build natively):
 deploy/bundle/build_offline_bundle.sh --cross    # target aarch64 / cp311
 ```
 
-Output: the folder `dist/2_pi_install/` (+ `MANIFEST.txt` listing the bundled
+Output: `dist/move-detect-edge-bundle-aarch64-cp311.tar.gz` (+ `MANIFEST.txt`
-wheels). Copy the WHOLE FOLDER across the air gap as-is — no archive step.
+listing the bundled wheels). This single file crosses the air gap.
-Set `MAKE_TARBALL=1` if you would rather transfer one
-`dist/2_pi_install-aarch64-cp311-hailo8.tar.gz` file.
 
 ## 2. Transfer + install (on the air-gapped Pi)
 
-Copy `dist/2_pi_install/` across the gap (USB, one-way transfer, etc.), then:
+Copy the tarball across the gap (USB, one-way transfer, etc.), then:
 
 ```bash
-# tarball variant only (MAKE_TARBALL=1): tar xzf 2_pi_install-aarch64-cp311-hailo8.tar.gz
+tar xzf move-detect-edge-bundle-aarch64-cp311.tar.gz
-cd 2_pi_install
+cd move-detect-edge-bundle
 sudo ./install_offline.sh
 ```
 
@@ -105,8 +81,8 @@ sudo systemctl enable --now move-detect-edge
 journalctl -u move-detect-edge -f
 ```
 
-`DEVICE_ID`/`DEVICE_SECRET` must match a `devices` row in the server (see
+`DEVICE_ID`/`DEVICE_SECRET` must match a `devices` row in the cloud (see
-`server/docs/server-deploy.md` §6). `MOVENET_ONNX` should point at the bundled
+`cloud/docs/cloud-deploy.md` §6). `MOVENET_ONNX` should point at the bundled
 model (`/opt/move-detect/models/movenet_lightning.onnx`).
 
 ## 4. Verify the air gap (do this before trusting a build)
@@ -117,7 +93,7 @@ model (`/opt/move-detect/models/movenet_lightning.onnx`).
 - [ ] Step [4/6] of the installer prints `edge import OK` (onnxruntime + cv2 +
       numpy + requests all import from the venv).
 - [ ] `systemctl status move-detect-edge` is `active (running)`; the log shows
-      frames processed and (if the server is reachable) heartbeats.
+      frames processed and (if the cloud is reachable) heartbeats.
 - [ ] Pull the network cable → events keep queueing (`QUEUE_DB` grows) → restore
       → the queue flushes. (End-to-end behavior verified in the edge e2e harness.)
 
@@ -149,14 +125,14 @@ validated). USB webcam stays available anytime via `CAMERA_BACKEND=uvc`.
 
 **Multiple cameras at once.** Set `CAMERAS=backend:device:camera_id,...` to run several
 cameras in one daemon — each gets its own detection pipeline and `camera_id`, they share
-the Hailo device (round-robin) and the offline queue, and server zones are routed to the
+the Hailo device (round-robin) and the offline queue, and cloud zones are routed to the
 matching camera. Example — CSI + USB together:
 
 ```ini
 CAMERAS=csi:0:cam-01,uvc:0:cam-02
 ```
 
-Each `camera_id` must match the `camera_id` on that camera's zones in the server.
+Each `camera_id` must match the `camera_id` on that camera's zones in the cloud.
 
 > **Air gap:** `hailo-all` / `python3-picamera2` are the ONE piece this bundle can't
 > carry (Hailo's own driver + apt tree). Pre-install them on the Pi image, or transfer
@@ -165,7 +141,7 @@ Each `camera_id` must match the `camera_id` on that camera's zones in the server
 
 ## Not bundled (by design)
 
-- **MySQL / the server app** — a separate host; see `server/docs/server-deploy.md`.
+- **MySQL / the cloud app** — a separate host; see `cloud/docs/cloud-deploy.md`.
 - **HailoRT + `yolov8s_pose.hef` + picamera2** — Hailo's runtime/driver, the compiled
   HEF, and the CSI camera stack are Pi system packages installed out-of-band (above);
   the default CPU MoveNet + USB path needs none of them.

deploy/bundle/build_offline_bundle.sh

@@ -20,17 +20,12 @@ set -euo pipefail
 
 REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../.." && pwd)"
 OUT_DIR="${OUT_DIR:-$REPO_ROOT/dist}"
-STAGE="$OUT_DIR/2_pi_install"
+STAGE="$OUT_DIR/move-detect-edge-bundle"
 WHEELHOUSE="$STAGE/wheelhouse"
 PYVER="${PYVER:-3.11}"                       # Pi OS Bookworm ships CPython 3.11
 PYABI="cp${PYVER//./}"                        # cp311
 TARGET_ARCH="${TARGET_ARCH:-aarch64}"
-HAILO_ARCH="${HAILO_ARCH:-hailo8}"            # 26 TOPS AI HAT+ (Hailo-8); set hailo8l for the 13 TOPS AI Kit
+RUNTIME_PKGS=(numpy requests onnxruntime opencv-python-headless)
-# Mandatory for EVERY backend (cv2/numpy/requests are on the unconditional startup chain).
-# onnxruntime is the CPU-MoveNet fallback only and publishes no 32-bit-ARM wheel / no sdist, so
-# it is downloaded best-effort — a Hailo bundle need not carry it (install_offline treats it optional).
-RUNTIME_PKGS=(numpy requests opencv-python-headless)
-OPTIONAL_PKGS=(onnxruntime)
 
 MODE="native"
 [ "${1:-}" = "--cross" ] && MODE="cross"
@@ -38,13 +33,12 @@ MODE="native"
 echo ">> build mode      : $MODE"
 echo ">> python target   : $PYVER ($PYABI)"
 echo ">> target arch     : $TARGET_ARCH"
-echo ">> hailo arch      : $HAILO_ARCH"
 echo ">> output          : $OUT_DIR"
 
 rm -rf "$STAGE"
 mkdir -p "$WHEELHOUSE" "$STAGE/src" "$STAGE/models" "$STAGE/deploy/systemd" "$STAGE/docs"
 
-echo ">> [1/6] downloading runtime wheels -> wheelhouse/"
+echo ">> [1/5] downloading runtime wheels -> wheelhouse/"
 if [ "$MODE" = "cross" ]; then
   # Best-effort cross download. Try the common manylinux aarch64 tags.
   python3 -m pip download \
@@ -53,14 +47,6 @@ if [ "$MODE" = "cross" ]; then
     --platform "manylinux2014_${TARGET_ARCH}" \
     --platform "manylinux_2_28_${TARGET_ARCH}" \
     -d "$WHEELHOUSE" "${RUNTIME_PKGS[@]}"
-  # CPU fallback wheel, best-effort — onnxruntime may have no matching aarch64/$PYABI tag.
-  python3 -m pip download \
-    --only-binary=:all: \
-    --python-version "$PYVER" --implementation cp --abi "$PYABI" \
-    --platform "manylinux2014_${TARGET_ARCH}" \
-    --platform "manylinux_2_28_${TARGET_ARCH}" \
-    -d "$WHEELHOUSE" "${OPTIONAL_PKGS[@]}" \
-    || echo "   -> onnxruntime aarch64/$PYABI wheel unavailable; Hailo-only bundle (no CPU MoveNet)."
 else
   # Native: wheels for THIS host's interpreter/arch (run on the Pi / arm64 CI).
   # Guard the ABI: numpy/onnxruntime ship version-specific cpXY wheels, so a build
@@ -73,131 +59,37 @@ else
     echo "       or use --cross to pin aarch64/$PYABI wheels explicitly." >&2
     exit 1
   fi
-  # Guard the ARCH too: a native build on an x86_64 workstation would download x86_64 wheels
-  # while the tarball is still named/declared aarch64 (line 27/86/92) — a bundle that installs
-  # then fails to import on the Pi. numpy/opencv/onnxruntime are per-arch, so this is fatal.
-  HOST_ARCH="$(uname -m)"
-  if [ "$HOST_ARCH" != "$TARGET_ARCH" ]; then
-    echo "ERROR: native build host arch is $HOST_ARCH but TARGET_ARCH is $TARGET_ARCH." >&2
-    echo "       Build natively ON an $TARGET_ARCH host (a Pi 5 / arm64 CI), or use --cross." >&2
-    exit 1
-  fi
   python3 -m pip download -d "$WHEELHOUSE" "${RUNTIME_PKGS[@]}"
-  # CPU fallback wheel, best-effort — a Hailo bundle is complete without it.
-  python3 -m pip download -d "$WHEELHOUSE" "${OPTIONAL_PKGS[@]}" \
-    || echo "   -> onnxruntime unavailable for this host; Hailo-only bundle (no CPU MoveNet)."
 fi
 
-echo ">> [2/6] fetching MoveNet ONNX model (optional CPU fallback; build-machine only)"
+echo ">> [2/5] fetching MoveNet ONNX model (build-machine only)"
-# Optional: the MoveNet source may be unreachable, and a Hailo-8 delivery runs off the HEF. Do
+( cd "$REPO_ROOT" && python3 -m edge.tools.fetch_movenet )
-# not abort the whole bundle over the CPU fallback — stage it if we can, otherwise carry on.
+cp "$REPO_ROOT/models/movenet_lightning.onnx" "$STAGE/models/"
-if ( cd "$REPO_ROOT" && python3 -m edge.tools.fetch_movenet ); then
-  cp "$REPO_ROOT/models/movenet_lightning.onnx" "$STAGE/models/"
-else
-  echo "   -> MoveNet ONNX unavailable; Hailo-only bundle (CPU fallback not included)."
-fi
 
-echo ">> [3/6] fetching Hailo $HAILO_ARCH yolov8s_pose HEF (build-machine only)"
+echo ">> [3/5] staging edge source (package + pyproject)"
-# Mandatory for a Hailo delivery: this is the primary pose backend. fetch_hailo_hef verifies the
-# download against a pinned sha256 and refuses a mismatch, so a bad/tampered HEF aborts the build.
-( cd "$REPO_ROOT" && HAILO_ARCH="$HAILO_ARCH" python3 -m edge.tools.fetch_hailo_hef --arch "$HAILO_ARCH" )
-cp "$REPO_ROOT/models/yolov8s_pose.hef" "$STAGE/models/"
-
-echo ">> [4/6] staging edge source (package + pyproject)"
 cp -r "$REPO_ROOT/edge" "$STAGE/src/edge"
 cp "$REPO_ROOT/pyproject.toml" "$STAGE/src/"
 # do not ship compiled caches
 find "$STAGE/src" -name '__pycache__' -type d -prune -exec rm -rf {} +
 
-echo ">> [5/6] staging deploy assets + install script"
+echo ">> [4/5] staging deploy assets + install script"
 cp "$REPO_ROOT/deploy/systemd/move-detect-edge.service"     "$STAGE/deploy/systemd/"
 cp "$REPO_ROOT/deploy/systemd/move-detect-edge.env.example" "$STAGE/deploy/systemd/"
 cp "$REPO_ROOT/deploy/bundle/install_offline.sh"            "$STAGE/"
 cp "$REPO_ROOT/docs/pilot-runbook.md"                       "$STAGE/docs/" 2>/dev/null || true
 chmod +x "$STAGE/install_offline.sh"
 
-# Supply-chain integrity (air-gap: the target can't reach PyPI to re-resolve, so pin + hash here).
-#   requirements.lock — exact name==version of every bundled wheel, for a reproducible rebuild.
-#   sbom.json         — CycloneDX component list: wheels AND models (name, version, sha256).
-#   SHA256SUMS        — sha256 of EVERY staged file (code, unit, installer, env template, models,
-#                       wheels, lock, sbom, MANIFEST). Generated LAST so it covers everything
-#                       install_offline.sh lays down and runs as root — not just the wheels/models.
-echo ">> generating requirements.lock + sbom.json"
-: > "$STAGE/requirements.lock"
-{
-  printf '{\n  "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",\n  "specVersion": "1.5",\n  "version": 1,\n  "components": [\n'
-  sep=""
-  for whl in "$WHEELHOUSE"/*.whl; do
-    [ -e "$whl" ] || continue
-    base="$(basename "$whl")"
-    name="$(echo "$base" | cut -d- -f1)"       # wheel: {name}-{version}-{pyabi}-...-{plat}.whl
-    ver="$(echo "$base" | cut -d- -f2)"
-    sum="$(sha256sum "$whl" | cut -d' ' -f1)"
-    echo "${name}==${ver}" >> "$STAGE/requirements.lock"
-    printf '%s    {"type":"library","name":"%s","version":"%s","purl":"pkg:pypi/%s@%s","hashes":[{"alg":"SHA-256","content":"%s"}]}' \
-      "$sep" "$name" "$ver" "$name" "$ver" "$sum"
-    sep=$',\n'
-  done
-  # ML weights are shipped artifacts too — record them so a customer-side SBOM audit is complete.
-  for mdl in "$STAGE"/models/*; do
-    [ -e "$mdl" ] || continue
-    mbase="$(basename "$mdl")"
-    msum="$(sha256sum "$mdl" | cut -d' ' -f1)"
-    printf '%s    {"type":"file","name":"%s","hashes":[{"alg":"SHA-256","content":"%s"}]}' \
-      "$sep" "$mbase" "$msum"
-    sep=$',\n'
-  done
-  printf '\n  ]\n}\n'
-} > "$STAGE/sbom.json"
-sort -u -o "$STAGE/requirements.lock" "$STAGE/requirements.lock"
-
-# Which pose backends this bundle can actually run, so the operator knows before it crosses the
-# air gap. Hailo needs the HEF (present) + system hailo_platform on the Pi; MoveNet needs the ONNX.
-HAS_ONNX=no; [ -f "$STAGE/models/movenet_lightning.onnx" ] && HAS_ONNX=yes
-SIGNED=no; [ -n "${SIGN_KEY:-}" ] && SIGNED=yes
 {
   echo "bundle: move-detect-edge"
   echo "built_mode: $MODE"
   echo "python: $PYVER ($PYABI)"
   echo "target_arch: $TARGET_ARCH"
-  echo "hailo_arch: $HAILO_ARCH"
-  echo "pose_backends: hailo (yolov8s_pose.hef)$([ "$HAS_ONNX" = yes ] && echo ', movenet (movenet_lightning.onnx)')"
-  echo "integrity: SHA256SUMS covers ALL bundle files (verified on install)$([ "$SIGNED" = yes ] && echo ', SHA256SUMS.asc (signed)')"
-  echo "models:"
-  ls -1 "$STAGE/models"
   echo "wheels:"
   ls -1 "$WHEELHOUSE"
 } > "$STAGE/MANIFEST.txt"
 
-# SHA256SUMS LAST: hash every staged file EXCEPT the manifest itself and its detached signature,
+echo ">> [5/5] packaging tarball"
-# so the daemon source, systemd unit, installer, env template, models and wheels are ALL covered.
+TARBALL="$OUT_DIR/move-detect-edge-bundle-${TARGET_ARCH}-${PYABI}.tar.gz"
-# A tampered edge/daemon.py can no longer pass `sha256sum -c` and then be installed and run.
+tar -C "$OUT_DIR" -czf "$TARBALL" "move-detect-edge-bundle"
-( cd "$STAGE" && find . -type f ! -name SHA256SUMS ! -name 'SHA256SUMS.asc' -print0 \
-    | sort -z | xargs -0 sha256sum > SHA256SUMS )
-
-# Optional detached GPG signature over the integrity file. When present, install_offline.sh
-# REQUIRES it to verify (a failed signature is fatal there); when absent the bundle offers
-# corruption-detection only. Provenance-critical deliveries MUST set SIGN_KEY.
-if [ -n "${SIGN_KEY:-}" ]; then
-  gpg --local-user "$SIGN_KEY" --armor --detach-sign --output "$STAGE/SHA256SUMS.asc" "$STAGE/SHA256SUMS"
-  echo ">> signed SHA256SUMS with key $SIGN_KEY -> SHA256SUMS.asc"
-else
-  echo ">> NOTE: SHA256SUMS is unsigned (corruption-detection only). Set SIGN_KEY=<gpg-id> for a"
-  echo ">>       detached signature; install_offline.sh will then require it to verify."
-fi
-
-echo ">> [6/6] packaging tarball"
-if [ "${MAKE_TARBALL:-0}" != "1" ]; then
-  # Default: leave $STAGE uncompressed — copy the folder to the Pi (USB/scp) and run
-  # install_offline.sh inside it. Set MAKE_TARBALL=1 for a single transferable file.
-  echo ">> skipped (MAKE_TARBALL=1 to also produce a .tar.gz)"
-  echo ">> DONE: $STAGE"
-  echo ">> copy this folder to the Pi, then run ./install_offline.sh inside it."
-  exit 0
-fi
-# Embed the Hailo arch in the filename: hailo8 and hailo8l bundles are byte-different but were
-# otherwise identically named, so the wrong one could be shipped to a board and crash-loop.
-TARBALL="$OUT_DIR/2_pi_install-${TARGET_ARCH}-${PYABI}-${HAILO_ARCH}.tar.gz"
-tar -C "$OUT_DIR" -czf "$TARBALL" "2_pi_install"
 echo ">> DONE: $TARBALL"
 echo ">> transfer this single file across the air gap, then run install_offline.sh on the Pi."

deploy/bundle/install_offline.sh

@@ -18,78 +18,7 @@ STATE=/var/lib/move-detect
 ETC=/etc/move-detect
 SVC_USER=movedetect
 WHEELHOUSE="$HERE/wheelhouse"
-# Mandatory for every backend. onnxruntime is deliberately NOT here — see the optional
+RUNTIME_PKGS=(numpy requests onnxruntime opencv-python-headless)
-# install below; a Hailo bundle need not carry its wheel.
-RUNTIME_PKGS=(numpy requests opencv-python-headless)
-OPTIONAL_PKGS=(onnxruntime)
-
-echo ">> [0/6] verify bundle integrity BEFORE touching the system"
-# Verify EVERY bundled file against the build-time SHA256SUMS before any mutation of $PREFIX. A
-# truncated/tampered bundle must abort HERE — with the previous install still intact — never after
-# rm -rf has already destroyed it and left the Restart=always unit to run half-copied code. The
-# build now hashes the daemon source, unit and this installer too, so tampered code cannot pass.
-ALLOW_UNVERIFIED="${ALLOW_UNVERIFIED:-0}"
-if [ -f "$HERE/SHA256SUMS" ]; then
-  ( cd "$HERE" && sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS ) \
-    || { echo "ERROR: bundle integrity check failed (SHA256SUMS mismatch) — refusing to install." >&2; exit 1; }
-  # sha256sum -c only checks LISTED files; an INJECTED extra wheel (which could win pip's version
-  # resolution) would pass unnoticed. Refuse any staged file not present in the manifest.
-  EXTRA="$( cd "$HERE" && comm -23 \
-      <(find . -type f ! -name SHA256SUMS ! -name 'SHA256SUMS.asc' | sed 's|^\./||' | sort) \
-      <(awk '{print $2}' SHA256SUMS | sed 's|^[*]||; s|^\./||' | sort) )"
-  if [ -n "$EXTRA" ]; then
-    echo "ERROR: bundle contains file(s) not listed in SHA256SUMS (possible injection):" >&2
-    echo "$EXTRA" >&2
-    exit 1
-  fi
-  # A detached signature proves PROVENANCE — an unsigned SHA256SUMS only detects corruption, since
-  # an attacker who can modify the bundle can strip the .asc and regenerate the hashes. Set
-  # REQUIRE_SIGNATURE=1 for untrusted transport to make a missing/invalid signature fatal.
-  REQUIRE_SIGNATURE="${REQUIRE_SIGNATURE:-0}"
-  if [ -f "$HERE/SHA256SUMS.asc" ]; then
-    gpg --verify "$HERE/SHA256SUMS.asc" "$HERE/SHA256SUMS" 2>/dev/null \
-      || { echo "ERROR: SHA256SUMS.asc present but its signature did NOT verify — refusing to install." >&2; exit 1; }
-    echo "   -> SHA256SUMS signature verified"
-  elif [ "$REQUIRE_SIGNATURE" = 1 ]; then
-    echo "ERROR: REQUIRE_SIGNATURE=1 but this bundle has no SHA256SUMS.asc. An unsigned bundle" >&2
-    echo "detects corruption only, not tampering — refusing. Build with SIGN_KEY, or clear the flag." >&2
-    exit 1
-  else
-    echo "   -> NOTE: unsigned bundle (corruption-detection only; set REQUIRE_SIGNATURE=1 to require a signature)."
-  fi
-  echo "   -> bundle integrity OK"
-elif [ "$ALLOW_UNVERIFIED" = 1 ]; then
-  echo "   -> WARNING: no SHA256SUMS; ALLOW_UNVERIFIED=1 set — installing WITHOUT integrity check." >&2
-else
-  echo "ERROR: no SHA256SUMS in this bundle — refusing to install unverified code. Rebuild with a" >&2
-  echo "current build_offline_bundle.sh, or (NOT recommended) re-run with ALLOW_UNVERIFIED=1." >&2
-  exit 1
-fi
-
-echo ">> [0b/6] Hailo arch preflight (BEFORE any mutation)"
-# A hailo8 HEF on a hailo8l board (or vice-versa) imports fine but the daemon dies with
-# HAILO_INVALID_HEF(26) on every start, forever. Catch the WRONG bundle here — using MANIFEST.txt
-# (staged) + hailortcli (a system CLI, no venv needed) — so a mismatch aborts with the previous
-# install still intact, not after the HEF/source/venv have already been overwritten.
-BUNDLE_HAILO_ARCH="$(awk -F': ' '/^hailo_arch:/{gsub(/[[:space:]]/,"",$2); print tolower($2); exit}' "$HERE/MANIFEST.txt" 2>/dev/null || true)"
-if [ -n "$BUNDLE_HAILO_ARCH" ]; then
-  BOARD_HAILO_ARCH=""
-  if command -v hailortcli >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-    BOARD_HAILO_ARCH="$(hailortcli fw-control identify 2>/dev/null \
-      | awk -F': ' '/[Aa]rchitecture/{gsub(/[[:space:]]/,"",$2); print tolower($2); exit}')"
-  fi
-  if [ -n "$BOARD_HAILO_ARCH" ] && [ "$BUNDLE_HAILO_ARCH" != "$BOARD_HAILO_ARCH" ]; then
-    echo "ERROR: Hailo arch mismatch — this bundle's HEF is '$BUNDLE_HAILO_ARCH' but the board is" >&2
-    echo "'$BOARD_HAILO_ARCH'. It would crash-loop with HAILO_INVALID_HEF(26). Rebuild with" >&2
-    echo "HAILO_ARCH=$BOARD_HAILO_ARCH (deploy/bundle/build_offline_bundle.sh)." >&2
-    exit 1
-  elif [ -z "$BOARD_HAILO_ARCH" ]; then
-    echo "   -> NOTE: could not read the board's Hailo arch (hailortcli?) to verify the bundle's" >&2
-    echo "      '$BUNDLE_HAILO_ARCH'; if the daemon later fails HAILO_INVALID_HEF(26), the arch is wrong." >&2
-  else
-    echo "   -> Hailo arch OK ($BUNDLE_HAILO_ARCH)"
-  fi
-fi
 
 echo ">> [1/6] service account + groups"
 if ! id -u "$SVC_USER" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
@@ -102,24 +31,15 @@ done
 
 echo ">> [2/6] lay down source, model, docs under $PREFIX"
 install -d -m 0755 "$PREFIX" "$PREFIX/src" "$PREFIX/models" "$PREFIX/docs"
-# Fully replace the package tree on re-install/upgrade, atomically. Stage the new tree beside the
+# Fully replace the package tree on re-install/upgrade. Without the rm, `cp -r SRC DEST`
-# old and rename over it: an interrupted copy leaves the previous WORKING tree untouched (the
+# nests SRC *inside* an existing DEST (edge/edge/...) and the OLD code keeps running.
-# Restart=always unit keeps running old code) instead of a half-copied one. The rename also avoids
-# `cp -r SRC DEST` nesting SRC *inside* an existing DEST (edge/edge/...) and running the OLD code.
-rm -rf "$PREFIX/src/edge.new"
-cp -r "$HERE/src/edge" "$PREFIX/src/edge.new"
 rm -rf "$PREFIX/src/edge"
-mv "$PREFIX/src/edge.new" "$PREFIX/src/edge"
+cp -r "$HERE/src/edge" "$PREFIX/src/edge"
 cp "$HERE/src/pyproject.toml" "$PREFIX/src/" 2>/dev/null || true
-# Copy whichever pose models the bundle carries. Each is optional on its own — a Hailo bundle
+cp "$HERE/models/"*.onnx "$PREFIX/models/"
-# ships only the .hef, a CPU bundle only the .onnx — so a missing glob must not abort the install
-# (the [5/6] backend gate below is what refuses a bundle with NO usable backend).
-cp "$HERE/models/"*.hef  "$PREFIX/models/" 2>/dev/null || true
-cp "$HERE/models/"*.onnx "$PREFIX/models/" 2>/dev/null || true
 cp "$HERE/docs/"*.md "$PREFIX/docs/" 2>/dev/null || true
 
 echo ">> [3/6] python venv + offline wheel install (--no-index)"
-# Integrity was already verified up-front in step [0/6], before any system mutation.
 # --system-site-packages so the venv can import the Pi SYSTEM packages that are NOT
 # pip-installable: hailo_platform (HailoRT, apt: hailo-all) for POSE_BACKEND=hailo, and
 # picamera2 (apt: python3-picamera2) for CAMERA_BACKEND=csi. The wheelhouse install
@@ -129,96 +49,21 @@ echo ">> [3/6] python venv + offline wheel install (--no-index)"
 python3 -m venv --system-site-packages "$PREFIX/venv"
 "$PREFIX/venv/bin/pip" install --no-index --find-links "$WHEELHOUSE" --upgrade pip >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
 "$PREFIX/venv/bin/pip" install --no-index --find-links "$WHEELHOUSE" "${RUNTIME_PKGS[@]}"
-# Optional: only present if the bundle was built for the CPU MoveNet backend. Still --no-index
-# (zero fetches, air-gap intact); absent simply means Hailo-only.
-"$PREFIX/venv/bin/pip" install --no-index --find-links "$WHEELHOUSE" "${OPTIONAL_PKGS[@]}" \
-  || echo "   -> onnxruntime not in the wheelhouse; Hailo-only bundle (CPU MoveNet unavailable)."
 
 echo ">> [4/6] verify the edge package imports offline"
-# cv2/numpy/requests are mandatory for every backend (snapshot.py imports cv2 at module level
+PYTHONPATH="$PREFIX/src" "$PREFIX/venv/bin/python" -c "import edge.daemon, onnxruntime, cv2, numpy, requests; print('edge import OK')"
-# on the unconditional startup chain; the daemon's server clients import requests at startup).
-PYTHONPATH="$PREFIX/src" "$PREFIX/venv/bin/python" -c "import edge.daemon, cv2, numpy, requests; print('edge import OK')"
-# onnxruntime is the CPU-MoveNet-only dep — the Hailo path never imports it, and onnxruntime
-# ships no sdist and no 32-bit-ARM wheel, so a bundle built for a Hailo Pi legitimately may
-# not carry it. Report, don't fail: a hard `import onnxruntime` here refuses the install over
-# a package the daemon never loads.
-if PYTHONPATH="$PREFIX/src" "$PREFIX/venv/bin/python" -c "import onnxruntime" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-  echo "   -> onnxruntime present; CPU MoveNet available"
-else
-  echo "   -> onnxruntime absent; CPU MoveNet unavailable (set POSE_BACKEND=hailo in $ETC/edge.env)"
-fi
-
-echo ">> [5/6] pose backend gate + state dir + env file"
-# Do NOT hand over a Pi whose POSE_BACKEND cannot load. The template ships POSE_BACKEND=movenet,
-# but a Hailo-only bundle carries no onnxruntime/ONNX — installing it verbatim would crash-loop.
-# Probe what can ACTUALLY run (like setup_online's [6/8]) and reconcile, or refuse.
-HEF_DEST="$PREFIX/models/yolov8s_pose.hef"
-ONNX_DEST="$PREFIX/models/movenet_lightning.onnx"
-pyhas() { PYTHONPATH="$PREFIX/src" "$PREFIX/venv/bin/python" -c "import $1" >/dev/null 2>&1; }
-state() { if "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; then echo present; else echo MISSING; fi; }
-HAILO_OK=0; MOVENET_OK=0
-if [ -f "$HEF_DEST" ]  && pyhas hailo_platform; then HAILO_OK=1; fi
-if [ -f "$ONNX_DEST" ] && pyhas onnxruntime;    then MOVENET_OK=1; fi
-if [ "$HAILO_OK" != 1 ] && [ "$MOVENET_OK" != 1 ]; then
-  echo "" >&2
-  echo "ERROR: no usable pose backend in this bundle — refusing to install a daemon that" >&2
-  echo "cannot start." >&2
-  echo "  Hailo  : HEF=$(state test -f "$HEF_DEST")  hailo_platform=$(state "$PREFIX/venv/bin/python" -c 'import hailo_platform')" >&2
-  echo "  MoveNet: onnx=$(state test -f "$ONNX_DEST")  onnxruntime=$(state "$PREFIX/venv/bin/python" -c 'import onnxruntime')" >&2
-  echo "  Rebuild the bundle for the target backend (deploy/bundle/build_offline_bundle.sh)." >&2
-  exit 1
-fi
-# Prefer Hailo (the accelerator) when usable; MoveNet is the CPU fallback. (Arch already
-# preflighted in [0b/6].)
-if [ "$HAILO_OK" = 1 ]; then DEFAULT_BACKEND=hailo; else DEFAULT_BACKEND=movenet; fi
-backend_usable() {   # 0 (true) iff the named backend can actually load in THIS bundle
-  case "$1" in
-    hailo)   [ "$HAILO_OK" = 1 ] ;;
-    movenet) [ "$MOVENET_OK" = 1 ] ;;
-    *) return 1 ;;
-  esac
-}
 
+echo ">> [5/6] state dir + env file"
 install -d -m 0750 "$STATE"
 chown "$SVC_USER":"$SVC_USER" "$STATE"
 install -d -m 0750 "$ETC"
 if [ ! -f "$ETC/edge.env" ]; then
-  POSE_BACKEND="$DEFAULT_BACKEND"
   install -m 0640 "$HERE/deploy/systemd/move-detect-edge.env.example" "$ETC/edge.env"
-  sed -i "s|^POSE_BACKEND=.*|POSE_BACKEND=$POSE_BACKEND|" "$ETC/edge.env"
+  chown root:"$SVC_USER" "$ETC/edge.env"
-  echo "   -> wrote $ETC/edge.env (POSE_BACKEND=$POSE_BACKEND; EDIT IT: DEVICE_ID, DEVICE_SECRET, CAFE24_URL)"
+  echo "   -> wrote $ETC/edge.env from template (EDIT IT: DEVICE_ID, DEVICE_SECRET, CAFE24_URL)"
 else
-  # Preserve the operator's DELIBERATE backend choice when it still works in this bundle; only
+  echo "   -> $ETC/edge.env already exists; left unchanged"
-  # switch when the current one can't load — the crash-loop this reconcile exists to prevent
-  # (e.g. a stale POSE_BACKEND=movenet on a Hailo-only bundle with no onnxruntime).
-  CURRENT_BACKEND="$(sed -n 's|^POSE_BACKEND=\(.*\)|\1|p' "$ETC/edge.env" | head -n1)"
-  if backend_usable "$CURRENT_BACKEND"; then
-    POSE_BACKEND="$CURRENT_BACKEND"
-    echo "   -> $ETC/edge.env POSE_BACKEND=$POSE_BACKEND is usable in this bundle; kept"
-  else
-    POSE_BACKEND="$DEFAULT_BACKEND"
-    if grep -q '^POSE_BACKEND=' "$ETC/edge.env"; then
-      sed -i "s|^POSE_BACKEND=.*|POSE_BACKEND=$POSE_BACKEND|" "$ETC/edge.env"
-    else
-      printf 'POSE_BACKEND=%s\n' "$POSE_BACKEND" >> "$ETC/edge.env"
-    fi
-    echo "   -> reconciled $ETC/edge.env POSE_BACKEND: '${CURRENT_BACKEND:-unset}' (unusable) -> '$POSE_BACKEND'"
-  fi
 fi
-# For the hailo backend, HAILO_HEF must point at a HEF that actually EXISTS — correct a missing
-# key OR one left pointing at a stale/absent path, else the daemon crash-loops on a bad path.
-if [ "$POSE_BACKEND" = hailo ]; then
-  CURRENT_HEF="$(sed -n 's|^HAILO_HEF=\(.*\)|\1|p' "$ETC/edge.env" | head -n1)"
-  if [ -z "$CURRENT_HEF" ] || [ ! -f "$CURRENT_HEF" ]; then
-    if grep -q '^HAILO_HEF=' "$ETC/edge.env"; then
-      sed -i "s|^HAILO_HEF=.*|HAILO_HEF=$HEF_DEST|" "$ETC/edge.env"
-    else
-      printf 'HAILO_HEF=%s\n' "$HEF_DEST" >> "$ETC/edge.env"
-    fi
-    echo "   -> set HAILO_HEF=$HEF_DEST (was '${CURRENT_HEF:-unset}')"
-  fi
-fi
-chown root:"$SVC_USER" "$ETC/edge.env"
 
 echo ">> [6/6] systemd unit"
 install -m 0644 "$HERE/deploy/systemd/move-detect-edge.service" /etc/systemd/system/
@@ -226,11 +71,6 @@ systemctl daemon-reload
 
 echo ""
 echo "Installed. Next:"
-echo "  1. edit $ETC/edge.env (device id/secret, server URL; MOVENET_ONNX=$PREFIX/models/movenet_lightning.onnx)"
+echo "  1. edit $ETC/edge.env (device id/secret, cloud URL; MOVENET_ONNX=$PREFIX/models/movenet_lightning.onnx)"
-echo "  2. camera check BEFORE enabling — a wrong /dev/video index or an unseated CSI ribbon"
+echo "  2. sudo systemctl enable --now move-detect-edge"
-echo "     otherwise yields a green unit that silently monitors one camera less (build_runtimes"
+echo "  3. journalctl -u move-detect-edge -f"
-echo "     logs-and-skips a camera it cannot open). This mirrors setup_online.sh's [8/9] probe,"
-echo "     which the offline path cannot run at install time (CAMERAS is only set in step 1):"
-echo "       sudo sh -c 'cd $PREFIX/src && CAMERAS=\$(sed -n \"s/^CAMERAS=//p\" $ETC/edge.env) $PREFIX/venv/bin/python -m edge.probe'"
-echo "  3. sudo systemctl enable --now move-detect-edge"
-echo "  4. journalctl -u move-detect-edge -f"

deploy/setup_online.sh

@@ -5,18 +5,9 @@
 # Run from a clone/copy of this repo, as root:
 #   sudo deploy/setup_online.sh
 #
-# Pre-provisioned (shortest path): put the values in deploy/device.env on the BUILD machine
+# Non-interactive: pass values as env vars, e.g.
-# (DEVICE_ID / DEVICE_SECRET / CAFE24_URL / CAMERAS, one KEY=value per line, gitignored), copy
+#   sudo DEVICE_ID=pi-01 DEVICE_SECRET=... CAFE24_URL=https://cloud CAMERAS=csi:0:cam-01,uvc:0:cam-02 \
-# the repo to the Pi, and the whole install is just:
+#        HAILO_HEF=/home/pi/yolov8s_pose.hef deploy/setup_online.sh
-#   sudo deploy/setup_online.sh
-#
-# Non-interactive: pass values as env vars (these override device.env), e.g.
-#   sudo DEVICE_ID=pi-01 DEVICE_SECRET=... CAFE24_URL=https://server CAMERAS=csi:0:cam-01,uvc:0:cam-02 \
-#        deploy/setup_online.sh
-# MODELS ARE NOT DOWNLOADED HERE. The pose HEF (and optional MoveNet ONNX) ship IN the delivery,
-# staged on the BUILD machine (deploy/bundle/build_offline_bundle.sh) — air-gap rule "build pulls,
-# target doesn't". Copy the delivery (with its models/) to the Pi and this installer places them.
-# Have a HEF elsewhere on the Pi? Point at it: HAILO_HEF=/home/pi/yolov8s_pose.hef.
 # Interactive (a real terminal): it prompts for anything not passed.
 set -euo pipefail
 
@@ -31,56 +22,21 @@ STATE=/var/lib/move-detect
 ETC=/etc/move-detect
 SVC_USER=movedetect
 
-echo ">> [1/9] system packages (CSI camera, venv; Hailo runtime best-effort)"
+echo ">> [1/8] system packages (CSI camera, venv; Hailo runtime best-effort)"
 export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
-# A freshly-booted Pi runs apt-daily / apt-daily-upgrade / unattended-upgrades, which hold
+apt-get update
-# /var/lib/apt/lists/lock and /var/lib/dpkg/lock-frontend for the first few minutes —
+apt-get install -y python3-picamera2 python3-venv python3-pip
-# exactly when someone runs a one-command installer. A bare apt-get then exits 100 with
-# "E: Unable to lock directory /var/lib/apt/lists/" and `set -e` (set -e above) kills us here.
-#   -o DPkg::Lock::Timeout is not enough on its own: apt applies it to the dpkg locks, but
-#   `apt-get update`'s lists lock is taken with a single non-blocking fcntl(F_SETLK) and no
-#   retry. That wait has to live here, in the shell.
-# Retry ONLY on lock contention; a real error (e.g. hailo-all absent from the repo) must
-# still fail fast so the `|| echo WARN` fallback below stays instant.
-apt_retry() {
-  local tries=30 i=1 rc log
-  log="$(mktemp)"
-  while :; do
-    rc=0
-    # LC_ALL=C is load-bearing, not cosmetic: apt gettext-translates its errors, and sudo
-    # passes the caller's LANG/LC_* straight through. On a ko_KR Pi the lists-lock message
-    # renders as "%s 디렉터리를 잠글 수 없습니다", the grep below misses it, and lock
-    # contention gets misread as a real error — fail-fast, zero retries, exactly the bug
-    # this function exists to fix. Pinning it per-call (not script-wide) keeps pip/venv and
-    # fetch_movenet at [4/9]-[5/9] on the system locale.
-    LC_ALL=C apt-get -o DPkg::Lock::Timeout=60 "$@" 2>&1 | tee "$log" || rc=${PIPESTATUS[0]}
-    if [ "$rc" -eq 0 ]; then rm -f "$log"; return 0; fi
-    if ! grep -qE 'Could not get lock|Unable to lock|Unable to acquire the dpkg' "$log"; then
-      rm -f "$log"; return "$rc"
-    fi
-    if [ "$i" -ge "$tries" ]; then
-      rm -f "$log"
-      echo "   ERROR: apt/dpkg still locked after $((tries * 10))s. See who holds it with:" >&2
-      echo "     systemctl status apt-daily.service apt-daily-upgrade.service unattended-upgrades.service" >&2
-      return "$rc"
-    fi
-    echo "   apt/dpkg locked by another process (apt-daily/unattended-upgrades); retry $i/$tries in 10s..."
-    i=$((i + 1)); sleep 10
-  done
-}
-apt_retry update
-apt_retry install -y python3-picamera2 python3-venv python3-pip
 # hailo-all is the Hailo driver+runtime; only present in Pi repos with a Hailo HAT.
 # Best-effort so a Pi without it still installs and runs on CPU MoveNet.
-apt_retry install -y hailo-all || echo "   WARN: hailo-all not installed — Hailo accel unavailable, CPU MoveNet will be used."
+apt-get install -y hailo-all || echo "   WARN: hailo-all not installed — Hailo accel unavailable, CPU MoveNet will be used."
 
-echo ">> [2/9] service account + device groups"
+echo ">> [2/8] service account + device groups"
 id -u "$SVC_USER" >/dev/null 2>&1 || useradd --system --no-create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin "$SVC_USER"
 for g in video render plugdev hailo; do
   getent group "$g" >/dev/null 2>&1 && usermod -aG "$g" "$SVC_USER" || true
 done
 
-echo ">> [3/9] source + dirs under $PREFIX"
+echo ">> [3/8] source + dirs under $PREFIX"
 install -d -m 0755 "$PREFIX" "$PREFIX/src" "$PREFIX/models" "$PREFIX/docs"
 rm -rf "$PREFIX/src/edge"                       # full replace on re-run (no nested edge/edge)
 cp -r "$REPO_ROOT/edge" "$PREFIX/src/edge"
@@ -88,172 +44,42 @@ cp "$REPO_ROOT/pyproject.toml" "$PREFIX/src/" 2>/dev/null || true
 find "$PREFIX/src" -name __pycache__ -type d -prune -exec rm -rf {} +
 cp "$REPO_ROOT/docs/pilot-runbook.md" "$PREFIX/docs/" 2>/dev/null || true
 
-echo ">> [4/9] venv (+ system site-packages) + pip runtime deps"
+echo ">> [4/8] venv (+ system site-packages) + pip runtime deps"
 python3 -m venv --system-site-packages "$PREFIX/venv"
 "$PREFIX/venv/bin/pip" install --upgrade pip >/dev/null
-# MANDATORY for every backend — do not soften these to `|| echo WARN`:
+# numpy is intentionally NOT pinned here: it comes in transitively via onnxruntime, and
-#   cv2      edge/snapshot.py imports it at MODULE level, and that module is on the
+# leaving the system numpy in place (the venv sees it) avoids shadowing the numpy that
-#            unconditional startup chain (daemon -> runtime -> snapshot). No POSE_BACKEND
+# the apt python3-picamera2 stack was compiled against.
-#            can reach build_pose() without it.
+"$PREFIX/venv/bin/pip" install requests onnxruntime opencv-python-headless
-#   requests the daemon builds its server/alert clients with no injected HTTP fn, so
-#            `import requests` fires at startup regardless of backend.
-# numpy is still deliberately NOT named here, but the reason has moved: it no longer arrives
-# transitively via onnxruntime (best-effort below, may be absent). opencv-python-headless
-# hard-requires numpy and opencv is mandatory, so numpy still always arrives; leaving it
-# unnamed lets the resolver keep the apt numpy that python3-picamera2 was compiled against
-# whenever that copy satisfies opencv's floor.
-"$PREFIX/venv/bin/pip" install requests opencv-python-headless
-# onnxruntime is the CPU-MoveNet-ONLY dep: movenet_pose.py imports it inside
-# MoveNetPoseAdapter.__init__, and the Hailo path never imports the module at all. It
-# publishes NO sdist and NO 32-bit-ARM wheel, so pip can legitimately find zero candidates
-# and exit non-zero in seconds — which under `set -euo pipefail` used to kill this installer
-# on a Hailo-8 Pi that never needed it. Best-effort, like hailo-all at [1/9]; [6/9] decides
-# whether a backend actually exists.
-"$PREFIX/venv/bin/pip" install onnxruntime \
-  || echo "   WARN: onnxruntime did not install — CPU MoveNet unavailable (Hailo unaffected)."
 
-echo ">> [5/9] MoveNet CPU model (from the delivery, not downloaded)"
+echo ">> [5/8] MoveNet CPU model"
-# Models ship IN the delivery, staged on the BUILD machine (deploy/bundle/build_offline_bundle.sh
+( cd "$REPO_ROOT" && "$PREFIX/venv/bin/python" -m edge.tools.fetch_movenet )
-# fetches them there) and carried across with the repo copy — air-gap rule "build pulls, target
+cp "$REPO_ROOT/models/movenet_lightning.onnx" "$PREFIX/models/" 2>/dev/null || true
-# doesn't". This installer NEVER downloads a model on the Pi. On-device fetch was removed because
-# it was fragile in two ways at once: a partial repo copy made `-m edge.tools.fetch_*` fail with a
-# ModuleNotFoundError that the `|| echo WARN` mislabeled as "download failed", and the MoveNet URL
-# is dead upstream anyway. MoveNet is the OPTIONAL CPU fallback; stage it only if present.
-if cp "$REPO_ROOT/models/movenet_lightning.onnx" "$PREFIX/models/" 2>/dev/null; then
-  echo "   -> MoveNet ONNX staged from the delivery"
-else
-  echo "   note: no MoveNet ONNX in the delivery (expected for a Hailo device)."
-fi
 
-echo ">> [6/9] pose backend"
+echo ">> [6/8] pose backend"
+POSE_BACKEND=movenet
 HEF_DEST="$PREFIX/models/yolov8s_pose.hef"
-ONNX_DEST="$PREFIX/models/movenet_lightning.onnx"
+if [ -n "${HAILO_HEF:-}" ] && [ -f "${HAILO_HEF:-}" ]; then
-if [ -n "${HAILO_HEF:-}" ]; then
-  # An explicit path that does not exist is a typo, not a request to fall back. The old single
-  # guarded `cp` skipped it with NO warning and produced the byte-identical HEF=MISSING table
-  # as the unset case, never echoing the bad value — and if an earlier run had left a
-  # $HEF_DEST behind, that stale HEF got adopted as though it were the one named.
-  [ -f "$HAILO_HEF" ] || { echo "ERROR: HAILO_HEF=$HAILO_HEF does not exist." >&2; exit 1; }
   cp "$HAILO_HEF" "$HEF_DEST"
-  echo "   -> HEF installed from HAILO_HEF=$HAILO_HEF"
-elif [ -f "$REPO_ROOT/models/yolov8s_pose.hef" ]; then
-  # The delivery carries the board-matching HEF, staged on the BUILD machine
-  # (build_offline_bundle.sh runs fetch_hailo_hef there, where hailortcli or --arch picks
-  # hailo8 vs hailo8l). This installer only PLACES it — it never downloads or guesses an arch
-  # on the Pi. Air-gap rule: build pulls, target doesn't.
-  cp "$REPO_ROOT/models/yolov8s_pose.hef" "$HEF_DEST"
-  echo "   -> HEF staged from the delivery (models/yolov8s_pose.hef)"
-else
-  echo "   WARN: no Hailo HEF in the delivery (models/yolov8s_pose.hef) and HAILO_HEF unset —"
-  echo "         no Hailo backend. The probe below decides if CPU MoveNet can carry the install."
-fi
-
-# Probe what can ACTUALLY run, in the venv the service will use. A HEF on disk is not enough
-# (hailo_platform comes from apt hailo-all, best-effort at [1/9]), and a pip exit code is not
-# enough either (a wheel can install and still fail to load its .so). Both probes must sit
-# inside `if` conditions — a bare `a && b` list that fails is fatal under set -e.
-pyhas() { "$PREFIX/venv/bin/python" -c "import $1" >/dev/null 2>&1; }
-state() { if "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; then echo present; else echo MISSING; fi; }
-HAILO_OK=0; MOVENET_OK=0
-if [ -f "$HEF_DEST" ]  && pyhas hailo_platform; then HAILO_OK=1; fi
-if [ -f "$ONNX_DEST" ] && pyhas onnxruntime;    then MOVENET_OK=1; fi
-
-if [ "$HAILO_OK" = 1 ]; then
   POSE_BACKEND=hailo
-  echo "   -> Hailo HEF + hailo_platform present; POSE_BACKEND=hailo"
+  echo "   -> Hailo HEF installed; POSE_BACKEND=hailo"
-  [ "$MOVENET_OK" = 1 ] || echo "      (CPU MoveNet fallback unavailable — Hailo does not need it)"
+else
-elif [ "$MOVENET_OK" = 1 ]; then
+  echo "   -> no HAILO_HEF given; starting on CPU MoveNet."
-  POSE_BACKEND=movenet
-  echo "   -> no usable Hailo; starting on CPU MoveNet."
   echo "      For Hailo: copy yolov8s_pose.hef to $HEF_DEST, set POSE_BACKEND=hailo in"
   echo "      $ETC/edge.env, then: sudo systemctl restart move-detect-edge"
-else
-  # Fail HERE, loudly, naming the fix — not at 3am. build_pose() runs outside the daemon's
-  # try/except, so a missing backend is an uncaught traceback (ModuleNotFoundError on the
-  # MoveNet path, KeyError 'HAILO_HEF' on the Hailo one) on every Restart=always cycle,
-  # forever — a unit that looks installed and never processes a frame.
-  # The board's own answer is the most diagnostic field here: it separates "no HEF" from
-  # "driver installed, reboot pending" from "no Hailo at all" — three different fixes.
-  HAILO_ARCH="$(hailortcli fw-control identify 2>/dev/null \
-                | sed -n 's/.*Device Architecture:[[:space:]]*//p' | head -1)"
-  echo "" >&2
-  echo "ERROR: no usable pose backend — refusing to install a daemon that cannot start." >&2
-  echo "  Hailo  : HEF=$(state test -f "$HEF_DEST")  hailo_platform=$(state "$PREFIX/venv/bin/python" -c 'import hailo_platform')  board=${HAILO_ARCH:-NOT DETECTED}" >&2
-  echo "  MoveNet: onnx=$(state test -f "$ONNX_DEST")  onnxruntime=$(state "$PREFIX/venv/bin/python" -c 'import onnxruntime')" >&2
-  echo "" >&2
-  echo "  Fix ONE of these, then re-run: sudo deploy/setup_online.sh" >&2
-  echo "" >&2
-  echo "  A) Hailo-8 HAT (the intended path). The HEF ships IN the delivery" >&2
-  echo "     (models/yolov8s_pose.hef, staged on the build machine) — this installer does NOT" >&2
-  echo "     download it. Read the table above:" >&2
-  echo "       HEF=MISSING            -> this Pi's copy of the delivery has no" >&2
-  echo "                                 models/yolov8s_pose.hef. Re-copy it, or point at one:" >&2
-  echo "                                 sudo HAILO_HEF=/path/to/yolov8s_pose.hef deploy/setup_online.sh" >&2
-  echo "       hailo_platform=MISSING -> the HailoRT driver/runtime is not up yet:" >&2
-  echo "                                 sudo apt-get install -y hailo-all && sudo reboot" >&2
-  echo "                                 (/dev/hailo0 appears only after that reboot). Confirm:" >&2
-  echo "                                 hailortcli fw-control identify   # -> Device Architecture: HAILO8" >&2
-  echo "  B) CPU MoveNet: put models/movenet_lightning.onnx in the delivery, and" >&2
-  echo "       $PREFIX/venv/bin/pip install onnxruntime" >&2
-  echo "" >&2
-  echo "  If onnxruntime AND hailo-all both refuse to install, check the userland arch:" >&2
-  echo "       dpkg --print-architecture" >&2
-  echo "  'armhf' means 32-bit Pi OS. Neither package ships for it (uname -m still says" >&2
-  echo "  aarch64 there — the kernel is 64-bit, the userland is not). Reflash 64-bit Pi OS." >&2
-  exit 1
 fi
 
-echo ">> [7/9] config -> $ETC/edge.env"
+echo ">> [7/8] config -> $ETC/edge.env"
 install -d -m 0750 "$STATE"; chown "$SVC_USER":"$SVC_USER" "$STATE"
 install -d -m 0750 "$ETC"
 if [ -f "$ETC/edge.env" ]; then
-  # Re-running IS the normal Hailo flow: install -> reboot so the driver creates /dev/hailo0
+  echo "   -> $ETC/edge.env already exists; left unchanged"
-  # -> re-run. So [6/9] can legitimately reach a different verdict than last time. Leaving the
-  # file wholly unchanged meant run #1's POSE_BACKEND=movenet survived while [6/9] printed
-  # "POSE_BACKEND=hailo" — and with onnxruntime absent that is a ModuleNotFoundError crash
-  # loop the installer just called a success.
-  # Reconcile ONLY the backend keys, in place: DEVICE_SECRET and the operator's other answers
-  # must survive untouched.
-  cur="$(sed -n 's/^POSE_BACKEND=//p' "$ETC/edge.env" | head -1)"
-  if [ "$cur" = "$POSE_BACKEND" ]; then
-    echo "   -> $ETC/edge.env already exists; left unchanged"
-  else
-    if [ -n "$cur" ]; then
-      sed -i "s|^POSE_BACKEND=.*|POSE_BACKEND=$POSE_BACKEND|" "$ETC/edge.env"
-    else
-      printf 'POSE_BACKEND=%s\n' "$POSE_BACKEND" >> "$ETC/edge.env"
-    fi
-    grep -q '^HAILO_HEF=' "$ETC/edge.env" || printf 'HAILO_HEF=%s\n' "$HEF_DEST" >> "$ETC/edge.env"
-    grep -q '^MOVENET_ONNX=' "$ETC/edge.env" || printf 'MOVENET_ONNX=%s\n' "$ONNX_DEST" >> "$ETC/edge.env"
-    # sed -i and >> can leave the file owned root:root, and the unit reads it as movedetect
-    # via EnvironmentFile= — a wrong group here fails the start with a bare permission error.
-    chown root:"$SVC_USER" "$ETC/edge.env"
-    chmod 0640 "$ETC/edge.env"
-    echo "   -> $ETC/edge.env: POSE_BACKEND ${cur:-<unset>} -> $POSE_BACKEND (re-run reconciled)"
-  fi
 else
-  # Pre-provisioning file: values written on the BUILD machine so the operator only has to
-  # type `sudo deploy/setup_online.sh`. A real env var always wins over the file, so the
-  # long-form command documented at the top still overrides a stale device.env.
-  PROVISION="${PROVISION:-$REPO_ROOT/deploy/device.env}"
-  if [ -f "$PROVISION" ]; then
-    echo ">> reading pre-provisioned values from $PROVISION"
-    # device.env holds the plaintext HMAC secret. It arrived via "copy the working tree" and may
-    # be world-readable (umask 022). Lock it to root-only now so it is not left readable by every
-    # local account for the life of the device. The secret still lands in /etc/move-detect/edge.env
-    # (0640 root:movedetect); once the install succeeds you should DELETE this file and rotate the
-    # secret if it was ever exposed — see deploy/README.md "Secret handling".
-    chmod 600 "$PROVISION" 2>/dev/null || true
-    while IFS='=' read -r k v; do
-      case "$k" in DEVICE_ID|DEVICE_SECRET|CAFE24_URL|CAMERAS) ;; *) continue ;; esac
-      [ -n "${!k:-}" ] || printf -v "$k" '%s' "$v"
-    done < <(grep -E '^[A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*=' "$PROVISION")   # digits matter: CAFE24_URL
-  fi
   : "${DEVICE_ID:=}"; : "${DEVICE_SECRET:=}"; : "${CAFE24_URL:=}"; : "${CAMERAS:=}"
   if [ -t 0 ]; then
     [ -n "$DEVICE_ID" ]     || read -rp  "DEVICE_ID [pi-01]: " DEVICE_ID
-    [ -n "$DEVICE_SECRET" ] || { read -rsp "DEVICE_SECRET (from server): " DEVICE_SECRET; echo; }
+    [ -n "$DEVICE_SECRET" ] || { read -rsp "DEVICE_SECRET (from cloud): " DEVICE_SECRET; echo; }
-    [ -n "$CAFE24_URL" ]    || read -rp  "CAFE24_URL (e.g. https://<domain>/move_detect — include the subdir!): " CAFE24_URL
+    [ -n "$CAFE24_URL" ]    || read -rp  "CAFE24_URL (cloud base URL): " CAFE24_URL
     [ -n "$CAMERAS" ]       || read -rp  "CAMERAS [csi:0:cam-01,uvc:0:cam-02]: " CAMERAS
   fi
   DEVICE_ID="${DEVICE_ID:-pi-01}"
@@ -273,69 +99,14 @@ TARGET_FPS=12
 EOF
   chown root:"$SVC_USER" "$ETC/edge.env"
   chmod 0640 "$ETC/edge.env"
-  [ -n "$DEVICE_SECRET" ] || echo "   NOTE: DEVICE_SECRET is empty — set it in $ETC/edge.env before the server will accept events."
+  [ -n "$DEVICE_SECRET" ] || echo "   NOTE: DEVICE_SECRET is empty — set it in $ETC/edge.env before the cloud will accept events."
   echo "   -> wrote $ETC/edge.env"
 fi
 
-echo ">> [8/9] camera check (open every camera in CAMERAS and grab a frame)"
+echo ">> [8/8] systemd service"
-# Do this BEFORE enabling the unit. build_runtimes() logs-and-skips a camera it cannot open,
-# so a wrong /dev/video index or an unseated ribbon would otherwise produce a green unit that
-# silently monitors one camera less. Fail here, while someone is still at the Pi.
-# SKIP_CAMERA_CHECK=1 for a headless/bench install with no cameras attached yet.
-if [ "${SKIP_CAMERA_CHECK:-0}" = "1" ]; then
-  echo "   -> skipped (SKIP_CAMERA_CHECK=1)"
-else
-  # Probe exactly what the unit will run with: the CAMERAS line as written to edge.env, and
-  # the installed copy of the package ($PREFIX/src, not the repo checkout).
-  probe_cams="$(sed -n 's/^CAMERAS=//p' "$ETC/edge.env" | head -1)"
-  if ( cd "$PREFIX/src" && CAMERAS="$probe_cams" "$PREFIX/venv/bin/python" -m edge.probe \
-         --save "$STATE/probe" ); then
-    echo "   -> every camera delivered a frame (previews in $STATE/probe)"
-    chown -R "$SVC_USER":"$SVC_USER" "$STATE/probe" 2>/dev/null || true
-  else
-    echo "" >&2
-    echo "ERROR: camera check failed — refusing to enable the service." >&2
-    echo "  Fix CAMERAS in $ETC/edge.env and re-run, or install with SKIP_CAMERA_CHECK=1" >&2
-    echo "  to enable the service anyway (it will monitor only the cameras that work)." >&2
-    exit 1
-  fi
-fi
-
-echo ">> [9/9] systemd service"
 install -m 0644 "$REPO_ROOT/deploy/systemd/move-detect-edge.service" /etc/systemd/system/
 systemctl daemon-reload
-
+systemctl enable --now move-detect-edge
-diagnose() {
-  echo "" >&2
-  echo "ERROR: move-detect-edge did not come up. systemd's reason:" >&2
-  echo "--------------------------------------------------------------------" >&2
-  systemctl status --no-pager --full move-detect-edge >&2 || true
-  journalctl -xeu move-detect-edge -n 50 --no-pager >&2 || true
-  echo "--------------------------------------------------------------------" >&2
-  echo "Full log: sudo journalctl -xeu move-detect-edge" >&2
-  exit 1
-}
-
-# enable + restart rather than `enable --now`, so a re-run also picks up a rewritten
-# edge.env instead of no-op'ing on an already-running unit.
-systemctl enable move-detect-edge
-systemctl restart move-detect-edge || diagnose
-# Type=exec fails the job on exec-step errors, but a Python traceback *after* execve still
-# leaves `restart` returning 0. RestartSec=5 means a crash-looping unit reads as
-# "activating" here, which is-active correctly rejects. This is a crash detector, not a
-# readiness gate: under Type=exec the unit is active the moment execve() succeeds, so a
-# slow camera/Hailo init cannot false-fail it.
-sleep 5
-systemctl is-active --quiet move-detect-edge || diagnose
-# is-active alone is phase-dependent: a crash at T<=~0.2s after execve is already back in
-# "active" by the time we sample (T + RestartSec=5 <= 5.2), so a crash-looping daemon can
-# read as healthy. NRestarts is phase-independent — for a unit we just started, any restart
-# at all means it has already died once.
-if [ "$(systemctl show -p NRestarts --value move-detect-edge 2>/dev/null || echo 0)" != "0" ]; then
-  echo "" >&2
-  echo "ERROR: move-detect-edge has already restarted at least once — it is crash-looping." >&2
-  diagnose
-fi
 
 echo ""
 echo "Done. The edge daemon is installed and started."

deploy/systemd/move-detect-edge.env.example

@@ -10,11 +10,8 @@
 DEVICE_ID=pi-01
 # DEVICE_SECRET: per-device HMAC secret; must match devices.secret.
 DEVICE_SECRET=CHANGEME
-# CAFE24_URL: cloud base URL (POST events / poll config / heartbeat). MUST include the app's
+# CAFE24_URL: cloud base URL (POST events / poll config / heartbeat).
-# subdirectory when the cloud is mounted under an existing www/ (the cafe24 package default):
+CAFE24_URL=https://cloud.example.com
-# use https://<domain>/move_detect, NOT https://<domain>. A wrong/missing path 404s every
-# upload — the daemon now refuses to start on a blank value, but a wrong path it cannot detect.
-CAFE24_URL=https://your-domain.example/move_detect
 # CAMERA_ID: stamped on events and matched to dashboard zones.
 CAMERA_ID=cam-01
 

deploy/systemd/move-detect-edge.service

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # move-detect edge daemon — systemd unit (Raspberry Pi 5, air-gapped/폐쇄망).
 # Install: copy to /etc/systemd/system/, fill /etc/move-detect/edge.env, then
 #   sudo systemctl daemon-reload && sudo systemctl enable --now move-detect-edge
-# The daemon tolerates the server being offline (events buffer in the local queue
+# The daemon tolerates the cloud being offline (events buffer in the local queue
 # and flush on reconnect), so this unit only *wants* the network, not requires it.
 
 [Unit]
@@ -9,23 +9,9 @@ Description=move-detect edge daemon (workplace-safety AI CCTV)
 Documentation=file:/opt/move-detect/docs/pilot-runbook.md
 Wants=network-online.target
 After=network-online.target
-# Order after clock sync so Event.occurred_at is real wall time, not the stale fake-hwclock time a
-# Pi 5 (no RTC battery) boots with. Detector TIMERS are already immune (they run on a monotonic
-# clock — see daemon.main), so this only affects timestamp accuracy; Wants (not Requires) so an
-# air-gapped Pi with no reachable NTP still starts rather than hanging forever on time-sync.
-Wants=time-sync.target
-After=time-sync.target
-# Never stop retrying. This MUST live in [Unit]: systemd's parser table knows
-# Unit.StartLimitIntervalSec but only Service.StartLimitInterval (no "Sec"), so in
-# [Service] it is an unknown key — silently ignored, leaving the default 5-starts/10s
-# limit to defeat Restart=always below.
-StartLimitIntervalSec=0
 
 [Service]
-# Type=exec, not simple: with simple, systemd marks the start job done the instant fork()
+Type=simple
-# returns, so an exec-step failure (226/NAMESPACE, 216/GROUP, 217/USER, 203/EXEC) never
-# reaches `systemctl enable --now` and the installer reports success over a dead daemon.
-Type=exec
 # Dedicated unprivileged account; must be in the groups that own the camera and
 # the Hailo accelerator device nodes.
 User=movedetect
@@ -42,36 +28,21 @@ ExecStart=/opt/move-detect/venv/bin/python -m edge
 # periodic-op exceptions internally so a single glitch never exits the process.
 Restart=always
 RestartSec=5
+StartLimitIntervalSec=0
 
 # Writable state (offline queue sqlite lives here; keep QUEUE_DB pointed at it).
 # systemd creates/owns /var/lib/move-detect for the service user.
 StateDirectory=move-detect
 StateDirectoryMode=0750
 
-# Camera + accelerator device access. Once ANY DeviceAllow= is present, systemd denies every
+# Camera + accelerator device access (USB UVC = /dev/video*, Hailo = /dev/hailo0).
-# unlisted device node, so the CSI camera needs its nodes explicitly:
-#   char-video4linux  USB UVC (/dev/video*) AND the CSI capture nodes
-#   char-media        picamera2/libcamera opens /dev/media* to configure the CSI pipeline (Pi 5)
-#   char-dma_heap     libcamera allocates capture buffers from the dma-heap on Pi 5
-# Without char-media + char-dma_heap a Hailo Pi with a CSI camera is denied its own camera by this
-# unit's policy. (OFF-HW: verify on the Pi — `journalctl` shows a libcamera EPERM/open failure.)
-#
-# NOTE: DeviceAllow= takes a device-node path OR a `char-<group>`/`block-<group>` name — NOT a
-# directory. `/dev/dma_heap/` (a directory, trailing slash) is rejected at cgroup-realize time and
-# silently dropped, leaving dma-heap DENIED under this deny-by-default policy. Use the char group
-# (dma_heap appears in /proc/devices as a char device) so the whole /dev/dma_heap/* set is allowed.
 DeviceAllow=/dev/hailo0 rw
 DeviceAllow=char-video4linux rw
-DeviceAllow=char-media rw
-DeviceAllow=char-dma_heap rw
 
 # Conservative hardening (loosen if it blocks device access on your image).
 NoNewPrivileges=true
 ProtectSystem=strict
-# Do NOT add ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/move-detect here. StateDirectory= above already emits
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/move-detect
-# a recursive read-write bind mount for that exact path, which outranks a ReadWritePaths=
-# entry for the same path and drops it before any path is resolved. It is dead config: it
-# can neither cause nor fix a state-dir problem.
 ProtectHome=true
 PrivateTmp=true
 

docs/delivery-audit.md

@@ -1,287 +0,0 @@
-# Delivery Audit — move-detect (납품 전 결함 목록 · 순차 처리)
-
-Source: 62-agent adversarial audit (2026-07-16) + skill `iot-airgap-delivery` §3 + manual
-verification of every blocker against real code. Ordered for sequential fixing. Each item is
-checked off only after a test locks it and verification passes.
-
-Legend: **[B]** blocks delivery · **[H]** high · **[M]** medium · **[L]** low ·
-`OFF-HW` = cannot be verified without the Hailo board.
-
----
-
-## Phase 1 — Silent failure & misconfiguration (the #1 delivery risk)
-
-A safety system that *looks* healthy while doing nothing is the worst failure. Make every
-misconfig/degradation fail LOUD.
-
-- [x] **P1-1 [H]** `edge/serverclient.py`, `edge/alert.py` — `requests` sends the default
-  `python-requests/x.y` User-Agent; cafe24's shared-hosting WAF commonly blocks it with an
-  HTML 403 while curl passes. Every event then silently fails. Also `allow_redirects=True`
-  turns the .htaccess http→https 302 into a GET → 405/404. **Fix:** custom UA
-  (`move-detect-edge/1.0`) on every call + `allow_redirects=False`, log once on 3xx.
-  DONE — `USER_AGENT` in alert.py, both clients send it + `allow_redirects=False`;
-  tests in test_alert.py / test_serverclient.py.
-- [x] **P1-2 [B]** `deploy/systemd/move-detect-edge.env.example`, `setup_online.sh` prompt,
-  docs — `CAFE24_URL` must be `https://<domain>/move_detect` (subdir mount). Empty/typo/
-  missing-subdir is 100% silent. **Fix:** examples show the subdir; installer validates.
-  DONE — env.example + installer prompt now show/require the `/move_detect` subdir.
-- [x] **P1-3 [H]** `edge/config.py:40` + `edge/daemon.py` — empty `CAFE24_URL`/`DEVICE_SECRET`
-  defaults let the daemon run green while every upload fails and the queue grows forever.
-  **Fix:** fail loud at startup if either is blank.
-  DONE — `require_upload_config(cfg)` raises at daemon startup; test_config.py locks it.
-- [x] **P1-4 [H]** `edge/daemon.py:23` — `run_loop` swallows every per-frame/per-camera
-  exception with no log and no degraded-monitoring signal → a permanently broken pipeline
-  looks green. **Fix:** rate-limited `logging.exception` + consecutive-error counter.
-  DONE — per-camera + periodic error streaks, logged 1st + every 300th, names the camera;
-  test_daemon.py locks the rate-limit.
-- [x] **P1-5 [H]** `edge/daemon.py:33` — heartbeat hardcodes `fps=0.0` and counts ticks where
-  `source.read()` returned nothing, so the server cannot tell a dead device from a live one.
-  **Fix:** real fps + per-camera frame-age/health in the heartbeat body.
-  DONE — heartbeat now sends measured fps + cameras_total/cameras_erroring/errors;
-  test_daemon.py locks fps math + failing-camera flag.
-- [x] **P1-6 [H]** `edge/adapters/uvc_source.py:12` — a camera that stops delivering frames is
-  never detected or reopened; monitoring dies silently. **Fix:** fail loud on open failure;
-  emit `device_fault`/`monitoring_degraded` when a camera goes stale.
-  DONE — open-failure raises (build_runtimes logs+skips); read() releases+reopens after a
-  streak; heartbeat's cameras_erroring (P1-5) reports the fault. test_uvc_source.py locks it.
-- [x] **P1-7 [M]** `edge/queue.py` — offline sqlite queue has no size cap/TTL; an outage (or a
-  permanent misconfig) fills the SD card, then new events drop silently. **Fix:** bounded
-  queue (row/byte budget), log dropped-oldest count.
-  DONE — `max_rows` (default 2000) evicts oldest on enqueue; test_queue.py locks it.
-- [x] **P1-8 [H]** `edge/queue.py:52` — a permanently-rejected event (e.g. 400) is retried
-  forever at the head, blocking the whole queue. **Fix:** drop/quarantine after N failures.
-  DONE — `attempts` column; a row is dropped after `max_send_attempts` (default 20) so a
-  poison head unwedges the queue; test locks the drain-past-poison behavior.
-- [x] **P1-9 [M]** `edge/alert.py:43` — a POST that succeeds server-side but times out
-  client-side is re-queued and re-sent; no dedup key → duplicate alerts. **Fix:** stable
-  client-generated `event_id` in the payload; server dedups on it.
-  DONE — the edge `Event` now carries a stable `event_uuid` (uuid4 hex, generated once at
-  creation, preserved through the offline queue + every retry). Server: `events.event_uuid`
-  CHAR(32) NULL UNIQUE; `EventValidator` accepts/validates it; `IngestController` returns the
-  already-stored event (200 `dedup:true`) on a repeat uuid, race-safe against the UNIQUE key.
-  Tests: queue round-trip keeps the uuid (edge); repeat-uuid dedups to one row (server).
-- [x] **P1-10 [M]** `edge/daemon.py:134` — `TARGET_FPS=0`/non-numeric → ZeroDivision/ValueError
-  at every start → infinite systemd restart loop. **Fix:** validate, default sanely.
-  DONE — `frame_interval_from_env` validates; test_config.py locks it.
-- [x] **P1-11 [L]** `edge/daemon.py:120` — `QUEUE_DB` defaults to relative `queue.db`,
-  unwritable under the hardened unit (`ProtectSystem=strict`) → crash loop when env omitted.
-  **Fix:** absolute default under the state dir.
-  DONE — `queue_db_path` defaults to /var/lib/move-detect/queue.db; test_config.py locks it.
-
-## Phase 2 — Core safety correctness (fall / zone / tracking)
-
-- [x] **P2-1 [B]** `edge/zones.py:19` ↔ `server/public/assets/zone-draw.js:196` — zones are
-  saved in 960×540 canvas pixels but the edge compares against camera-native pixels; **every
-  zone is silently misplaced.** **Fix:** normalized 0..1 polygon contract on both sides.
-  DONE — dashboard stores/loads 0..1 (zone-draw.js), edge normalizes the foot by frame size
-  (zone.py → engine.process → run_once threads frame_wh); Polygon::validate is range-agnostic
-  so PHP stores it opaquely. test_zone.py locks the normalized contract.
-- [x] **P2-2 [B]** `edge/engine.py:72` — a `pinch` (협착) zone falls through to
-  `ZONE_WARNING`; the PINCH event + HIGH severity are never emitted. **Fix:** map
-  `pinch→PINCH`, `restricted→ZONE_RESTRICTED`, else WARNING.
-  DONE — dict map pinch→PINCH/restricted→ZONE_RESTRICTED; test_engine.py locks PINCH+HIGH.
-- [x] **P2-3 [H]** `edge/detectors/fall.py:65` — a per-frame keypoint-confidence gate
-  silently disables fall, no_motion AND ghost for an occluded/low-confidence fallen person —
-  exactly when someone is on the floor. **Fix:** use bbox cues when keypoints are low-conf.
-  DONE — bbox cues (aspect/height-collapse) always run; keypoint cues gated by kp_ok;
-  test_fall.py locks both the low-conf detection and the no-false-positive-standing case.
-- [x] **P2-4 [H]** `edge/detectors/ghost.py:38` — a ghost candidate is cancelled when ANY
-  person (a colleague) passes near the loss point. **Fix:** only the plausibly-same track
-  cancels it.
-  DONE — candidate snapshots the active track ids at loss time; only a NEW track (not a
-  known bystander) near the loss point cancels. test_ghost.py locks the bystander case.
-- [x] **P2-5 [H]** `edge/geometry.py:66` — stillness compares raw per-frame displacement to a
-  fixed threshold with no dt normalization → immobility/no_motion flips with FPS. **Fix:**
-  normalize by elapsed time.
-  DONE — track_displacement divides by dt (per-second speed); test_geometry.py locks
-  FPS-invariance. NOTE: motion_thr is now per-second and needs on-device re-tuning.
-- [ ] **P2-6 [M]** `edge/tracking.py:50` — greedy IoU matching swaps IDs when workers cross,
-  transferring FALLEN state + frozen baseline to the wrong person. **Fix:** gate matches;
-  reset per-track safety state on a low-confidence match.
-- [ ] **P2-7 [M]** `edge/detectors/fall.py:92` — a single prone-looking frame sets FALLING and
-  arms a CRITICAL ghost if the person then leaves. **Fix:** require sustained prone.
-- [ ] **P2-8 [M]** `edge/app.py:30` — detection dropouts keep a track 'active' with a frozen
-  frame; time-based timers accrue on stale data. **Fix:** treat a stale track as no-data.
-- [x] **P2-9 [M]** `edge/detectors/zone.py:45` — foot point averages both ankles with no
-  confidence check; a hallucinated ankle at (0,0) drags the foot into/out of a zone. **Fix:**
-  confidence-gate the ankles, fall back to bbox-bottom-center.
-  DONE — `_foot` averages only ankles with conf ≥ MIN_ANKLE_CONF (0.2, the existing 'visible'
-  gate); with neither trustworthy it falls back to bbox bottom-centre. No tuning knob — reuses
-  the codebase's keypoint-visible convention. test_zone.py locks the fallback.
-- [x] **P2-10 [M]** `edge/adapters/movenet_pose.py:34` — the CPU MoveNet fallback is
-  single-person; with 2+ workers all but one are invisible to every detector, no warning.
-  **Fix:** warn loudly that MoveNet fallback is single-person (Hailo is multi-person).
-  DONE — MoveNetPoseAdapter.__init__ logs a startup WARNING ("SINGLE-PERSON … use POSE_BACKEND=
-  hailo at multi-person sites"). test_movenet_pose.py asserts the warning via caplog.
-- [x] **P2-11 [L]** `edge/geometry.py:39` — `head_below_hips` uses the NOSE keypoint
-  regardless of confidence. **Fix:** confidence-gate.
-  DONE — `head_below_hips` returns False when nose conf < nose_thr (0.2), so an unconfident/
-  hallucinated nose no longer fires the fall cue. test_geometry.py locks it; test_fall.py stays
-  green (the cue's confident-nose path is unchanged).
-
-## Phase 3 — Privacy / PIPA (delivery compliance)
-
-- [x] **P3-1 [H]** `edge/app.py:18` — `FaceBlurrer` blurs a fixed ~40×40px patch regardless of
-  face size; close faces stay identifiable. **Fix:** size the blur box from the person bbox.
-  DONE — `_head_boxes` sizes the box from the person bbox (scales with distance) + bbox-top
-  fallback when the nose keypoint is low-confidence. test_faceblur.py locks both.
-- [x] **P3-2 [H]** `server/src/Ingest/IngestController.php:68` — worker snapshots are stored
-  forever; no retention/purge anywhere. PIPA violation. **Fix:** `snapshot_retention_days`
-  config + a token-guarded purge route + `SnapshotRepository::purgeOlderThan`.
-  DONE (retention = **7 days**) — `snapshot_retention_days` config; `purgeOlderThan` on the
-  interface + Pdo + double (files then rows, bounded batch); opportunistic purge in the
-  ingest path (cafe24 has no cron; the edge POSTs 24/7). IngestControllerTest locks it.
-- [x] **P3-2b [M]** `server/src/Dashboard/EventListController.php:17` — `site_scope` is stored
-  in the session but never enforced; any authenticated user sees every device's worker
-  snapshots. **Fix:** scope event/snapshot queries by the session's `site_scope`.
-  DONE (site↔device model approved) — added `devices.site`; ingest denormalizes it onto
-  `events.site` (server-derived, never client-supplied). `App\Security\SiteScope` centralizes the
-  rule (NULL scope = global operator). The event LIST filters in SQL (`page(...,$site)`); event
-  DETAIL + ACK and the SNAPSHOT proxy guard per-row and return 404 (not 403) cross-site so
-  existence never leaks. Migration ALTERs + provisioning UPDATEs documented in schema.sql.
-  Tests: list scoped, detail cross-site 404, snapshot cross-site 404 / same-site 200.
-- [x] **P3-3 [H]** `edge/tools/fetch_movenet.py:12` — downloads the ONNX from a mutable ref
-  with no checksum; spec mandates SHA256. **Fix:** pin URL to a commit + sha256+size, mirror
-  `fetch_hailo_hef.py`.
-  DONE (with a caveat) — rewrote to stage-validate: rejects HTML/LFS-pointer, optional pinned
-  sha256+size, temp-file staging, fails LOUD. DISCOVERY: the old URL is DEAD (GitHub 404 / HTML
-  — PINTO hosts models off-repo), so it was silently saving garbage. No known-good sha256 to
-  pin until a valid MOVENET_ONNX_URL is set. NON-BLOCKING for the Hailo delivery path (MoveNet
-  is the optional CPU fallback); flag for whoever needs CPU MoveNet.
-
-## Phase 4 — Server hardening (shared hosting)
-
-- [x] **P4-1 [H]** `server/public/index.php:106` — no top-level try/catch; a PDOException
-  becomes a raw 500 that leaks DSN/db_user if `display_errors` is on (cafe24 often ships On).
-  **Fix:** global try/catch → generic 500 + `error_log`; `ini_set('display_errors','0')`;
-  ship `.user.ini`.
-  DONE — index.php sets display_errors=0 + a set_exception_handler → generic {"error":"internal"}
-  + error_log; a `.user.ini` (display_errors=Off) ships in www/move_detect/ as the pre-parse
-  backstop. Package build verified.
-- [x] **P4-2 [H]** `server/src/Api/ConfigController.php:22`, `HeartbeatController.php` — no rate
-  limiting (unlike /api/events). **Fix:** per-IP + per-device limiter, fail-open on storage
-  error.
-  DONE — both take an optional RateLimiterRepository + clientIp; pre-auth per-IP limit
-  (shared ingest_ip cap) returns 429; index.php passes REMOTE_ADDR. ApiSyncTest locks the flood.
-- [x] **P4-3 [M]** `server/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoNonceRepository.php:30` — nonces + rate_limits
-  grow without bound; no cron on cafe24. **Fix:** opportunistic in-request reap of expired
-  rows.
-  DONE — remember() reaps expired nonces; hit() reaps stale rate-limit windows (bounded,
-  gated 1/100). Full PHP suite green.
-- [x] **P4-4 [M]** `server/src/Http/Router.php:18` — route params are never `rawurldecode`d; a
-  `camera_id` with a space/`+`/Korean saves zones but never loads them. **Fix:** decode
-  captured params.
-  DONE — dispatch rawurldecodes captured params; BasePathTest locks space + Korean cases.
-- [x] **P4-5 [M]** `server/src/Dashboard/EventListController.php:17` — event list hard-capped at
-  newest 100, no pagination/date filter; older events unreachable. **Fix:** cursor pagination.
-  DONE — added keyset `EventRepository::page(limit, severity, beforeTs, beforeId)` (Pdo + InMemory),
-  a `(occurred_at DESC, event_id DESC)` cursor stable under concurrent inserts. Controller takes
-  `limit` (default 50, cap 200) + `cursor` ("occurred_at:event_id"), returns `next_cursor` on full
-  pages. `recent()` kept for existing callers. The live-tail dashboard consumes page 1; a
-  history-browse UI can layer on the same cursor later. Test `testListPaginatesWithCursor`.
-- [x] **P4-6 [M]** `server/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoZoneRepository.php:86` — editing a zone with a
-  changed device_id/camera_id throws an uncaught RuntimeException → 500. **Fix:** 400 with a
-  clear error.
-  DONE — ZoneConfigController::save wraps `$this->zones->save()` in try/catch(\RuntimeException)
-  → `invalid_zone` 400; test `testSaveOwnershipMismatchIs400NotError` with a throwing repo double.
-- [x] **P4-7 [L]** `server/src/Ingest/IngestController.php:64` — snapshot write failure is
-  swallowed (201 with evidence lost); file-write/DB-insert non-atomic → orphan JPEGs. **Fix:**
-  order write→insert, log failures, reconcile orphans.
-  DONE — extracted `storeSnapshot()`: re-encode→write→index in order; every failure (re-encode,
-  file write, DB index) now `error_log`s instead of a silent `continue`; a DB-index failure after
-  the file lands `@unlink`s the orphan. A snapshot problem no longer fails the ingest — the event
-  is already stored, 201 stands. Test `testSnapshotIndexFailureCleansOrphanFileButKeepsEvent`
-  (throwing repo double → asserts 201, event stored, no leftover *.jpg).
-- [x] **P4-8 [L]** `server/src/Auth/AuthController.php:31` — login form emits a CSRF token that
-  `login` never checks. **Fix:** verify it (or drop it).
-  DONE — verified (completed the half-built defense, not dropped). login() checks
-  `Csrf::check($sess->get('csrf'), $req->post('csrf'))` → 403 before the user lookup, closing the
-  login-CSRF / session-fixation hole. Tests updated to seed the session+body token; added
-  `testLoginRejectsMissingOrWrongCsrf`.
-- [x] **P4-9 [L]** `server/src/Auth/AuthController.php:71` — logout calls `regenerate()` after
-  `session_destroy()` → E_WARNING, old cookie not replaced. **Fix:** reorder.
-  DONE — logout() rotates the id then wipes (was regenerate-after-destroy).
-- [x] **P4-10 [L]** `server/src/Ingest/EventValidator.php:26` — no string length caps → an
-  overlong id becomes a MySQL 'Data too long' 500 retry loop instead of a 400. **Fix:** cap
-  lengths in the validator.
-  DONE — EventValidator caps device_id/camera_id (64) + zone_id (32); EventValidatorTest.
-- [x] **P4-11 [L]** `server/src/Http/Request.php:45` — `pathFor` routes any `//...` URI to `/`
-  (parse_url scheme-relative). **Fix:** collapse/normalize.
-
-## Phase 5 — Install / bundle / supply-chain
-
-  DONE — pathFor collapses leading slashes before parse_url; BasePathTest locks it.
-- [x] **P5-1 [B]** `deploy/bundle/install_offline.sh:79` — the OFFLINE installer has no
-  backend-usability gate (setup_online's [6/8] does): it installs `POSE_BACKEND=movenet`
-  verbatim even when the bundle carries no working backend. **Fix:** mirror the [6/8] probe.
-  DONE — [5/6] probes HEF+hailo_platform / onnx+onnxruntime, reconciles POSE_BACKEND in the
-  installed env, hard-fails if neither. test_deploy_artifacts.py locks the gate.
-- [x] **P5-2 [H]** `deploy/bundle/build_offline_bundle.sh:55` — a native build on x86 produces
-  an aarch64-named tarball full of x86_64 wheels. **Fix:** assert `uname -m == TARGET_ARCH`.
-  DONE — native branch now hard-fails when uname -m != TARGET_ARCH.
-- [x] **P5-3 [M]** `deploy/bundle/build_offline_bundle.sh:65` — the air-gapped bundle never
-  carries the Hailo HEF, so offline Hailo install is impossible. **Fix:** stage the HEF (via
-  `fetch_hailo_hef --arch`) into the bundle.
-  DONE — build now fetches the `$HAILO_ARCH` (default hailo8) HEF via `fetch_hailo_hef` (pinned
-  sha256, aborts on mismatch) and stages `yolov8s_pose.hef`. Also fixed two latent breaks that
-  made the offline path unusable regardless: the MoveNet ONNX fetch was unconditional so its dead
-  source aborted the whole build under `set -e` (now guarded/optional → Hailo-only bundle), and
-  `install_offline.sh` copied only `*.onnx` so a bundled HEF never reached `$PREFIX/models` for the
-  backend gate to find (now copies `*.hef` too). MANIFEST lists models + available pose_backends.
-  Tests: fetches/stages HEF, MoveNet optional, installer copies the HEF.
-- [x] **P5-4 [M]** `deploy/bundle/build_offline_bundle.sh:28` — pip deps unpinned, no digests,
-  MANIFEST has no hashes, bundle unsigned; spec requires SHA256/GPG + SBOM. **Fix:** pin +
-  hash + manifest digests.
-  DONE — build emits `SHA256SUMS` (sha256 of every wheel + model), `requirements.lock` (exact
-  `name==version` pins for a reproducible rebuild), and `sbom.json` (CycloneDX 1.5: name, version,
-  pypi purl, sha256). Optional detached GPG signature via `SIGN_KEY` → `SHA256SUMS.asc`.
-  `install_offline.sh` runs `sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS` (and verifies the signature if present)
-  BEFORE any pip install, hard-failing on mismatch. Generation logic verified end-to-end on a
-  synthetic stage (valid JSON, `sha256sum -c` passes). Tests lock the manifest + the install-time
-  check.
-- [x] **P5-5 [H]** `deploy/systemd/move-detect-edge.service:46` `OFF-HW` — `DeviceAllow` omits
-  `/dev/media*` and `/dev/dma_heap`; picamera2/libcamera on Pi 5 needs them, so the CSI camera
-  is denied by the unit's own policy. **Fix:** add the device classes; verify on hardware.
-  DONE — added `char-media` + `/dev/dma_heap/`. OFF-HW: confirm on the Pi with the CSI camera.
-- [x] **P5-6 [L]** `server/deploy/build_cafe24_package.sh` — dev cache dirs
-  (`.impeccable/`, `.ruff_cache/`) can ship inside the web-served package. **Fix:** exclude.
-
----
-
-## Progress log
-
-(updated as each item lands — newest first)
-
-- **2026-07-17 — P1-9 + P3-2b landed (both approved data-model changes).** 40/43 done.
-  P1-9: edge `event_uuid` idempotency key (stable through the queue) + server dedup on a UNIQUE
-  column. P3-2b: `devices.site` → denormalized `events.site`; `SiteScope` enforced on the event
-  list (SQL filter), event detail/ack, and snapshot proxy (per-row 404). Schema migration +
-  provisioning UPDATEs documented in schema.sql. phpunit 97, pytest 158 — all green. REMAINING 3:
-  P2-6/7/8 (safety-timing / tracking-match — deferred to on-hardware commissioning).
-
-- **2026-07-17 — off-hardware solo work COMPLETE (35/43).** Landed this pass, each test-locked:
-  P4-8 (login CSRF), P4-6 (zone 400-not-500), P4-5 (cursor pagination), P4-7 (snapshot atomicity
-  + orphan cleanup), P5-3 (HEF in the offline bundle + fixed the broken build), P5-4 (pin + hash +
-  SBOM + install-time verify), P2-9/10/11 (keypoint confidence gating + MoveNet single-person
-  warning). phpunit 90, pytest 157 — all green.
-  REMAINING 8, none solo-doable:
-  · P1-9, P3-2b — need a DATA-MODEL decision (event dedup key + schema column; site↔device model).
-  · P2-6, P2-7, P2-8 — safety-timing / tracking-match logic that must be validated ON HARDWARE.
-    Changing them blind could make fall detection MISS events (worse than today's over-alarm,
-    which is fail-safe), so they are deliberately deferred to on-device commissioning.
-  · (P2 threshold notes: motion_thr and the sustained-prone/staleness windows are commissioning
-    knobs — tune with real camera footage on the Pi.)
-
-- **2026-07-17 — P4-6 + P4-8 landed (server error/auth hardening).** ZoneConfig ownership-mismatch
-  now 400 not 500 (P4-6); login CSRF token now verified — closes login-CSRF/session-fixation
-  (P4-8). phpunit 88 green (4 skipped: PDO). Remaining solo: P4-5 (pagination), P4-7 (atomic
-  snapshot), P5-3 (HEF in bundle), P5-4 (pin+hash+SBOM).
-
-- **2026-07-17 — 17 items landed, all with tests, full suite green.** ALL 4 BLOCKERS cleared
-  (P1-2, P2-1, P2-2, P5-1) + all Phase-1 silent-failure (P1-1,3,4,5,6,7,8,10,11) + Phase-2 HIGH
-  correctness (P2-3,4,5). Remaining: P1-9 (deferred to server batch), P2-6..11 (mostly threshold
-  tuning — needs on-device validation), Phase 3 (privacy — P3-2 retention needs a policy
-  decision: how many days), Phase 4 (server hardening, 11 items — mostly clear), Phase 5 (P5-2..6).
-  Nothing committed yet.
-
-  DONE — build prunes .ruff_cache/.impeccable/__pycache__/etc from the staged package.

docs/pilot-runbook.md

@@ -1,45 +1,17 @@
-# 파일럿 · 운영 런북
+# P1 파일럿 런북 (노트북 웹캠 엔드투엔드)
 
-이 문서는 두 경로를 다룬다. **자신의 상황에 맞는 절에서 시작하라:**
+이 문서는 노트북 웹캠 하나로 **엣지 → 클라우드 → 관리자 응답**의 최소 경로를 돌리는 절차다.
+실장비(Hailo·Pi5)·폐쇄망 전체 번들·드릴 게이트·SMS 연동은 후속(범위 밖, §6).
 
-- **§0 폐쇄망 Pi 현장 설치·운영** — Hailo·Pi5 실장비를 오프라인 번들로 설치한 경우. systemd 유닛의
+- 엣지: `python -m edge` (또는 `move-detect-edge`) — CPU MoveNet pose → 감지 → HMAC 서명 POST.
-  `Documentation=`이 이 문서를 가리키므로 현장 운영자는 **§0만** 보면 된다.
+- 클라우드: 기존 `cloud/` PHP 앱 — ingest + 대시보드 + 사고 상세 + 데스크 Web Audio 알림.
-- **§1~§6 노트북 웹캠 개발 파일럿** — 개발/데모 머신에서 CPU MoveNet로 엔드투엔드를 돌리는 최소 경로.
-  **이 절들의 `pip install`·모델 `fetch` 명령은 개발/빌드 머신 전용이다 — 폐쇄망 Pi에서 실행하지 말 것.**
-
-- 엣지: `python -m edge` (또는 `move-detect-edge`) — pose → 감지 → HMAC 서명 POST.
-- 서버: 기존 `server/` PHP 앱 — ingest + 대시보드 + 사고 상세 + 데스크 Web Audio 알림.
 
 ---
 
-## 0. 폐쇄망 Pi 현장 설치·운영
+## 1. 빌드 머신 준비 (모델 · onnxruntime)
 
-실장비 Hailo·Pi5는 **오프라인 전체 번들**로 설치한다. 런타임 휠·pose 모델(HEF)·소스·systemd 유닛이
+> **폐쇄망 원칙:** onnxruntime 휠과 `.onnx` 모델은 **빌드 머신에서 받아 번들**한다. 타깃(폐쇄망)에서
-모두 번들에 동봉되어 있으므로 **Pi에서 인터넷을 받지 않는다** (아래 §1의 `pip install`/`fetch`는 절대
+> 인터넷을 받지 않는다. 노트북 파일럿은 빌드=타깃이 같은 머신이라 아래를 그대로 실행하면 된다.
-실행 금지 — 빌드 머신 전용).
-
-1. **설치:** 번들 절차는 [deploy/README.md](../deploy/README.md)를 따른다. 빌드 머신에서
-   `deploy/bundle/build_offline_bundle.sh`(aarch64)로 번들을 만들어 Pi로 옮기고,
-   `sudo ./install_offline.sh`가 SHA256SUMS 검증 → 오프라인 휠 설치 → HEF 배치 → 유닛 설치를 수행한다.
-   (온라인 프로비저닝은 `sudo deploy/setup_online.sh` — 카메라 프로브까지 자동.)
-2. **멀티카메라:** `/etc/move-detect/edge.env`의 `CAMERAS=csi:0:cam-01,uvc:0:cam-02`
-   형식으로 1 Pi에 2~4대를 배선한다(형식 `backend:device:camera_id`).
-3. **enable 전 카메라 프로브** (설치 스크립트가 출력하는 명령) — 잘못된 인덱스/미체결 리본이 만드는
-   "초록불인데 한 대 덜 감시" 상태를 현장에서 잡는다.
-4. **기동·확인:** `sudo systemctl enable --now move-detect-edge` → `journalctl -u move-detect-edge -f`.
-5. **시크릿 위생:** 프로비저닝에 `deploy/device.env`를 썼다면 설치 후 삭제·필요시 로테이션
-   (deploy/README.md "Secret handling").
-
-> 시크릿·서버 URL·모델 경로 등 env 키는 §3 표와 동일하다. 감지 임계값은 서버 대시보드의 구역·임계값이
-> 다음 config 폴링에 반영된다.
-
----
-
-## 1. 빌드/개발 머신 준비 (모델 · onnxruntime) — 폐쇄망 Pi에서 실행 금지
-
-> **폐쇄망 원칙:** onnxruntime 휠과 `.onnx` 모델은 **빌드 머신에서 받아 번들**한다. 타깃(폐쇄망 Pi)에서는
-> 인터넷을 받지 않으며, 아래 두 명령을 Pi에서 실행하면 안 된다(§0 참조 — Pi는 이미 번들로 설치됨).
-> 노트북 파일럿은 빌드=타깃이 같은 머신이라 아래를 그대로 실행하면 된다.
 
 ```bash
 pip install onnxruntime          # CPU 추론 런타임 (에어갭 타깃엔 오프라인 휠로 번들)
@@ -53,23 +25,23 @@ COCO-17 remap 로직은 그대로). 어댑터 remap은 `tests/test_movenet_pose.
 
 ---
 
-## 2. 서버 로컬 기동
+## 2. 클라우드 로컬 기동
 
 로컬 MySQL 8(스키마 CHECK 제약은 8.0.16+)과 PHP 8.2+ 필요. 상세 배포·전제조건(gd/argon2/HTTPS 등)은
-[server/docs/server-deploy.md](../server/docs/server-deploy.md) 참조 — 여기선 로컬 최소 절차만.
+[cloud/docs/cloud-deploy.md](../cloud/docs/cloud-deploy.md) 참조 — 여기선 로컬 최소 절차만.
 
-1. DB 생성 후 스키마 임포트: `mysql <db> < server/schema.sql` (10개 테이블).
+1. DB 생성 후 스키마 임포트: `mysql <db> < cloud/schema.sql` (10개 테이블).
-2. `server/config.php`를 `server/config.example.php`에서 복사, 로컬 DB DSN/계정 기입
+2. `cloud/config.php`를 `cloud/config.example.php`에서 복사, 로컬 DB DSN/계정 기입
    (`snapshot_dir`는 쓰기 가능 경로로).
 3. **관리자 계정 · 디바이스 시크릿 등록** — 앱에 셀프 가입 흐름이 없으므로 직접 넣는다.
-   CLI 스니펫과 SQL은 server-deploy.md **§6(디바이스 시크릿)** · **§7(첫 관리자)** 그대로 사용:
+   CLI 스니펫과 SQL은 cloud-deploy.md **§6(디바이스 시크릿)** · **§7(첫 관리자)** 그대로 사용:
    - 시크릿 생성: `php -r "echo bin2hex(random_bytes(32)), \"\n\";"`
    - `INSERT INTO devices (device_id, name, secret, config_version) VALUES ('pi-01','노트북','<시크릿>',1);`
    - 관리자 해시: `php -r "echo password_hash('바꿀-암구호', PASSWORD_ARGON2ID), \"\n\";"`
    - `INSERT INTO users (username, password_hash, role, ...) VALUES ('admin','<해시>','admin',NULL,0,0);`
-4. 기동: `php -S localhost:8000 -t server/public`
+4. 기동: `php -S localhost:8000 -t cloud/public`
    - 세션 쿠키가 `cookie_secure`라 순수 HTTP에선 로그인 쿠키가 안 붙을 수 있다. 로컬은 대개
-     `localhost`가 secure-context로 취급돼 동작하지만, 안 되면 server-deploy.md §8(HTTPS) 참조.
+     `localhost`가 secure-context로 취급돼 동작하지만, 안 되면 cloud-deploy.md §8(HTTPS) 참조.
 
 ---
 
@@ -81,7 +53,7 @@ COCO-17 remap 로직은 그대로). 어댑터 remap은 `tests/test_movenet_pose.
 |-----|------|------|
 | `DEVICE_ID` | `devices.device_id`와 일치 | `pi-01` |
 | `DEVICE_SECRET` | `devices.secret`와 일치(HMAC) | `<§2에서 생성한 값>` |
-| `CAFE24_URL` | 서버 베이스 URL | `http://localhost:8000` |
+| `CAFE24_URL` | 클라우드 베이스 URL | `http://localhost:8000` |
 | `CAMERA_ID` | 이벤트/구역의 camera_id | `cam-01` |
 | `MOVENET_ONNX` | 모델 경로 **(필수, 없으면 즉시 KeyError)** | `models/movenet_lightning.onnx` |
 | `UVC_DEVICE` | OpenCV 캡처 인덱스 | `0` |
@@ -111,13 +83,10 @@ python -m edge        # 또는 move-detect-edge
    ≈ 12fps에서 약 12초. 저장 후 ~15초 기다렸다가 진입할 것.
 6. **오프라인 큐:** 네트워크(또는 `php -S`) 중단 상태에서 이벤트 발생 → 큐에 적재 →
    복구 후 `flush_every=300` 프레임(≈25초)마다 flush로 밀린 이벤트 전송.
-7. **하트비트:** **30초 시간기반**(`heartbeat_interval_s=30`)으로 `POST /api/heartbeat`(서명).
+7. **하트비트:** `heartbeat_every=900` 프레임(≈75초)마다 `POST /api/heartbeat`(서명).
-   부하와 무관하게 주기가 일정해 서버의 오프라인 판정(120초, 4배 마진)이 정상 장치를 오프라인으로
-   깜빡이지 않는다. temp/throttle/queue_pending/config_version 텔레메트리를 함께 싣는다.
 
-> cadence(`sync_every`/`flush_every`는 프레임 수, `heartbeat_interval_s`는 초)는 `daemon.main()`
+> cadence(`sync_every`/`heartbeat_every`/`flush_every`)는 `daemon.main()` 기본값이며 env로
-> 기본값이며 env로 노출돼 있지 않다. 데모에서 더 빠른 주기가 필요하면 `run_loop(...)` 호출 인자를
+> 노출돼 있지 않다. 데모에서 더 빠른 주기가 필요하면 `run_loop(...)` 호출 인자를 임시 조정한다.
-> 임시 조정한다. 감지 타이머는 monotonic 시계로 돌아 NTP 시각 점프에 영향받지 않는다(occurred_at만 벽시계).
 
 ---
 
@@ -125,7 +94,7 @@ python -m edge        # 또는 move-detect-edge
 
 ```bash
 pytest -q                                   # 엣지 유닛(하드웨어 스모크는 모델 없으면 skip)
-cd server && ./vendor/bin/phpunit --display-warnings --display-deprecations   # 서버(0 warnings)
+cd cloud && ./vendor/bin/phpunit --display-warnings --display-deprecations   # 클라우드(0 warnings)
 ```
 
 모델을 번들한 뒤 실추론 경로까지 확인하려면 `models/movenet_lightning.onnx` 존재 상태로 `pytest -q` —
@@ -133,15 +102,11 @@ cd server && ./vendor/bin/phpunit --display-warnings --display-deprecations   #
 
 ---
 
-## 6. 한계 (명시)
+## 6. 파일럿 한계 (명시)
 
-> **이 절은 §1~§5의 노트북 웹캠 파일럿에 대한 것이다.** 폐쇄망 Pi 현장 설치(§0)는 아래 항목 다수를
+- **단일 카메라 · CPU pose(저 fps)** — 실장비 Hailo 가속은 후속.
-> 이미 해소했다 — 실장비 Hailo 가속, 멀티카메라, 오프라인 전체 번들이 제공된다.
+- **단일 프레임 스냅샷** — 前中後 링버퍼 다중 프레임은 P2.
-
+- **알림 1채널(데스크 Web Audio)** — critical SMS/webhook 실연동은 후속(게이트 정보 필요).
-- **노트북 파일럿은 단일 카메라 · CPU pose(저 fps)** — 폐쇄망 Pi(§0)는 Hailo 가속 + 멀티카메라
+- **폐쇄망 전체 번들 아님** — onnxruntime/모델 fetch만 제공. 오프라인 휠·차단 설치·`docker save`
-  (`CAMERAS=` 다중 배선)를 사용한다.
+  패키징은 별도 후속 태스크.
-- **단일 프레임 스냅샷** — 前中後 링버퍼 다중 프레임은 P2(양끝 인프라는 존재, 배선 대기).
-- **알림 1채널(데스크 Web Audio)** — critical SMS/webhook·미확인 에스컬레이션 메일은 후속(P3).
-- **폐쇄망 전체 번들은 이미 존재한다** — `deploy/bundle/`에 오프라인 휠·HEF·소스·SHA256SUMS 검증
-  설치를 제공한다(§0). 노트북 파일럿만 `pip install`/`fetch`로 편의 실행할 뿐이다.
 - **드릴 게이트 · F14 컴플라이언스 · 감사 해시체인** — 범위 밖(P1-C/P3).

docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-11-p1b-cloud-ingest-dashboard.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# P1-B 서버 수신·대시보드 (Server Ingest + Dashboard) Implementation Plan
+# P1-B 클라우드 수신·대시보드 (Cloud Ingest + Dashboard) Implementation Plan
 
 > **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development (recommended) or superpowers:executing-plans to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
 
@@ -10,22 +10,22 @@
 
 ## Global Constraints
 
-- **PHP 8.5**, `declare(strict_types=1);` 모든 파일. PSR-4 오토로드(`App\` → `server/src/`).
+- **PHP 8.5**, `declare(strict_types=1);` 모든 파일. PSR-4 오토로드(`App\` → `cloud/src/`).
-- **폐쇄망/공유호스팅:** 런타임 composer 의존성 금지(대시보드는 vendor 없이 동작). phpunit은 개발 전용. Cafe24 `public_html`에 `server/public/`만 웹 노출.
+- **폐쇄망/공유호스팅:** 런타임 composer 의존성 금지(대시보드는 vendor 없이 동작). phpunit은 개발 전용. Cafe24 `public_html`에 `cloud/public/`만 웹 노출.
 - **HMAC 계약(P1-A와 정확히 일치):** 서명 = `hmac-sha256(nonce + timestamp + body, per_device_secret)` hex. P1-A `edge/alert.py::sign`과 바이트 동일하게 검증. 헤더 `X-Signature`, `X-Nonce`, `X-Timestamp`.
 - **replay 방지:** nonce 1회성(저장·재사용 거부) + timestamp 윈도우(기본 300초).
-- **스냅샷:** base64 JPEG를 **gd로 재인코딩**(페이로드 제거·강제 .jpg·랜덤 UUID 파일명), **웹루트 밖**(`server/storage/snapshots/`) 저장, 인증 프록시로만 서빙. 원본 바이트 절대 그대로 저장 금지.
+- **스냅샷:** base64 JPEG를 **gd로 재인코딩**(페이로드 제거·강제 .jpg·랜덤 UUID 파일명), **웹루트 밖**(`cloud/storage/snapshots/`) 저장, 인증 프록시로만 서빙. 원본 바이트 절대 그대로 저장 금지.
 - **SQL:** 전부 prepared statement(placeholder). event_type/severity/level 등은 **화이트리스트 enum** 검증.
 - **인증:** 로그인 필수(argon2id), 세션 쿠키 HttpOnly+Secure+SameSite=Lax, CSRF 토큰, brute-force 잠금. RBAC: admin/operator/viewer.
 - **심각도 색상 단독 금지(NF9):** 텍스트(위급/높음/경고)+아이콘+색, 색맹안전 팔레트.
-- **시크릿:** per-device secret·DB 자격증명은 env/시크릿 파일(`server/config.php`는 `.gitignore`), 하드코딩 금지.
+- **시크릿:** per-device secret·DB 자격증명은 env/시크릿 파일(`cloud/config.php`는 `.gitignore`), 하드코딩 금지.
 - **테스트:** 로직은 mock repository로 DB 없이 단위테스트. DB 통합은 마지막 게이트 태스크(로컬 pdo_sqlite or Cafe24).
 - 파일 작고 단일책임. 컨트롤러는 얇게(검증·오케스트레이션), 로직은 서비스/헬퍼로.
 
 ## File Structure
 
 ```
-server/
+cloud/
   composer.json                 # PSR-4 autoload + phpunit(dev)
   phpunit.xml
   config.example.php            # DB dsn, snapshot dir, nonce ttl 등 (실배포 config.php는 gitignore)
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ server/
 ## Task 1: 스캐폴드 (composer, autoload, Config, PHPUnit)
 
 **Files:**
-- Create: `server/composer.json`, `server/phpunit.xml`, `server/src/Config.php`, `server/config.example.php`, `server/tests/ConfigTest.php`, `server/.gitignore`
+- Create: `cloud/composer.json`, `cloud/phpunit.xml`, `cloud/src/Config.php`, `cloud/config.example.php`, `cloud/tests/ConfigTest.php`, `cloud/.gitignore`
 
 **Interfaces:**
 - Consumes: (없음)
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ server/
 
 ```json
 {
-  "name": "move-detect/server",
+  "name": "move-detect/cloud",
   "type": "project",
   "require": { "php": ">=8.2" },
   "require-dev": { "phpunit/phpunit": "^11" },
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ server/
 </phpunit>
 ```
 
-- [ ] **Step 3: `.gitignore`** (server/)
+- [ ] **Step 3: `.gitignore`** (cloud/)
 
 ```
 /vendor/
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ server/
 !/storage/snapshots/.gitkeep
 ```
 
-- [ ] **Step 4: 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/ConfigTest.php`
+- [ ] **Step 4: 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/ConfigTest.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -135,10 +135,10 @@ final class ConfigTest extends TestCase
 
 - [ ] **Step 5: 실패 확인**
 
-Run: `cd server && composer install -q && ./vendor/bin/phpunit tests/ConfigTest.php`
+Run: `cd cloud && composer install -q && ./vendor/bin/phpunit tests/ConfigTest.php`
 Expected: FAIL — `Class "App\Config" not found`
 
-- [ ] **Step 6: 구현** — `server/src/Config.php`
+- [ ] **Step 6: 구현** — `cloud/src/Config.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -180,8 +180,8 @@ return [
 Run: `./vendor/bin/phpunit tests/ConfigTest.php` → PASS
 
 ```bash
-git add server/composer.json server/phpunit.xml server/.gitignore server/config.example.php server/src/Config.php server/tests/ConfigTest.php
+git add cloud/composer.json cloud/phpunit.xml cloud/.gitignore cloud/config.example.php cloud/src/Config.php cloud/tests/ConfigTest.php
-git commit -m "feat(server): P1-B scaffold — composer autoload + Config"
+git commit -m "feat(cloud): P1-B scaffold — composer autoload + Config"
 ```
 
 ---
@@ -189,13 +189,13 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): P1-B scaffold — composer autoload + Config"
 ## Task 2: HMAC 검증 (Hmac::sign/verify) — P1-A 계약 일치
 
 **Files:**
-- Create: `server/src/Security/Hmac.php`, `server/tests/HmacTest.php`
+- Create: `cloud/src/Security/Hmac.php`, `cloud/tests/HmacTest.php`
 
 **Interfaces:**
 - Consumes: (없음)
 - Produces: `App\Security\Hmac::sign(string $secret, string $nonce, string $ts, string $body): string` (hex), `Hmac::verify(string $secret, string $nonce, string $ts, string $body, string $sig): bool` (hash_equals, 상수시간).
 
-- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/HmacTest.php`
+- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/HmacTest.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ final class HmacTest extends TestCase
 
 Run: `./vendor/bin/phpunit tests/HmacTest.php` → FAIL (class not found)
 
-- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `server/src/Security/Hmac.php`
+- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `cloud/src/Security/Hmac.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -256,8 +256,8 @@ final class Hmac
 Run: `./vendor/bin/phpunit tests/HmacTest.php` → PASS
 
 ```bash
-git add server/src/Security/Hmac.php server/tests/HmacTest.php
+git add cloud/src/Security/Hmac.php cloud/tests/HmacTest.php
-git commit -m "feat(server): HMAC sign/verify matching P1-A edge contract"
+git commit -m "feat(cloud): HMAC sign/verify matching P1-A edge contract"
 ```
 
 ---
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): HMAC sign/verify matching P1-A edge contract"
 ## Task 3: Repository 인터페이스 + InMemory 테스트더블
 
 **Files:**
-- Create: `server/src/Repository/{EventRepository,UserRepository,DeviceRepository,ZoneRepository,ThresholdRepository,NonceRepository,RateLimiterRepository,AuditRepository,SnapshotRepository}.php`, `server/tests/Support/InMemoryRepositories.php`, `server/tests/RepositoryContractTest.php`
+- Create: `cloud/src/Repository/{EventRepository,UserRepository,DeviceRepository,ZoneRepository,ThresholdRepository,NonceRepository,RateLimiterRepository,AuditRepository,SnapshotRepository}.php`, `cloud/tests/Support/InMemoryRepositories.php`, `cloud/tests/RepositoryContractTest.php`
 
 **Interfaces:**
 - Consumes: (없음)
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): HMAC sign/verify matching P1-A edge contract"
 
 - [ ] **Step 1: 인터페이스들 작성** — 각 파일에 `interface` 정의.
 
-`server/src/Repository/DeviceRepository.php`:
+`cloud/src/Repository/DeviceRepository.php`:
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ interface AuditRepository
 }
 ```
 
-- [ ] **Step 2: InMemory 더블 + 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/Support/InMemoryRepositories.php` (테스트 전용 구현)
+- [ ] **Step 2: InMemory 더블 + 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/Support/InMemoryRepositories.php` (테스트 전용 구현)
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ final class InMemoryAuditRepository implements AuditRepository {
 }
 ```
 
-그리고 `server/tests/RepositoryContractTest.php`:
+그리고 `cloud/tests/RepositoryContractTest.php`:
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -523,8 +523,8 @@ Expected: FAIL (interfaces/doubles absent) → 작성 후 PASS.
 - [ ] **Step 4: 커밋**
 
 ```bash
-git add server/src/Repository/*.php server/tests/Support/InMemoryRepositories.php server/tests/RepositoryContractTest.php
+git add cloud/src/Repository/*.php cloud/tests/Support/InMemoryRepositories.php cloud/tests/RepositoryContractTest.php
-git commit -m "feat(server): repository interfaces + in-memory test doubles"
+git commit -m "feat(cloud): repository interfaces + in-memory test doubles"
 ```
 
 ---
@@ -532,13 +532,13 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): repository interfaces + in-memory test doubles"
 ## Task 4: EventValidator (enum 화이트리스트 + 스키마 검증)
 
 **Files:**
-- Create: `server/src/Ingest/EventValidator.php`, `server/tests/EventValidatorTest.php`
+- Create: `cloud/src/Ingest/EventValidator.php`, `cloud/tests/EventValidatorTest.php`
 
 **Interfaces:**
 - Consumes: (없음)
 - Produces: `App\Ingest\EventValidator::validate(array $payload): array` — `['ok' => bool, 'errors' => string[], 'clean' => array]`. 화이트리스트: event_type ∈ {fall,no_motion,immobility,ghost,zone_warning,zone_restricted,pinch,monitoring_degraded,device_fault}; severity ∈ {critical,high,warning,info}. 필수: device_id, camera_id, event_type, severity, occurred_at. snapshots는 배열(≤3), 문자열 항목.
 
-- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/EventValidatorTest.php`
+- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/EventValidatorTest.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ final class EventValidatorTest extends TestCase
 
 - [ ] **Step 2: 실패 확인** → FAIL
 
-- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `server/src/Ingest/EventValidator.php`
+- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `cloud/src/Ingest/EventValidator.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -627,8 +627,8 @@ final class EventValidator
 - [ ] **Step 4: 통과 + 커밋**
 
 ```bash
-git add server/src/Ingest/EventValidator.php server/tests/EventValidatorTest.php
+git add cloud/src/Ingest/EventValidator.php cloud/tests/EventValidatorTest.php
-git commit -m "feat(server): event payload validator with enum whitelist"
+git commit -m "feat(cloud): event payload validator with enum whitelist"
 ```
 
 ---
@@ -636,13 +636,13 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): event payload validator with enum whitelist"
 ## Task 5: ImageProcessor (gd 재인코딩 + UUID)
 
 **Files:**
-- Create: `server/src/Ingest/ImageProcessor.php`, `server/tests/ImageProcessorTest.php`
+- Create: `cloud/src/Ingest/ImageProcessor.php`, `cloud/tests/ImageProcessorTest.php`
 
 **Interfaces:**
 - Consumes: (없음)
 - Produces: `App\Ingest\ImageProcessor::reencode(string $base64, int $quality = 80): array` — `['ok'=>bool, 'bytes'=>string, 'uuid'=>string, 'hash'=>string]`. base64 디코드 → gd로 로드 → 순수 JPEG로 재출력(원본 메타/페이로드 제거). 실패 시 `['ok'=>false]`. uuid=랜덤 32hex, hash=sha256(재인코딩 바이트).
 
-- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/ImageProcessorTest.php`
+- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/ImageProcessorTest.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ final class ImageProcessorTest extends TestCase
 
 - [ ] **Step 2: 실패 확인** → FAIL
 
-- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `server/src/Ingest/ImageProcessor.php`
+- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `cloud/src/Ingest/ImageProcessor.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -710,8 +710,8 @@ final class ImageProcessor
 - [ ] **Step 4: 통과 + 커밋**
 
 ```bash
-git add server/src/Ingest/ImageProcessor.php server/tests/ImageProcessorTest.php
+git add cloud/src/Ingest/ImageProcessor.php cloud/tests/ImageProcessorTest.php
-git commit -m "feat(server): gd image re-encode (strip payload, uuid, hash)"
+git commit -m "feat(cloud): gd image re-encode (strip payload, uuid, hash)"
 ```
 
 ---
@@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): gd image re-encode (strip payload, uuid, hash)"
 ## Task 6: Http Request/Response
 
 **Files:**
-- Create: `server/src/Http/Request.php`, `server/src/Http/Response.php`, `server/tests/HttpTest.php`
+- Create: `cloud/src/Http/Request.php`, `cloud/src/Http/Response.php`, `cloud/tests/HttpTest.php`
 
 **Interfaces:**
 - Consumes: (없음)
@@ -727,7 +727,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): gd image re-encode (strip payload, uuid, hash)"
   - `App\Http\Request(string $method, string $path, array $headers, string $body, array $query, array $post)` with getters `method(), path(), header(string $name): ?string, body(), json(): array, query(string $k): ?string, post(string $k): ?string`, and static `fromGlobals(): self`.
   - `App\Http\Response`: static `json(array $data, int $status=200): self`, `text(string $s, int $status=200): self`, `bytes(string $b, string $contentType, int $status=200): self`, `redirect(string $to): self`; getters `status(), headers(), body()`; `send(): void`.
 
-- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/HttpTest.php`
+- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/HttpTest.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -755,7 +755,7 @@ final class HttpTest extends TestCase
 
 - [ ] **Step 2: 실패 확인** → FAIL
 
-- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `server/src/Http/Request.php`
+- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `cloud/src/Http/Request.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -792,7 +792,7 @@ final class Request
 }
 ```
 
-`server/src/Http/Response.php`:
+`cloud/src/Http/Response.php`:
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -829,8 +829,8 @@ final class Response
 - [ ] **Step 4: 통과 + 커밋**
 
 ```bash
-git add server/src/Http/Request.php server/src/Http/Response.php server/tests/HttpTest.php
+git add cloud/src/Http/Request.php cloud/src/Http/Response.php cloud/tests/HttpTest.php
-git commit -m "feat(server): Http Request/Response primitives"
+git commit -m "feat(cloud): Http Request/Response primitives"
 ```
 
 ---
@@ -838,13 +838,13 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): Http Request/Response primitives"
 ## Task 7: IngestController (POST /api/events) — 보안 파이프라인 통합
 
 **Files:**
-- Create: `server/src/Ingest/IngestController.php`, `server/tests/IngestControllerTest.php`
+- Create: `cloud/src/Ingest/IngestController.php`, `cloud/tests/IngestControllerTest.php`
 
 **Interfaces:**
 - Consumes: `Hmac` (T2), `EventValidator`/`ImageProcessor` (T4/T5), `Request`/`Response` (T6), `DeviceRepository`/`NonceRepository`/`RateLimiterRepository`/`EventRepository`/`SnapshotRepository` (T3), `Config` (T1)
 - Produces: `App\Ingest\IngestController(Config, DeviceRepository, NonceRepository, RateLimiterRepository, EventRepository, SnapshotRepository)` with `handle(Request $req, int $now): Response`. 순서: rate limit → device secret 조회 → HMAC 검증 → timestamp 윈도우 → nonce replay → 검증 → 이미지 재인코딩·저장 → 이벤트+스냅샷 insert. 실패는 401/400/429, 성공 201 `{event_id}`.
 
-- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/IngestControllerTest.php`
+- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/IngestControllerTest.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -919,7 +919,7 @@ final class IngestControllerTest extends TestCase
 
 - [ ] **Step 2: 실패 확인** → FAIL
 
-- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `server/src/Ingest/IngestController.php`
+- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `cloud/src/Ingest/IngestController.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -991,8 +991,8 @@ final class IngestController
 - [ ] **Step 4: 통과 + 커밋**
 
 ```bash
-git add server/src/Ingest/IngestController.php server/tests/IngestControllerTest.php
+git add cloud/src/Ingest/IngestController.php cloud/tests/IngestControllerTest.php
-git commit -m "feat(server): ingest controller (HMAC+nonce+ratelimit+reencode+persist)"
+git commit -m "feat(cloud): ingest controller (HMAC+nonce+ratelimit+reencode+persist)"
 ```
 
 ---
@@ -1000,7 +1000,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): ingest controller (HMAC+nonce+ratelimit+reencode+pe
 ## Task 8: Password (argon2id) + Csrf
 
 **Files:**
-- Create: `server/src/Security/Password.php`, `server/src/Security/Csrf.php`, `server/tests/PasswordCsrfTest.php`
+- Create: `cloud/src/Security/Password.php`, `cloud/src/Security/Csrf.php`, `cloud/tests/PasswordCsrfTest.php`
 
 **Interfaces:**
 - Consumes: (없음)
@@ -1008,7 +1008,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): ingest controller (HMAC+nonce+ratelimit+reencode+pe
   - `App\Security\Password::hash(string $p): string` (PASSWORD_ARGON2ID), `Password::verify(string $p, string $hash): bool`.
   - `App\Security\Csrf::issue(callable $randHex): string`, `Csrf::check(string $expected, string $given): bool` (hash_equals).
 
-- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/PasswordCsrfTest.php`
+- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/PasswordCsrfTest.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -1036,7 +1036,7 @@ final class PasswordCsrfTest extends TestCase
 
 - [ ] **Step 2: 실패 확인** → FAIL
 
-- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `server/src/Security/Password.php`
+- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `cloud/src/Security/Password.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -1054,7 +1054,7 @@ final class Password
 }
 ```
 
-`server/src/Security/Csrf.php`:
+`cloud/src/Security/Csrf.php`:
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -1073,8 +1073,8 @@ final class Csrf
 - [ ] **Step 4: 통과 + 커밋**
 
 ```bash
-git add server/src/Security/Password.php server/src/Security/Csrf.php server/tests/PasswordCsrfTest.php
+git add cloud/src/Security/Password.php cloud/src/Security/Csrf.php cloud/tests/PasswordCsrfTest.php
-git commit -m "feat(server): argon2id password + CSRF token helpers"
+git commit -m "feat(cloud): argon2id password + CSRF token helpers"
 ```
 
 ---
@@ -1082,13 +1082,13 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): argon2id password + CSRF token helpers"
 ## Task 9: Rbac (역할→권한)
 
 **Files:**
-- Create: `server/src/Auth/Rbac.php`, `server/tests/RbacTest.php`
+- Create: `cloud/src/Auth/Rbac.php`, `cloud/tests/RbacTest.php`
 
 **Interfaces:**
 - Consumes: (없음)
 - Produces: `App\Auth\Rbac::can(string $role, string $permission): bool`. 권한: `view_events`(all), `acknowledge`(admin,operator), `edit_zones`(admin,operator), `manage_thresholds`(admin), `manage_compliance`(admin).
 
-- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/RbacTest.php`
+- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/RbacTest.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -1123,7 +1123,7 @@ final class RbacTest extends TestCase
 
 - [ ] **Step 2: 실패 확인** → FAIL
 
-- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `server/src/Auth/Rbac.php`
+- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `cloud/src/Auth/Rbac.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -1146,8 +1146,8 @@ final class Rbac
 - [ ] **Step 4: 통과 + 커밋**
 
 ```bash
-git add server/src/Auth/Rbac.php server/tests/RbacTest.php
+git add cloud/src/Auth/Rbac.php cloud/tests/RbacTest.php
-git commit -m "feat(server): RBAC permission matrix"
+git commit -m "feat(cloud): RBAC permission matrix"
 ```
 
 ---
@@ -1155,7 +1155,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): RBAC permission matrix"
 ## Task 10: Session + AuthController (로그인/brute-force 잠금)
 
 **Files:**
-- Create: `server/src/Auth/Session.php`, `server/src/Auth/AuthController.php`, `server/tests/AuthControllerTest.php`
+- Create: `cloud/src/Auth/Session.php`, `cloud/src/Auth/AuthController.php`, `cloud/tests/AuthControllerTest.php`
 
 **Interfaces:**
 - Consumes: `Password` (T8), `Request`/`Response` (T6), `UserRepository`/`AuditRepository` (T3)
@@ -1163,7 +1163,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): RBAC permission matrix"
   - `interface App\Auth\SessionStore { get(string $k): mixed; set(string $k, mixed $v): void; clear(): void; }`, `ArraySessionStore` (test), `PhpSessionStore` (prod, secure cookie).
   - `App\Auth\AuthController(UserRepository $users, AuditRepository $audit, int $maxAttempts=5, int $lockSeconds=900)` with `login(Request $req, SessionStore $sess, int $now): Response` and `logout(SessionStore $sess): Response`. Locks after maxAttempts; 200 on success (sets user in session), 401 on bad creds, 423 when locked.
 
-- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/AuthControllerTest.php`
+- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/AuthControllerTest.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -1210,7 +1210,7 @@ final class AuthControllerTest extends TestCase
 
 - [ ] **Step 2: 실패 확인** → FAIL
 
-- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `server/src/Auth/Session.php`
+- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `cloud/src/Auth/Session.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -1240,7 +1240,7 @@ final class PhpSessionStore implements SessionStore {
 }
 ```
 
-`server/src/Auth/AuthController.php`:
+`cloud/src/Auth/AuthController.php`:
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -1300,8 +1300,8 @@ final class AuthController
 - [ ] **Step 4: 통과 + 커밋**
 
 ```bash
-git add server/src/Auth/Session.php server/src/Auth/AuthController.php server/tests/AuthControllerTest.php
+git add cloud/src/Auth/Session.php cloud/src/Auth/AuthController.php cloud/tests/AuthControllerTest.php
-git commit -m "feat(server): session store + auth controller with lockout"
+git commit -m "feat(cloud): session store + auth controller with lockout"
 ```
 
 ---
@@ -1309,13 +1309,13 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): session store + auth controller with lockout"
 ## Task 11: Router + 프론트컨트롤러 준비
 
 **Files:**
-- Create: `server/src/Http/Router.php`, `server/tests/RouterTest.php`
+- Create: `cloud/src/Http/Router.php`, `cloud/tests/RouterTest.php`
 
 **Interfaces:**
 - Consumes: `Request`/`Response` (T6)
 - Produces: `App\Http\Router` with `add(string $method, string $path, callable $handler): void` and `dispatch(Request $req): Response` (404 if no match; path params `{id}` → passed to handler as second arg assoc array).
 
-- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/RouterTest.php`
+- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/RouterTest.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -1347,7 +1347,7 @@ final class RouterTest extends TestCase
 
 - [ ] **Step 2: 실패 확인** → FAIL
 
-- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `server/src/Http/Router.php`
+- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `cloud/src/Http/Router.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -1379,8 +1379,8 @@ final class Router
 - [ ] **Step 4: 통과 + 커밋**
 
 ```bash
-git add server/src/Http/Router.php server/tests/RouterTest.php
+git add cloud/src/Http/Router.php cloud/tests/RouterTest.php
-git commit -m "feat(server): path-param router + dispatch"
+git commit -m "feat(cloud): path-param router + dispatch"
 ```
 
 ---
@@ -1388,7 +1388,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): path-param router + dispatch"
 ## Task 12: 대시보드 컨트롤러 (목록·상세·확인) + 스냅샷 프록시
 
 **Files:**
-- Create: `server/src/Dashboard/EventListController.php`, `server/src/Dashboard/EventDetailController.php`, `server/src/Dashboard/SnapshotProxy.php`, `server/tests/DashboardTest.php`
+- Create: `cloud/src/Dashboard/EventListController.php`, `cloud/src/Dashboard/EventDetailController.php`, `cloud/src/Dashboard/SnapshotProxy.php`, `cloud/tests/DashboardTest.php`
 
 **Interfaces:**
 - Consumes: `Request`/`Response` (T6), `SessionStore`/`Rbac` (T9/T10), `EventRepository`/`SnapshotRepository`/`AuditRepository` (T3)
@@ -1397,7 +1397,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): path-param router + dispatch"
   - `EventDetailController(EventRepository, SnapshotRepository, AuditRepository, SessionStore)::show(Request, array $params): Response`; `acknowledge(Request, array $params): Response` (RBAC `acknowledge`).
   - `SnapshotProxy(SnapshotRepository, SessionStore)::serve(Request, array $params): Response` — 인증 필요, uuid→웹루트밖 파일 바이트 서빙(image/jpeg), 미인증 401, 없음 404.
 
-- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/DashboardTest.php`
+- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/DashboardTest.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -1451,7 +1451,7 @@ final class DashboardTest extends TestCase
 
 - [ ] **Step 2: 실패 확인** → FAIL
 
-- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `server/src/Dashboard/EventListController.php`
+- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `cloud/src/Dashboard/EventListController.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -1476,7 +1476,7 @@ final class EventListController
 }
 ```
 
-`server/src/Dashboard/EventDetailController.php`:
+`cloud/src/Dashboard/EventDetailController.php`:
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -1516,7 +1516,7 @@ final class EventDetailController
 }
 ```
 
-`server/src/Dashboard/SnapshotProxy.php`:
+`cloud/src/Dashboard/SnapshotProxy.php`:
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -1545,8 +1545,8 @@ final class SnapshotProxy
 - [ ] **Step 4: 통과 + 커밋**
 
 ```bash
-git add server/src/Dashboard/EventListController.php server/src/Dashboard/EventDetailController.php server/src/Dashboard/SnapshotProxy.php server/tests/DashboardTest.php
+git add cloud/src/Dashboard/EventListController.php cloud/src/Dashboard/EventDetailController.php cloud/src/Dashboard/SnapshotProxy.php cloud/tests/DashboardTest.php
-git commit -m "feat(server): dashboard list/detail/ack + auth-gated snapshot proxy"
+git commit -m "feat(cloud): dashboard list/detail/ack + auth-gated snapshot proxy"
 ```
 
 ---
@@ -1554,7 +1554,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): dashboard list/detail/ack + auth-gated snapshot pro
 ## Task 13: Polygon 검증 + ZoneConfigController
 
 **Files:**
-- Create: `server/src/Geometry/Polygon.php`, `server/src/Dashboard/ZoneConfigController.php`, `server/tests/ZoneConfigTest.php`
+- Create: `cloud/src/Geometry/Polygon.php`, `cloud/src/Dashboard/ZoneConfigController.php`, `cloud/tests/ZoneConfigTest.php`
 
 **Interfaces:**
 - Consumes: `Request`/`Response` (T6), `SessionStore`/`Rbac`, `ZoneRepository`/`AuditRepository` (T3)
@@ -1562,7 +1562,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): dashboard list/detail/ack + auth-gated snapshot pro
   - `App\Geometry\Polygon::validate(array $points): bool` — ≥3점, 각 점 `[x,y]` 숫자.
   - `ZoneConfigController(ZoneRepository, AuditRepository, SessionStore)`: `list(Request, array): Response` (camera별), `save(Request): Response` (RBAC edit_zones; level ∈ {warning,restricted,pinch}; polygon 검증; zone_id 반환), `delete(Request, array): Response`.
 
-- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/ZoneConfigTest.php`
+- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/ZoneConfigTest.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -1610,7 +1610,7 @@ final class ZoneConfigTest extends TestCase
 
 - [ ] **Step 2: 실패 확인** → FAIL
 
-- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `server/src/Geometry/Polygon.php`
+- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `cloud/src/Geometry/Polygon.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -1631,7 +1631,7 @@ final class Polygon
 }
 ```
 
-`server/src/Dashboard/ZoneConfigController.php`:
+`cloud/src/Dashboard/ZoneConfigController.php`:
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -1698,8 +1698,8 @@ final class ZoneConfigController
 - [ ] **Step 4: 통과 + 커밋**
 
 ```bash
-git add server/src/Geometry/Polygon.php server/src/Dashboard/ZoneConfigController.php server/tests/ZoneConfigTest.php
+git add cloud/src/Geometry/Polygon.php cloud/src/Dashboard/ZoneConfigController.php cloud/tests/ZoneConfigTest.php
-git commit -m "feat(server): polygon validation + zone config controller (RBAC)"
+git commit -m "feat(cloud): polygon validation + zone config controller (RBAC)"
 ```
 
 ---
@@ -1707,7 +1707,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): polygon validation + zone config controller (RBAC)"
 ## Task 14: ConfigController + HeartbeatController (Pi 동기 API)
 
 **Files:**
-- Create: `server/src/Api/ConfigController.php`, `server/src/Api/HeartbeatController.php`, `server/tests/ApiSyncTest.php`
+- Create: `cloud/src/Api/ConfigController.php`, `cloud/src/Api/HeartbeatController.php`, `cloud/tests/ApiSyncTest.php`
 
 **Interfaces:**
 - Consumes: `Request`/`Response` (T6), `Hmac` (T2), `DeviceRepository`/`ZoneRepository`/`ThresholdRepository` (T3), `Config` (T1)
@@ -1715,7 +1715,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): polygon validation + zone config controller (RBAC)"
   - `App\Api\ConfigController(DeviceRepository, ZoneRepository, ThresholdRepository)::get(Request): Response` — `?device_id=`; device secret HMAC 검증(엣지 폴링). 반환 `{version, zones, thresholds}`.
   - `App\Api\HeartbeatController(Config, DeviceRepository)::post(Request, int $now): Response` — HMAC 검증 후 `touchHeartbeat(device_id, {fps,temp,throttle,config_version,at})`. 200.
 
-- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `server/tests/ApiSyncTest.php`
+- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `cloud/tests/ApiSyncTest.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -1768,7 +1768,7 @@ final class ApiSyncTest extends TestCase
 
 - [ ] **Step 2: 실패 확인** → FAIL
 
-- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `server/src/Api/ConfigController.php`
+- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `cloud/src/Api/ConfigController.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -1802,7 +1802,7 @@ final class ConfigController
 }
 ```
 
-`server/src/Api/HeartbeatController.php`:
+`cloud/src/Api/HeartbeatController.php`:
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -1840,8 +1840,8 @@ final class HeartbeatController
 - [ ] **Step 4: 통과 + 커밋**
 
 ```bash
-git add server/src/Api/ConfigController.php server/src/Api/HeartbeatController.php server/tests/ApiSyncTest.php
+git add cloud/src/Api/ConfigController.php cloud/src/Api/HeartbeatController.php cloud/tests/ApiSyncTest.php
-git commit -m "feat(server): device config + heartbeat sync API (HMAC)"
+git commit -m "feat(cloud): device config + heartbeat sync API (HMAC)"
 ```
 
 ---
@@ -1849,11 +1849,11 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): device config + heartbeat sync API (HMAC)"
 ## Task 15: 프론트컨트롤러 배선 + 뷰 + .htaccess (통합)
 
 **Files:**
-- Create: `server/public/index.php`, `server/public/.htaccess`, `server/public/assets/{app.css,app.js,zone-draw.js}`, `server/src/View/{layout.php,login.php,events.php,event_detail.php,zones.php}`, `server/tests/WiringSmokeTest.php`
+- Create: `cloud/public/index.php`, `cloud/public/.htaccess`, `cloud/public/assets/{app.css,app.js,zone-draw.js}`, `cloud/src/View/{layout.php,login.php,events.php,event_detail.php,zones.php}`, `cloud/tests/WiringSmokeTest.php`
 
 **Interfaces:**
 - Consumes: 전 태스크. `Router`, 모든 컨트롤러, `PhpSessionStore`, PDO repos (T16에서 실제 구현; 여기선 배선만).
-- Produces: `server/public/index.php` — Config 로드 → PDO repos 생성 → Router에 모든 경로 등록 → dispatch → send. 뷰는 서버렌더 PHP. **테스트는 라우팅 표만 스모크 검증**(핸들러 스텁).
+- Produces: `cloud/public/index.php` — Config 로드 → PDO repos 생성 → Router에 모든 경로 등록 → dispatch → send. 뷰는 서버렌더 PHP. **테스트는 라우팅 표만 스모크 검증**(핸들러 스텁).
 
 라우트 표:
 | method | path | handler |
@@ -1872,7 +1872,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): device config + heartbeat sync API (HMAC)"
 | GET | /snap/{uuid} | SnapshotProxy::serve |
 | GET | /, /zones, /login | View render |
 
-- [ ] **Step 1: 라우터 스모크 테스트** — `server/tests/WiringSmokeTest.php`
+- [ ] **Step 1: 라우터 스모크 테스트** — `cloud/tests/WiringSmokeTest.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -1902,7 +1902,7 @@ final class WiringSmokeTest extends TestCase
 
 - [ ] **Step 2: 실패/통과 확인** → 라우터만 검증(회귀 방지). `./vendor/bin/phpunit tests/WiringSmokeTest.php` → PASS.
 
-- [ ] **Step 3: 프론트컨트롤러** — `server/public/index.php`
+- [ ] **Step 3: 프론트컨트롤러** — `cloud/public/index.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -1970,7 +1970,7 @@ $r->add('GET', '/zones', fn() => $render('zones'));
 $r->dispatch(Request::fromGlobals())->send();
 ```
 
-- [ ] **Step 4: .htaccess** — `server/public/.htaccess`
+- [ ] **Step 4: .htaccess** — `cloud/public/.htaccess`
 
 ```apache
 RewriteEngine On
@@ -1994,8 +1994,8 @@ RewriteRule ^ index.php [QSA,L]
 Run: `./vendor/bin/phpunit` (전체) — green.
 
 ```bash
-git add server/public server/src/View server/tests/WiringSmokeTest.php
+git add cloud/public cloud/src/View cloud/tests/WiringSmokeTest.php
-git commit -m "feat(server): front controller wiring + views + zone-draw UI"
+git commit -m "feat(cloud): front controller wiring + views + zone-draw UI"
 ```
 
 ---
@@ -2005,13 +2005,13 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): front controller wiring + views + zone-draw UI"
 > ⚠️ **DB 통합 태스크.** 로컬에 PDO 드라이버 미로드 시 이 태스크의 DB 실행 테스트는 **게이트**(로컬에서 `pdo_sqlite` 활성 or Cafe24 MySQL). 단위 로직은 이미 T1~T15에서 mock repo로 검증됨. 이 태스크는 PDO 구현 + DDL + 배포 절차.
 
 **Files:**
-- Create: `server/src/Db/Database.php`, `server/src/Repository/Pdo/Pdo{Device,Nonce,RateLimiter,Event,Snapshot,User,Zone,Threshold,Audit}Repository.php` (9개), `server/schema.sql`, `server/docs/server-deploy.md`, `server/tests/PdoIntegrationTest.php`
+- Create: `cloud/src/Db/Database.php`, `cloud/src/Repository/Pdo/Pdo{Device,Nonce,RateLimiter,Event,Snapshot,User,Zone,Threshold,Audit}Repository.php` (9개), `cloud/schema.sql`, `cloud/docs/cloud-deploy.md`, `cloud/tests/PdoIntegrationTest.php`
 
 **Interfaces:**
 - Consumes: repository 인터페이스(T3), `Config`(T1)
 - Produces: `App\Db\Database::connect(Config): PDO` (ERRMODE_EXCEPTION, prepared). 각 `Pdo*Repository`가 인터페이스 구현(전부 prepared statement).
 
-- [ ] **Step 1: Database factory** — `server/src/Db/Database.php`
+- [ ] **Step 1: Database factory** — `cloud/src/Db/Database.php`
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -2035,7 +2035,7 @@ final class Database
 
 - [ ] **Step 2: schema.sql** — MySQL DDL (P1-B 서브셋: users, devices, cameras, zones, events, event_snapshots, thresholds, nonces, rate_limits, audit_log). §7.4 스펙 기준. `event_type`/`severity`/`level`은 애플리케이션 화이트리스트(+ 선택 CHECK). `nonces(nonce PK, expires_at INDEX)`, `rate_limits(rate_key, window)` 유니크. sqlite 호환 노트(AUTOINCREMENT 등) 주석. metrics/polygon_json은 TEXT/JSON.
 
-- [ ] **Step 3: PDO repositories (9개)** — 각 인터페이스를 prepared statement로 구현. 예 `server/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoNonceRepository.php`:
+- [ ] **Step 3: PDO repositories (9개)** — 각 인터페이스를 prepared statement로 구현. 예 `cloud/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoNonceRepository.php`:
 
 ```php
 <?php
@@ -2069,7 +2069,7 @@ final class PdoNonceRepository implements NonceRepository
 - `PdoThresholdRepository`: forDevice(SELECT key/value → assoc).
 - `PdoAuditRepository`: append(INSERT, before/after=json_encode).
 
-- [ ] **Step 4: (게이트) sqlite 통합 테스트** — `server/tests/PdoIntegrationTest.php`:
+- [ ] **Step 4: (게이트) sqlite 통합 테스트** — `cloud/tests/PdoIntegrationTest.php`:
 
 ```php
 protected function setUp(): void {
@@ -2082,15 +2082,15 @@ protected function setUp(): void {
 
 로컬 PDO 미로드 환경에서도 `markTestSkipped`로 스위트 green 유지.
 
-- [ ] **Step 5: 배포 문서** — `server/docs/server-deploy.md`: Cafe24 업로드 절차(`public/`만 웹루트; `storage/`·`src/`·`config.php`는 웹루트 밖 또는 상위 디렉토리), `config.php` 작성(config.example.php 복사), `schema.sql` phpMyAdmin import, per-device secret 발급(admin), 최초 admin 계정 생성 CLI 스니펫(`password_hash` argon2id), HTTPS/HSTS 강제, PHP 버전·gd·openssl 확인, `vendor/`는 배포 제외(런타임 의존성 0), storage/snapshots 쓰기권한.
+- [ ] **Step 5: 배포 문서** — `cloud/docs/cloud-deploy.md`: Cafe24 업로드 절차(`public/`만 웹루트; `storage/`·`src/`·`config.php`는 웹루트 밖 또는 상위 디렉토리), `config.php` 작성(config.example.php 복사), `schema.sql` phpMyAdmin import, per-device secret 발급(admin), 최초 admin 계정 생성 CLI 스니펫(`password_hash` argon2id), HTTPS/HSTS 강제, PHP 버전·gd·openssl 확인, `vendor/`는 배포 제외(런타임 의존성 0), storage/snapshots 쓰기권한.
 
 - [ ] **Step 6: 전체 스위트 + 커밋**
 
 Run: `./vendor/bin/phpunit` — green(통합은 sqlite 없으면 skip).
 
 ```bash
-git add server/src/Db server/src/Repository/Pdo server/schema.sql server/docs/server-deploy.md server/tests/PdoIntegrationTest.php
+git add cloud/src/Db cloud/src/Repository/Pdo cloud/schema.sql cloud/docs/cloud-deploy.md cloud/tests/PdoIntegrationTest.php
-git commit -m "feat(server): PDO repositories + schema + Cafe24 deploy doc"
+git commit -m "feat(cloud): PDO repositories + schema + Cafe24 deploy doc"
 ```
 
 ---
@@ -2118,7 +2118,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(server): PDO repositories + schema + Cafe24 deploy doc"
 
 ## Execution Handoff
 
-**Plan complete. 저장: `docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-11-p1b-server-ingest-dashboard.md`.**
+**Plan complete. 저장: `docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-11-p1b-cloud-ingest-dashboard.md`.**
 
 실행 옵션:
 1. **Subagent-Driven (추천)** — 태스크마다 새 subagent + 리뷰. `superpowers:subagent-driven-development`.

docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-12-p1-pilot-integration.md

@@ -2,18 +2,18 @@
 
 > **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development (recommended) or superpowers:executing-plans to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
 
-**Goal:** 이미 구현·병합된 P1-A(엣지 감지 라이브러리) + P1-B(서버) 사이의 **끊긴 배선을 연결**해, 노트북 웹캠으로 실행되는 **엔드투엔드 파일럿**을 만든다: 실제 프레임 → CPU pose → 감지 → 서명 POST → 서버 → 관리자가 **사진 보고 알림 받고 확인**. 역루프(대시보드 구역 → 엣지 적용)와 하트비트도 살린다. (실장비 Hailo·폐쇄망 번들·드릴 게이트는 별도 후속.)
+**Goal:** 이미 구현·병합된 P1-A(엣지 감지 라이브러리) + P1-B(클라우드) 사이의 **끊긴 배선을 연결**해, 노트북 웹캠으로 실행되는 **엔드투엔드 파일럿**을 만든다: 실제 프레임 → CPU pose → 감지 → 서명 POST → 클라우드 → 관리자가 **사진 보고 알림 받고 확인**. 역루프(대시보드 구역 → 엣지 적용)와 하트비트도 살린다. (실장비 Hailo·폐쇄망 번들·드릴 게이트는 별도 후속.)
 
-**Architecture:** 순수 배선. 기존 부품(`run_once`, EventEngine, PostClient, OfflineQueue, ZoneIntrusionDetector, 서버 ingest/detail/snapshot)은 그대로 두고 (1) 엣지 데몬(main 루프)이 부품을 조립·구동, (2) ServerClient가 config 폴링·하트비트, (3) MoveNet ONNX 어댑터가 PosePort 구현, (4) 서버 detail 뷰·Web Audio가 응답루프 완성. 모든 데몬/클라이언트 로직은 주입(fake source/pose/clock/http)으로 TDD; 실 pose는 정적이미지로 게이트 테스트.
+**Architecture:** 순수 배선. 기존 부품(`run_once`, EventEngine, PostClient, OfflineQueue, ZoneIntrusionDetector, 클라우드 ingest/detail/snapshot)은 그대로 두고 (1) 엣지 데몬(main 루프)이 부품을 조립·구동, (2) CloudClient가 config 폴링·하트비트, (3) MoveNet ONNX 어댑터가 PosePort 구현, (4) 클라우드 detail 뷰·Web Audio가 응답루프 완성. 모든 데몬/클라이언트 로직은 주입(fake source/pose/clock/http)으로 TDD; 실 pose는 정적이미지로 게이트 테스트.
 
-**Tech Stack:** Python 3.11+(dev 3.13), pytest, numpy, opencv, requests, **onnxruntime**(CPU) + **MoveNet SinglePose Lightning ONNX**(COCO-17, Apache-2). 서버는 기존 바닐라 PHP + JS(Web Audio, 의존성 0). 런타임 ultralytics(AGPL) 금지 유지.
+**Tech Stack:** Python 3.11+(dev 3.13), pytest, numpy, opencv, requests, **onnxruntime**(CPU) + **MoveNet SinglePose Lightning ONNX**(COCO-17, Apache-2). 클라우드는 기존 바닐라 PHP + JS(Web Audio, 의존성 0). 런타임 ultralytics(AGPL) 금지 유지.
 
 ## Global Constraints
 
-- Python **3.11+**, 타입힌트, `edge/` 기존 패턴 준수. PHP 8.5 `declare(strict_types=1)`, 서버 스위트 **0 warnings/0 deprecations** 유지.
+- Python **3.11+**, 타입힌트, `edge/` 기존 패턴 준수. PHP 8.5 `declare(strict_types=1)`, 클라우드 스위트 **0 warnings/0 deprecations** 유지.
 - **판정/루프 로직은 주입 타임스탬프·주입 의존성으로 TDD** — 데몬 루프 내부에서 `time.sleep`/`time.time` 직접 호출 금지(주입된 clock/sleeper 사용). 실 pose 추론만 게이트(모델/onnxruntime 없으면 `skip`).
 - **폐쇄망 지속:** 새 의존성(onnxruntime)·모델(.onnx)은 **빌드머신서 받아 번들**할 것 — 후속 패키징 태스크 대상. 런타임 인터넷은 Cafe24 POST + config 폴링뿐.
-- **HMAC 계약 유지:** config 폴링·하트비트도 P1-A `sign(nonce+ts+body)` 동일 서명(서버 T14가 이미 검증). PostClient 서명 재사용.
+- **HMAC 계약 유지:** config 폴링·하트비트도 P1-A `sign(nonce+ts+body)` 동일 서명(클라우드 T14가 이미 검증). PostClient 서명 재사용.
 - **키포인트 계약:** PosePort는 `list[Person]` (COCO-17 `Keypoint`) 반환 — MoveNet 17관절을 그 순서로 매핑.
 - YAGNI: 파일럿에 필요한 배선만. 멀티캠·감도·처리결과 등 P2/P3는 손대지 않음.
 
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
 
 ```
 edge/
-  serverclient.py      # ServerClient: fetch_config(HMAC GET), send_heartbeat(HMAC POST)
+  cloudclient.py      # CloudClient: fetch_config(HMAC GET), send_heartbeat(HMAC POST)
   zones.py            # zone rows(dict) -> Zone objects; thresholds
   runtime.py          # PipelineRuntime: assemble source/pose/tracker/smoother/engine/ring/snapshotter/sink; step(); apply_zones()
   daemon.py           # main loop: step every frame + periodic sync/heartbeat/queue-flush; signals; main()
@@ -30,33 +30,33 @@ edge/
     movenet_pose.py   # MoveNetPoseAdapter(PosePort) via onnxruntime + COCO-17 remap
   tools/
     fetch_movenet.py  # build-machine: download MoveNet Lightning ONNX to models/
-server/
+cloud/
   src/View/event_detail.php   # (replace stub) HTML detail shell + script
   public/assets/detail.js     # fetch GET /events/{id} -> render meta + <img src=/snap/{uuid}>
   public/assets/app.js        # (edit) link rows to /events/{id}/view, desk Web Audio on new critical
   public/index.php            # (edit) add GET /events/{id}/view HTML route
-tests/ (edge)  + server/tests/
+tests/ (edge)  + cloud/tests/
 docs/pilot-runbook.md
 ```
 
 ---
 
-## Task 1: ServerClient — config 폴링 + 하트비트 (HMAC 서명)
+## Task 1: CloudClient — config 폴링 + 하트비트 (HMAC 서명)
 
-**Files:** Create `edge/serverclient.py`, `tests/test_serverclient.py`
+**Files:** Create `edge/cloudclient.py`, `tests/test_cloudclient.py`
 
 **Interfaces:**
 - Consumes: `sign` (edge/alert.py), injected `http_get`/`http_post`, `nonce_fn`, `now_fn`.
 - Produces:
-  - `ServerClient(base_url, device_id, secret, nonce_fn, now_fn, http_get=None, http_post=None, timeout=5.0)`
+  - `CloudClient(base_url, device_id, secret, nonce_fn, now_fn, http_get=None, http_post=None, timeout=5.0)`
   - `fetch_config() -> dict | None` — GET `{base}/api/config?device_id=`, headers X-Nonce/X-Timestamp/X-Signature (sign over empty body), returns parsed `{version, zones, thresholds}` on 200 else None.
   - `send_heartbeat(metrics: dict) -> bool` — POST `{base}/api/heartbeat` body `{device_id, **metrics}` signed, True on 2xx.
 
-- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `tests/test_serverclient.py`
+- [ ] **Step 1: 실패 테스트** — `tests/test_cloudclient.py`
 
 ```python
 import json
-from edge.serverclient import ServerClient
+from edge.cloudclient import CloudClient
 from edge.alert import sign
 
 class _Resp:
@@ -68,30 +68,30 @@ def test_fetch_config_signs_and_parses():
     def fake_get(url, headers=None, timeout=None):
         captured["url"] = url; captured["headers"] = headers
         return _Resp(200, json.dumps({"version": 3, "zones": [], "thresholds": {}}))
-    c = ServerClient("https://x", "pi-1", "sek", nonce_fn=lambda: "n1", now_fn=lambda: 1000.0, http_get=fake_get)
+    c = CloudClient("https://x", "pi-1", "sek", nonce_fn=lambda: "n1", now_fn=lambda: 1000.0, http_get=fake_get)
     cfg = c.fetch_config()
     assert cfg["version"] == 3
     assert "device_id=pi-1" in captured["url"]
     assert captured["headers"]["X-Signature"] == sign("sek", "n1", "1000.0", "")
 
 def test_fetch_config_none_on_error():
-    c = ServerClient("https://x", "pi-1", "sek", lambda: "n", lambda: 1.0, http_get=lambda *a, **k: _Resp(401))
+    c = CloudClient("https://x", "pi-1", "sek", lambda: "n", lambda: 1.0, http_get=lambda *a, **k: _Resp(401))
     assert c.fetch_config() is None
 
 def test_send_heartbeat_signs_body():
     captured = {}
     def fake_post(url, data=None, headers=None, timeout=None):
         captured["data"] = data; captured["headers"] = headers; return _Resp(200)
-    c = ServerClient("https://x", "pi-1", "sek", lambda: "n1", lambda: 1000.0, http_post=fake_post)
+    c = CloudClient("https://x", "pi-1", "sek", lambda: "n1", lambda: 1000.0, http_post=fake_post)
     assert c.send_heartbeat({"fps": 12.0}) is True
     body = captured["data"]
     assert json.loads(body)["device_id"] == "pi-1"
     assert captured["headers"]["X-Signature"] == sign("sek", "n1", "1000.0", body)
 ```
 
-- [ ] **Step 2: 실패 확인** — `pytest tests/test_serverclient.py -v` → FAIL (ModuleNotFoundError)
+- [ ] **Step 2: 실패 확인** — `pytest tests/test_cloudclient.py -v` → FAIL (ModuleNotFoundError)
 
-- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `edge/serverclient.py`
+- [ ] **Step 3: 구현** — `edge/cloudclient.py`
 
 ```python
 import json
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ import json
 from edge.alert import sign
 
 
-class ServerClient:
+class CloudClient:
     def __init__(self, base_url: str, device_id: str, secret: str,
                  nonce_fn, now_fn, http_get=None, http_post=None, timeout: float = 5.0):
         self.base_url = base_url.rstrip("/")
@@ -146,16 +146,16 @@ class ServerClient:
         return 200 <= resp.status_code < 300
 ```
 
-- [ ] **Step 4: 통과 + 커밋** — `pytest tests/test_serverclient.py -v` → PASS
+- [ ] **Step 4: 통과 + 커밋** — `pytest tests/test_cloudclient.py -v` → PASS
 
 ```bash
-git add edge/serverclient.py tests/test_serverclient.py
+git add edge/cloudclient.py tests/test_cloudclient.py
-git commit -m "feat(edge): ServerClient for config poll + heartbeat (HMAC-signed)"
+git commit -m "feat(edge): CloudClient for config poll + heartbeat (HMAC-signed)"
 ```
 
 ---
 
-## Task 2: 서버 zone 행 → Zone 객체 로딩
+## Task 2: 클라우드 zone 행 → Zone 객체 로딩
 
 **Files:** Create `edge/zones.py`, `tests/test_zones.py`
 
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ def thresholds_from_config(config: dict) -> dict:
 
 ```bash
 git add edge/zones.py tests/test_zones.py
-git commit -m "feat(edge): parse server config zones/thresholds into Zone objects"
+git commit -m "feat(edge): parse cloud config zones/thresholds into Zone objects"
 ```
 
 ---
@@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(edge): PipelineRuntime assembles components + hot-swaps zone
 **Files:** Create `edge/daemon.py`, `edge/__main__.py`, `tests/test_daemon.py`; Modify `pyproject.toml`
 
 **Interfaces:**
-- Consumes: `PipelineRuntime` (T3), `ServerClient` (T1), `zones_from_config` (T2), `OfflineQueue` (edge/queue.py), `PostClient` (edge/alert.py).
+- Consumes: `PipelineRuntime` (T3), `CloudClient` (T1), `zones_from_config` (T2), `OfflineQueue` (edge/queue.py), `PostClient` (edge/alert.py).
 - Produces:
   - `run_loop(runtime, client, queue, *, clock, sleep, iterations=None, sync_every=150, heartbeat_every=900, flush_every=300, frame_interval=0.0) -> dict` — `iterations` 프레임 루프(None이면 무한, 테스트는 유한). 매 프레임 `runtime.step(clock())`(예외 삼켜 카운트); sync_every 프레임마다 `client.fetch_config()`→`runtime.apply_zones(zones_from_config(...))`; heartbeat_every마다 `send_heartbeat`; flush_every마다 `queue.flush()`. 반환 카운터 dict.
   - `main()` — env로 구성 후 무한 루프. `edge/__main__.py`가 호출. (`# pragma: no cover` — 실장비 엔트리)
@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ def run_loop(runtime, client, queue, *, clock, sleep, iterations=None,
 def main() -> None:  # pragma: no cover (integration entrypoint, exercised on device)
     import time
     from edge.config import load_config
-    from edge.serverclient import ServerClient
+    from edge.cloudclient import CloudClient
     from edge.alert import PostClient
     from edge.queue import OfflineQueue
     from edge.runtime import PipelineRuntime
@@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ def main() -> None:  # pragma: no cover (integration entrypoint, exercised on de
     nonce = lambda: os.urandom(8).hex()
     now = time.time
     base = cfg.cafe24_url.rstrip("/")
-    client = ServerClient(base, cfg.device_id, cfg.secret, nonce, now)
+    client = CloudClient(base, cfg.device_id, cfg.secret, nonce, now)
     post = PostClient(base + "/api/events", cfg.device_id, cfg.secret, nonce, now)
     queue = OfflineQueue(os.environ.get("QUEUE_DB", "queue.db"), post)
     source = UvcSource(int(os.environ.get("UVC_DEVICE", "0")))
@@ -591,15 +591,15 @@ git commit -m "feat(edge): MoveNet ONNX CPU pose adapter (COCO-17 remap)"
 
 ---
 
-## Task 6: 서버 사고 상세 뷰 — 스냅샷 표시
+## Task 6: 클라우드 사고 상세 뷰 — 스냅샷 표시
 
-**Files:** Modify `server/src/View/event_detail.php`; Create `server/public/assets/detail.js`; Modify `server/public/index.php`; Modify `server/tests/WiringSmokeTest.php`
+**Files:** Modify `cloud/src/View/event_detail.php`; Create `cloud/public/assets/detail.js`; Modify `cloud/public/index.php`; Modify `cloud/tests/WiringSmokeTest.php`
 
 **Interfaces:**
 - Consumes: existing `GET /events/{id}` (JSON: event+snapshots) + `GET /snap/{uuid}` (auth image).
 - Produces: `GET /events/{id}/view` → renders `event_detail.php` (HTML shell + `<script src="/assets/detail.js">`). `detail.js` parses the id from the URL, fetches `GET /events/{id}`, renders meta + each snapshot as `<img src="/snap/{uuid}">` (createElement, XSS-safe).
 
-- [ ] **Step 1: 스모크 테스트 갱신** — `server/tests/WiringSmokeTest.php`의 paths 배열에 `['GET','/events/{id}/view']` 추가. `cd server && ./vendor/bin/phpunit tests/WiringSmokeTest.php` — (index 라우트 추가 전이라 실제 앱엔 없지만 스모크는 자체 라우터에 등록하므로) 통과 유지 확인. (스모크는 라우터 매칭만 검증.)
+- [ ] **Step 1: 스모크 테스트 갱신** — `cloud/tests/WiringSmokeTest.php`의 paths 배열에 `['GET','/events/{id}/view']` 추가. `cd cloud && ./vendor/bin/phpunit tests/WiringSmokeTest.php` — (index 라우트 추가 전이라 실제 앱엔 없지만 스모크는 자체 라우터에 등록하므로) 통과 유지 확인. (스모크는 라우터 매칭만 검증.)
 
 - [ ] **Step 2: event_detail.php (스텁 교체)**
 
@@ -612,7 +612,7 @@ git commit -m "feat(edge): MoveNet ONNX CPU pose adapter (COCO-17 remap)"
 <script src="/assets/detail.js" defer></script>
 ```
 
-- [ ] **Step 3: detail.js** — `server/public/assets/detail.js`
+- [ ] **Step 3: detail.js** — `cloud/public/assets/detail.js`
 
 ```javascript
 (function () {
@@ -653,18 +653,18 @@ git commit -m "feat(edge): MoveNet ONNX CPU pose adapter (COCO-17 remap)"
 $r->add('GET', '/events/{id}/view', fn() => $render('event_detail'));
 ```
 
-- [ ] **Step 5: 통과 + 커밋** — 전체 `cd server && ./vendor/bin/phpunit --display-warnings --display-deprecations` green; `php -l server/public/index.php`.
+- [ ] **Step 5: 통과 + 커밋** — 전체 `cd cloud && ./vendor/bin/phpunit --display-warnings --display-deprecations` green; `php -l cloud/public/index.php`.
 
 ```bash
-git add server/src/View/event_detail.php server/public/assets/detail.js server/public/index.php server/tests/WiringSmokeTest.php
+git add cloud/src/View/event_detail.php cloud/public/assets/detail.js cloud/public/index.php cloud/tests/WiringSmokeTest.php
-git commit -m "feat(server): incident detail view renders snapshot images"
+git commit -m "feat(cloud): incident detail view renders snapshot images"
 ```
 
 ---
 
 ## Task 7: 응답 루프 — 목록 링크 + 데스크 Web Audio
 
-**Files:** Modify `server/public/assets/app.js`
+**Files:** Modify `cloud/public/assets/app.js`
 
 **Interfaces:**
 - Consumes: `GET /api/events` (기존 폴링).
@@ -702,11 +702,11 @@ function updateAlarm(events) {
 
 그리고: (a) 행 빌더에서 각 행을 `/events/{event_id}/view` 링크로 감싸기 — `var a = document.createElement('a'); a.href = '/events/' + e.event_id + '/view'; a.appendChild(rowEl);` 후 컨테이너에 append. (b) 폴링 성공 콜백에서 `renderList(events)` 뒤에 `updateAlarm(events)` 호출.
 
-- [ ] **Step 2: 통과 + 커밋** — `node --check server/public/assets/app.js`(node 있으면), 전체 phpunit green(JS만 변경).
+- [ ] **Step 2: 통과 + 커밋** — `node --check cloud/public/assets/app.js`(node 있으면), 전체 phpunit green(JS만 변경).
 
 ```bash
-git add server/public/assets/app.js
+git add cloud/public/assets/app.js
-git commit -m "feat(server): dashboard rows link to detail + desk Web Audio on critical"
+git commit -m "feat(cloud): dashboard rows link to detail + desk Web Audio on critical"
 ```
 
 ---
@@ -735,8 +735,8 @@ def test_real_movenet_runs():
 
 - [ ] **Step 2: 파일럿 런북** — `docs/pilot-runbook.md`, 노트북 파일럿 절차:
   1. **빌드:** `pip install onnxruntime`; `python -m edge.tools.fetch_movenet` (모델 → `models/`).
-  2. **서버:** `php -S localhost:8000 -t server/public` (config.php에 로컬 DB) 또는 Cafe24. admin 계정 생성 + device secret을 `devices` 테이블에 등록.
+  2. **클라우드:** `php -S localhost:8000 -t cloud/public` (config.php에 로컬 DB) 또는 Cafe24. admin 계정 생성 + device secret을 `devices` 테이블에 등록.
-  3. **env:** `DEVICE_ID`, `DEVICE_SECRET`(서버와 일치), `CAFE24_URL`(예 http://localhost:8000), `MOVENET_ONNX=models/movenet_lightning.onnx`, `UVC_DEVICE=0`, `TARGET_FPS=12`.
+  3. **env:** `DEVICE_ID`, `DEVICE_SECRET`(클라우드와 일치), `CAFE24_URL`(예 http://localhost:8000), `MOVENET_ONNX=models/movenet_lightning.onnx`, `UVC_DEVICE=0`, `TARGET_FPS=12`.
   4. **실행:** `move-detect-edge` (또는 `python -m edge`).
   5. **데모:** 웹캠 앞 눕기 → 3초 후 fall, 10초 후 no_motion(위급, 데스크 비프) → 목록행 클릭 → 상세서 스냅샷 확인 → 확인처리(비프 멈춤). 대시보드서 구역 그리기 → 발끝 진입 → 침입 이벤트(역루프). 네트워크 끊고 이벤트 → 복구 후 큐 flush.
   6. **한계(명시):** 단일캠·CPU pose(저fps)·SMS 미연동(Web Audio만)·前中後 아닌 단일프레임. 실장비 Hailo·폐쇄망 번들·드릴 게이트·F14 컴플라이언스는 후속.
@@ -753,7 +753,7 @@ git commit -m "docs: pilot runbook + gated MoveNet smoke test"
 ## Self-Review
 
 **1. 최소경로 커버리지 (기능검토 1~7):**
-- 엣지 데몬(1) → T4 ✓ · CPU pose(2) → T5 ✓ · edge→서버 흐름(3) → T4 데몬+기존 PostClient ✓
+- 엣지 데몬(1) → T4 ✓ · CPU pose(2) → T5 ✓ · edge→클라우드 흐름(3) → T4 데몬+기존 PostClient ✓
 - 사고 가시화(4) → T6 ✓ · 응답 1채널(5) → T7 Web Audio ✓
 - config-sync 역루프(6) → T1+T2+T3(apply_zones)+T4(주기 sync) ✓ · 하트비트(7) → T1+T4 ✓ · 큐 flush(rank7) → T4 ✓
 - **범위 밖(명시):** 실 Hailo(하드웨어), 폐쇄망 전체 번들(T5/T8은 fetch+게이트만; 번들·차단설치는 후속 패키징), 드릴 게이트(P1-C), F14 컴플라이언스(별도), 前中後 링버퍼(rank11 — 파일럿 단일프레임 유지).
@@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ git commit -m "docs: pilot runbook + gated MoveNet smoke test"
 
 **2. Placeholder scan:** 데몬/클라이언트/런타임/어댑터/zone은 실코드+TDD. T5 실모델 스모크·T8은 게이트(모델 없으면 skip) — 의도적. fetch URL은 빌드 편의(구현자 노트로 검증 지시).
 
-**3. Type consistency:** `ServerClient.sign` = PostClient/서버 T14 동일(`nonce+ts+body`). `PipelineRuntime.step`가 `run_once(source,pose,tracker,pool,engine,ring,snapshotter,sink,now_fn)` — P1-A 최종형(per-track smoother 수정 후) 일치. `apply_zones`가 `ZoneIntrusionDetector.zones` 재할당. MoveNet [1,1,17,3](y,x,score)→COCO-17 Keypoint(x,y,conf) 일관.
+**3. Type consistency:** `CloudClient.sign` = PostClient/클라우드 T14 동일(`nonce+ts+body`). `PipelineRuntime.step`가 `run_once(source,pose,tracker,pool,engine,ring,snapshotter,sink,now_fn)` — P1-A 최종형(per-track smoother 수정 후) 일치. `apply_zones`가 `ZoneIntrusionDetector.zones` 재할당. MoveNet [1,1,17,3](y,x,score)→COCO-17 Keypoint(x,y,conf) 일관.
 
 ---
 

edge/adapters/hailo_pose.py

@@ -169,11 +169,7 @@ class HailoPoseAdapter:
                        for info in out_infos}
             bindings = configured.create_bindings(output_buffers=buffers)
             bindings.input().set_buffer(np.ascontiguousarray(frame))
-            # Positional, NOT timeout_ms=. Upstream is `def run(self, bindings, timeout)` in
+            configured.run([bindings], timeout_ms=10000)
-            # every HailoRT that supports Hailo-8 (v4.19.0 / v4.20.0 / v4.23.0 / master), so
-            # the keyword form is a TypeError on EVERY frame — and run_loop swallows it
-            # (edge/daemon.py:23-24), so it presents as a green unit emitting zero events.
-            configured.run([bindings], 10000)
             return [buffers[info.name][None, ...] if buffers[info.name].ndim == 3
                     else buffers[info.name] for info in out_infos]
 

edge/adapters/movenet_pose.py

@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
-import logging
-
 import cv2
 import numpy as np
 
@@ -19,13 +17,6 @@ class MoveNetPoseAdapter:
             session = onnxruntime.InferenceSession(onnx_path, providers=["CPUExecutionProvider"])
         self.session = session
         self._input_name = session.get_inputs()[0].name
-        # MoveNet SinglePose returns ONE person per frame. At a multi-worker site every worker
-        # but one is invisible to fall/zone/ghost detection with no other symptom — so say it
-        # loudly at startup. The Hailo backend (yolov8s_pose) is multi-person.
-        logging.getLogger("edge.pose").warning(
-            "MoveNet CPU fallback is SINGLE-PERSON: only one worker is tracked per frame; any "
-            "additional workers are invisible to fall/zone/ghost detection. Use the Hailo "
-            "backend (POSE_BACKEND=hailo) at multi-person sites.")
 
     def infer(self, frame) -> list:
         h, w = frame.shape[:2]

edge/adapters/uvc_source.py

@@ -4,43 +4,10 @@ import cv2
 
 
 class UvcSource:
-    def __init__(self, dev, mjpeg: bool = True, *, reopen_after: int = 30, _open=None):
+    def __init__(self, dev, mjpeg: bool = True):
-        # _open lets tests inject a fake capture; production uses cv2.VideoCapture.
+        self.cap = cv2.VideoCapture(dev)
-        self._dev = dev
+        if mjpeg:
-        self._mjpeg = mjpeg
+            self.cap.set(cv2.CAP_PROP_FOURCC, cv2.VideoWriter_fourcc(*"MJPG"))
-        self._reopen_after = reopen_after
-        self._open = _open or (lambda d: cv2.VideoCapture(d))
-        self._fail_streak = 0
-        self.cap = self._open_cap()
-
-    def _open_cap(self):
-        cap = self._open(self._dev)
-        # Fail LOUD: a device that never opens must not become a silently-dead capture that
-        # returns (False, None) forever while the daemon looks healthy. build_runtimes catches
-        # this and logs+skips the camera.
-        if not cap.isOpened():
-            raise RuntimeError(f"UVC device {self._dev!r} failed to open")
-        if self._mjpeg:
-            cap.set(cv2.CAP_PROP_FOURCC, cv2.VideoWriter_fourcc(*"MJPG"))
-        return cap
 
     def read(self):
-        ok, frame = self.cap.read()
+        return self.cap.read()
-        if ok:
-            self._fail_streak = 0
-            return ok, frame
-        # A USB cam that browns out / is unplugged returns (False, None) indefinitely. After a
-        # streak, release and reopen so a recovered device resumes on its own rather than the
-        # camera staying dead until someone restarts the service.
-        self._fail_streak += 1
-        if self._fail_streak >= self._reopen_after:
-            self._fail_streak = 0
-            try:
-                self.cap.release()
-            except Exception:
-                pass
-            try:
-                self.cap = self._open_cap()
-            except Exception:
-                pass  # still dead — the daemon's error/heartbeat path surfaces it
-        return False, None

edge/alert.py

@@ -2,28 +2,9 @@ import base64
 import hashlib
 import hmac
 import json
-from enum import Enum
 
 from edge.events import Event
 
-# Shared-hosting WAFs (cafe24) frequently block the default "python-requests/x.y" User-Agent
-# with an HTML 403 while curl passes — so every event would silently 403 with a correct HMAC
-# and URL. Send an explicit UA on every request. ServerClient imports this too.
-USER_AGENT = "move-detect-edge/1.0"
-
-
-class SendResult(Enum):
-    """Outcome of one upload attempt. The offline queue must tell a transient outage (retry
-    forever — a real fall alert has to survive an overnight internet outage) apart from a
-    permanent rejection (poison — count toward the drop cap), which a bare bool cannot express.
-    DELIVERED is the only truthy value, so `if client.send(...)` keeps working unchanged."""
-    DELIVERED = "delivered"
-    REJECTED = "rejected"    # a definite 4xx (not 429): the server will never accept this event
-    TRANSIENT = "transient"  # network error / timeout / 429 / 5xx — connectivity or server hiccup
-
-    def __bool__(self) -> bool:
-        return self is SendResult.DELIVERED
-
 
 def sign(secret: str, nonce: str, ts: str, body: str | bytes) -> str:
     if isinstance(body, str):
@@ -46,7 +27,7 @@ class PostClient:
             http_post = requests.post
         self._post = http_post
 
-    def send(self, event: Event, snapshots: list[bytes]) -> SendResult:
+    def send(self, event: Event, snapshots: list[bytes]) -> bool:
         payload = event.to_payload(self.device_id)
         payload["snapshots"] = [base64.b64encode(s).decode() for s in snapshots]
         body = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True)
@@ -54,33 +35,12 @@ class PostClient:
         ts = str(self.now_fn())
         headers = {
             "Content-Type": "application/json",
-            "User-Agent": USER_AGENT,
             "X-Nonce": nonce,
             "X-Timestamp": ts,
             "X-Signature": sign(self.secret, nonce, ts, body.encode()),
         }
         try:
-            # allow_redirects=False: the .htaccess http->https 302 must not silently become a
+            resp = self._post(self.url, data=body, headers=headers, timeout=self.timeout)
-            # GET (405/404). A redirect is a CAFE24_URL misconfiguration to surface, not follow.
-            resp = self._post(self.url, data=body, headers=headers, timeout=self.timeout,
-                              allow_redirects=False)
         except Exception:
-            # Connection refused / DNS / timeout — the server is unreachable, not rejecting us.
+            return False
-            return SendResult.TRANSIENT
+        return 200 <= resp.status_code < 300
-        code = resp.status_code
-        if 200 <= code < 300:
-            return SendResult.DELIVERED
-        # Transient — "back off and retry", NOT a permanent verdict on the event: all 5xx plus the
-        # 4xx codes that explicitly mean try-again (408 Request Timeout, 425 Too Early, 429 Too
-        # Many Requests). Counting these toward the poison drop cap would delete real events during
-        # a proxy/server hiccup. Only a definite "bad request" 4xx is a permanent rejection.
-        #
-        # 401 is transient too: the server returns it for a STALE timestamp (abs(now-ts) > window),
-        # which is exactly what an RTC-less Pi hits after a power cut until NTP steps the clock —
-        # the event is valid and will be accepted verbatim once time syncs. The only permanent 401
-        # cause is a wrong/rotated secret, a provisioning error to fix; retrying (events stay queued,
-        # bounded by max_rows) is far safer than poison-dropping a real fall alert. Poison-drop is
-        # reserved for a definite CONTENT rejection (400/422), never an auth/clock condition.
-        if code in (401, 408, 425, 429) or code >= 500:
-            return SendResult.TRANSIENT
-        return SendResult.REJECTED

edge/app.py

@@ -11,32 +11,18 @@ from edge.models import BBox
 
 
 def _head_boxes(persons: list) -> list:
-    # Head region for face anonymization (PIPA). Sized from the PERSON bbox, not a fixed
+    # 배경인물 머리영역 근사: 코 주변 작은 박스 (MVP; 실제는 얼굴 검출 포트로 교체)
-    # ~40x40 patch — a close worker fills far more than 40px, so a constant box left the face
-    # fully identifiable. Centered on the nose when it is confident, else on the bbox's top
-    # (the head is the upper part of the person) so a bad keypoint can't move the blur off it.
     boxes = []
     for p in persons:
-        bb = p.bbox
         nose = p.keypoints[0]
-        half_w = max(8.0, 0.25 * bb.width)
+        boxes.append(BBox(nose.x - 20, nose.y - 25, nose.x + 20, nose.y + 15))
-        if nose.conf >= 0.3:
-            cx, cy = nose.x, nose.y
-        else:
-            cx, cy = bb.cx, bb.y1 + 0.12 * bb.height
-        boxes.append(BBox(cx - half_w, cy - 0.18 * bb.height,
-                          cx + half_w, cy + 0.08 * bb.height))
     return boxes
 
 
-def run_once(source, pose, tracker, pool, engine, ring, snapshotter, sink, now_fn, wall_fn=None):
+def run_once(source, pose, tracker, pool, engine, ring, snapshotter, sink, now_fn):
     ok, frame = source.read()
     if not ok:
-        # No frame this tick. Return None (not []) so the daemon can tell "camera produced no
+        return []
-        # frame" apart from "frame processed, no events" — a dead/unplugged USB camera returns
-        # (False, None) forever, and counting it as a healthy frame made a monitoring outage
-        # look perfectly green (fps~=target, cameras_erroring=0).
-        return None
     now = now_fn()
     persons = pose.infer(frame)
     tracks = tracker.update(persons, now)  # RAW keypoints; smoothing happens per-track below
@@ -45,11 +31,7 @@ def run_once(source, pose, tracker, pool, engine, ring, snapshotter, sink, now_f
         f = tr.latest
         f.keypoints = pool.smoother_for(tr.track_id).smooth(f.keypoints, now)
     ring.push(now, frame)
-    h, w = frame.shape[:2]
+    events = engine.process(tracks, lost, now)
-    # `now` (monotonic) drives detector timers; wall time stamps the event (occurred_at). Off the
-    # daemon (direct callers / tests) wall_fn is None → engine falls back to now, as before.
-    wall_now = wall_fn() if wall_fn is not None else None
-    events = engine.process(tracks, lost, now, frame_wh=(w, h), wall_now=wall_now)
     for tr in lost:
         pool.forget(tr.track_id)
     if events:

edge/cloudclient.py

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 import json
 
-from edge.alert import USER_AGENT, sign
+from edge.alert import sign
 
 
-class ServerClient:
+class CloudClient:
     def __init__(self, base_url: str, device_id: str, secret: str,
                  nonce_fn, now_fn, http_get=None, http_post=None, timeout: float = 5.0):
         self.base_url = base_url.rstrip("/")
@@ -22,15 +22,13 @@ class ServerClient:
     def _headers(self, body: str) -> dict:
         nonce = self.nonce_fn()
         ts = str(self.now_fn())
-        # User-Agent: cafe24's WAF 403s the default python-requests UA (see edge/alert.py).
+        return {"X-Nonce": nonce, "X-Timestamp": ts,
-        return {"User-Agent": USER_AGENT, "X-Nonce": nonce, "X-Timestamp": ts,
                 "X-Signature": sign(self.secret, nonce, ts, body)}
 
     def fetch_config(self) -> dict | None:
         url = f"{self.base_url}/api/config?device_id={self.device_id}"
         try:
-            resp = self._get(url, headers=self._headers(""), timeout=self.timeout,
+            resp = self._get(url, headers=self._headers(""), timeout=self.timeout)
-                             allow_redirects=False)
         except Exception:
             return None
         if 200 <= resp.status_code < 300:
@@ -46,7 +44,7 @@ class ServerClient:
         headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json", **self._headers(body)}
         try:
             resp = self._post(f"{self.base_url}/api/heartbeat", data=body,
-                              headers=headers, timeout=self.timeout, allow_redirects=False)
+                              headers=headers, timeout=self.timeout)
         except Exception:
             return False
         return 200 <= resp.status_code < 300

edge/config.py

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-import math
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 
 from edge.detectors.fall import FallConfig
@@ -25,89 +24,13 @@ def _f(env: dict, key: str, default: float) -> float:
     return float(env[key]) if key in env else default
 
 
-def frame_interval_from_env(env: dict) -> float:
-    """Seconds per frame from TARGET_FPS, validated. TARGET_FPS=0 (ZeroDivisionError) or a
-    non-numeric value (ValueError) would otherwise crash at every startup into an infinite
-    systemd restart loop (Restart=always + StartLimitIntervalSec=0)."""
-    raw = env.get("TARGET_FPS", "12")
-    try:
-        fps = float(raw)
-    except (TypeError, ValueError):
-        raise ValueError(f"TARGET_FPS={raw!r} is not a number")
-    if fps <= 0:
-        raise ValueError(f"TARGET_FPS={raw!r} must be > 0")
-    return 1.0 / fps
-
-
-def queue_db_path(env: dict) -> str:
-    """Absolute sqlite path for the offline queue. A relative 'queue.db' resolves against the
-    unit's read-only WorkingDirectory under ProtectSystem=strict and cannot be created ->
-    crash loop. Default to the systemd StateDirectory, the one writable path."""
-    return env.get("QUEUE_DB") or "/var/lib/move-detect/queue.db"
-
-
-# Ship-time placeholders that are non-empty (so they pass a blank check) yet are never a real
-# provisioned value. A unit left at any of these uploads nothing while looking healthy.
-_PLACEHOLDER_MARKERS = ("changeme", "your-domain.example", "example.com", "todo", "xxxx")
-# Per-device secrets issued by the server are HMAC-derived (long hex); anything shorter is a
-# stub left in the template, not a real key.
-_MIN_SECRET_LEN = 16
-
-
-def require_upload_config(cfg: Config) -> None:
-    """Fail LOUD at startup when the daemon cannot possibly deliver events.
-
-    load_config defaults cafe24_url and secret to '' so unit tests can build a Config from a
-    minimal env — but a real daemon with either blank, left at a ship-time placeholder, or on
-    plaintext http runs perfectly green while every upload fails (a bad/empty URL makes requests
-    raise, which PostClient catches and returns False; http is refused by allow_redirects=False),
-    and the offline queue grows until the SD card is full. The operator sees a healthy unit and
-    an empty dashboard, or worker snapshots leave the Pi in plaintext. Refuse to start instead.
-    """
-    problems: list[str] = []
-    url = cfg.cafe24_url.strip()
-    secret = cfg.secret.strip()
-
-    if not url:
-        problems.append("CAFE24_URL not set")
-    elif not url.lower().startswith("https://"):
-        problems.append(f"CAFE24_URL must be https:// (got {url!r}) — plaintext would leak "
-                        "worker snapshots and the .htaccess redirect is not followed")
-    elif any(m in url.lower() for m in _PLACEHOLDER_MARKERS):
-        problems.append(f"CAFE24_URL is still a template placeholder ({url!r})")
-
-    if not secret:
-        problems.append("DEVICE_SECRET not set")
-    elif any(m in secret.lower() for m in _PLACEHOLDER_MARKERS):
-        problems.append("DEVICE_SECRET is still a template placeholder (e.g. CHANGEME)")
-    elif len(secret) < _MIN_SECRET_LEN:
-        problems.append(f"DEVICE_SECRET is too short (<{_MIN_SECRET_LEN} chars) — use the "
-                        "per-device secret issued by the server, not a stub")
-
-    if problems:
-        raise ValueError(
-            "FATAL /etc/move-detect/edge.env: " + "; ".join(problems) + ". The daemon would run "
-            "but upload nothing. CAFE24_URL must include the app path, e.g. "
-            "https://<domain>/move_detect ; DEVICE_SECRET is the per-device secret from the server."
-        )
-
-
 def load_config(env: dict) -> Config:
     camera_id = env.get("CAMERA_ID", "cam-01")
-    # Per-second stillness threshold (units/second), shared by fall no-motion and immobility.
-    # track_displacement is now frame-rate-normalized, so this must be tuned per device — expose
-    # it via env instead of forcing a code edit + redeploy. Reject a non-finite or non-positive
-    # value at startup (a 0 or NaN would make everything read as "still" -> constant no_motion).
-    motion_thr = _f(env, "MOTION_THR", 0.25)
-    if not math.isfinite(motion_thr) or motion_thr <= 0:
-        raise ValueError(f"MOTION_THR must be a finite positive number, got {motion_thr!r}")
     fall = FallConfig(
         prone_confirm_s=_f(env, "FALL_PRONE_S", 3.0),
         no_motion_s=_f(env, "FALL_NO_MOTION_S", 10.0),
-        motion_thr=motion_thr,
     )
-    immobility = ImmobilityConfig(immobile_s=_f(env, "IMMOBILE_S", 120.0),
+    immobility = ImmobilityConfig(immobile_s=_f(env, "IMMOBILE_S", 120.0))
-                                  motion_thr=motion_thr)
     ghost = GhostConfig(reappear_s=_f(env, "GHOST_REAPPEAR_S", 10.0))
     zone = ZoneConfig(debounce_s=_f(env, "ZONE_DEBOUNCE_S", 0.75))
     engine = EngineConfig(camera_id=camera_id, cooldown_s=_f(env, "COOLDOWN_S", 30.0))

edge/daemon.py

@@ -1,136 +1,42 @@
 import os
 
 
-# Rate-limit for the swallowed-exception log: a camera failing every frame must be VISIBLE
-# (not a silent green unit) but must not spam the journal. Log the 1st of a run of consecutive
-# failures, then every LOG_EVERY-th, and again after any recovery.
-_LOG_EVERY = 300
-
-
-def _default_log(msg, exc=None):  # pragma: no cover (thin stderr wrapper)
-    import sys
-    import traceback
-    print(msg, file=sys.stderr)
-    if exc is not None:
-        traceback.print_exception(type(exc), exc, exc.__traceback__, file=sys.stderr)
-
-
 def run_loop(runtime, client, queue, *, clock, sleep, iterations=None,
              sync_every=150, heartbeat_every=900, flush_every=300,
-             frame_interval=0.0, zones_for=None, log=None,
+             frame_interval=0.0, zones_for=None):
-             heartbeat_interval_s=None, health_fn=None, configured_cameras=None):
     # `runtime` may be a single PipelineRuntime or a list of them (multi-camera). All
     # cameras share this loop, one shared clock read per tick, and the periodic
-    # sync/heartbeat/flush. A per-camera step exception is counted and rate-limit-logged,
+    # sync/heartbeat/flush. A per-camera step exception is counted, never fatal.
-    # never fatal — but it is no longer SILENT (a permanently broken pipeline used to look
-    # perfectly green).
     runtimes = list(runtime) if isinstance(runtime, (list, tuple)) else [runtime]
     if zones_for is None:
         from edge.zones import zones_from_config
         zones_for = lambda cfg, rt: zones_from_config(cfg)
-    if log is None:
-        log = _default_log
-    if health_fn is None:
-        from edge.health import read_health
-        health_fn = read_health
     counters = {"frames": 0, "syncs": 0, "beats": 0, "flushes": 0, "errors": 0}
-    streak = {}  # id(rt)/"periodic" -> consecutive-error count, for rate-limited logging
-
-    def note(key, label, exc=None):
-        counters["errors"] += 1
-        n = streak.get(key, 0) + 1
-        streak[key] = n
-        if n == 1 or n % _LOG_EVERY == 0:
-            if exc is not None:
-                log(f"{label}: {type(exc).__name__}: {exc} (consecutive #{n})", exc)
-            else:
-                log(f"{label} (consecutive #{n})", None)
-
-    beat_anchor = None  # (wall_time, frames) at the previous heartbeat, for measured fps
-    last_beat = None    # wall time of the last heartbeat, for the time-based cadence
-    reported_version = None  # last config version the server told us; echoed in heartbeats
     i = 0
     while iterations is None or i < iterations:
         i += 1
         now = clock()  # one timestamp per tick, shared across cameras
-        if beat_anchor is None:
-            beat_anchor = (now, 0)
-        if last_beat is None:
-            last_beat = now
         for rt in runtimes:
             try:
-                produced = rt.step(now)
+                rt.step(now)
-            except Exception as e:
-                cam = getattr(rt, "camera_id", "?")
-                note(id(rt), f"camera {cam} step failed", e)
-                continue
-            if produced is None:
-                # step() returned no frame (unplugged/browned-out camera). Count it toward the
-                # erroring streak instead of as a healthy frame — otherwise a dead camera ticks
-                # frames++ forever and reports fps~=target with cameras_erroring=0 (a silent
-                # monitoring outage that looks green). A single dropped frame self-clears on the
-                # next good frame, so only SUSTAINED starvation shows as erroring.
-                cam = getattr(rt, "camera_id", "?")
-                note(id(rt), f"camera {cam} produced no frame")
-            else:
                 counters["frames"] += 1
-                streak.pop(id(rt), None)  # recovered — reset the streak
+            except Exception:
+                counters["errors"] += 1
         try:
             if sync_every and i % sync_every == 0:
                 cfg = client.fetch_config()
                 if cfg is not None:
                     for rt in runtimes:
                         rt.apply_zones(zones_for(cfg, rt))
-                    # Remember the config version so heartbeats can echo it back — the server's
-                    # config-drift indicator is meaningless until the device reports what it runs.
-                    if isinstance(cfg, dict) and cfg.get("version") is not None:
-                        reported_version = int(cfg["version"])
                     counters["syncs"] += 1
-            # Heartbeat cadence: time-based when heartbeat_interval_s is set (production), so the
+            if heartbeat_every and i % heartbeat_every == 0:
-            # interval is predictable regardless of per-tick cost (CPU MoveNet, multi-cam, thermal
+                if client.send_heartbeat({"fps": 0.0, "frames": counters["frames"]}):
-            # throttle can push a tick past 100ms) — an iteration count cannot guarantee a wall-clock
-            # cadence, and the server marks a device offline on ELAPSED time. Falls back to the
-            # iteration count when unset (used by the deterministic unit tests).
-            if heartbeat_interval_s:
-                do_beat = (now - last_beat) >= heartbeat_interval_s
-            else:
-                do_beat = bool(heartbeat_every) and (i % heartbeat_every == 0)
-            if do_beat:
-                # Measured fps over the window since the last beat, and per-camera health, so
-                # the server can tell a live device from a degraded/dead one (was hardcoded 0.0
-                # + a frames counter that ticked even when no frame was read).
-                t0, f0 = beat_anchor
-                elapsed = now - t0
-                fps = (counters["frames"] - f0) / elapsed if elapsed > 0 else 0.0
-                # cameras_total is the CONFIGURED count, not just the started one: a camera that
-                # failed to construct at boot (wrong /dev index, unseated ribbon) is skipped by
-                # build_runtimes and would otherwise vanish from the heartbeat entirely — the
-                # server could never see that a configured camera is missing. Count the not-started
-                # cameras as erroring so a 4-cam device that lost one reports 4 total / 1 erroring.
-                total = configured_cameras if configured_cameras is not None else len(runtimes)
-                not_started = max(0, total - len(runtimes))
-                erroring = not_started + sum(1 for rt in runtimes if id(rt) in streak)
-                metrics = {"fps": round(fps, 2), "frames": counters["frames"],
-                           "cameras_total": total, "cameras_erroring": erroring,
-                           "errors": counters["errors"], "queue_pending": queue.pending()}
-                # Pi thermal telemetry (None off-Pi or on failure → field omitted, never a fake 0).
-                health = health_fn()
-                if health.get("temp") is not None:
-                    metrics["temp"] = health["temp"]
-                if health.get("throttle") is not None:
-                    metrics["throttle"] = health["throttle"]
-                if reported_version is not None:
-                    metrics["config_version"] = reported_version
-                if client.send_heartbeat(metrics):
                     counters["beats"] += 1
-                beat_anchor = (now, counters["frames"])
-                last_beat = now
             if flush_every and i % flush_every == 0:
                 queue.flush()
                 counters["flushes"] += 1
-            streak.pop("periodic", None)
+        except Exception:
-        except Exception as e:
+            counters["errors"] += 1
-            note("periodic", "periodic op (sync/heartbeat/flush) failed", e)
         if frame_interval:
             sleep(frame_interval)
     return counters
@@ -181,9 +87,8 @@ def build_runtimes(cameras, make_source, make_runtime, log=None):
 def main() -> None:  # pragma: no cover (integration entrypoint, exercised on device)
     import time
     from dataclasses import replace
-    from edge.config import (frame_interval_from_env, load_config, queue_db_path,
+    from edge.config import load_config
-                             require_upload_config)
+    from edge.cloudclient import CloudClient
-    from edge.serverclient import ServerClient
     from edge.alert import PostClient
     from edge.queue import OfflineQueue
     from edge.runtime import PipelineRuntime
@@ -207,33 +112,24 @@ def main() -> None:  # pragma: no cover (integration entrypoint, exercised on de
         return MoveNetPoseAdapter(os.environ["MOVENET_ONNX"])
 
     cfg = load_config(dict(os.environ))
-    require_upload_config(cfg)  # fail loud now, not silently upload nothing forever
     nonce = lambda: os.urandom(8).hex()
-    # Two clocks, deliberately: the loop/detector timers run on a MONOTONIC clock so an NTP step
+    now = time.time
-    # (a Pi 5 has no RTC battery; it boots on stale fake-hwclock time until chrony corrects it)
-    # cannot instantly satisfy immobile_s, expire every track, or reset an immobility countdown.
-    # Wall time is used only where a real timestamp is required: the HMAC X-Timestamp headers,
-    # which the server validates against its own wall clock, and Event.occurred_at.
-    mono = time.monotonic
-    wall = time.time
     base = cfg.cafe24_url.rstrip("/")
-    client = ServerClient(base, cfg.device_id, cfg.secret, nonce, wall)
+    client = CloudClient(base, cfg.device_id, cfg.secret, nonce, now)
-    post = PostClient(base + "/api/events", cfg.device_id, cfg.secret, nonce, wall)
+    post = PostClient(base + "/api/events", cfg.device_id, cfg.secret, nonce, now)
-    queue = OfflineQueue(queue_db_path(dict(os.environ)), post)
+    queue = OfflineQueue(os.environ.get("QUEUE_DB", "queue.db"), post)
 
     pose = build_pose()  # shared across cameras
 
     def make_runtime(cam, source):
         # Per-camera config so events are stamped with that camera's id.
         cam_cfg = replace(cfg, camera_id=cam, engine=replace(cfg.engine, camera_id=cam))
-        return PipelineRuntime(cam_cfg, source, pose, queue, wall_clock=wall)
+        return PipelineRuntime(cam_cfg, source, pose, queue)
 
     # A missing/unseated camera is skipped (logged), not fatal — the others still run.
-    cameras = parse_cameras(dict(os.environ), cfg.camera_id)
+    runtimes = build_runtimes(parse_cameras(dict(os.environ), cfg.camera_id),
-    runtimes = build_runtimes(cameras, build_source, make_runtime)
+                              build_source, make_runtime)
 
-    run_loop(runtimes, client, queue, clock=mono, sleep=time.sleep, iterations=None,
+    run_loop(runtimes, client, queue, clock=now, sleep=time.sleep, iterations=None,
-             frame_interval=frame_interval_from_env(dict(os.environ)),
+             frame_interval=1.0 / float(os.environ.get("TARGET_FPS", "12")),
-             heartbeat_interval_s=30,  # predictable cadence; server marks offline after 120s (4x)
-             configured_cameras=len(cameras),  # so a camera that failed to start stays visible
              zones_for=lambda c, rt: zones_from_config(c, rt.camera_id))

edge/detectors/fall.py

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ class FallConfig:
     height_collapse: float = 0.35   # baseline 대비 남은 높이 비율(이 값 미만이면 급붕괴)
     prone_confirm_s: float = 3.0
     no_motion_s: float = 10.0
-    motion_thr: float = 0.25        # per-second normalized joint speed (units/s); MOTION_THR env
+    motion_thr: float = 0.02        # 정규화 관절변위 임계
     min_conf: float = 0.5
     min_visible: int = 10
     recover_grace_s: float = 1.0    # 사고 상태에서 회복 판정까지 요구되는 지속 비-prone 시간
@@ -40,19 +40,18 @@ class FallDetector:
     def forget(self, track_id: int) -> None:
         self._states.pop(track_id, None)
 
-    def _prone(self, kps, bbox, st: _State, kp_ok: bool) -> tuple[bool, dict]:
+    def _prone(self, kps, bbox, st: _State) -> tuple[bool, dict]:
+        angle = torso_angle_deg(kps)
         ar = bbox.aspect
         remaining = 1.0
         if st.baseline_height:
             remaining = bbox.height / st.baseline_height
-        # bbox cues need NO keypoints — a fallen person is wide-and-short, or their bbox height
+        prone = (
-        # collapsed. These stay live even when the pose model has lost confidence (occluded /
+            angle > self.cfg.fallen_angle
-        # on the floor), which is exactly when a fall must not be missed.
+            or ar > self.cfg.aspect_ratio
-        prone = ar > self.cfg.aspect_ratio or remaining < self.cfg.height_collapse
+            or remaining < self.cfg.height_collapse   # 높이 급붕괴(정면/후면 낙상)
-        angle = torso_angle_deg(kps)
+            or head_below_hips(kps)
-        # keypoint cues only when the keypoints are actually trustworthy, else they are noise.
+        )
-        if kp_ok:
-            prone = prone or angle > self.cfg.fallen_angle or head_below_hips(kps)
         return prone, {"torso_angle": round(angle, 1),
                        "aspect_ratio": round(ar, 2),
                        "height_remaining": round(remaining, 2)}
@@ -62,34 +61,20 @@ class FallDetector:
         f = track.latest
         kps, bbox = f.keypoints, f.bbox
 
-        # Confidence gate — no longer a blanket early-return (that disabled fall/no_motion/
+        # 신뢰도 게이트
-        # ghost for the occluded person on the ground). It now only decides whether the
+        if not core_visible(kps, self.cfg.min_conf) or visible_count(kps) < self.cfg.min_visible:
-        # KEYPOINT-based cues are trustworthy; the bbox cues always run.
+            return None, {}
-        kp_ok = core_visible(kps, self.cfg.min_conf) and visible_count(kps) >= self.cfg.min_visible
 
-        prone, meta = self._prone(kps, bbox, st, kp_ok)
+        prone, meta = self._prone(kps, bbox, st)
 
-        # incident 비활성일 때만 baseline(정상 키높이) 갱신 = incident 중 freeze. Only trust a
+        # incident 비활성일 때만 baseline(정상 키높이) 갱신 = incident 중 freeze
-        # confident standing frame for the baseline so a bad low-conf bbox can't corrupt it.
+        if st.name == "STANDING" and not prone:
-        if st.name == "STANDING" and not prone and kp_ok:
             st.baseline_height = bbox.height
 
         if not prone:
             if st.name in ("FALLING", "FALLEN", "NO_MOTION"):
-                # Only a CONFIDENT non-prone frame may recover an active incident. A low-conf
-                # (kp_ok False) frame's bbox-only "not prone" reading is untrusted: occlusion of
-                # a still-fallen worker must FREEZE the incident, not run the recovery countdown
-                # on noise. Freezing also protects baseline_height below (only seeded here, when
-                # kp_ok holds, so a bad low-conf bbox can't corrupt the next fall's collapse cue).
-                if not kp_ok:
-                    # Occlusion PAUSES recovery — it must not count toward the grace window. Reset
-                    # so recovery requires a FRESH, continuous run of confident non-prone frames;
-                    # otherwise a confident frame at t0 plus a lone confident frame after a long
-                    # low-conf gap would recover instantly on wall-clock elapsed alone.
-                    st.not_prone_since = None
-                    return None, {}
                 # 단일 튐(noisy) 프레임만으로 CRITICAL 사고를 즉시 취소하지 않도록
-                # recover_grace_s만큼 지속된 (신뢰) 비-prone을 요구한다.
+                # recover_grace_s만큼 지속된 비-prone을 요구한다.
                 if st.not_prone_since is None:
                     st.not_prone_since = now
                     return None, {}

edge/detectors/ghost.py

@@ -26,20 +26,13 @@ class GhostIncidentDetector:
             state = self._states.get(tr.track_id, "STANDING")
             if state in _DANGEROUS:
                 b = tr.latest.bbox
-                # Snapshot the OTHER tracks active at loss time. Only a track that did NOT
+                self._candidates[tr.track_id] = ((b.cx, b.cy), state, b.height, now)
-                # exist then can be the victim re-appearing (a re-acquired track gets a new
-                # id); a track already present is a bystander/colleague and must not cancel
-                # the incident by walking over the loss point.
-                bystanders = set(self._states) - {tr.track_id}
-                self._candidates[tr.track_id] = ((b.cx, b.cy), state, b.height, now, bystanders)
             self._states.pop(tr.track_id, None)
 
     def update(self, active_tracks: list[Track], now: float) -> list[dict]:
-        # 인근 재출현이면 후보 취소 — 단, 손실 시점에 없던 새 트랙만 (진짜 재출현).
+        # 인근 재출현이면 후보 취소
-        for tid, (spatial, _state, height, _lost_at, bystanders) in list(self._candidates.items()):
+        for tid, (spatial, _state, height, _lost_at) in list(self._candidates.items()):
             for tr in active_tracks:
-                if tr.track_id in bystanders:
-                    continue  # a colleague who was already here — not the reappearing victim
                 b = tr.latest.bbox
                 dist = ((b.cx - spatial[0]) ** 2 + (b.cy - spatial[1]) ** 2) ** 0.5
                 if dist <= self.cfg.reappear_dist * (height or 1.0):
@@ -47,7 +40,7 @@ class GhostIncidentDetector:
                     break
         # 대기 초과 방출
         out = []
-        for tid, (spatial, state, _height, lost_at, _by) in list(self._candidates.items()):
+        for tid, (spatial, state, _height, lost_at) in list(self._candidates.items()):
             if now - lost_at >= self.cfg.reappear_s:
                 out.append({"track_id": tid, "spatial": spatial, "last_state": state,
                             "waited_s": round(now - lost_at, 1)})

edge/detectors/immobility.py

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ from edge.geometry import track_displacement
 
 @dataclass
 class ImmobilityConfig:
-    motion_thr: float = 0.25   # per-second normalized joint speed (units/s); MOTION_THR env
+    motion_thr: float = 0.02
     immobile_s: float = 120.0
     zone_immobile_s: float = 30.0
 

edge/detectors/zone.py

@@ -3,9 +3,6 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass
 from edge.tracking import Track
 from edge.models import L_ANKLE, R_ANKLE
 
-# Below this an ankle keypoint is treated as unusable (typically hallucinated at conf~0).
-MIN_ANKLE_CONF = 0.2
-
 
 def point_in_polygon(x: float, y: float, poly: list[tuple[float, float]]) -> bool:
     inside = False
@@ -43,36 +40,16 @@ class ZoneIntrusionDetector:
         self._inside_since = {k: v for k, v in self._inside_since.items() if k[0] != track_id}
         self._fired = {k for k in self._fired if k[0] != track_id}
 
-    def _foot(self, track: Track, frame_wh=None) -> tuple[float, float]:
+    def _foot(self, track: Track) -> tuple[float, float]:
-        p = track.latest
+        kps = track.latest.keypoints
-        a, b = p.keypoints[L_ANKLE], p.keypoints[R_ANKLE]
+        a, b = kps[L_ANKLE], kps[R_ANKLE]
-        # Average only the ankles the model is confident about. A hallucinated ankle (conf~0,
+        return ((a.x + b.x) / 2, (a.y + b.y) / 2)
-        # often pinned to (0,0) or a frame corner) would otherwise drag the foot point into or
-        # out of a zone. With neither ankle trustworthy, fall back to the bbox bottom-centre — a
-        # robust standing-foot proxy (same bbox-fallback discipline as fall.py's cues).
-        good = [k for k in (a, b) if k.conf >= MIN_ANKLE_CONF]
-        if good:
-            fx = sum(k.x for k in good) / len(good)
-            fy = sum(k.y for k in good) / len(good)
-        else:
-            fx, fy = p.bbox.cx, p.bbox.y2
-        # Zones are stored NORMALIZED (0..1 of the image) by the dashboard, which stretches the
-        # camera snapshot to a fixed canvas. The foot is camera-native pixels, so normalize it
-        # by the frame size to compare in the same space — otherwise every zone is misplaced
-        # (a zone drawn at image-centre would be checked against a raw pixel like 480, matching
-        # nothing on a 1280-wide frame). frame_wh=None keeps raw coords for unit tests that
-        # supply their own matching space.
-        if frame_wh:
-            w, h = frame_wh
-            if w > 0 and h > 0:
-                fx, fy = fx / w, fy / h
-        return (fx, fy)
 
     def active_zone_ids(self, track_id: int) -> set:
         return {z for (tid, z) in self._inside_since if tid == track_id}
 
-    def update(self, track: Track, now: float, frame_wh=None) -> list[dict]:
+    def update(self, track: Track, now: float) -> list[dict]:
-        fx, fy = self._foot(track, frame_wh)
+        fx, fy = self._foot(track)
         out = []
         for zone in self.zones:
             key = (track.track_id, zone.zone_id)