move_detect/cloud/docs/cloud-deploy.md
유창욱 9aa7f44ea4 feat(cloud): PDO repositories + schema + Cafe24 deploy doc
Implements Task 16 (final, P1-B): App\Db\Database::connect(Config): PDO
factory and the 9 App\Repository\Pdo\Pdo*Repository classes backing the
repository interfaces consumed by controllers since T1-T15, all-prepared
statements, plus cloud/schema.sql (MySQL 8 DDL) and cloud/docs/cloud-deploy.md.

Security hardening incorporated per accumulated task reviews:
- PdoNonceRepository: nonces.nonce is PK; duplicate remember() throws instead
  of racing seen() (closes T7 TOCTOU).
- PdoRateLimiterRepository::hit(): atomic INSERT ... ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE
  upsert on (rate_key, window_start), no read-modify-write race.
- PdoSnapshotRepository::pathByUuid(): validates 32-hex uuid before building
  any filesystem path (closes T12 path-traversal risk).
- PdoZoneRepository::save(): update path is ownership-scoped by
  (zone_id, device_id, camera_id); throws on mismatch instead of silently
  overwriting an unrelated zone (closes T13 cross-tenant overwrite risk).
- Database::connect(): ERRMODE_EXCEPTION, EMULATE_PREPARES=false, FETCH_ASSOC.

cloud/tests/PdoIntegrationTest.php round-trips Nonce/Event/Zone against a
real sqlite :memory: DB, gated via markTestSkipped when pdo_sqlite is
unavailable (this host has pdo_mysql only, no pdo_sqlite) -- suite stays
green with 4 tests skipped.

Full suite: 59 tests, 114 assertions, 4 skipped, 0 failures, 0
warnings/deprecations. php -l passes on all new files and on
cloud/public/index.php (T15), which references all new FQCNs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ne4rU4FToTLHcBUMUvUnT1
2026-07-12 01:58:05 +09:00

12 KiB

Cafe24 Cloud Deploy Guide (P1-B)

This document covers deploying the cloud/ PHP application (ingest API + dashboard) to a Cafe24 shared/managed PHP hosting plan. The application has zero runtime Composer dependencies (PHPUnit is dev-only) and speaks to MySQL exclusively through PDO with prepared statements — there is nothing to composer install on the production host.

1. Directory layout on the server

Only cloud/public/ may be reachable from the web. Everything else must sit outside the web root (one level up, or wherever your Cafe24 plan's "web root" / "html" folder is), or be blocked by hosting-level access rules if your plan cannot place files outside the web root at all.

/home/<account>/                <- NOT web-reachable
├── src/                        <- App\ classes (App\Db, App\Repository\Pdo, ...)
├── storage/
│   └── snapshots/               <- re-encoded JPEGs; must be writable by the PHP process
├── config.php                  <- copied from config.example.php, secrets filled in (see §3)
├── schema.sql                  <- only needed transiently for the phpMyAdmin import (§4);
│                                    delete it from the server afterwards
└── public/                     <- web root ("html" folder in Cafe24's control panel)
    ├── index.php
    ├── .htaccess
    └── assets/

cloud/public/index.php resolves its dependencies as __DIR__ . '/../config.php', __DIR__ . '/../src/View/...', etc. — so src/, config.php, and storage/ must be exactly one directory above public/, matching the layout above.

Do not upload vendor/. It contains only phpunit and its dev dependencies (see cloud/composer.json — require-dev only, require has no packages beyond the php version constraint). Shipping it would put a large, unused, occasionally-vulnerable dependency tree on a production box for no benefit; leave it off the transfer entirely.

If your Cafe24 plan cannot place folders outside the web root, upload src/, storage/, and config.php into public/ but add explicit deny rules for them in public/.htaccess (e.g. RewriteRule ^(src|storage)/ - [F] and RewriteRule ^config\.php$ - [F], placed before the existing rewrite-to-index rule) — placing them outside the web root is strongly preferred and should be the default choice.

2. Host prerequisites — verify before importing data

Check these on the actual Cafe24 PHP build (a phpinfo() page or php -m / php -v over SSH if available) — do not assume, since PHP builds vary by hosting plan:

  • PHP version matches cloud/composer.json's "php": ">=8.2" (the app is written and tested against PHP 8.5; anything ≥ 8.2 should run it, but confirm the exact version Cafe24 provisions for your plan).
  • pdo_mysql extension is enabled (PDO::getAvailableDrivers() must include mysql).
  • gd extension is enabled — App\Ingest\ImageProcessor::reencode() calls imagecreatefromstring() / imagejpeg() to re-encode uploaded snapshots; without gd, every event with a snapshot silently drops that snapshot (reencode() returns ['ok' => false] and the caller just continues).
  • openssl extension is enabled — required for random_bytes()'s CSPRNG backing and TLS to the DB/clients on most builds; effectively always present, but confirm.
  • PASSWORD_ARGON2ID support (the argon2 build flag on PHP's password_hash()). Run: php <?php var_dump(defined('PASSWORD_ARGON2ID'), in_array('argon2i', password_algos())); This is the one that most commonly bites on shared hosting — some PHP builds ship without libargon2, in which case PASSWORD_ARGON2ID is undefined and both App\Security\Password::hash() (account creation) and App\Security\Password::verify() (login, called on every login attempt including unknown-username ones, per AuthController::DUMMY_HASH) fatal immediately — the dashboard login is completely broken until this is fixed. If your plan lacks it, escalate with Cafe24 support to switch to a PHP build with Argon2, or migrate the hashing scheme (out of scope for this doc — do not silently downgrade to a weaker algorithm).
  • HTTPS is available for the domain/subdomain you're deploying to (Cafe24 free or custom TLS certificate) — see §7.

3. config.php

Copy the example and fill in real values — never commit config.php (already covered by cloud/.gitignore):

cp config.example.php config.php

Edit config.php (outside the web root, per §1):

<?php
return [
    'db_dsn'  => 'mysql:host=localhost;dbname=<your_db_name>;charset=utf8mb4',
    'db_user' => '<cafe24_mysql_user>',
    'db_pass' => '<cafe24_mysql_password>',
    'snapshot_dir' => __DIR__ . '/storage/snapshots',
    'nonce_ttl' => 86400,
    'timestamp_window' => 300,
    'rate_limit_per_min' => 60,
];

Get the DB host/user/password/database name from the Cafe24 hosting control panel's MySQL section. Do not reuse the DB password anywhere else, and do not paste it into chat, tickets, or version control.

4. Import the schema

cloud/schema.sql contains the full MySQL 8.0+ DDL (users, devices, cameras, zones, events, event_snapshots, thresholds, nonces, rate_limits, audit_log).

  1. Open phpMyAdmin from the Cafe24 control panel, select the database created for this app.
  2. Import tab → choose file → upload schema.sql → Go.
  3. Confirm all 10 tables were created (phpMyAdmin's table list on the left, or SHOW TABLES; in the SQL tab).
  4. Delete schema.sql from the server once the import succeeds — it doesn't need to live on the host afterwards, and leaving DDL lying around outside the web root is unnecessary attack surface for no benefit.

If your Cafe24 MySQL version predates 8.0.16, the CHECK (...) constraints in the DDL (on role, event_type, severity, level) will be parsed but silently not enforced — harmless, since the application already whitelists these values before every insert (App\Ingest\EventValidator, App\Auth\Rbac, App\Dashboard\ZoneConfigController::LEVELS). Everything else in the schema (tables, keys, indexes, JSON columns) requires only MySQL 5.7+.

5. Storage directory

Create the snapshot directory and make it writable by the PHP process (the account PHP-FPM or mod_php runs as on your Cafe24 plan — typically your hosting account's own user, so a plain chmod from your account is usually sufficient; confirm via a test upload):

mkdir -p storage/snapshots
chmod 750 storage/snapshots

storage/snapshots/ must sit outside the web root (§1) — snapshots are only ever served through the authenticated GET /snap/{uuid} route (App\Dashboard\SnapshotProxy), never as static files. If storage/ were reachable directly under public/, every snapshot would be an unauthenticated static download by UUID.

6. Per-device secrets

There is no self-registration flow for edge devices in P1-B — an admin provisions each devices row (and its HMAC secret) directly, before that device is allowed to sync config/heartbeat or ingest events (App\Repository\Pdo\PdoDeviceRepository::secretFor() is the single gate all three ingest-side HMAC checks depend on).

Generate a secret and insert the device row via phpMyAdmin's SQL tab (or CLI, if available):

php -r "echo bin2hex(random_bytes(32)), \"\n\";"
INSERT INTO devices (device_id, name, secret, config_version)
VALUES ('pi-01', 'Line 3 — Fall Cam', '<paste the generated secret here>', 1);

Deliver the secret to the device provisioning process out-of-band (not email/chat) and configure it as the device's HMAC signing key for X-Signature on /api/events, /api/heartbeat, and /api/config. Rotate a compromised secret by UPDATE devices SET secret = ? WHERE device_id = ? with a freshly generated value — the old value stops working immediately since secretFor() always reads the current row.

7. First admin account

App\Repository\UserRepository has no create() method in P1-B (accounts aren't created through the app UI) — create the first admin directly via phpMyAdmin, using a CLI snippet to generate the Argon2id hash so the plaintext password never touches the SQL you paste into phpMyAdmin's history:

php -r "echo password_hash('CHANGE-ME-to-a-real-passphrase', PASSWORD_ARGON2ID), \"\n\";"

(If this errors with an undefined-constant fatal, your PHP build lacks Argon2 — go back to §2 before continuing; do not fall back to PASSWORD_DEFAULT/bcrypt without updating App\Security\Password::hash()/verify() to match, since they're hardcoded to PASSWORD_ARGON2ID.)

INSERT INTO users (username, password_hash, role, site_scope, failed_attempts, locked_until)
VALUES ('admin', '<paste the argon2id hash here>', 'admin', NULL, 0, 0);

Log in at /login, then change the password by re-running the CLI snippet with a new passphrase and updating the row (there's no self-service "change password" flow in P1-B).

8. HTTPS / HSTS

The dashboard sets cookie_secure => true on its session cookie (App\Auth\Session::PhpSessionStore) — the session cookie will not be sent by the browser over plain HTTP at all, so the dashboard is non-functional without HTTPS; this isn't optional hardening, it's a hard requirement for login to work.

  • Enable Cafe24's free TLS certificate (or upload your own) for the domain.
  • Force HTTP → HTTPS redirect (Cafe24 control panel setting, or add a rewrite rule in public/.htaccess above the existing rewrite-to-index rule).
  • Add HSTS via public/.htaccess: apache Header always set Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains" (requires mod_headers; most Cafe24 Apache plans have it enabled by default — verify the header actually appears on a response before relying on it).
  • Set session.cookie_secure = 1 at the PHP level too if your Cafe24 plan lets you set php.ini/.user.ini overrides, as defense-in-depth alongside the explicit cookie_secure option already passed in code.

9. Error display (do not leak stack traces)

Set in php.ini or a .user.ini in public/ (whichever your Cafe24 plan supports):

display_errors = Off
log_errors = On
error_log = /home/<account>/logs/php_errors.log   ; outside the web root

Several Pdo*Repository methods intentionally throw on invariant violations that should never happen in normal operation (e.g. PdoZoneRepository::save() throws RuntimeException if a caller supplies a zone_id that doesn't belong to the given device_id/camera_id, to prevent one device's zones being silently overwritten by another's). With display_errors off, an uncaught exception like that surfaces to the client as a bare 500 with no body/trace, which is the intended behavior — turning display_errors on in production would leak file paths and internal structure instead.

10. Post-deploy smoke check

  • GET /login renders over HTTPS.
  • Log in with the admin account from §7; dashboard (/) loads and polls /api/events.
  • POST /api/heartbeat from a real (or curl-simulated, correctly-signed) device using the secret from §6 returns 200 {"ok":true}.
  • A snapshot uploaded via /api/events is retrievable at /snap/{uuid} only while logged in, and 404s for a made-up UUID.
  • storage/snapshots/, src/, config.php, and schema.sql (if not yet deleted per §4) are not reachable over HTTP — e.g. curl -I https://<domain>/../config.php and curl -I https://<domain>/storage/snapshots/ should not return the file/listing.