move_detect/docs/delivery-audit.md

Delivery Audit — move-detect (납품 전 결함 목록 · 순차 처리)

Source: 62-agent adversarial audit (2026-07-16) + skill iot-airgap-delivery §3 + manual verification of every blocker against real code. Ordered for sequential fixing. Each item is checked off only after a test locks it and verification passes.

Legend: [B] blocks delivery · [H] high · [M] medium · [L] low · OFF-HW = cannot be verified without the Hailo board.

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Phase 1 — Silent failure & misconfiguration (the #1 delivery risk)

A safety system that looks healthy while doing nothing is the worst failure. Make every misconfig/degradation fail LOUD.

• P1-1 [H] edge/cloudclient.py, edge/alert.py — requests sends the default python-requests/x.y User-Agent; cafe24's shared-hosting WAF commonly blocks it with an HTML 403 while curl passes. Every event then silently fails. Also allow_redirects=True turns the .htaccess http→https 302 into a GET → 405/404. Fix: custom UA (move-detect-edge/1.0) on every call + allow_redirects=False, log once on 3xx. DONE — USER_AGENT in alert.py, both clients send it + allow_redirects=False; tests in test_alert.py / test_cloudclient.py.
• P1-2 [B] deploy/systemd/move-detect-edge.env.example, setup_online.sh prompt, docs — CAFE24_URL must be https://<domain>/move_detect (subdir mount). Empty/typo/ missing-subdir is 100% silent. Fix: examples show the subdir; installer validates. DONE — env.example + installer prompt now show/require the /move_detect subdir.
• P1-3 [H] edge/config.py:40 + edge/daemon.py — empty CAFE24_URL/DEVICE_SECRET defaults let the daemon run green while every upload fails and the queue grows forever. Fix: fail loud at startup if either is blank. DONE — require_upload_config(cfg) raises at daemon startup; test_config.py locks it.
• P1-4 [H] edge/daemon.py:23 — run_loop swallows every per-frame/per-camera exception with no log and no degraded-monitoring signal → a permanently broken pipeline looks green. Fix: rate-limited logging.exception + consecutive-error counter. DONE — per-camera + periodic error streaks, logged 1st + every 300th, names the camera; test_daemon.py locks the rate-limit.
• P1-5 [H] edge/daemon.py:33 — heartbeat hardcodes fps=0.0 and counts ticks where source.read() returned nothing, so the cloud cannot tell a dead device from a live one. Fix: real fps + per-camera frame-age/health in the heartbeat body. DONE — heartbeat now sends measured fps + cameras_total/cameras_erroring/errors; test_daemon.py locks fps math + failing-camera flag.
• P1-6 [H] edge/adapters/uvc_source.py:12 — a camera that stops delivering frames is never detected or reopened; monitoring dies silently. Fix: fail loud on open failure; emit device_fault/monitoring_degraded when a camera goes stale. DONE — open-failure raises (build_runtimes logs+skips); read() releases+reopens after a streak; heartbeat's cameras_erroring (P1-5) reports the fault. test_uvc_source.py locks it.
• P1-7 [M] edge/queue.py — offline sqlite queue has no size cap/TTL; an outage (or a permanent misconfig) fills the SD card, then new events drop silently. Fix: bounded queue (row/byte budget), log dropped-oldest count. DONE — max_rows (default 2000) evicts oldest on enqueue; test_queue.py locks it.
• P1-8 [H] edge/queue.py:52 — a permanently-rejected event (e.g. 400) is retried forever at the head, blocking the whole queue. Fix: drop/quarantine after N failures. DONE — attempts column; a row is dropped after max_send_attempts (default 20) so a poison head unwedges the queue; test locks the drain-past-poison behavior.
• P1-9 [M] edge/alert.py:43 — a POST that succeeds server-side but times out client-side is re-queued and re-sent; no dedup key → duplicate alerts. Fix: stable client-generated event_id in the payload; cloud dedups on it. DEFERRED to the cloud-ingest batch (needs a schema column + IngestController dedup); sequenced with Phase 4 / P4-7.
• P1-10 [M] edge/daemon.py:134 — TARGET_FPS=0/non-numeric → ZeroDivision/ValueError at every start → infinite systemd restart loop. Fix: validate, default sanely. DONE — frame_interval_from_env validates; test_config.py locks it.
• P1-11 [L] edge/daemon.py:120 — QUEUE_DB defaults to relative queue.db, unwritable under the hardened unit (ProtectSystem=strict) → crash loop when env omitted. Fix: absolute default under the state dir. DONE — queue_db_path defaults to /var/lib/move-detect/queue.db; test_config.py locks it.

Phase 2 — Core safety correctness (fall / zone / tracking)

• P2-1 [B] edge/zones.py:19 ↔ cloud/public/assets/zone-draw.js:196 — zones are saved in 960×540 canvas pixels but the edge compares against camera-native pixels; every zone is silently misplaced. Fix: normalized 0..1 polygon contract on both sides. DONE — dashboard stores/loads 0..1 (zone-draw.js), edge normalizes the foot by frame size (zone.py → engine.process → run_once threads frame_wh); Polygon::validate is range-agnostic so PHP stores it opaquely. test_zone.py locks the normalized contract.
• P2-2 [B] edge/engine.py:72 — a pinch (협착) zone falls through to ZONE_WARNING; the PINCH event + HIGH severity are never emitted. Fix: map pinch→PINCH, restricted→ZONE_RESTRICTED, else WARNING. DONE — dict map pinch→PINCH/restricted→ZONE_RESTRICTED; test_engine.py locks PINCH+HIGH.
• P2-3 [H] edge/detectors/fall.py:65 — a per-frame keypoint-confidence gate silently disables fall, no_motion AND ghost for an occluded/low-confidence fallen person — exactly when someone is on the floor. Fix: use bbox cues when keypoints are low-conf. DONE — bbox cues (aspect/height-collapse) always run; keypoint cues gated by kp_ok; test_fall.py locks both the low-conf detection and the no-false-positive-standing case.
• P2-4 [H] edge/detectors/ghost.py:38 — a ghost candidate is cancelled when ANY person (a colleague) passes near the loss point. Fix: only the plausibly-same track cancels it. DONE — candidate snapshots the active track ids at loss time; only a NEW track (not a known bystander) near the loss point cancels. test_ghost.py locks the bystander case.
• P2-5 [H] edge/geometry.py:66 — stillness compares raw per-frame displacement to a fixed threshold with no dt normalization → immobility/no_motion flips with FPS. Fix: normalize by elapsed time. DONE — track_displacement divides by dt (per-second speed); test_geometry.py locks FPS-invariance. NOTE: motion_thr is now per-second and needs on-device re-tuning.
• P2-6 [M] edge/tracking.py:50 — greedy IoU matching swaps IDs when workers cross, transferring FALLEN state + frozen baseline to the wrong person. Fix: gate matches; reset per-track safety state on a low-confidence match.
• P2-7 [M] edge/detectors/fall.py:92 — a single prone-looking frame sets FALLING and arms a CRITICAL ghost if the person then leaves. Fix: require sustained prone.
• P2-8 [M] edge/app.py:30 — detection dropouts keep a track 'active' with a frozen frame; time-based timers accrue on stale data. Fix: treat a stale track as no-data.
• P2-9 [M] edge/detectors/zone.py:45 — foot point averages both ankles with no confidence check; a hallucinated ankle at (0,0) drags the foot into/out of a zone. Fix: confidence-gate the ankles, fall back to bbox-bottom-center.
• P2-10 [M] edge/adapters/movenet_pose.py:34 — the CPU MoveNet fallback is single-person; with 2+ workers all but one are invisible to every detector, no warning. Fix: warn loudly that MoveNet fallback is single-person (Hailo is multi-person).
• P2-11 [L] edge/geometry.py:39 — head_below_hips uses the NOSE keypoint regardless of confidence. Fix: confidence-gate.

Phase 3 — Privacy / PIPA (delivery compliance)

• P3-1 [H] edge/app.py:18 — FaceBlurrer blurs a fixed ~40×40px patch regardless of face size; close faces stay identifiable. Fix: size the blur box from the person bbox.
• P3-2 [H] cloud/src/Ingest/IngestController.php:68 — worker snapshots are stored forever; no retention/purge anywhere. PIPA violation. Fix: snapshot_retention_days config + a token-guarded purge route + SnapshotRepository::purgeOlderThan.
• P3-2b [M] cloud/src/Dashboard/EventListController.php:17 — site_scope is stored in the session but never enforced; any authenticated user sees every device's worker snapshots. Fix: scope event/snapshot queries by the session's site_scope.
• P3-3 [H] edge/tools/fetch_movenet.py:12 — downloads the ONNX from a mutable ref with no checksum; spec mandates SHA256. Fix: pin URL to a commit + sha256+size, mirror fetch_hailo_hef.py.

Phase 4 — Cloud hardening (shared hosting)

• P4-1 [H] cloud/public/index.php:106 — no top-level try/catch; a PDOException becomes a raw 500 that leaks DSN/db_user if display_errors is on (cafe24 often ships On). Fix: global try/catch → generic 500 + error_log; ini_set('display_errors','0'); ship .user.ini.
• P4-2 [H] cloud/src/Api/ConfigController.php:22, HeartbeatController.php — no rate limiting (unlike /api/events). Fix: per-IP + per-device limiter, fail-open on storage error.
• P4-3 [M] cloud/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoNonceRepository.php:30 — nonces + rate_limits grow without bound; no cron on cafe24. Fix: opportunistic in-request reap of expired rows.
• P4-4 [M] cloud/src/Http/Router.php:18 — route params are never rawurldecoded; a camera_id with a space/+/Korean saves zones but never loads them. Fix: decode captured params.
• P4-5 [M] cloud/src/Dashboard/EventListController.php:17 — event list hard-capped at newest 100, no pagination/date filter; older events unreachable. Fix: cursor pagination.
• P4-6 [M] cloud/src/Repository/Pdo/PdoZoneRepository.php:86 — editing a zone with a changed device_id/camera_id throws an uncaught RuntimeException → 500. Fix: 400 with a clear error.
• P4-7 [L] cloud/src/Ingest/IngestController.php:64 — snapshot write failure is swallowed (201 with evidence lost); file-write/DB-insert non-atomic → orphan JPEGs. Fix: order write→insert, log failures, reconcile orphans.
• P4-8 [L] cloud/src/Auth/AuthController.php:31 — login form emits a CSRF token that login never checks. Fix: verify it (or drop it).
• P4-9 [L] cloud/src/Auth/AuthController.php:71 — logout calls regenerate() after session_destroy() → E_WARNING, old cookie not replaced. Fix: reorder.
• P4-10 [L] cloud/src/Ingest/EventValidator.php:26 — no string length caps → an overlong id becomes a MySQL 'Data too long' 500 retry loop instead of a 400. Fix: cap lengths in the validator.
• P4-11 [L] cloud/src/Http/Request.php:45 — pathFor routes any //... URI to / (parse_url scheme-relative). Fix: collapse/normalize.

Phase 5 — Install / bundle / supply-chain

• P5-1 [B] deploy/bundle/install_offline.sh:79 — the OFFLINE installer has no backend-usability gate (setup_online's [6/8] does): it installs POSE_BACKEND=movenet verbatim even when the bundle carries no working backend. Fix: mirror the [6/8] probe. DONE — [5/6] probes HEF+hailo_platform / onnx+onnxruntime, reconciles POSE_BACKEND in the installed env, hard-fails if neither. test_deploy_artifacts.py locks the gate.
• P5-2 [H] deploy/bundle/build_offline_bundle.sh:55 — a native build on x86 produces an aarch64-named tarball full of x86_64 wheels. Fix: assert uname -m == TARGET_ARCH.
• P5-3 [M] deploy/bundle/build_offline_bundle.sh:65 — the air-gapped bundle never carries the Hailo HEF, so offline Hailo install is impossible. Fix: stage the HEF (via fetch_hailo_hef --arch) into the bundle.
• P5-4 [M] deploy/bundle/build_offline_bundle.sh:28 — pip deps unpinned, no digests, MANIFEST has no hashes, bundle unsigned; spec requires SHA256/GPG + SBOM. Fix: pin + hash + manifest digests.
• P5-5 [H] deploy/systemd/move-detect-edge.service:46 OFF-HW — DeviceAllow omits /dev/media* and /dev/dma_heap; picamera2/libcamera on Pi 5 needs them, so the CSI camera is denied by the unit's own policy. Fix: add the device classes; verify on hardware.
• P5-6 [L] cloud/deploy/build_cafe24_package.sh — dev cache dirs (.impeccable/, .ruff_cache/) can ship inside the web-served package. Fix: exclude.

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Progress log

(updated as each item lands — newest first)

• 2026-07-17 — 17 items landed, all with tests, full suite green. ALL 4 BLOCKERS cleared (P1-2, P2-1, P2-2, P5-1) + all Phase-1 silent-failure (P1-1,3,4,5,6,7,8,10,11) + Phase-2 HIGH correctness (P2-3,4,5). Remaining: P1-9 (deferred to cloud batch), P2-6..11 (mostly threshold tuning — needs on-device validation), Phase 3 (privacy — P3-2 retention needs a policy decision: how many days), Phase 4 (cloud hardening, 11 items — mostly clear), Phase 5 (P5-2..6). Nothing committed yet.